1988 PLP 734 (MLD)

This was a suit for perpetual injunction brought by Malik Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff, against the Province of Punjab and the Multan Development Authority, Multan "restraining the defendants/respondents from acquiring-the property in dispute for the purpose of scheme drawn up by defendant No. 2 vide resolution No 11 of 1973 and giving effect to the same under the provisions of Act No.VIII of 1973 or in any manner or for any purpose". The suit was dismissed by judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Multan, dated 30-7-1986. On appeal, however, the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, passed a decree by his judgment dated 19-25-1987 "restraining the defendants-respondents from acquiring the Property in dispute for the purpose of Scheme drawn up by defendant No.2 Resolution No.11 of 1973 and giving effect to the same under the provisions of Act No.VIII of 1973 or in any manner or for any purpose and adding that "the defendants-respondents would be at liberty to proceed into the matter afresh in accordance with law if so advised"..

2. It should be mentioned here that Malik Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff had died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives, Malik Zahoor Hussain, Malik Muhammad Nawaz, sons, and Mst. Sughran Bibi, widow, were brought on the record. They and the Province of the Punjab are the respondents in this revision petition.

3. The Multan Development Authority, Multan, has filed this revision petition under section 115 of the C.P.C.

4. The land in suit comprises Khasra Nos. 1225 and 122.6 measuring "? Kanals 9 Marlas and k1hasra No.122r/1 measuring 4 Kanals 5 Marlas. Admittedly, it belongs to the plaintiffs. On 4-1-1962, the Multan Improvement Trust passed Resolution No.42 approving the proposal of Major Muhammad Afzal Khan Daha Trustee "that a Commercial Scheme may be framed at this place. The site measures about 6 Acres, 7 Kanals and 11 Marlas and is suitable for the purpose". This scheme was under sections 24 and 28 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The scheme was duly approved by the Government and in pursuance thereof, the Collector was asked to acquire the land included in the scheme, including the land in suit. The plaintiffs' case was that the acquisition proceedings were completed. Vide a Letter No.33/50-LAC, dated 15-12-1972, the Collector called upon the Improvement Trust "to deposit Rs.3,12,713.66 in the Government Treasury for the purpose of awarding compensation". The process 41 compensation was, thus, completed tinder the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the meantime, the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973 (VIII of 1973) came into force from 14-3-1973; the maximum rate of compensation awardable under that Act was Rs.20,000 per acre. The Improvement Trust, therefore, "with mala fide intention and ulterior motive" restarted the proceedings of acquisition under that Act "with a view to deprive the plaintiffs of the compensation that was awarded by the Land Acquisition Act of 1894". It was said that "after having cancelled the housing scheme a fresh scheme for the same purpose cannot be. drawn up and approved on the basis of Act, VIII of 1973 with a view to deprive the plaintiffs of the compensation that had already been determined"; that the scheme once having been dropped cannot be drawn up under the law in the manner of the circumstances mentioned above and that, therefore, the notification dated 25-6-1973 was void, without jurisdiction and ultra vices.

5. The suit was contested by the second defendant, namely, the Multan Improvement Trust, by filing a written statement. It appears that the facts that under the Town Improvement Act, 1922, a scheme was sanctioned and the proceedings for the acquisition of the land in suit in pursuance of that scheme were initiated and completed; that on the coming into force of the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973, the acquisition proceedings under the Town Improvement Act, 1922 were "cancelled" and that a new scheme under the tatter Act was framed and proceedings for the acquisition of the land in suit under that scheme were set in motion were not expressly denied. The plea taken by the Improvement Trust was that they were entitled to take advantage of the provisions of the Punjab Acquisition of I-and (Housing) Act, 1973.

6. The Multan Improvement Trust also raised a number of preliminary pleas. On the parties pleadings, the learned Civil Judge formulated the following (1) Whether the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction is try the suit? (2) Whether the plaintiff has not served the defendants with the legal notice prior to the institution of the suit, if so its effect? (3) Whether the suit is barred by section 56 of the Specific Relief Act? (4) Whether the suit is time-barred? (5) Whether the plaintiff is estopped to bring the present suit by his own conduct? (6) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of res judicata? ' (6-A) Whether acquisition proceedings under Punjab Land Acquisition (Housing) Act, 1973, are mala fide and with ulterior motive? If so, its effect? (7) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and the defendants are not authorised to acquire the same for the purposes of housing scheme? (8) Relief.

