2026 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

WIQAR AHMAD, J.

Through the instant petition, petitioner Uzair Ahmad challenges the vires of Regulation 19(f)(ii) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017 ("Regulations of 2017"). The petitioner contends that Respondent No.1, i.e., the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission ("the Commission"), invited applications for the post of GIS Expert (BPS-17) in the Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Cooperative Department (Engineering Wing) through a public notice published in a daily newspaper dated 10.08.2022. The required qualification for the post was stated as follows: (i) At least 2nd Class Engineering or Geographic Geo Informatics Engineering or Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing; or (ii) At least 2nd Class Bachelor Degree in Computer Science IT (BSC/DIT 4 years) with at least one-year Diploma in Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing or its equivalent qualification, from a recognized university/ institute having at least 3 years' experience in the relevant field." The petitioner applied for the said post. In accordance with Regulation 24(a) of the Regulations of 2017, the Commission shortlisted the top five candidates on merit for interview against the single vacancy of GIS Expert. The petitioner further contends that one of the shortlisted candidates, Respondent No.4, Roman Khan, did not possess the requisite qualification for the post and was thus erroneously called for interview. It is asserted that if Respondent No.4 is excluded from the top five on this ground, the petitioner, being next in merit at sixth position, would be entitled to be interviewed for the appointment.

2. The petitioner also submits that the Commission relied on Regulation 19(f)(ii) to call Respondent No.4 for interview, notwithstanding his failure to meet the minimum prescribed qualification set out in the advertisement. While it is admitted that Respondent No.4 does not hold a Bachelor's degree in Geo-Informatics Engineering or in Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing, it is also undisputed that he holds an MS degree in Remote Sensing and GIS, preceded by a BSc in Geography. The petitioner contends that treating a higher qualification in a related but non-specified discipline as a substitute for the expressly required qualification is legally untenable and prejudices his rightful claim to be considered for the interview.

3. The core question for determination in this petition is, "Whether Regulation 190(f)(ii) of the Regulations of 2017, is ultra vires and liable to be struck down"?

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Regulation 19(f)(ii) is in direct conflict with Regulation 3(b) and Regulation 11 of the Regulations of 2017. He submitted that under Regulation 3(b), departmental requisitions must align with notified service rules specifying required qualifications, while Regulation 11 obliges the Commission to assess candidates strictly in accordance with the advertised criteria and applicable service rules. Referring to the relevant service rules, counsel contended that the prescribed qualification does not include an MS degree, and therefore, the Commission erred in considering Respondent No.4 eligible for interview based on a non-specified higher qualification.

4. Learned Additional Advocate General rebutted the petitioner's arguments by submitting that Regulation 19(f)(ii), which permits consideration of higher qualifications, does not contravene Article 8 or any other provision of the Constitution. He placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Communication and Works Department, Peshawar v. Bacha Alam Khan (2022 SCMR 718), wherein the Apex Court, in paragraph 7, upheld the Commission's discretion under Regulation 19(f)(ii) to recommend candidates possessing qualifications higher than those prescribed. He contended that the said provision is neither unreasonable nor contrary to law.

5. We have heard the learned counsel and perused the record with their valuable assistance.

6. The Regulations of 2017 have been framed by the Commission under Section 10A of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1978 ("the Ordinance"), to regulate its functions. For ease of reference, Section 10A of the Ordinance is reproduced below: "10A. Power of the Commission to make regulation. - Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance and the rules made thereunder, the Commission may make regulations for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance."

7. Similarly, Paragraph 19 of the Regulations of 2017 outlines the mechanism for assessing academic qualifications. Clause (f) thereof provides as follows: "(f) (i). Candidate who possess qualification equivalent to the prescribed qualification may be considered eligible. (ii). Candidates who possession qualification higher than the prescribed qualification in the relevant field of studies shall also be considered eligible."

8. The petitioner primarily challenges the vires of Regulation 19(f)(ii), which allows candidates with qualifications higher than those prescribed in the relevant field to be considered eligible. Since Respondent No.4, Roman Khan, held an MS in Remote Sensing and GIS, a higher qualification than the prescribed minimum, the Commission called him for an interview, superseding the petitioner. The petitioner's argument that this regulation conflicts with Regulations 11 and 3(b) of the same set was found to lack merit. Similarly, there was no conflict with Rule 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989 ("APT Rules"). Rule 13 mandates that appointments be made in accordance with the minimum qualifications prescribed by the concerned department. Regulation 13 of the Regulations also requires the Commission to assess qualifications based on the prescribed service rules. However, Regulation 19(f)(ii) grants the Commission the discretion to consider higher qualifications, which aligns harmoniously with Regulation 3(b). Thus, no conflict exists between the provisions.

