P (PLP)

TYABJI, C. J.‑

At a meeting of the Karachi Bar Association held on 15th June, 1949 a resolution was passed in the following terms :‑‑ " The Karachi Bar Association has learned with great regret and concern of the un served insults given by the Hon ble Chief Judge to the President of the Karachi Bar Association. Mr. Sayed Ahmed Rafique, Barrister-at‑Law; ‑and to an out standing member of this Association, Mr. M. A. Alvi, Advocate, and places on record that In its opinion the attitude of the Hon'ble Chief judge has been persistently contemptuous towards the members of the Bar in general and the displaced lawyers in particular, making: it impossible for them to keep up the well‑known traditions of the Bar, of placing their clients' causes before a Bench adequately and fearlessly." This Association further affirms that the learned profession of law is the main stay of the liberty and fights of the citizens and the Courts in Pakistan will be undermining the foundation of the State by a disregard of the rights of the lawyers and this Association warns the learned Chief judge that if there is a further repetition of "behaviour, the Association will be forced to take measures which it sincerely wishes to avoid.". This resolution was moved from the Chair by Sayed Ahmed Rafique, the President of the Bar Association. Sayed Riza Mirza, ,the Secretary of the Association was also present and supported the resolution. This resolution was communicated to the Press and also to several persons by the Bar Association in its issue of 'the 17th June 1949 the " Dawn ", a Karachi daily newspaper, reproduced most of the resolution under the caption. ``Karachi Lawyers Resent Chief Judge's Attitude ". Altaf Hussain is the Editor, and Ghulam Hussain Thaver is the printer and publisher of the " Dawn ''. When these matters were brought to the notice of this Court, notices were issued to Sayed Ahmed Rafique, Sayed Riza Mirza, Altaf Hussain and Ghulam Hussain Thaver, to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 ; and they are now before us in answer to the notices. No attempt has been made to deny that the passing of the resolution at the meeting of the Bar Association and the publication of the resolution by causing it to appear in the issue of the " Dawn " of the 17th June or by communicating it to certain persons, were acts which constituted a contempt of Court. There is indeed little room for any argument on the point. It is sufficient to, refer here to the of quoted passage from Lord Russel's judgment in Reg. v. Gray, (1900) 2 Q B 36 :‑-- " Any act done or writing published ‑calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt or lawyer his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of con tempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or 'interfere with the due Course of justice of the awful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke, U. C. characterized as `scandalizing a Court or a Judge. That. description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an important qualification. Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism; and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as Contempt of 'Court. The law ought not to be astute in such cases to criticize adversely what under such circum stances and with an object is published ; but it is to be remembered that in this matter the liberty of the Press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen. There can be no question here about the imputations and threats contained in the resolution being such as were calcu lated to lower the authority of the Chief judge and this. Court. It has not been argued and it would be impossible to argue that the matter published was merely a reasonable argument or expostulation against some particular judicial acts as being con trary to the law or to the public good. Lord Russel's words in the case above referred to, immediately following the passage which has been cited. " Now, as I have said, no one has‑ suggested that this is not a contempt of Court, and nobody has suggested, or could suggest, that it falls within the right of public criti cism in the sense I have described. It is not criticism ; I repeat that it is personal scurrilon, abuse of a judge as a judge. We have therefore to deal with it as a case o contempt and we have to deal with it brevi manu," apply in the present case with at least as great a force as they did in that‑case. All the four respondents have tendered unqualified apologies. Altaf Hussain, the Editor of the " Dawn ", has stated that he was at Lahore at the tithe when the issue of the 17th June was published, that he learnt of the publication " with great surprise and regret" after his return to Karachi." He has assured the Court that he has been, and will continue to be, "the greatest supporter of the judiciary in their difficult task of main taining law and order " and in upholding their prestige. He has explained that the publication was the result of what was regarded as a mere news item creeping into the printing section without being duly checked , and has expressed his unqualified regret for the lack of care on the part of the staff, and assured this Court " that proper diligence and care will in future be exercised against any repetition of a mistake of this nature."' Mr. Ghulam Hussain Thaver has made a very similar statement while giving his explanation and submitting an equally unqualified apology. There is no doubt that the publication in the " Dawn" took place while Altaf Hussain was away at Lahore, and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the assurances given as regards the 'attitude of the " Dawn " in matters concerning the authority and prestige of Courts. I would, therefore, discharge the notice as against Altaf Hussain. There is also no reason for doubting Ghulam Hussain Thaver's explanation that the publication of the 17th June was in fact due to an error in regarding the matter published merely as a news item, and to the negligence of the staff in not care fully checking the nature of the matter. It is of course obvious that those responsible for publishing or editing a newspaper cannot escape liability merely