1984K37 (PLP)

AJMAL MIAN, J.--This Petition is directed against the orders dated 4-10-1982 and dated 8-10-1983 passed by respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 2 res pectively i. e. the Commissioner Sukkur, Division and the Appellate Committee appointed under rule 8(3) of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971, respectively. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition as averred in the petition are that the petitioner is a permanent resident of Sukkur District, Sind having been born at Sukkur on 10-1-1965. It has been averred that the petitioner's father, a doctor by profession is employed with Pakistan Railways and most of the time he remained posted at Rohri except for the period from September, 1968 to 1971. It has also been averred that the petittuner's father has been continuously posted as Medical Officer, Pakistan Railways Hospital since 1972 till the filing of the Petition at Robri. It has also been averred by the petitioner that she completed her primary and secondary school certificate level education from the Railway Girls High School Rohri and passed her Secondary School Examination in 1979 from the Board of Intbrmediate and Secondary Education Hyderabad. After that she passed her Higher Secondary Examination (Intermediate) from Suktcur Board in 198). It has been further averred that the petitioner on the basis of her permanent residence in Sukkur District. Since her birth and her taking education from primary level upto Higher Secondary Education during the period from 1-8-1973 upto 1981 in the Railway Girls High School Rohri and Government Girls College, Sukkur, applied to respondent No. 4 i. e. the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Sukkur for grant of domicile certificate to her and after due inquiry the above certificate was granted to her on 8-10-1981. It has also been averred that after that petitioner applied to respondent No. 4 for grant of Permanent residence certificate for the purpose of admission to educational institution and respondent after due inquiries granted the same. The petitioner's father also obtained domicile certificate on 23-8-1981. It seems that after obtaining the above documents the petitioner applied for admission in the First Year M. B., B. S. course against 19 seats allocated to Sukkur District for girls candidates for section 1981-82. It further seems that a provisional merit list (Annexure J to the Petition) of girls candidates who applied for admission in M. B., B. S. for District Sukkur, Chandka Medical College, Larkana for session 1981-82 was prepared and put on notice board on 10-3-1982 in which the petitioner was listed at Serial No. 17, whereas respondent No. 5 the contesting respondent was listed at Serial No.

26. It further seems that after that a list of girls candidates having been selected in M. B., B. S in Chandka Medical College Larkana for the session 1981-82 was prepared and pasted on the notice board on 25-3-1982, in which the petitioner was listed at Serial No. 16 but the name of respondent No. 5 did not appear. The petitioner was accordingly admitted to Chandka Medical College, whereas according to the averment in the petition respondent No. 5 got admission in B. D. S. course in Liaquat Medical College, Jamshoro for the year 1981-82 session as having failed to compete in the selection of M. B., B. S. Itseems that respondent No. 5 filed an appeal under rule 8 of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) against the petitioner and four other selected girls candidates from the seats of District Sukkur on 29-4-1983 which was opposed by the petitioner and inter alia it was pleaded that the appeal was time-barred. However, respondent No, 3 by his above order dated 4-10-1982 allowed respondent No. 5's above appeal and cancelled the P. R. C. The petitioner being aggrieved by the above order filed Appeal No. 4/1983 before respondent No. 2 which was dismissed by an order dated 8th October, 1983. The petitioner being aggrieved by the above two orders has filed the present petition.

2. In support of the above petition Mr. A. M. Mobeen Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged as follows :- (i) That respondent No. 3 was under obligation to decide the question of limitation which he failed to decide. (ii) That the finding of respondent No. 2 that the appeal was not time. barred on the face of it is based on misreading of evidence. (iii) That respondents Nos. 3 and 2 wrongly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner after the domicile and P. R. C. were issued in favour of the petitioner after due inquiry by respondent No. 4 Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate. (IV) That the petitioner's case was covered under two categories of rule 6 of the Rules and domicile and P. R. C. were correctly issued by respondent No.