9. The appointment criteria, including the minimum required qualifications for the post, were framed by the department under the authority granted by Rule 3(2) of the APT Rules. An amendment to the same was made on 3rd March 2022. The qualifications specified in the advertisement are as follows: (v) After Serial No. 03, the following new entries shall be inserted in the respective columns: 1 2 3 4 5 3A GIS Expert (BPS-17) (a) At least Second Class Bachelor's Degree 3 in Geo‑Informatics Engineering or Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing; or (b) At least Second Class bachelor's Degree in Computer Science, Information Technology (BSS/BIT four years) with at least one year Diploma in Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing or its equivalent qualification, form a recognized University/Institute having at least three years' experience in the relevant field. 21-32 years By initial recruitment.

10. The qualification mentioned above has consistently been prefaced with the words "at least," whether referring to academic credentials, experience, or alternate qualifications. This phrasing clearly indicates that the prescribed qualifications were intended to represent the minimum threshold, not the maximum. In other words, a candidate possessing a higher qualification than the one prescribed cannot be deemed ineligible for lacking the requisite qualification. Any interpretation to the contrary would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. To illustrate, holding that a candidate with a Bachelor's degree in Geographic Geo-Informatics Engineering or GIS and Remote Sensing is eligible for the post, while a candidate with an MSc in the same or a closely related discipline is not, would be an untenable and irrational conclusion. Such an approach would defeat the intent behind the prescribed criteria and lead to absurd results. The use of the words "at least" in the eligibility criteria reinforces that the qualifications enumerated were intended to reflect the minimum acceptable standard rather than an exhaustive or maximum limit.

11. In this context, the well-established principle of statutory interpretation, as articulated in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes by P. St. J. Langan (1969: Twelfth Edition, p. 199), is particularly instructive. It emphasizes that an interpretation which leads to unreasonable or inconvenient results should not be adopted when a more rational construction is available. The relevant passage from the treatise reads: "In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. The question of inconvenience or unreasonableness must be looked at in the light of the state of affairs at the date of the passing of the statute, not in the light of subsequent events."

12. This principle applies with equal force to rules and regulations enacted under delegated legislative authority as has been explained by Oliver Jones in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (2013: Sixth Edition, p. 237): "In effect, most delegated legislation constitutes legislation by the government or executive. This is taken to have the same general intention as Parliament, so that the like rules, principles, presumptions and linguistic cannons apply as in the case of Acts. The matter was thus summed by the Law Commissions in their 1969 report on statutory interpretation: 'it seems clear that the courts when dealing with [delegated] legislation apply the same general common law principle of interpretation which they apply to statutes.' The only exception noted was the obvious one which related to the ultra vires doctrine."

13. It is also a trite law that the principles which regulate the interpretation of a statute must be taken to regulate the interpretation of the rules as well. In this regard, reliance is placed on Punjab Province v. Nisar Ahmad (PLD 1960 (W. P.) Lahore 801) and Dilawar Shah Roghani v. North-West Frontier Province through Secretary. Works and Services Department, Government of N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 2 others (2006 CLC 15 [Peshawar]). The doctrine of harmonious construction, which stands as a foundational principle of statutory interpretation, further reinforces this interpretive approach. It has been comprehensively explained by Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr. Harpreet Kaur in Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes (2009, Third Edition, pp. 69-70), as follows: "The basis of the harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute. The Act has to read as a whole and its provisions have to be harmonized giving effect to all of them. The rule of harmonious construction says that when two or more provisions of the same are repugnant, the Court tries to construe these provisions in such a manner, if possible, as to give effect to both by harmonizing them with each other. The court may do so either by holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations or by holding that one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule contained therein. Although it may be very difficult to determine whether separate provisions of the same statute are overlapping or are mutually exclusive but the court tries to harmoniously construe them."

14. Applying the rule of harmonious construction to the present case, it becomes evident that para 19(f)(ii) of the Regulations of 2017 can be read in a manner that aligns with the prescribed qualification criteria, Rule 13 of APT Rules, and other important provisions of the Regulations, particularly paras 3(b) and

11. Such an interpretation enables the Commission to exercise its discretion in considering candidates who not only meet but also exceed the minimum qualifications stipulated for the post, without in any way violating the requirement that appointments be made in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the relevant department. This construction not only preserves the internal consistency of the statutory framework but also avoids any interpretation that may lead to unreasonable or inconvenient consequences. It ensures that no clause or provision is rendered redundant, superfluous, or devoid of meaning.

