1984 PLP 1453 (CLC)

(a) West Pakistan Wheat, Wheat‑Atta, Maize, Rice and Sugar Distribution Order (4 of 1967)‑ ‑‑ S. 6 (1x3)‑Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981), Art. 9 Order of competent Authority in revision that "I think forfeiture of whole of the cash security deposited by depot‑holders, will meet the ends of justice"‑Expression "may for reasons to be recorded in writing, pass an order suspending or cancelling an authorization and direct that security deposited or any part thereof may be forfeit ed to Government" in S. 6 (l)‑Contention that cancellation of authorisation by competent authority in revision under S. 6 (1) and direction for forfeiture of security should go together and only forfeiture could not be ordered by competent authority when allega tion proved‑Held, contention was without force as S. 6 (3) authorises competent Authority to pass any order "as it may think fit"‑Revisional Authority competent to modify order or reduce liability‑Word "and" where conjunctive or disjunctive depends on the context‑Word "and" may be relative as well as copulative Words have meaning in context and the purpose for which emp loyed‑Collection of letters put together have no life of their own but it is only when user employs them to convey an idea to be under stood by another in the given context.‑[Words and phrases]. Stoud's Judicial Dictionary, 2nd Edn., p. 82 ; R. V. Brixton Prison Governor, ex parte Bidwell (1937) 1 K B 305 ; R. v. Newbould (1962) 2 Q B 102 ; Muhammad Hussain v. The Additional District Judge, Lahore and others P L D 1966 Lah. 128 and L. H. Sugar Factory Pilibhit v. Moti A I R 1941 All. 243, ref. (b) Interpretution of statutes‑ ‑‑ Word and phrases in a statute and word "and" may be relative as well as copulative‑‑Word "and" when can be converted into disjunc tive "or" ‑Words have meaning in the context and purpose for which employed‑Collection of letters put together have no life of their own but it was only when user employs words to convey an idea to be understood by another in given context‑Courts interpret words as usually understood‑‑‑Courts adhere to what is stated to be strict literal interpretation‑Such adherence when found destructive of the object of enactment or diminitive of authority conferred by statute or otherwise leads to anomalies and absurdities, it is fair to assume that Legislature did not use words in that sense and in such a case conversion of a word "and" into disjunctive "or" is per missible. Stoud's Judicial Dictionary, 2nd Edn., p. 82 ; R. V. Brixton Prison Governsr, ex parte Bidwell (1937) 1 K B 305 ; R. v. Newbould (1962) 2 Q. B. 102 ; Muhammad Hussain v. The Additional District Judge, Lahore and others P L D 1966 Lah. 128 and L. H. Sughar Factory, Pilibhit v. Moti A I R 1941 All. 243, ref. (c) Provisional Constitution (Order 1 of 1981)‑ ‑‑Art. 9‑Principal and agent‑Locus standi to invoke constitutional jurisdiction‑For default of agent, principal may take 'any action more or less‑Third party has no locus standi to say that principal should have punished his agent more severely.‑[Principal and agent]. Mehar Ghulam Ali Mobashar for the Petitioner. Date of the bearing : 27th March, 1984. The petitioner filed an application against the two depot‑holders, res pondents Nos. 4 and

5. After enquiry the District ‑ ' Controller, Sargodha, vide order, dated 9th May, 1983 cancelled their authoriza tion. Their appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Director Food, Sargodha Region, Sargodha vide order, dated 22nd May, 1983. On their revision, the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Food Department, Lahore vide order, dated 11th January, 1984 passed the following order :‑ I feel that the extreme penalty of cancellation of depot authorization/ nomination was not called for in the circumstances of the case, especially when the presence of party faction as pointed out in the Inquiry Report of the Assistant Commissioner cannot be ruled out. I think forfeiture of whole of the cash security deposited by the depot‑holders, will meet the ends of justice. I order accordingly." This is challenged by the petitioner through the afore‑titled Constitu tional petition.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under the West' Pakistan Wheat, Wheat‑Atta, Maize, Rice and Sugar Distribution Order, 1967 vide section 6 (I) it is provided that the relevant officers "may for reasons to be recorded in writing, pass an order suspending or cancelling an authorization and direct that the security deposited or any part thereof may be forfeited to Government." Therefore, he contends, cancellation of authorization and direction for forfeiture of security should go together Only forfeiture could not have been ordered by the Secretary as the allegations had been proved.