7. The learned Civil Judge dealt with issues Nos. 6-A and 7 together; he found that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in suit; that it was correct that the acquisition proceedings under the Acquisition of Land Act, 1894 were dropped "but proceedings under Punjab Land Acquisition Act, 1973 were initiated and in pursuance of Exh.P-1, a letter was issued to Land Acquisition Collector, Multan, on 24-5-1973 copy of which is Exh.P-5 and in pursuance of it, on 8th June, 1973 a Notification was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Multan under section 4 of the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. Then on 22-8-1974 a Notification was issued by Collector, Multan, under section 6(1) of the Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973, the copy of which is on the record so these documents reveal that acquisition proceedings under the 1973 Act issued and completed and no irregularities have been made in this respect". As regards the compensation, the learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that "although the rate according to 1973 Act was fixed as Rs.20,000 per acre but as per directions of Law Department the photostat of which is included and judicial notice is being taken, it was decided to deposit the compensation only not to cause the pecuniary damage to the plaintiffs". In this connection, the learned Civil Judge noticed copes of challans Exh.D-2 and Exh.D-3, which proved the deposit of the amount of compensation. As compensation had been deposited "under the previous compensation award", the objection of the plaintiffs that compensation was being paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1973, so held the learned Civil Judge, "does not hold water and the act of defendant No. 2 cannot be declared as mala fide because plaintiffs were not suffered with financial loss". The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, of the view that the acquisition of the land under the 1973 Act could not be said to be mala fide, for, "the previous compensation award amounting to Rs.3,12,713.66 was deposited and no loss has been caused to the plaintiffs, so the acquisition proceedings cannot be termed as mala fide one".

8. The learned Civil Judge was also of the view that as no illegality or irregularity in the acquisition of land had been committed, and the proceedings were not mala fide, "so the Court has got no jurisdiction and 'issue is decided against the defendants'.

9. The learned Additional District Judge referred to the award dated 8-4-1977 Exh.D-1 and found that award was given on the request of the Director- General of the Multan Development Authority, Multan, "without legally fulfilling the requirements of the acquisition proceedings under the new Act. It was also clear that without conducting the proceedings under the new .Act the respondent by their own sweet-will and with some ulterior motive, compelled the Land Acquisition Collector to announce the award under the old Act without issuing any fresh notification under sections 4 and 6 of the said old Act. It is also evident that acquisition proceedings initiated under the new Act were also dropped inasmuch as no proceedings were conducted as are envisaged under sections 7 to 11 of the new Act." The learned Additional District Judge then referred to the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Repealing Act, 1985, and observed that the plaintiffs were owners in possession of the property, "inasmuch as no compensation of award was announced under the Act VIII of 1973 nor any compensation or award has been deposited under the said Act". The learned Additional District Judge, thus, reached the conclusion that the impugned action of the defendants was mala fide and, therefore, the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to hear the suit.

10. The Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter to be called the 1922 Act) ceased to apply to Multan City on the establishment of the Multan Development Authority by a notification under section 4 of the Punjab Development of Cities Ordinance 1976, dated 8-5-1976. The Multan Development Authority (hereinafter to be walled the petitioner) is, therefore, the successor-in-interest of the Improvement Trust, Multan.

11. The Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973 (Act VIII of 1973) was published in the Gazette of Punjab, Extraordinary, dated 4th March, 1973 and will hereinafter be called the 1973 Act. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, will, for the sake of brevity, be called the 1894 Act.

12. Section 24 of the 1922 Act empowered the Trust, for the purpose of development of any locality, to prepare a development scheme or an expansion scheme. By section 28 of that Act, a scheme so prepared should provide for all or any of the matters enumerated therein, including the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

13. Section 36 of the 1922 Act provided that when a scheme had been framed, the Trust would prepare a notice mentioning the facts stated therein and publish it in accordance therewith and section 38 required the said notice to be served on the person whom the Trust had reason to believe after due inquiry to be the owner of any immovable property which it was proposed to acquire in executing the scheme and on the occupier of such premises. Section 40 provided that after the expiry of periods respectively prescribed under sections 36, 37 and 38 in respect of any scheme, the Trust would consider any objection or representation received thereunder and after hearing all persons or their representatives making any such objection or representation, who might desire to be heard, the Trust might either abandon the scheme or apply to the Provincial Government for sanction to the scheme with such modifications as the Trust might deem necessary. Section 4, empowered the Provincial Government to sanction a scheme either with or without modification, or refuse to sanction it and section 42 required the Provincial Government to notify the sanction of every scheme under that Act and required the trust to forthwith proceed to execute such scheme. Section 42-A empowered the provincial government, on the request of the Trust, to permit the abandonment of the whole or part of a scheme sanctioned under section 41 and notify such permission in the official Gazette and section 43 empowered the Trust to alter a scheme "at any time between its sanction by the Provincial Government and its execution."