4. On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi assisted by Mr. Imdad Ali Awan has urged as follows :- (i) The question of limitation was conceded by the petitioner's counsel before respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the petitioner cannot agitate the same. (ii) That even otherwise the appeal was within time. (iii) That since there is concurrent finding of the two Courts that petitioner was not a permanent resident of Sukkur, in order to qualify her to obtain the P. R. C., the above finding cannot be interfered with by this Court in a writ petition. (iv) That the case of petitioner does not fall under any category of rule 6.

3. Adverting to the question of limitation, it may be observed that though the question of limitation was raised before respondent No. 3 but it was not adjudicated upon. However, respondent No. 2 in its order has dealt with the question of limitation as follows "It is urged that the respondent No. 3 came to know about the grant of the P. R. C. on 25-3-1982 and that she had to file appeal within 30 days from 25-3-1982. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3 stated that they applied for the copies of the P. R. C. on 10-4-1982 and obtained the copies on 22-4-1982. This period has to be excluded while computing period of 30 days. This fact is not disputed by the learned Advocate for the appellant. As such we hold that appeal filed by respondent No. 3 before the learned Commissioner was not time-barred." It has been vehemently urged by Mr. Mobeen Khan that the alleged concession recorded by respondent No. 2 in its order related only to the exclusion of the period spent for obtaining the copies of the order and not any concession that the appeal was within time. It has been further urged by Mr. Mobeen Khan that in any case any alleged concession on the part of the then petitioner's counsel did not absolve respondent No. 2 from deciding the question of limitation. In support of his above submission he has referred to the case of ihsan All and others v. District Judge and others (PLD19615C167) and the case of Government of West Pakistan through the Secretary, P, W. D, (Irrigation Branch), Lahore v. Mian Muhammad Hayat (P L D 1976 SC 202). In the first case the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (the judgment of which was written by Justice Hamoodur Rehman, C. J.) held that whether the plea of limitation was raised or not, it was the duty of the Settlement Court to have noticed the point of limitation and that a waiver of the question of limitation is not permissible even where the period of limitation is prescribed by special law or a local law. In the second case a Full Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court held that any concession on the part of the Advocate-General of the erstwhile West Pakistan as to the interpretation of rule 7 3(a) of the Civil Service Rules (Punjab) does not bind the particular party or the Court and that it was the duty of the Court to place the correct construction. A passage from the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Governmeni of West Pakistan v. Nasir M. Khan (P L D 1965 S C 106) was quoted with approval to the effect that any concession on a point of law made by counsel, could not bind a party he represented. We are inclined to hold that factually there was no admission on the part of the petitioner's counsel that respondent No. 5's above appeal was within time. The only admission which can be inferred from the above-quoted passage from the order of respondent No. 2 is as to the exclusion of the period taken in obtaining the copies of the relevant documents. Even otherwise, the alleged concession on the part of the then learned counsel for the petitioner did not absolve respondent No. 2 from its statutory duty to examine the question of limitation in proper, perspective and to decide the same correctly and not on the basis of any alleged admission in view of the above clear pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case of 1969.

4. This leads us to the question, whether factually the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 was within time. It is an admitted position that the provisional list was prepared and put on notice board on 10th March, 1982. It may be advantageous to reproduce hereinbelow the above provisional list, which reads as follows :- "Provisional Merit List of Girl Candidates Applied for Admission in M. B., B. S. for District Sukkur, Chandka Medical College, Larkana for Session 1981-82: (1) Miss Farhana. (2) Miss Mehrunissa. (3) Miss Najma . (4) Miss Dur-e-Naz. (5) Miss Nasim Akhtar. (6) Miss Rubi Kanyalal. (7) Miss Seema Iqbal. (8) Miss Yasmeen Muhammad Hanif. (9) Miss Shabnam Rubina. (10) Miss Naghama Abdul Latif. (11) Miss Farida Aziz. (12) Miss Badrunissa. (13) Miss Zahida Perveen. (14) Miss Seema Perveen. (15) Miss Shamsunissa. (16) Miss Shamina Nishal. (17) Miss Shama Ehsan. (18) Miss Dure Shahwar. (19) Miss Zeba Zaidi. 120) Miss Sarwar Sultana. (21) Miss Deeba Jaafar. (22) Miss Reeba Janfar. (23) Miss Rafat Perveen. (24) Miss Khairunissa. (25) Miss umtaz azi. (26) Miss Shabnam Gul. (27) Miss Khalida Shaheen. (28) Miss Naseem. (29) Miss (sic). (30) Miss Afshan Sattar." It is evident that the above provisional list was for girls candidates wino applied for admission in M. B., B. S. Chandka Medical College, Larkana for District Sukkur for the session 1981-82. The petitioner's name appeared at Serial No. 17, whereas respondent No. 5's name appeared at Serial No.

