1983 PLP 1184 (PLC(CS))

This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned VIth Labour Court, given on 3rd April, 1982, allowing the grievance petition preferred by the respondent workman against the orders of his dismissal from service, passed by the Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd the appellants herein, and directing the said‑company to re‑instate the respondent work. man in service with full back benefits.

2. The facts of this case, shortly stated, are that the appellant Company, which is engaged in the manufacture of textile at Kotri, had taken the mills of the Textile Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., on lease. The respondent was employed by the appellant Company in the leased mills as a Ring Four Sider with effect from 21st November, 1979. The separate charge‑sheets are stated to have been issued to him. The first is 'dated 5th March. 1981 and refers to 2 separate incidents, one on 1st March, 1981, and the other on 2nd March, 1981. In the incident of 1st March, 1981, the respondent is alleged to have used improper language towards his shift incharge, Muhammad Saeed Shah and to have threatened to see him outside the gate when the latter asked him to show reason for his absence without leave on 28th February, 1981. It is further alleged that after misbehaving with the Shift Incharge, the respondent left the factory without doing any work. In the incident of 2nd March, 1981, the respondent is alleged to have stoned the vehicle of the company in which the Shift Incharge, Saeed Shah was coming to the factory, at about 10‑15 p.m. at the crossing in Latifabad Unit No. 12, on account of which some damage was caused to the vehicle, but luckily no one was hurt. The second charge‑sheet, which is dated 10th March, 1981. charges the respon dent with the misconduct of remaining absent from duties, without leave, with effect from 28th February, 1981 for a period exceeding 10 days. For holding. enquiry into the first charge of misconduct, Abdul Qayyum Khan, Accountant in the appellant‑Company, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer, and the enquiry was fixed for 4th April, 1981, but as the respondent workman objected to the appointment of Abdul Qayyum Khan as an Enquiry Officer, the appellant‑Company appointed Syed Sirajul Hassan as the Enquiry Officer in his place. For holding domestic enquiry into the second charge‑sheet against the respondent, the appellant‑Company appointed their officer, Abdul Rasheed, as Enquiry Officer. However, the respondent objected to the appointment of Abdul Rasheed also and hence Syed Sirajul Hassad Jafri was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to conduct the second enquiry also. According to the appellant‑Company, both the enquiries were adjourned from time to time on account. of the absence of the respondent and ultimately both the domestic enquiries were fixed for hearing on 19th April, 1981, the first to be field at 10‑00 a. m., and the second to be held at 2‑00 p. m. It is the case of the appel lant‑Company that the respondent did appear before the Enquiry Officer in the first enquiry on 19th April, 1981, but when he was asked to put his signatures/thumb impression on the record of the enquiry proceedings as establishing his presence during the enquiry proceedings, he walked out from the enquiry proceedings and hence the enquiry was ‑held ex parte. In the second enquiry which was to be held at 2‑00 p. m., he did not put in his appearance at all and hence this enquiry was also held ex parte. On the other hand, the version of the respondent is that when he appeared before the enquiry officer in the first enquiry on 19th April, 1981, he was asked to sign on previously prepared proceedings and on his refusal _ to do so, he was beaten and maltreated by Mr. Jafri and some other persons sitting with him and was driven out from the factory. In his letter, which was written by the respondent to the appellant‑Company on the very date, he has described the happening on the morning of 19th and asserted that the enquiry officer had first tried to compel him to put his signature on previously prepared statements but when he refused to do so, he was beaten and driven out. The said letter appears as Annexure `A/39' on the record of the learned Labour Court. In respect of the happening in the second enquiry, the respondent wrote another letter to the appellant Company on 19th April. 1981, which appears as Annexure 'A/28' in the record of the learned Labour Court. The Enquiry Officer, Syed Sirajul Hassan Jafri, submitted 2 separate reports one each in respect of the 2 enquiries. The report in respect of the first enquiry is dated 20th April, 1981, and that in respect of the second enquiry is dated 22nd April, 1981. In both these enquiries, he held that the charges against the respondent had been fully established. On the basis of the Enquiry Officer's reports, a show‑cause notice, dated 23rd April, 1981, was issued to the respondent with which a copy of the report of the enquiry officer in respect of the first enquiry was appended. No second show‑cause notice in respect of the second enquiry appears to have come on the record of the learned Labour Court. The respondent was ultimately dismissed from service vide order of the appellant‑Company, dated 27th April, 1981. The dismissal order is based on both the charge‑sheets, namely, the charge‑sheet dated 5th March, 1981 and the charge‑sheet dated 10th March, 1981. 3: The respondent challenged the orders of his dismissal before the VIth Labour Court, Hyderabad. In those proceedings the respondent examined himself, while on behalf of the appellant‑Company, the Enquiry Officer, Syed Sirajul Hassan Jafri, the Administrative Officer of the appel lant Company, Abdul Qadeer Qureshi, the Labour Officer Waris Ali, and Chowkidar Hussain Ali, were examined.. In respect of the first charge, the learned Labour Court expressed its inability to rely upon the ex parse evidence adduced in the enquiry proceedings. According to the learned Labour Court, if there had been any stoning on the vehicle of the Com pany as alleged by the witnesses of the Company, the driver of the vehicle would have certainly reported the matter to the Police and most proba bly some persons would have received injuries, but neither the driver had reported the matter to the police .nor any person received any injury and moreover there were no independent witnesses. The learned Labour Court also expressed‑its view that the alleged act of stoning of the vehi cle did not, in its opinion, constitute misconduct punishable under Stan ding Order 15, as it neither took place during duty hours nor in that factory premises. The learned Labour Court also did not rely upon the evidence on the second charge relating to the alleged absence of the respondent for more than 10 days with effect from 28th February, 1981, and pointed out that the allegation of the appellant‑Company regarding the incident in the premises of the Company on 1st March, 1981, in which the respondent is stated to have taken part, was destructive of the charge of absence for more than 10 days. The learned Labour Court has also relied upon the letters of the respondent indicating that repeated attempts had been made by him to enter the factory and to perform his duties but he was gate‑stopped and was not allowed to enter the factory. I will refer to these letters in some details while examining the respective conten tions of the learned counsel for the parties. The learned Labour Court was, further, of the view that the charge‑sheets issued to the respondents under the signatures of the Labour Officer of the appellant‑Company were invalid as he was not authorised to charge‑sheet the respondent.