because they can show that the publication was the result of negligence on their own part or on the part of their staff. As, however, there is no reason for doubting the sincerity of the assurance given, that every effort would be made in the future to see that no repetition of any such negligence occurs, I would also discharge the notice against Ghulam Hussain Thaver. The cases of Sayed Ahmed Rafique and Sayed Riza Mirza, who are advocates, require much more serious consideration. As Scott, C. J. pointed out in Government Pleader v. Jagannath M. Samant (1908) 10 Bom. L. R. 1169 :‑-- "Pleaders are a priviledged class enrolled for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Courts in the administration of justice. Their position, training and practice give them influence with the public and it is directly contrary to their duty to use that influence for the purpose of bringing the adminis tration of justice into contempt." Offences of contempt by advocates have; therefore, ordinarily to be regarded seriously, and in the case just referred to the pleader was suspended from practice for six months for presiding, at a meeting at which a resolution, mainly of a 'political character, denouncing the conduct of a judge was passed, although the pleader had neither moved' nor supported the resolution. There can also be no question about the terms of the resolution passed in the present case constituting " grave abuse of a judge. It was asserted that by inflicting undeserved insults and persistently treating the members of the Bar in general and the displaced lawyers in particular in a contemptuous manner, the Chief judge due was making it impossible for advocates to present their case adequately. The Threat in the last portion of the resolution greatly aggravated the contempt. It .is also obvious that the resolution under existing circumstances, was of a particularly mischievous character, as it was calculated to support propaganda that the lawyers, who had come to Pakistan from India were not receiving fair treatment. We have, thus, before us a case which would appear to merit and call for condign and even exemplary punishment even after. taking the unconditional apologies tendered into consideration. At the same time the circumstances before us present certain' exceptional, features. The two, advocates haul, before the commencement of the hearing, handed over to the Advocate‑General their written statements containing their unconditional apologies. Sayed Ahmed Rafique in his statement said:‑-- "I Sayed Ahmad Rafique, beg to apologise unconditionally to the Chief judge and to the Court for my part in the passing of the resolution on the 15th of June. 1949 and the publication for the same thereafter. I admit that there was no justification for the resolution and that it was extremely improper for' an advocate, as an officer of the Court, to lake part in anything which: showed disrespect to the Court. I assure the Chief Judge and the Court that I extremely regret my action". Sayed. Riza Mirza's statement is in. identical terms. In addition in reply to questions put by my learned brothers and myself at the hearing, they admitted before us in the clearest and most categorical terms, that there never was the slightest justi fication of any kind for any of the allegations made in the resolution ‑which was an admission that they and those who were associated' with them had acted in a wholly irresponsible and an almost incomprehensible manner. These admissions were, amplified by other statements made in order to emphasize the sincerity of their regret for what they had done, and their realisation of the gravity of their offence. One result of these admissions and apologies was to eliminate all possibility of anyone giving any consideration to the opinions of those who took part in passing the resolution. So far as Sayed Riza Mirza is concerned, it must be mentioned that he took steps, very soon after the passing of the resolution, to make it clear that he entirely disassociated himself from the resolution. Though he would undoubtedly have been much better advised to have opposed the resolution, we must, 1 think, take into consideration that his participation in the passing of the resolution was mainly the result of his weakness. Under these circumstances, I think that his early disassociation and apology are efficient grounds for our refraining from any further action, and I would discharge the notice against him. We have reason to believe that Sayed Ahmad Rafique was the prime mover behind the resolution, and that it was personal pique, arising from offended vanity, which had led him astray into the irresponsible course which he‑ followed. Under these circumstances ‑the humiliation involved in the recantation which he was concerned to make, in the presence of his fellow‑advocates and in a crowded Court, may in itself I think be regarded as n fitting punishment for an offence, which appears to have been committed very largely as the result of false pride. Taking all the facts into consideration, I am of the view that it is not necessary to take guy further action even against him; and I would discharge the notice. While proposing these orders in the cases of the two advocates. I wish to make it very clear that one of the reasons why I do not consider that .any further action is necessary, is that I am sure that there is no likelihood of any advocate being encouraged to commit and offence of contempt by reason of our refraining from ordering condign punishment in this case. I consider that the offence in this case was an aberration of a very abnormal kind. The offence of scandalising a Court or a Judge ought to be as obsolete in Pakistan as it is in most countries. It is hardly necessary to point out that in case of any further offence of contempt being committed by any advocate, this Court would be compelled to consider such punish ment as would really prove deterrent. This Court must and will see to it that the proper atmosphere is maintained in which alone Courts can function properly and any tendencies to show less respect than, is due to the Courts on the part of advocates mast be sternly discouraged: CONSTANTINE, J.‑