26. The final list was prepared on 25-3-1982, in which though the petitioner was selected and was mentioned at Serial No. 16 but the name of respondent No. 5 did not find place in the above final list. Under rule 8 of the Rules as amended by Notifi:ation No. SO(C)/1-86/71 gazetted in the Gazette of Sind, Extraordinary, Part 1V-A dated 11th February, 1982 an appeal against the grant of permanent residence certificate, can be filed by a person within 30 days from the date such grant or refusal comes to his knowledge. Prior to the above amendment in rule 8 the appeal was to be filed within 30 days of the grant of the certificate as contained in the unamended rule

8. It has been vehemently urged by Mr. Mobeen Khan that in the instant case date of knowledge on the part of respondent No. 5 is 10-3-1982 when the above provisional list was prepared and put on the notice board, whereas according to Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi the date of knowledge is 25th March, 1982 when the final list was prepared and was put on the notice board which did not mention the name of respondent No.

5. It has been further urged by Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi that actually respondent No. 5 had no cause of action for filing the appeal before her application was rejected for admission on 25th March, 1982 by the final list and, therefore, the appeal -.as filed within time if the period spent on obtaining copies of the relevant documents is to be excluded and the period is computed from 25th March, 1982 and not from 10th March, 1982. If, I were to reckon the period of limitation from l0 th March, 1982, admittedly the appeal of respondent No. 5 before respondent No. 3 was time-barred. Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi in support of his above contention has referred to the case of Taj Muhammad v. Commissioner, Hyderabad Division and 7 others (1979 C L C 237), the case of Miss Samina Nighat v. P. R. C. Appellate Tribunal. and 3 others (P L D 1983 Kas. 324) and the case of Mist Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others (P L D 1975 S C 624). In. the first case a Division Bench of this Court while construing the unamended rule 8, held, that the above rule is to be construed so as to advance remedy and curtail mischief intended to be remedied and that placing of strict construction on rule 8 by computing period of limitation from the date of certificate and not from the date of knowledge was not legal as the petitioner had no notice of grant of certificate in question to the respondents. In other words, in spite of the fact that in unamended rule 8, 30 days limitation period was provided from the date of issuance of P. R. C., the Division Bench took the view that as the petitioner had no notice of grant of P. R. C., the 30 days were to be reckoned from the date of knowledge and not from the date of grant of the P. R. C. It may be observed that the amendment brought about by the above notification dated 11-2-1982 is fact incorporated the above principle enunciated by the Division Bench in the above Karachi case. In the second case Division Bench of this Court. In which one of us, Ajmal Mian Judge, was a party held that 30 days period for the purpose of limitation under rule 8 is to be computed from the date of knowledge and not from the date of grant of P. R. C. The reliance was placed on the above Division Bench case of Karachi, namely Taj Muhammad v. Commisioner, Hyderabad Division and 7 others. Whereas in the third case a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia while construing Article 91 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, held that under the above Article three years period is to be computed when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. On the basis of the above observation of the Supreme Court, it was vehemently urged by Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi that in the instant case the cause of action accrued or in other words she became entitled to get the P. R. C. in favour of the petitioner cancelled when in the final list on 25th March, 1982, her name was not mentioned. We are inclined to hold that the two Karachi judgments referred to hereinabove relied upon and so also the above Supreme Court judgment have no application to the present case. In the above two Karachi cases the question in issue was, whether 30 days limitation period under rule 8 was to be computed from the date of grant of P. R. C. or from the date of knowledge on the part of the appellant. In both the cases it was held that it is the date of knowledge. In the instant case there is no controversy that 30 days period is to be reckoned from the date of knowledge but the point in issue, is whether the respondent No. 5 had acquired knowledge of issuing of P. R. C. in favour of the petitioner on the date when the provisional list on 10-3-1982 was prepared and put on notice board or it is the final list which would give cause of action. It may be mentioned that rule 8 as amended does not provid 31 days from the date of cause of action but it lays down 30 days from the date of knowledge. We are, therefore, not impressed by the argument of Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi that it is the date of cause of action i. e. the rejection of respondent No. 5's application for admission which would give cause of action and not the date when the provisional list was prepared and put on the notice board. It may be pointed out that under the prospectus the basic requirement inter alia is to file attested copies of the documents mentioned in the prospectus which include a P. R. C. in case a candidate applies from reserved seats of a particular District. The provisional list which was prepared on 10th March, 1982 was exclusively prepared for the reserved seats for District Sukkur for girls candidates. As observed herein above the petitioner's name was mentioned at Serial No. 17 whereas respondent No. 5's name was shown at Serial No.