14. Reference may with advantage also be made to section 56 of the 1922 Act. It provided that if in any locality comprised in any scheme under that Act, the Provincial Government had sanctioned the acquisition of land which was subsequently discovered to be unnecessary for the execution of the scheme the owner of such land, or any person having an interest therein, might make an application to the Trust requesting that the acquisition of such land be abandoned in consideration of the payment by him of a sum to be fixed by the Trust in that behalf, provided the application reached the Trust before the time fixed by the Collector under section 9 of the 1894 Act.

15. As noticed above: the 1922 Act ceased to apply to Multan City in the `I`' year 1979 on the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976. By section 47 of the latter Act, it is provided that on the establishment of the authority under that Ordinance, the Town Improvement Act, 1922 "shall cease to apply to the area and all schemes, projects, or works started under the said Act but not completed shall be taken over by the Authority and executed under the provisions of this Act"; and "notwithstanding the fact of the Town Improvement Act, 1922, ceasing to apply to the Areas, ail rules, regulations and orders made, notifications issued, land acquired, schemes prepared, or executed suits instituted by or against the Improvement Trust or any other right accrued, or liability incurred or action taken, or proceedings initiated, shall so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force and be deemed to have been made, imposed, levied, entered into, instituted, prepared, executed, accrued or incurred, taken and initiated under this Act".

16. The 1973 Act envisaged its own "Housing Scheme", which meant a scheme providing for residential sites, houses or apartments and declared by section 3 thereof that "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other law for the time being in force, all land within the Province shall be liable to acquisition at any time under this Act for a housing scheme approved and notified by Government or Official Development Agency"; the latter term included the Improvement Trust constituted under the 1922 Act. As to the procedure for the acquisition of land, section 4 thereof empowered the Deputy Commissioner to publish a notification in the Official Gazette that land in any locality was needed or was likely to be needed for any housing scheme; upon the publication of that notification, it was lawful for any officer to enter upon any such land. Section 6 of the Act required the Collector to cause public notice to be given stating that Government intended to take possession of the land and that claim to compensation for all interests in such land should be made to him. After hearing the objections, if any, under section 7 of the Act, the Collector was empowered to determine the amount to be paid as compensation in accordance with sections 9 and 10 of the Act. As noticed above, the maximum rate of compensation to be determined by the Collector under the Act "shall not exceed Rs.20,000 per acre".

17. Turning to the facts of the case, it is common ground between the parties that a scheme under sections 24 and 28 of the 1922 Act was prepared by the Improvement Trust, Multan in the year 1962; it appears that after the necessary formalities under sections 36, 38 and 40 of the 1922 Act had been fulfilled, the Improvement Trust applied to the Provincial Government for the sanction of the Hassan Parwana Road Scheme and the Provincial Government had, in exercise of its powers under section 41 of that Act, sanctioned the scheme. The sanction so accorded by the Provincial Government was duly notified under section 42 of that Act. These facts are borne out by the copy of Resolution No. 42 (Exh.P-4) and copy of Resolution No.15, dated 27-1-1971 (Exh.P-2). The latter resolution mentions the notification, by which, the scheme was sanctioned by the Provincial Government. By Exh.P-2, the Trust had asked the Land Acquisition Collector to give his award determining the amount of compensation. On 16-2-1973, the Collector asked the Trust to arrange to deposit the approximate amount of Rs.3,12,713.66 "on account of cost of land into Government Treasury, Multan, under head Revenue Deposit-Compensation Money".

18. The 1973 Act came into force on 14-3-1973; on 28-3-1973, the Improvement Trust passed Resolution No. 11 (Exh.P-1); in that resolution was mentioned the advice obtained from the Legal Advisor of the Trust advising the Trust to abandon previous acquisition of land proceedings and to acquire the land under the 1973 Act. The Trust accorded its approval to this proposal. By a letter dated 24-5-1973 (Exh.P-5), the Improvement Trust informed the Land Acquisition Collector that "the Multan Improvement Trust vide its Resolution No.11, dated 28-3-1973 decided to drop the previous acquisition proceedings and to acquire the land in question under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. "A draft Notification under section 4 of the 1973 Act was sent and a request was made to the Land Acquisition Collector" to please proceed in the matter expeditiously as the case has already been delayed. Then comes Notification No.184-LAC of 8th June, 1973 published in the Punjab Gazette of 25th June, 1973 Exh.P-3. This Notification was issued under section 4 of the 1973 Act; it included the land in suit; by it, the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied that the land mentioned therein was needed or was likely to be needed for the execution of the housing scheme known as Housing Scheme situate on Hassan Parwana Road outside Bohar Gate, which, the Multan Improvement Trust, Multan, an Official Development Agency vide Resolution No. 42, dated 4th January, 1962 "conceived and approved". The intention that the Trust proposed to acquire the land under the 1973 Act was conveyed to Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff, and Abdus Salam son of Muhammad Bakhsh vide notices Exhs. P-9 and P-8 dated 21-6-1974 inviting objections. In these notices, the Notification No.184/LAC, dated 25-6-1973 was expressly mentioned.