I concur. HASSANALLY AGHA, J.‑

I agree. VELLANI, J.‑

I have had the advantage of reading through the judgment of the learned Chief judge and have but little to add. The gist of the allegations is that by his persistent attitude of contempt towards the Bar (and particularly towards the displaced lawyers) the Chief judge prevents an adequate placing of litigants' cases before him' as a judge; arid from these allegations flow the very serious imputations that the Chief judge does not do justice and does not want justice in his Court to be done after adequate presentation of litigants' cases and that in that way he denies justice to litigants in his Court. These 'imputations read with the threat which follows in the resolution leave no room for doubt that the resolution is calculated to bring the Chief Judge and the Court into contempt and to lower their authority. Naturally therefore there was no attempt at arguing that there had been no contempt. I have no doubt that the apologies of Altaf Hussain and Ghulam Hussain Thaver respectively the Editor and publisher of "Dawn" should be accepted. These proceedings against them will remind them and those who aspire to responsible journalism that Publication without responsible scrutiny of what a reporter might consider to be sensational news item, often has grave consequences, and that a Court will not be inclined to overlook more than once the absence of such responsible scrutiny. With regard to the cases of S. A. Rafiq and S. Riza Mirza, the President and Secretary respectively of the Karachi Bar Asso ciation, I take the view that their conduct in getting the resolution Passed affected in the main the unreflecting and irresponsible elements in the association who were susceptible to the false propaganda interestedly created, that advocates who have migrated from India to Pakistan and who now form a very large proportion of the members of the Karachi Bar, are not' fairly or property treated till the Courts. These proceedings in contempt and the full And comprehensive apologies made in Court in the very presence of such advocates as wore misled have however, by themselves had the salutary effect of, bringing to the realization of the advocates misleading and misled holy grievously wrong and irresponsible has been their conduct and I take, the view that this realization sincerely arrived at, as I think‑‑has done more good than any punishment we should be inclined to inflict upon the President and the Secretary of the Bar Association, can be reasonably expected to do. I have no doubt that these advocate's will not again lapse into such, unreflecting and, irresponsible conduct, but if they unfortunately do they will themselves know that they merit exemplary and deterrent punishment. In the very exceptional circumstances of this case, it becomes unnecessary in my view to inflict any punishment upon Syed A. Rafique and Syed Riza Mirza and I concur that the notices against, them should be discharged. MOHAMMED BACHAL, J.

I agree in the order proposed. A. H. Notices discharged.