4. I have heard Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned counsel for the appellant Company, and Mr. Ali Amjad, who appeared for the respon dent workman. Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani raised the following conten tions :‑ (i) Whether issuance of a charge‑sheet is a requirement of law, and if so, whether charge‑sheet by the Labour Officer was duly authorized in this behalf by the Mills Manager and does not comply with the requirements of law ? Whether the respondent was prevented from participating in the 2 domestic enquiries or he had deliberately absented himself from doing so ? (iii) Whether the respondent on 1st March, 1981 had threatened the Shift Incharge, Muhammad Saeed Shah, in the mills that he would see him ? (iv) Whether it has been established that the respondent stoned the company's vehicle outside the mills of the appellants and whether such act constitutes misconduct falling under Standing Order 15 ? (v) Whether the respondent had remained absent from duty with effect from 28th February, 1981 ?

5. I will now proceed to examine each of the above contentions seriatum in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

6. In regard to the first contention of Mr. Mahmood Ghani, the admitted position is that the 2 charge‑sheets, one dated 5th March, 1981 regarding the unauthorized absence of the respondent from his duties for a period exceeding 10 days and the other, dated 5th March, 1981, regar ding the 2 incidents of 1st March, 1981 and 2nd March, 1981, have teen signed for the Shahyar Textile Mills by their Labour officer, Waris Ali. The respondent in paragraphs 8 and 24 of his grievance petition has admitted the receipt of the 2 charge‑sheets and submissions of his replies thereto. The learned Labour Court has taken exception to the charge‑sheets on the ground that the Labour Officer was not authorized to issue the 2 charge‑sheets. The learned Labour Court has not accepted the version of the Labour Officer that he had been authorized by the Mills' Manager, Zahoor Ahmad, to charge‑sheet the respondent. The view taken by the learned Labour Court does not appear to be well‑founded. As already pointed out, the 2 charge‑sheets‑ have been signed by the Labour Officer on behalf of the Mills' Management. In his affidavit, dated 3rd December, 1981, he clearly stated that he had been authorized in writing by the Mills' Manager, Zahoor Ahmad, to charge‑sheet the respondent. The 2 authority letters were produced by him before the learned Labour Court, one dated 3rd March, 1981 and the second, dated 10th February, 1981. It is true that the Mills Manager Zahoor Ahmad, was not examined but the mere non‑examination of the Mills Manager would not erode the testimony of the Labour Officer in this behalf or make the latter's evidence untrustworthy. Coming back to the contention of Mr. Mahmood Ghani that clause (4) of Standing Order 15 does not require the service of a formal charge‑sheet upon a workman who is being proceeded against under the Standing Orders, it may be pointed out that service of a formal charge‑sheet upon the offending workman is not provided for or a require ment. of clause (4) of Standing Order 15, and all that the said clause requires is that the offending workman should be informed in writing of the alleged misconduct within one month of the commission of the act of misconduct or such act coming to the notice of the employer, as pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Indus Jute Mills Ltd., Dhabeji (1980 P L C 972). Similar view has been taken by the learned Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, in the case reported as Nauroze Khan v. Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. (1977 P L C 74). Moreover, a charge‑sheet or a show cause notice need not be issued by the employer and can be issued by any officer of the management duly authorized in this behalf by the employer or the Mills Manager. In the case of Muhammad Yousuf referred to above, it was held by this Tribunal that the charge‑sheet, which was issued by the Labour Officer who was duly authorized in this behalf by the management was valid and no exception could be taken thereto. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal also in the case of Nauroze Khan referred to above, has taken the view that a charge‑sheet issued by the Spinning Master under the directions of the Mills' Manager is valid and unexceptionable. In a Constitutional Petition preferred before the Karachi High Court, the decision wherein is reported as National & Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Homi F. Behrana and 2 others (P L D 1979 Kar.692) an objection was raised that the charge‑sheet had been served upon the offending workman by the Accountant of the Bank and not by the Manager. Repelling this objection, it was observed that there was no hard and fast rule that the charge‑sheet in such cases should be served by the manager or an officer higher to him. Since the Accountant of the Cash Department held higher rank than the respondent, he could take administrative disciplinary action by serving the respondent with a charge‑sheet. I am accordingly of the view that the charge‑sheets issued to the respondent are valid and had been duly served upon him.