19. This suit was instituted on 4-12-1975. To recapitulate, the plaintiffs' case was that though the proceedings for the acquisition of the land under the 1922 Act had been completed, so much so that the Collector had called upon the Trust to deposit Rs.3,12,713.66 as the approximate amount of compensation, yet those proceedings were "cancelled; that with mala fide intention and ulterior motive, the Trust tried to avail itself q*e provisions of the 1973 Act "with a view to deprive the plaintiffs of the compensation that was awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" and that as the Trust had been moved in so proceeding under the 1973 Act by mala fides, it was not entitled to do so. In the written statement, the Trust did not expressly deny the allegation that the acquisition proceedings under the 1922 Act "had been cancelled". What it said was that it was fully competent to take advantage of the provisions of the 1973 Act.

20. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs appeared to suggest that the scheme under the 1922 Act was at the stage of proposal and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings could not have been taken in pursuance of that scheme. This contention does not take due notice of Exh.P-2, which as seen above, mentions the Notification dated 21-1-1971, by which, the scheme had been sanctioned by the Government, the inference being that this was done under section 42 of the 1922 Act.

21. We must, therefore, proceed on the footing that the scheme had been duly sanctioned by the Provincial Government under section 41 and notified under section 42 of the 1922 Act. There is, however, no question that the acquisition proceedings under the 1922 Act read with the provisions of the 1894 Act had been dropped and the acquisition of the land in suit had been abandoned with a view to acquiring the land in suit under the 1973 Act. This is demonstrably clear from the Resolution No.11, dated 28-3-1973 (Exh.P.l) and the Trust's letter dated 24-5-1973 (Exh.P-5) as also from the Notification dated 8th June, 1973 published in the Punjab Gazette of 25th June 1973 (Exh.P-3) and the notices Exhs.P-8 and P-9, dated 21-6-1974.

22. The position that emerges, therefore, is that at the date of the suit, the Trust had abandoned the acquisition proceedings under the 1922 Act read with the provisions of the 1894 Act as amended by the former Act with the declared intention of acquiring the land under the 1973 Act. This was evidently done to avoid the payment of the compensation according to the market value of the land, that being the criterion for determining the compensation under the 1894 Act.. Under the 1973 Act, the maximum rate of compensation was not to exceed Rs.20,000 per acre under section 9 thereof. Thus, the intention was clear, namely, 1, that instead of paying as much as Rs.3,12,713.66 which was the approximate amount of compensation, according to the Land Acquisition Collector's letter dated 16-2-1973 (Exh. P-6), the Trust wanted to acquire the land in suit for mere Rs.60,

000. There is, therefore, no doubt that this was a clear case of mala fides and the Civil Courts are, therefore, competent to go into the vires of the Trust's fact. In Lahore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Province of Punjab A I R (30) 1943 Lah. 41, the plaintiff-Company had been requisitioned and subsequently acquired under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules. This was done during the pendency of a suit by the owners in which they had obtained a stay order against the Provincial Government restraining them from interfering with their possession. In a suit filed by the owners to challenge the acquisition, a Full Bench of this Court held that the order was not made bona fide and the bar contained in section 16 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, was not attracted. In Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others P L D 1972 S C 279, also a case of acquisition of land, one of the grounds which influenced the Supreme Court in holding the acquisition mala fide in law was that the property was already under requisition and being for the same purpose as was the purpose of the acquisition of the property. This applies equally here, for the land in suit was being acquired under the 1922 Act for a housing scheme when the Trust changed its mind on the coming into force of the 1973 Act and proceeded to acquire the land under the latter Act also for a housing scheme.