26. The reserved seats for Sukkur District for the above year were only 19 and, therefore, upon the preparation and putting on the notice board the provisional list, respondent No. 5 had the knowledge of the fact that petitioner had applied on the basis of P. R. C. from Sukkur District. It may be pertinent to quote hereinbelow para. 9 of the facts and para. 5 of the grounds of the petition and replies to the same contained in para. 9 and para. 5 of the replies to the grounds in respondent No. 5's counter affidavit dated 10-12-1983 read as under :- "

9. That the selection committee headed by the respondent No. 6 after verifying the entire documents produced by the girl candidates including the petitioner and the respondent No. 5, published provisional merit list on 10-3-1982 of 30 girl candidates of Sukkur District seeking admission in the first year M. B., B. S. course in the Chandka Medical College, Larkana for the Session 1981-82. Photo copy of the provisional merit list dated 10-3-1982 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure "J". According to that list, the petitioner's name appears at Serial No. 17 while the name of the respondent No. 5 is at Serial No. 26 thereof". "

5. Para. 5 of Grounds of the Petition.-That the respondent No. 2 has also erred in not treating the appeal of the respondent No. 5 before the respondent No. 3 as time-bared. ,It is submitted that the respondent No. 5 has herself admitted in paragraph number 4 of the memo. of appeal (Annexure "K") that the Chairman of the Selection Committee for admission in the M. B., B. S. course had declared list of the candidates and also announced the dates for interviews for selection of candidates on 13th, 14th and 15th March, 1982 ; that her name was at Serial No. 26 of that list and that she had to appear before the Board of interview on 14-3-1982. From her own admission, it is very much clear that she (respondent No. 5) came to know on 10-3-1982 of the provisional list of candidates from Sukkur district which also included the name of the petitioner at Serial No. 17 ; and at the latest before 14-3-1982 when she was required to appear for interview. The respondent No. 5, therefore, having come to know of the provisional list containing the name of the petitioner as a candidate, from Sukkur district, should have filed appeal against the grant of permanent resident certificate to the petitioner within 30 days of her knowledge i. e. before or on 9-4-1982 at the latest. Even excluding the period of 12 days consumed in obtaining copies as alleged by the respondent No. 5, the appeal filed on 29-4-1982 before the respondent No. 3 was still time-barred. The respondents assigned by the respondent No. 5 on the point of limitation are erroneous." "

9. Para. No. 9 of Counter-affidavit relating to facts.-Para. No. 9 of the petition is for the respondent No. 6 to reply. The list dated 10-3-1983 Annexure "J" with the petition is rot being merits lists as alleged in the para. but the list in which the names of the girls candidates has been mentioned who has applied for the selection. However, the said list got the character of the provisional list which cannot be deemed to both final list." "