7. It next falls to be considered whether the respondent had deli berately absented from participating in the domestic enquiry proceedings or was prevented from doing so by the management. In order to appre ciate this issue in its proper perspective, it would appear to be appropriate to refer to the correspondence between the management and the respon dent on this issue and his absence from his duties. It is the case of the respondent that right from 1st March, 1981, he had been repeatedly attempting to go to the factory to perform his duties but he was stopped at the gate and prevented from entering the factory and performing his duties. The first letter of the respondent in this behalf is a letter, dated 2nd March, 1981, which appears at page 25 of the record of the learned Labour Court. In this letter, he has stated that he had come to the factory on 1st March, 1981 at 10‑45 p. m., to perform his duties for the night shift, but he was not allowed to perform his duties and was not even told the reasons for such action. According to that letter, the respondent had no alternative but to return back home. The respondent, in that letter has claimed that since it was the management which had not allow ed him to perform duties, therefore, he was entitled to wages for that day. The said letter was sent to the appellant‑Company by registered post A/D. The appellant‑Company, i. e., Shahyar Textile Mills, has not denied the receipt of the said letter. No reply to the said letter appears to have been given to the respondent but on 5th March, 1981 he was charge‑sheeted in respect of incidents which are stated to have occurred on 1st March, 1981 and 2nd March, 1981. It appears that a second letter, dated 10th March, 1981, was written by the respondent to the management complaining of his not being allowed to perform his duties. Although the said letter has not been filed before the learned Labour Court, there is on the record of the learned Labour Court the reply of the management to the said letter in which it has been claimed that it was the respondent himself who bad been remaining absent from duties with effect from 28th February, 1981. In response to the management's above letter, dated 11th March, 1981, the respondent is said to have come to the gate of the appellant mills on 16th March, 1981, and submitted an application to the Labour Officer for being taken on duty but admittedly he was not taken on duty. The fact that the respondent had come to the gate of the factory on the aforesaid date and had made such an application to the Labour Officer is confirmed by the endorsement of the Labour Officer on his application acknowledging its receipt on 16th March, 1981 at 11‑50 a. m. The above application was followed by a third letter from the respondent to the management, dated 21st March, 1981, complaining that although he had repeatedly been going to the gate of the mills for performing his duties, he had been refused admission. On the same date, the respondent was informed that he had been charge‑sheeted on 10th March, 1981 for remaining absent from duties for a period exceeding 10 days, that no reply to the charge‑sheet has been received by the manage ment so far and that the domestic enquiry, in respect of the charges would be held on 30th March, 1981 before Abdul Rasheed, Enquiry Officer. The respondent by his letter, dated 26th March, 1981, denied the allegations regarding his remaining absent from duties and contended that it was the management who was refusing to allow him to perform his duties. By another letter, dated 26th March, 1981, which was in reply to the mana gement's letter of 26th March, 1981, the respondent reiterated his allega tions that he bad been attempting time and again to report for duties at the mills but was not allowed admission and stated that even presently he was prepared forthwith to join his duties. From the endorsement on this application by the Labour Officer of the appellant Company it appears that this application was received by the Labour Officer on 26th March, 1981 at 3‑30 p. m., but nevertheless the respondent was not taken on duty. The respondent, by his letter, dated 29th March, 1981, reminded the manage ment about his