P L D 1982 Lahore 690 (PLP)

This writ petition calls in question the validity of the judgment, dated 21‑5‑1973, of the learned District Judge, Gujranwala.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the writ petition may be briefly stated. Respondent No. 2 filed a suit on 14‑6‑1968 for possession in respect of the disputed land on the basis of superior right of pre emption. During the pendency of the suit, the contesting respondent made an application under Order VI, rule 17, Cr. P. C. for the amendment of the plaint so as to correct the date of sale deed, area of the land and khatoni as well as khasra numbers which, according to him, were incorrectly described due to clerical error. It was stated in the application that the correct date of the sale deed was 14‑6‑1967 instead of 14‑6‑1968. Likewise, the area of the land was 12 kanals and 16 marlas and not 11 kanals and 16 marlas and the correct khatoni numbers were 1481‑1482 and khasra numbers were 708 min and 708 min. The learned trial Judge, by his order dated 24‑1‑1972, dismissed the application on the ground that the right of pre‑emption being a predatory right and no discretion could be exercised in favour of respon dent No. 2 who had been negligent at the time of institution of the suit. Respondent No. 2, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order, filed a revi sion petition which was accepted by the learned District Judge, vide his judgment dated 21‑5‑1973. The learned District Judge repelled the conten tion of the petitioners that the amendment would change the complexion of the whole case and as such would effect the right of possession which had accrued to the petitioners. It was further observed that the contesting respondent should not have been penalised for the negligence of his counsel and that due to the partial claim out of the total khasras including those on which the factory has been built, the learned counsel for the respondent was misled to distinguish between the two sets of khasras and khatonis while drafting the plaint. The learned District Judge further observed that the counsel for the respondent was misled as to the identification of the climbable and non‑claimable properties mentioned in the deed of sale and the mistakes sought to be corrected were purely clerical in nature.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned trial Court, in the exercise of its discretion, refused to allow the amendment. The order of the trial Court was based on sound judicial principles and, therefore, the same was not open to challenge in revision, in that, it neither suffered from excess of jurisdiction nor failure to exercise jurisdiction nor exercising jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity within the ambit of section 115, C. P. C. The precise contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that neither the conditions precedent for invoking revisional jurisdiction had been satisfied nor the learned District Judge specifically adverted to this question as to whether a case was made out for exercising the revisional jurisdiction and, therefore, the impugned judgment is without lawful authority. Reliance is placed on Hussain Bakhsh v. Additional District Judge, Khairpur and 8 others PLD 1979 Kar.

475. In the precedent case it was held that a District Judge, while hearing the revision petition under section 115, C. P. C., does not enjoy the same powers as enjoyed by an appellate Court under section 107, C. P. C., and that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised without adverting to the question as to whether the trial Court acted in excess of jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction which would not be in accordance with law. The contention is devoid of any force. The learned trial Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdic tion in refusing to allow the amendment on the erroneous assumption that the mistake sought to be corrected would change the complexion of the suit. The learned District Judge, after perusal of the plaint and the document on record, held that the amendment sought for would not involve the setting up of a new case or altering the real matter in controversy between the parties. I am also in agreement with this finding. The amendments were intended to rectify the clerical errors which ought to have been allowed by the learned trial Judge, in conformity with the well‑established rule that the powers of amendment are wide and should always be liberally exercised to secure the proper administration of justice. This being so, the learned trial Court clearly acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing to allow the amendment. The order of the trial Court was, therefore, op.‑n to interference in the revisional jurisdiction of the learned District Judge under section 115, C. P. C. The mere fact that no specific mention was made in the impugned order to the condition specified in section 115, C. P. C., would not ipso facto render it as without lawful authority. Hussain Bakhsh's case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable and is not attracted to the facts of the present case.

4. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order refusing to allow the amendment of pleadings is not open to revision, in that, it was not a case decided within the meaning of section 115, C. P. C. This contention has no force in view of the authoritative pro nouncement of the Supreme Court in Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Qaisar Ali Khan and 2 others (1) where it was held that the order made by the trial Court' rejecting the application for amendment of the pleadings amounts to a case decided and amenable to correction in exercise of revisional powers, if falling within the ambit of any clause of section 115, C. P. C.

5. It is next contended that the revision petition was barred by time, in that, the same was filed after expiry of 90 days no application was made for extension of time. The contention is devoid of any force. No period of limitation is prescribed for the presentation of revision petition. Reference may be made to Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain & Fodder Agencies (2).

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the petition, in any case, suffers from gross laches and although no time limit is prescribed for entertaining a revision petition, good cause must be shown, if the petition is presented after expiry of 90 days, in view of the dictum of Supreme Court in Manager Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (3). The contention is devoid of any force. No objection as to laches in filing the revision petition was raised before the learned District Judge This being so, the petitioner is estopped to raise this question for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The authority cited b the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no avail. Reference may b made to the following dictum of the Supreme Court in the above‑quote authority . . Since the Limitation Act is not applicable to a revision, the Court was under no obligation to consider the question of limitation, moreso when the point was never raised by the Caveator before us. It may also be relevantly mentioned in this context that no Rule has been framed by any High Court under its rule‑making powers prescrib ing limitation for revision. It is a well‑known principle of the administration of justice that no litigant should be made to suffer at the hands of the Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in overruling h the objection taken on the ground of limitation." (1)PLD1973SC507 (2)PLD1964SC97 (3) P L D 1975 S C 678

7. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent submits that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order passed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the learned District Judge. There appears to be a great force in his contention. The order passed in revision by the learned District Judge under section 115, C. P. C., has attained finality and no second revision lies against his order in the High Court. This being so, to entertain writ petition against' the revisional order of the District Judge, would tan tamount to circumvent the law., If an order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be directly challenged in the High Court in the revisional jurisdiction the same cannot be permitted to be indirectly assailed in writ jurisdiction, except under very exceptional circumstances. It has bee repeatedly held by the superior Courts of this country that if a Court or tribunal set up under the ordinary law has the jurisdiction to decide a parti cular matter, then the mere fact that the decision is incorrect does not render it as without lawful authority. Reference may be made to Abdur Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and 9 others PLD1981SC

522. In the precedent case it was held that after the enactment of section 4.39 .A. Cr. P. C., which is in pari materia with the provisions of section 115, C. P. C., the jurisdiction of the High Court has been curtailed in order to relieve the High Court of burden of deciding thousand of revisions against the orders of subordinate Courts arid, therefore, filing of petitions for writ against the judgments of final Courts would tantamount to circumventing the law and defeating the intention of the Legislature.

8. In view of the above, I find no force in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed with costs. S. A.H. Petition dismissed.