5. Para. 5 of the Counter-affidavit relating to the grounds.-Para. No. 5 of the grounds of the petition is not admitted in view of the submissions made in Para. No. 4 above. The petitioner has arisen on the dates which are immaterial muchless. Petitioner submits that respondent No. 5 came to know on 10-3-1982 of the provisional list, however, cannot take place of the final list which was announced on 25th March, 1982, which gave the final cause of action for filing the appeal before the Commissioner. The respondent No. 5 in para. 10 at page No. 4 of memo. of appeal before the respondent No. 3 Annexure "J-1", at page No. 9 of the paper book of this petition dated 25-3-1982 cannot be turned as final selection list as still two girls out of quota of Sukkur, are yet to be selected. The respondent No. 5 received a telegram from respondent No. 6 Chandka Medical College, Larkana on 22-: -1982 directing her to appear for an interview on 25-3-1982 at Larkana. Photo copy of the telegram is annexed as Annexure. The other girls namely Miss Khairunnisa also appeared for the interview on 25-3-1982. Both of them were inter viewed by Mr. Abdui Kadir Shaikh, Vice-Principal of Chandka Medical College, and on 5-4-1982 Miss Mumtaz was interviewed as such these two girls namely Miss Khairunisa add Miss Mumtaz were selected subsequent to the publication of the list dated 25-3-1982 Annexure "J-I". This fact has been submitted by the respondent No. 5 in paras. 5 to 7 at page No. 2 of the memo. of appeal before the respondent No. 3 hence ground No. 5 has no bearing and is not valid has submitted hereinabove." From the above-quoted paras, it is evident that it is not the case of6' the respondent No. 3 that she had no knowledge of the provisional list on 10-3-1982 or that she had no knowledge of the fact that the petitioner had applied on the basis of a P. R. C. from the Sukkur District. The case setup by respondent No. 5 is that final cause of action accrued to her` on 25-3-1982, when final list was announced, which did not include her name. I may again observe that under rule 8, an appeal is to be filed within 30 days from the date of knowledge of the issuance of the P. R. C. which is to be impugned in an appeal and not within 30 days from the date of final cause of action. We are inclined to hold that the question, which is the date of knowledge is a question of fact, which will depend on the facts of each case. If the case of respondent No. 5 would have been that she had no knowledge of the above provisional list on 10-3-1982, her case might have been ondifferent footing and the date of provisional list might have not been the date of knowledge. In the instant case even if we were to give a few days of grace from 10-3-1982 respondent No. 5's appeal would still be time-barred. We are, therefore, of the view that respondent No. 3 of the Commissioner failed to consider the question of limitation though he was under obligation to deal with whereas respondent No. 2 has misread and misconstrued the evidence on record on the question of limitation and has also misconstrued rule

8. The appeal of respondent No. 5 on the basis of the above-admitted facts was time-barred and, therefore, respondent No. 2 should have allowed the petitioner's above appeal on the ground of limitation.

5. As regards the merits, it may be observed that respondent No. 31 in his order incorrectly stated that petitioner was not born in Sukkur District. He has also not adverted to the evidence on the basis of which respondent No. 4 had issued domicile and P. R. C. to the petitioner. The record" submitted by respondent No. 4 indicates that there is report of Mukhtiarkar Rohri No. Miscellaneous, 1987, dated 28-9-1981 on the basis of which the above domicile and P. R. C. were issued. The above report reads, as follows :-- .. To. The District Magistrate. Sukkur. Through the A. C. & S. D. M., Rohri. Subject : Application from Shama Ahsan daughter of D Syed Anwar Ahsan resident of H. No. M/77 Railway Hospital Railway Colony Robri for Grant of Domicile Certificate. The applicant Shama Ahsan daughter of Dr. Syed Anwar Ahsan has applied for grant of domicile certificate. She has adduced the following documents in support of her request. (1) Primary School Leaving Certificate issued by the H. M., P. W. R. Girls School Rohri which shows that the applicant was born at Sukkur. (2) Secondary School certificate issued by the H. M., P. W. R. Girls High School Rohri showing that the applicant passed S. S. C. Part 11. (3) Certificate from the Chief Officer, M. C. Rohri certifying that the applicant's father's name is entered in electoral roll at Serial No. 828 Ward No. 4, Railway Hospital New Yard Rohri. (4) Certificate, issued by the Controller Unit No. 4 M. C. Rohri that the applicant's father is residing at Railway Hospital Colony Rohri. (5) Identity Card No. 416-65-008-108 dated 19-6-1975 issued the name of the applicant (Form B attached) and applicant's father's Identity Card No. 416-32-008 105 dated 28-2-1974. (6) Domicile certificate issued in the name of the applicant's father, brother and P. R. C. of sisters. Tapedar Tapo Rohri has reported that the applicant is residing at Rohri permanently. In view of the documents produced by the applicant and the report of Tapedar and other agencies the request of the applicant for grant of domicile certificate is recommended. (Sd.) Mukhtiarkar Rohri. 2364 29-9-1961 Passed op R. D. O. to the District Magistrate, Sukkur and recommended. (Sd.) Assistant Commissioner, Rohri. The documents mentioned in the above report which were on the file o respondent No. 4 i. e. the District Magistrate, have not beLen adverted to by respondent No. 3 in his appellate order nor the same have been referred to by respondent No.