request contained in his letter, dated 26th March, 1981 for being taken up on duty but no action on this letter of his to report for duty was taken by the management. Again by his letters, dated 11th April, 1981, and 14th April, 1981, the respondent has asserted that on 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th, be bad been attempting to come to the mills for the purpose of participating in the domestic enquiry against him but was stopped at the gate and was not allowed to enter the mills. Finally, in his letters, dated 19th April, 1981, the respondent has narrated that he was asked by the Enquiry Officer to put his thumb impression on prepared documents but when he refused to do so, he was thereatened, beaten and turned out and hence he was submitting his report to the management. The above correspondence would seem to support the claim of the respon dent that repeatedly from 1st March, 1981 onwards he had been attempting to perform his duties but he was not allowed to perform his duties and to participate in the enquiry. Leaving aside for the time being the question whether the respondent had or had not attempted to come to the mills on any dates prior to 19th April, 1981, it has been admitted by the appellant‑Company and its witnesses that on the said day at 10‑00 o'clock, the appellant had appeared before the enquiry officer for parti cipating in the enquiry proceedings. The version of the appellant‑Company, however, is that whereas the respondent refused to comply with the reasonable direction of the enquiry officer to put his thumb impression on the record of the enquiry in token of his presence and walked out from the enquiry proceedings, which accordingly were held ex parte, the version of the respondent is that he was directed by the enquiry officer to put his thumb impression on prepared documents and on his refusal to do so, he was thereatened, beaten up and turned out. The 2 versions tally at least on the point that the respondent was directed by the enquiry officer to put his thumb impression on some documents prepared by him. It is possible that these documents were only the record of the presence of the parties during the enquiry as claimed b‑y the enquiry officer or it may have been some statements of the respondent or the witness prepared by the enquiry officer, as claimed by the respondent, who incidentally is an illiterate person and cannot sign his name. In view of the fact that the respondent is totally illiterate, he should not have been asked to put his thumb impression on any document before any evidence was recorded or if this was considered necessary he should have been given assistance of a co‑worker and either the signature of the co‑worker or the respondent should then have been taken on the statements recorded. Since this was not done, I am inclined to the view that the version of the respondent appears to be more plausible. There was no reason for the respondent to come for the enquiry proceedings and then boy cott the same unless he apprehended‑and there. was good reason for such apprehension for the reason that he had previously been refused entry into the mills that a trap had been set for him and he was asked to put his thumb impression on prepared documents. I am, there fore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the )earned Labour Court that the respondent was not afforded proper, opportunity of defending himself in the 2 domestic enquiries. Although according to the appellant‑Company the appellant had walked out of the enquiry No. 0057, which was to be held on 19th March, 1981 at 10‑00 a. m., and it is alleged that the respondent failed to turn up for the second enquiry bearing No. 0052, which was to be held at 2‑00 p. m., it is obvious that if the respondent had been beaten up in the earlier enquiry and turned out he could not be expected to return for the second enquiry on the same day particularly when he had been prevented from entering the mills on earlier occasions. Taking all these circum stances into consideration, I am not satisfied that the respondent was allowed a proper opportunity of defence or that it was he who had walked out or had deliberately absented from the enquiry proceedings.

