1986 PLP 514 (PTD)

(3) The income received by the trust should be taken to amount to a diversion of income by overriding title in which case the income received by the trust cannot be taken as the income of the assessee and assessed in his hands.

5. We will deal with the said three contentions advanced on behalf of the assessee seriatim.

6. Taking up the first contention it is true that the agreement of gift, dated 9‑2‑1969, purports to proceed on the basis that the gift has been effected on that day and the delivery of the properties referred to therein has been given to the trust on that day itself. But it is clear that the parties did not intend that document to be one of completed gift, as the agreement of gift itself provided for execution of a valid gift de at a later point of time after getting the requisite exemption from stamp duty from the Government. Thus the parties have proceeded only on the basis that the agreement of gift, dated 9‑2‑1969 did not amount to a gift deed as such, and that the gift deed was to be executed on a future date after complying with certain formalities. It is, therefore, clear that the parties themselves did not treat the agreement of gift as a completed gift. Clause 5 of the agreement of gift specifically provides." The donor undertakes to execute a document of gift and register the same as soon as exemption is obtained from the Government of Tamil Nadu for the stamp duty payable for the deed." It is clear from the above extract that the parties did not contemplate the agreement of gift as a document of gift as the said agreement specifically provided for execution and registration of a document of gift at a future point of time. Notwithstanding this fact, the learned counsel for the assessee raised the plea that no document of gift is necessary, if the intention of the donor to dedicate the properties is clear and that in this case such an intention is clear from the agreement of gift, dated 9‑2‑1969. In support of this plea, the learned counsel relied on the decisions of this Court in Jai Narayan Jai Govind v. Controller of Estate Duty, Madras, (1963) 49 1 T R (E.D.) 105 and S. Devaraj v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 90 I T R 400; 1973 Tax L R

989. But we entirely agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that the said two decisions have no application to the facts of the present case.

7. In S. Devaraj v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax 1973 T L R 989 Mad. a question arose as to whether for the purpose of dedication for a certain religious public charity a document by way of gift is necessary. This Court has held that it is well‑established that no express words of gift in writing either directly or indirectly in the shape of a trust are required to create a dedication, that all that is necessary is that the religious purpose or object of the donor should be clearly specified, that the property intended for the endowment should be set apart and dedicated to these purposes and that it is also well established that the existence of a trust can be established even by the conduct of parties.

8. The aforesaid two cases dealt with the creation of a public trust and the question was whether such a trust could be created without a formal document and that answer was in the affirmative. In the present case, we are not concerned with the creation of a trust for the first time or initial dedication of properties in favour of a trust or for a specific purpose. We are here concerned with the transfer of properties by a donor in favour of an already existing trust. The donor in this case donated certain properties in favour of an existing trust by way of addition to or enlargement of the trust properties. We are also not concerned with the question whether a trust could be created without a document in writing or not, for in this case the trust has already been created and the donation has been made under a document in writing.

9. A Division Bench of this Court in one of the earliest cases in Pallayya v. Ramavadhanulu, 1903 13 Mad. L J 364 has held that a declaration of trust in relation to immovable property for a public religious purpose is not governed by the Trusts Act which by section I is declared inapplicable to a religious endowment and that, therefore a dedication of an idol land for the building of temple for the same is not gift within section 122of T.P. Act.

10. In Ramalinga Chetti v. Sivachidambara Chetty, I L R 42 Mad. 440; A I R 1919 Mad. 809 (2) another Division Bench of this Court, has expressed the view that, there are three modes of giving property to a temple and one is by giving it to the trustees in which case the provisions of the T.P. Act must be complied with and another is by dedication to the idol itself. The Court was also of the view that though there can be an oral valid dedication to the idol, if the dedication is in writing, it is open to argument that by virtue of the Registration Act no title would pass unless the document is registered. The Court has also observed that the third mode, which is a dedication, offering, or oblation as it is called, is generally made on occasions of death or marriage in a Hindu family, that the usual form is to take a leaf of the Tulasi plant in hand and with water offer the property in the presence of the persons assembled and that it is not usually done before the temple or in the presence of the trustees. According to this decision, this third mode in the nature of things does not require any writing or no writing could be thought of and if a writing is insisted upon, that will be regarded as detracting from the sanctity of the proceeding. This decision is the authority for the proposition that even though a dedication may be made orally without any document in writing, if the parties choose to bring into existence a document in writing, then the provisions of the Registration Act would come in the way and no title would pass under the document unless it is registered.