3. The contention is without force. The subsection (3) of the same section quoted above, the Government is authorised to pass any order "as it may think fit". It is open to a revisional authority to modify an order or, reduce the liability. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the officers "may pass an order suspending or cancelling the authori zation and direct that the security deposited or any part thereof may be forfeited to the Government", envisages that the suspension or cancellation of an authorisation must be there if security is forfeited because the former is joined by the word "and" with the latter. The argument is usual that word "and" is conjunctive and not disjunctive. But it is not always so. It depends on the context. It is pointed out in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 2nd Edition p. 82 that "where a lessee underlet, with a proviso, on breach of covenant, enabling him and his lessor to re‑enter; held that he or his lessor might re‑enter, on breach,‑. `And' may be relative as well as copulative." Words have meaning in the context and the purpose for which they are employed. Collection of letters put together have no life of their own. It is only when the user employs them to convey an idea be understood by another in the given context. Courts interpret words as usually understood. They adhere to what is stated to be strict literal interpretation. But if such adherence is destructive of the object of the enactment or diminitive of the authority conferred by the statute or other wise leads to anomalies and absurdities, it is fair to assume that the legislature did not use the words in that sense and in such a case the con version of "and" into disjunctive "or" is permissible. Under the Disabled Soldiers Act, 1801 where property was to be employed for the maintenance of "sick and maimed soldiers" it was held in R. Y. Brixton Prison Gover nor, ex parte Bidwell ((1937) 1 K B 305) that the property could be employed for either sick or maimed soldiers and it was not necessary that they should be both `sick and maimed' because of use of word and" between sick and maimed. Similarly in R. V. Newbould ((1962) 2 K B 102) it was held that "the expression" local and public authorities in section 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 did not "mean authorities which are both local and public (but) authorties which are either local or public". In the case of Muhammad Hussain v. The Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (P L D 1966 Lah. 128) a question arose whether an appeal under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 wherein it was provided that an appeal would lie "if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds Rs. 300", was competent if the amount did not comprise of both wages and compensation. It was held by a learned Division Bench in which the judgment was deli vered by a very acute learned Judge Mr. Justice Muhammad Gul, if I may say so with great respect, that the word land' in between wages and compensation did not mean that both together must exceed the limit of Rs.

300. If either was above that limit, the appeal would be competent. The word "and" was interpreted to mean "or". In a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of L. H. Sugar Factory Pilibhit v. Moti (A I R 1941 All. 243 ) where section 40 of Agriculturists Relief Act provided that "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Stamp Act 11 of 1899 and the rules made under the Registration Act XVI of 1908 the stamp duty and the registration and the copying fees on bonds, value or amount not exceeding Rs. 3,000 executed by an agriculturist and registered under Registration Act shall be as laid down in Sch. 5", the question involved was whether the bond should be such as has been "executed by an agriculturist and regis tered under the Registration Act" for the applicability of the proviso or simply executed by an agriculturist or registered under the Registration Act. The words "and" in between "executed by an agriculturist "and" registered under the Registration Act", was interpreted to mean "or" in the context of the provision. In the case in hand, it has to be noticed that after setting aside the cancelletion of the authorization, the Secretary had directed the forfeiture of the security deposited by the respondents. It was the latter who were affected. They do not complain. The petitioner has no right. The matter was between the authorized agent and the principal. For the default of the agent, the principal may take any action more or less. Third party has no locus standi to say that the principal should have punished his agent more severely.

4. In view of what has been stated above, there is no merit or force in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. M. Z. M. Petition dismissed.