8. Coming next to the alleged incident of 1st March, 1981, I have already referred to the version of the respondent that he was not allowed to perform his duties although he had come to perform the same at 10‑45 p. m. The version of the management on the other hand, is that on being asked by the Shift Incharge, Syed Muhammad Shah, as to why the respondent had remained absent on 28th February, 1981 the respondent misbehaved with and used improper and unbecoming language towards Syed Muhammad Shah and walked away without perfor ming his duties. The incident is stated to have taken place during the night shift when a large number of workers must have been present at the Section where the respondent was employed. However, the only other person who was examined in the domestic enquiry on this charge, besides the Shift Incharge, Syed Muhammad Shah, was Moosa Khan Carding Jobber. There is no evidence to show that this Carding Jobber belongs to the Section in which the respondent was employed or has any business to be in that Section, it is also not understood why the respondent, if it was he who had misbehaved with the Shift Incharge should have walked out from the factory without performing his duties particularly when he had come all the way to attend the shift in the night. Moreover, no written report of this incident has come on the record of the learned Labour Court. It is unthinkable that the Shift Incharge should have been insulted and misbehaved with and yet no complaint in this behalf would have been made in writing to the manage ment on the very night. Another important ;circumstance which goes against the case of the appellants in regards to the respondents' alleged misbehaviour with Syed Muhammad Shah, the Shift Incharge, is that on 1st March, 1981 the respondent has been shown absent from his duties in his attendance sheet. It has been admitted by the Time‑Keeper of the appellants that no entry or endorsement was made in the card of the respondent that he had attended and had subsequently left with out doing any work, as is the case of the appellant‑Company, nor even in the attendance sheet. If the respondent had come inside the factory and remained there for half‑ an hour, as claimed by the witnesses of the appellants, such an entry would clearly have been made in his atten dance card and in the attendance sheet.

9. It next falls to be considered whether the respondent alongwith some other persons stoned the vehicle of the appellant‑Company in which the Shift Incharge, Syed Muhammad Shah, was travelling on 2nd March, 1981. The learned Labour Court has held that since the vehicle was stoned at some distance from the mills of the appellants, it will not constitute misconduct falling under Standing Order

15. The view taken by the learned Labour Court is not sound. Item (h) of clause 3 of Stand ing Order 15 is in 2 parts. The first part relates to riotous or disorderly behaving during working hours at the establishment, while the act of second part relates to acts subversive of discipline. While the act of riotious or disorderly behaviour must be not only during working hour but at the establishment, the act subversive of discipline need no necessarily be during working hours or at the establishment. There are a large number of authorities in support of the view that an act can be subversive of discipline though it is not committed during the working hours or at the establishment provided that it is connected with the working or the discipline in the establishment. In the case reported as Diwan Badri Das and others v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab (1961 P L C 1694), the facts were that the management of the Trustees of the Newspaper "Tribune" after a preliminary enquiry, appointed a Committee to investigate and report on certain acts of misconduct of a workman alleged to have been committed by him while on leave. outside the premises of the establishment but within the Colony of the workers of the establishment. On the basis of the report of the Committee that the workman was guilty of most of charges framed against him, the services of the workman were terminated. The Industrial Tribunal held that the management bad no jurisdiction to enquire into the above acts of misconduct because ; (1) the person abused by the workman was an outsider ; (ii) the quarrel was not in or near the premises of the establishment ; (iii) the workman was on leave and off duty at that time ; and (iv) there were no Standing Orders to regulate the conduct of the category of workmen to which the workman belonged. Reversing the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, the India Punjab High Court held that if a responsible workman of a commercial concern behaved himself in such a way, even outside the premises of the concern or even when he was off duty, that it impaired the reputation of the concern or was calculated to create resentment against the same or unrest among its workers, the Management would be perfectly justified in treating that conduct as one calculated to harm its reputation and as one being sub versive of discipline.