2. In any case, prima facie the burden of proof that E petitioner's father was not having domicile at the time of the petitioner' birth in Sukkur was on respondent No. 5, as the domicile certificate issue by respondent No. 4 indicated that petitioner's father was domicile in Rohri since 1952. The case relied upon by Mr. Mobeen Khan, namely Haflz Azizur Rehman v. Domicile Scrutiny Committee, Karachi and 2 others (P L D 1975 Kar. 1039) in which a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Sind & Baluchistan (Comprising of the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan Muhammad Haleem and M. A. Rashid, J.) which dealing with the question of burden of proof has made following observations :- "Another serious objection to the procedure followed by the Committee is that it was the petitioner who was called upon to prove certain facts in support of validity of the Permanent Residence Certificate. Petitioner had applied for a Permament Residence Certificate to the District Magistrate, who after due inquiry as required by the rules, had come to a finding that the petitioner fulfilled the conditions, as laid down in the Rules, for grant of such certificate. This shows that the petitioner has established before the District Magistrate his domicile in Math for the purposes of the rules. If any person asserts that such domicile has been changed the burden of proving such a change is on such person. It Winan v. Atta. Ge (1934 A C 287) the Privy Council observed "Now the law is plain, that where a domicile of origin is proved it lies upon the person who asserts a change of domicile to establish it ". Same principle was followed in Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infimmary (1930 A C 588). It was for the person appealing under rule 8 to show that the present petitioner was not entitled to the grant of such certificate. But instead of calling upon that unknown appellant it was the petitioner who was directed to defend the grant of permament Residence Certificate in his favour which proceed cannot be approved of." No evidence was produced by respondent No. 5 to bring on record that at the time of petitioner's birth her father was having domicile other than that of Rohri as mentioned in the domicile certificate. I may also mention that the factum of being domicile of a particular place is different from the' date of obtaining a domicile certificate. A person may be domicile of a particular place for a number of years but he may obtain domicile certificate after the expiry of considerable period. In the instant case both respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have taken the view it is the date of issuance of a domicile certificate which would be the governing factor and not the factum since when petitioner's father was domicile by choice in Rohri in Sukkur District. It is true that petitioner's father was an employee of the Pakistan Railways and, therefore, he could be posted at Rohri and might have not adopted domicile of Sukkur district by choice but there was nothing on record to prove this. If we would not have held that the respondent No. 5's appeal was time-barred, we would have been inclined to remand the case to respondent No. 3 for rehearing of respondent No. 5's appeal and to de ;ids after recording additional evidence on the question, whether factually the petitioner's father by choice had adopted domicile of Sukkur District by the time when the petitioner was born. However, since we have held that respondent No. 5's above appeal was time-barred, in our view no purpose would be served to remand the case.

6. It may also be mentioned that admittedly the petitioner has completed one year studies in M. B., B. S., whereas respondent No. 5 ha completed her first year of B. D. S. in Liaquat Medical College, Jamshoro and, therefore, even otherwise the matter is not free from doubt whether respondent No. 5 will be in any way benefited by non-seating the petitioner.

7. For the aforesaid reason, we would allow the above appeal(petition and declare the impugned orders as being without lawful authority and of no~ legal effect. The respondents are restrained from enforcing to the above) orders. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. a; Y. H, Petition allowed.