11. A Full Bench of this Court in Narasimhaswami v. Venkatalingam, I L R 50 Mad. 687; A I R 1927 Mad. 636 is also in point. In that case a Hindu executed an agreement, which recited that a person had been constituted trustee and certain lands had been dedicated to god Ramchandra Moorti that he would execute a formal conveyance and put him in possession of the lands, whenever the trustee required, and that he would, in the meantime, be accountable for the rents. When a creditor of the donor attempted to attach the said properties contending that no trust or gift was validly created for want of a registered document, the Court held that as the document was merely one which recorded a past transaction and gave another party a right to call for a formal document it was exempted from registration under section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act, that the document constituting trust of property for a public religious purpose fell within the saving clause of section 1 of the Trust Act and that consequently section 5 of the Act which relates to creation of trusts and requires registration of deeds of trust did not apply to the document. In this decision the Full Bench has taken the view that a gift to God Almighty is not a gift to a living person within the meaning of the T.P. Act and that consequently section 123 read with section 5 of the Act does not apply to such a gift so as to require a registered document for its creation. The Full Bench has also held that though an idol is considered by a fiction of law a juristic person clothed for some purposes with rights of persons, yet a juristic person is not a living person for the purpose of T.P. Act.

12. In Ramanathan v. Palaniappa, I L R 1945 Mad. 500 at pp. 512, 513, A I R 1945 Mad. 473 a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows:‑‑ "There are three modes in which a voluntary transfer of property in favour of a temple can be validly and effectually made. Firstly, by dedication of the properly directly to the deity. This mode is sanctioned by Hindu law and needs no compliance with the provisions of the T.P. Act, there being no transfer of property of a 'living person' within the meaning of section 5 of that Act. See Gangi Reddi v Tammi Reddi, I L R 50 Mad. 421: AIR 1927 P C 80). Sooniram Ramniranjandass v. Alagu Nachiyar Koil (1939) Rang. L R 59 : A I R 1938 P C 259 and Narasimha Swami r " v . Ven katalingam I L R 50 Mad. 687: A I D 1927 Mad. 636 F . B . The subject‑matter of a dedication must, however, be some specific property or asset and a mere credit entry in a book of account cannot be the subject of a dedication Secondly, property may be transferred by way of a gift to the trustee or trustees of a temple. Such a transfer, being one made to a living person, must comply with the requirements of section 123 of the T.P. Act."

13. Paragraph 790 of Mayne's Treatise on Hindu law and Usage Eleventh Edn. (pages 920‑921) explains as to how a dedication can be "effected and the relevant portion which deals with various principles as called out from the decisions referred to above and others is this: "A dedication of property, whether movable or immovable for a religious or charitable purpose, may, according to Hindu law, be validly made verbally. No writing is necessary to create an endowment except where the endowment is created by will, in, rich case the will must be in writing and attested by at least two witnesses if the case is governed by the Indian Succession Act, section

57. A dedication may be made by a gift inter vivoa or by a bequest or by a ceremonial or relinquishment. But a mere credit entry without setting aside and appropriating the sum credited is insufficient to constitute an endowment under the Hindu Law. A dedication eland for a public temple is not a gift requiring a registered deed and is not governed by section 123 of the T.P. Act. But property may be transferred by way of gift to the trustee or trustees of the temple. Such a transfer being one made to a living person, must, however, comply with the requirement of this section. The Trusts Act, 1882, does not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments." it is thus well‑established, that where a transfer is effected inter vivos by a donor to a living person, that will have to satisfy the requirements of the Registration Act. Even in a case where no document of gift is necessary, if the parties choose to reduce the transaction in writing, then the requirements of section 123 read with section 5 of the T.P. Act as also the provisions of the Registration Act must be satisfied. In the present case even if the agreement, dated 9‑2‑1969 is taken to be actually evidencing the transaction of a gift. as contended by the learned counsel for the assessee, then for want of registration the said document will be ineffective to transfer the title from the donor to the trust. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the assessee that the agreement of gift, dated 9‑2‑1969 results in the transfer of ownership from the donor to the trust and, therefore, the income received by the trust after that date should not be taken as the income of the assessee.

14. Coming to the second contention that even though the transfer of ownership had not taken place on 9‑2‑1969, since under the terms of the agreement of gift, dated 9‑2‑1969, the properties had beer handed over to the trust with a right to collect the income therefrom for the purpose of the trust, that would show that notwithstanding the continuance of the ownership in the donor till the gift was actually executed as contemplated by the agreement, dated 9‑2‑1969, the beneficial ownership had been vested in the trust, as it was given the right to collect and appropriate the income from the properties for the charitable purposes. Cut it is well‑establish that Indian law does not recognise the theory of beneficial ownership and it recognises only legal ownership.

15. In Hall and Anderson (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, 1963‑47 ITR 790 the Calcutta High Court has expressed the view that under section 9 of the Income‑tax Ant, 1922, an assessee has to pay tax under the head "income from property" in respect of the bona fide annual value of the property consisting of .any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of which he is the owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for the purposes of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him the profits of which are assessable to tax subject to allowances mentioned. The principle laid down in that case was whether the assessee was in receipt of rents or not from the property he has to pay tax under the head ''income from property" based on the annual valuation of his property.