10. In another case from the Indian jurisdiction, reported as Central India Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Bilas Shobnath (1961 P L C 543), the Supreme Court of India held that riotous and disorderly conduct in quarters near place of work would constitute misconduct and fall within the scope of the Standing Orders where such conduct on the part of a workman of a mine in quarters provided in the mine area itself, may lead to breach of peace in that area and such workman may be dismissed under the provisions of the Standing Orders. My learned predecessor in the case reported as Ahmed v. Mls. Bawany Violin Textile Mills Ltd. (1969 P L C 789), held that the word "or" appearing in Standing Order 15 (3) (h) was disjunctive and not conjuctive and that an act subversive of discipline, even if committed after working hours, would fall within the ambit of misconduct under the said Standing Order. In the case reported as Muhammad Kabir v. Pakistan Tourist Development Corporation (1978 P L C 492), the Chairman of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal observed that in determining whether an act was subversive of discipline and fall within the ambit of Standing Order 15 (3) (h), the time and place only are not material factors but the nature of the act may be kept in view. In that case it was held that a workman charged with abduction of the daughter of a workman living in residential quarters provided by the employer was guilty of an act subversive of discipline falling under Stand ing Order 15 (3) (h), as such act impaired the reputation of employer's establishment and was not only calculated to create resentment but also unrest among its workers. I have also in the case of Gharo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Muhammad Sultan (1980 P L C 999), held that the condition of the act being committed during working hours on the establishment are applicable to riotous or disorderly behaviour and that an act subversive of discipline even though not committed during working hours or on the establishment may constitute misconduct and be subversive of discipline. In that case the accused waylaid the Security Incharge on way from rounds of factory to residential quarter and abused, insulted and assaulted him with reference to his duties and performance.

11. If, therefore, the respondent is found to have stoned the appellant‑Company's vehicle in which the Shift Incharge, Syed Muhammad Shah, was travelling, though the stoning was at some distance from the, premises of the appellant, the respondent would be clearly guilty of misconduct and could be rightly punished with dismissal from his service. I am, however, of the opinion that the evidence on this charge is not reliable. The evidence on this charge is of Syed Muhammad Shah himself and the driver of the vehicle, Muhammad Nawaz. Although both witnesses have supported the charge that it was the respondent who along. with 10 or 12 others had stoned the vehicle but I find it difficult to rely upon their testimony in this behalf. The incident admittedly took place some time after 10‑00 p. m., near the Chungi Naka in Latifabad No.

12. There is no evidence that .here were any road lights at the place of the incident. Identification in such circumstance would at the best be of doubtful value, particularly, when there were a number of persons allegedly throwing stones at the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle Muhammad Nawaz. has admitted that be did not identify the persons throwing the vehicle and wanted to stop the vehicle in order to find out who they were but he was directed by Syed Muhammad Shah not to stop the vehicle and was further informed by Syad Muhammad Shah that it was Abdul Rasheed who alongwith his companions were stoning the vehicle. According to the witness it was only thereafter that he identified the respondent as the person who was throwing stones at the vehicle. Although Syed Muhammad Shah has stated that the respondent and his companions had thrown stones, driver Muhammad Nawaz has gone further and stated that besides throwing stones, they were hurling vulgar abuses and also raising slogans. This indicates that no reliance cap be placed on the testimony of this witness and his varacity. There was also another . person in the vehicle at the time, but he was not examined before the enquiry officer. Although the stoning of a vehicle on a public road is a serious matter, no report of the incident was made to the Police nor does it appear that the driver of the vehicle made a written report of the incident to the management. At least no such report either from the'., driver or even from Syed Muhammad Shah came before the enquiry officer. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, I am of view that the evidence before the enquiry officer does not inspire confidence and hence it cannot be said that it was the respondent who was responsible for stoning the vehicle in which Syed Muhammad Shah was travelling.