15. The principle of harmonious construction is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation and has repeatedly received judicial recognition in the decisions of the superior courts. It mandates that, where two or more provisions appear to be in conflict, they must be interpreted in such a manner as to give effect to all, thereby maintaining the coherence and integrity of the legislative scheme as a whole. Reliance is placed on Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed (2017 SCMR 152); MKB Spinning Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 2364 Lahore) and Multan Electric Power Co. Limited (MEPCO) v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (WHT), Regional Tax Officer, Multan (2016 PTD 2567 Lahore).

16. Additionally, it is a settled principle that the extent of delegated legislation depends on the nature and detail of the parent statute. Where the statute provides a detailed framework, the scope for delegated legislation is narrow; conversely, where the statute lays down general principles, broader delegation is permissible to fill in administrative and procedural details. Delegated legislation serves to ease legislative burden and respond flexibly to evolving circumstances. The underlying assumption is that while the legislature sets the policy, the executive is empowered to work out the operational specifics. Reference can be made to Muhammad Fahad Malik v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PLD 2018 Lahore 75) and Jameel Sweets v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2020 PTD 752 [Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)]).

17. Now turning to the question of the vires of Regulation 19(f)(ii), it is well settled that to determine the vires of delegated legislation, it must be examined whether it exceeds the authority granted by the parent statute, whether the prescribed procedure for its formulation was followed, and whether it aligns with the object of the enabling law. Rules and regulations, being forms of subordinate legislation, cannot override or contradict the principal statute. Their purpose is to elaborate on procedural details, not to alter the core provisions of the parent law. While such rules may be treated as part of the statute for practical application, they retain their subordinate character and may only be struck down if found repugnant to the purpose or established principles of the parent legislation. This position has been aptly explained by the learned Lahore High Court in the case of Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Coca Cola Pakistan Limited, Lahore (2022 PTD 1400 [Lahore High Court]) as: "9. [...] Rules are subordinate and delegated legislation, deriving authority and legal cover from the provisions of the main statute and cannot override the provisions of the Statute. They are meant to deal with details and can neither be a substitute for the fundamentals of the parent statute nor can add to them. Delegated legislation forms an important part of the statutory law, which expounds and explains the skeleton principles of the parent statute in order to achieve the purposes of the said legislation. To determine the vires of delegated legislation, this Court has to examine whether such delegated legislation was beyond the power granted by the enabling legislation and whether such delegated legislation was consistent with the parent statute. Needless to say that Rules / regulations continue to be rules subordinate to the parent statute, and though for certain purposes, including the purpose of construction, they are to be treated as if contained in the statute, their true nature as subordinate legislation is not lost. Rule of interpretation is that delegated legislation can only be struck down if it was directly repugnant to general purpose of the statute which authorized it or was repugnant to well established principle of statute..."

18. Moreover, for declaring a law unconstitutional or ultra vires, the Apex Court has laid down the following rules in the case of Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) which must be applied by the Courts: I. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality and a law must not be declared unconstitutional unless the statute is placed next to the Constitution and no way can be found in reconciling the two; II. Where more than one interpretation is possible, one of which would make the law valid and the other void, the Court must prefer the interpretation which favours validity; III. A statute must never be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the statute being valid; IV. If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the Court will abstain from deciding the constitutional question; V. The Court will not decide a larger constitutional question than is necessary for the determination of the case; VI. The Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the spirit of the Constitution unless it also violates the letter of the Constitution; VII. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom or prudence of the legislation but only with its constitutionality; VIII. The Court will not strike down statutes on principles of republican or democratic government unless those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution; IX. Mala fides will not be attributed to the Legislature.

19. In light of the foregoing principles, a review of the relevant provisions of the parent statute and the applicable service rules reveals that Regulation 19(f)(ii) is neither ultra vires the Constitution nor inconsistent with any provision of law. The Regulation falls squarely within the permissible scope of delegated legislation, as it does not override or contradict the fundamentals of the enabling framework. It merely supplements the recruitment process by allowing consideration of higher qualifications in the relevant field, an administrative detail well within the Commission's regulatory competence. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish any legal infirmity or constitutional violation warranting interference by this Court. His placement at serial No. 6 on the merit list, below the top five candidates shortlisted in accordance with Regulation 24(a), does not give rise to any enforceable right, especially when the Commission's action is found to be consistent with law and procedure. Consequently, no illegality can be attributed to the impugned decision of the Public Service Commission. While holding this view, we are fortified by the ratio laid down in the case of Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Communication and Works Department, Peshawar v. Bacha Alam Khan (2022 SCMR 718), wherein the Apex Court upheld the recommendation of a candidate on the basis of higher qualification by the Commission under Regulation 19(f).

20. Considering the discussion and findings recorded hereinabove, the writ petition fails to establish any valid ground for judicial intervention and, as such, stands dismissed. SA/205/P Petition dismissed.