16. In Commissioner of Income‑tax, West Bengal II v. Ganga Properties Ltd., (1970) 77 ITR 637 (Cal.) there was a sale agreement in respect of a house property followed by delivery of possession in 1956. However, the sale‑deed was executed only in the year 1958. A question arose as to whether the income from the house property during the interval between 1956 and 1958 could be assessed in the hands of the vendor on the ground that the vendor continued to be the owner till the year 1958. One of the points urged on behalf of the assessee in that case was that since the purchaser on the basis of the sale agreement was entitled to receive and enjoy the income from the property till the sale‑deed was executed, the sale agreement should be taken to confer on the vendee the beneficial ownership, and therefore, the income from the house property received by such beneficial owner cannot be assessed in the hands of the vendor. In rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out: "As we all know; ''the English doctrine of equitable ownership is not recognised in India. According to section 3 of the Trust Act, 1882, the 'beneficial interest' or 'interest' of the beneficiary is the right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. In other words, what would be in English law the equitable estate of the cestui qui trust is the benefit of an obligation annexed to the ownership of property. In English law an agreement for the sale of land leaves the legal estate in the seller but creates an equitable estate in the buyer. These equitable estates were the creation of the Court of Chancery. A cestui qui trust when in possession was protected in his enjoyment of the rents and profits and treated as if he were the owner, and the Court of Chancery continued to treat him as having an'' ' t' estate in land when out of possession. Again, the relation created by contract between a vendor and a purchaser was described as that of trustees and cestui qui trust and the contract was held give the purchaser as equitable estate in land; vide Mulla's T.P. Act, 5th Edn, pages 50,

51. In India the leading case on the subject is the case of J.M. Tagore v. G.M. Tagore, (1872 IA Supp 47), which the Judicial Committee decided in 1872." The Court also quoted in support of its view, the following observations of the Judicial Committee in Webb v. Macpherson, (1903) 30 Ind. App. 388:- "The law of India, speaking broadly, knows nothing of the distinction between legal and equitable property in the sense in, which that was understood when equity was administered by the Court of Chancery in English and the T.P. Act gives a statutory charge upon the estate to an unpaid vendor unless it be excluded by contract. Such a charge, therefore, stands in quite a different position from a vendr's lien. You have to find something, either, express contract, or at least something from which it is a necessary implication that such a contract exists, in order to ale‑exclude the charge given by the statute." Another passage from a decision in Chhatra Kumari Devi v Mohan Bikram Shah A I R 1931 P C 196 has also been quoted and it is as follows: ‑ "The Indian law does not recognise legal and equitable estates: .. By that law, therefore, there can be but one 'owner' and there the property is vested in a trustee, the owner' must, their Lordships think, be the trustee".

17. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the decision mentioned above ultimately summarised their conclusions as follows "In Indian Law, beneficial ownership is unknown and there is but one owner, namely, the legal owner both in respect of vendor and purchaser and trustee and cestui qui trust. And the expression 'income from property' used in sections 6 and 9 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922 refers to the income of the legal owner of the property who is the only person assessable to tax on the basis of the bona fide annual value thereof."

18. The Delhi High Court has followed the same principle in Commissioner of Income‑tax Delhi 1 v. Hans Raj Gupta 137 ITR 195: (1982 Tax LR 410) which arose under section 22 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922. In that case there was an agreement for the sale of certain property. Even on the date of the agreement, a substantial portion of the consideration was paid and the property was put in possession of the vendee. There was an interval between the date of the agreement and the actual sale. A question arose whether the vendor was liable to be assessed to tax on the income from the said property even though the purchaser was in possession of the property without payment of rent. The Court held that since the assessee's title to the property could not pass to the vendee till a conveyance deed was actually executed and registered, the assessee would be the owner of the property, in spite of the fact that he was not earning any income therefrom and therefore the assessee alone was to be assessed in respect of the income from the said property. Dealing with the theory of beneficial ownership which was advanced by the assessee in that case, the Court held that section 22 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, taxes the owner of a property in respect of a national income from the property irrespective of the actual derivation of any income or enjoyment thereof by the owner and that there is no notion of beneficial ownership under the Indian law.

19. Hence for the purpose of assessment under 'the head 'income from property' under the Income‑tax Act, 1961, one has to go only by the ownership and not by the fact as to who is in actual receipt of the income from the property.

20. We are not inclined to accept the third contention advanced on behalf of the assessee that there has been a diversion of income by overriding title in the present case and, therefore, the income from the Chettinad colony properties cannot be assessed in the hands of the assessee. We do not see how the principle of diversion of income by overriding title could be invoked by the assessee, on the facts and in the circumstances of this, case. Since the assessee's contention that the title had already passed from the donor to the Trust on 9‑2‑1969 itself has not been accepted and it has been found that the title passed from the donor to the trust only on 8‑3‑1971, the assessee in this case, continued to be the owner of the property till 8‑3‑1971, and therefore, it is only the assessee who has to be assessed on the income from those properties. From the mere fact that the assessee has chosen to permit the trust, to enjoy the income therefrom, it cannot be taken to be a diversion of income by overriding title.

21. In the light of the above discussion, we have to answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The question is accordingly answered. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue; counsel's fee Rs.500 (Rupees five hundred only). M. B. A Answer accordingly.