12. This brings me to the consideration to the last contention raised by Mr. Muhammad Ghani namely, whether the respondent remained absent from his duties without leave for a period exceeding 10 days with effect from 28th February, 1981. I have already referred to the various letters written by the respondent wherein he has claimed that right from 1st March, 1981 he bad been repeatedly making attempts to do work in the mills but he was prevented from entering the mills and to perform his duties. It is an admitted fact that the respondent remained in the mills on 1st March, 1981 for about 1/2 hour. During this period he must have done some work. It is, however, claimed by the management, including Syed Muhammad Shah, that the appellant did not work during this time. It is difficult to believe that during this period the respondent did no work. Even, if one could believe the Shift Incharge, Syed Muhammad Shah and his Carding Jobber, Muhammad Moosa, that the respondent misbehaved with and used highly improper language towards Syed Muhammad Shah, when the latter enquired from him as to why he remained absent on 28th February, 1981, it is hardly likely that this would have taken more than a few minutes. It has not been explained what the respondent was doing for the remaining part of 1/2 hour when he was in the mills. 1t is difficult to believe that the respondent would have remained idle during shift hours. Moreover, if it was the respondent who misbehaved with his superiors, he either would not have left the mills, as he is alleged to have done or if he had left the mills, he would not have thereafter attempted to return but according to the respondent he made repeated attempts to do so. The case of the appellant mills all along has been that the respondent unauthorizedly remained absent from his duties with effect from 28th February, 1981, but if the version of the appellant mills is accepted that the respondent had attended the mills on 1st March, 1981 for 1/2 hours, then, this would destroy the second charge against the respondent, as rightly observed by the learned Labour Court. I am inclined to the view that it was not the respondent who deliberately remained absent from his duties without leave but he was possibly not allowed to perform duties and even to enter the mills.

13. The learned Labour Court has taken the view that since the appellant‑Company had issued a second show‑cause notice to the respondent, it was incumbent upon it to give the respondent a reasonable opportunity of making a reply to it and also to supply to the respondent the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded during the 2 domestic enquiries for the purposes of submitting a reply to the show cause notice. It is, however, now settled law that neither the service of a second show‑cause notice after .the completion of an enquiry nor the supply of a report of the enquiry officer is a requirement either of Standing Order, 15 (4) or of natural justice see Dawood Cotton Mills v. Guftar Shah (P L D 1981 S C 225). The above view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Messrs International Laboratories Ltd. v. Employees' Union and another (P L D 1982 S C 460). As regards want of personal hearing in the instant case, I may refer to the case reported as Dr. Mumtaz v. University of Sind, Hyderabad and others (P L D 1966 (W. P.) Kar. 429), where it has been held that a personal hearing before deciding the matter is not a necessary requirement of the principle of natural justice and all that is necessary is that a full and fair oppor tunity of making representation or showing cause be given, what is full and fair opportunity clearly depends upon the facts of each ease. I may also refer in this behalf to my decision in the case of Asghor Ali v. Pakistan ‑Fisheries Ltd. (1982 P L C 184), where I had taken the view that copies of the state ments of witnesses need not be supplied before action is being. taken.

14. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would dismiss the appeal but in view of the fact that the proceedings in this case have dragged on for about 18 months and further there is no evidence that in the interval, the respondent was not gainfully employed elsewhere, I would reduce the award of back benefits to the respondent of 50%. A. E. Appeal dismissed.