23. The proposed acquisition under the 1973 Act was bad also for the reason that it was not for any of the purposes of that Act. It has been seen that the 1973 of Act envisaged its own housing scheme; and when such a scheme was prepared or approved by the Official Development Agency, which included the Improvement Trust constituted under the 1922 Act, the housing scheme was subject to prior approval by the Government. The Deputy Commissioner's Notification dated 8th June, 1973 published in the Punjab Gazette, dated 25th June, 1973, however, shows that the land in suit was needed or was likely to be needed for the execution of the scheme "conceived and approved" under the 1922 Act. The scheme, under which the land was proposed to be acquired at the date of the suit, was, therefore, not a scheme under the 1973 Act and, therefore, the land was not being acquired for the purposes of that Act. In Murree Brewery's case, no scheme appeared to have been framed under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, under which, the land was proposed to be acquired and this was treated as a mala fides in law.

24. That brings us to the events which took place after the institution of the suit. It appears that in the meantime, Malik Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff, had approached the Chief Minister of the Punjab with an application; it is not known whether the Chief Minister had or had not made any order on his application; what is known is that by its letter dated 5-3-1976, the Trust asked Malik Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff, if he would accept compensation as determined under the 1894 Act. There is no material on the record as to what was the reaction of Malik Muhammad Hussain, plaintiff. It appears that in the meantime, the Trust had also obtained the advice of the Law Department of the Provincial Government on the vires of acquisition proceedings under the 1973 Act and the advice of the Law Department was that those proceedings would be mala fide in law. The Trust, therefore, by a kind of relation back, purportedly resuscitated the proceedings under the 1894 Act and the Land Acquisition Collector announced an award on 8-3-1977 determining the compensation of the land in suit under the 1894 Act. In making the award, the Collector observed that though the Trust had, by its Resolution No.11, dated 28-3-1973, dropped the acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act and had decided to acquire the land in suit under the 1973 Act and though the proceedings under the 1894 Act had been "stopped" and further proceedings were initiated to acquire the land under the 1973 Act, "now Director-General, Multan Development Authority vide his memo . .......... dated 6-1-1977 has requested to announce the award for the land measuring 5 Acres 6 Kanals 3 Marlas situated in village Taraf Ismail, Tehsil Multan under the old Act i.e. 1894 for the said purpose".

25. Learned counsel for the Trust argued and in so doing appears to have adopted the view of the learned Civil Judge, that though the acquisition proceedings under the 1922 Act read with the provisions of the 1894, had been dropped, yet the scheme as framed under the 1922 Act had not been done away with and, therefore, the Trust and its successor, Multan Development Authority, were entitled to proceed under the 1894 Act. For one, this was not the Trust's case in the written statement; there, the Trust had persisted in its stand that it was entitled to proceed under the 1973 Act. Otherwise too the petitioner and its predecessor had been, if I may say so, blowing hot and cold and their conduct was hit by the well-known Scottish doctrine of "approbate and reprobate", which is analogous to that of election in the English Law; it is founded upon the principle that "no person can accept and reject the same instrument". The Trust had framed a scheme under the 1922 Act in January 1962. That scheme was sanctioned on 27-1-1971 as many as 9 years after the proceedings for the acquisition of the land in suit had been taken under the 1922 Act read with the provisions of the 1894 Act, so much so that the Land Acquisition Collector had asked the Trust to deposit the approximate amount of compensation. Then came the 1973 Act when the Trust turned round; and it passed a resolution abandoning the acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act and choosing to proceed under the 1973 Act. After the suit, once again, finding its position untenable in law, it changed its mind and directed the Land Acquisition Collector to proceed under the 1894 Act. It, therefore, did not lie in the mouth of the petitioner, that though the acquisition proceedings had been abandoned, yet the Scheme under the 1922 Act had remained. In any case as the acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act had been abandoned, every-thing done under that Act had come to an end and, therefore, the Trust or its successor, if it wanted to proceed afresh under the 1894 Act, had to begin again from the beginning; it could not resuscitate the acquisition proceedings which, according to its own documents, had been abandoned. To countenance the arguments of the learned counsel would allow the petitioner to accept and reject the same instrument and this cannot be allowed. This was, therefore a case, in which, the subsequent event determining the compensation of the land in suit under the 1894 Act was necessary to be noticed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and also for the reasons that the original relief claimed by the plaintiffs had by reason of change in the circumstances, become wholly inappropriate by the petitioner's own act. Reference in this behalf may be made to The Province of East Pakistan v. Major Nawab Khawaja Hasan Askary and others P L D 1971 S C 82.

26. It remains to mention that the petitioner had also abandoned the acquisition proceedings under the 1973 Act, for, as has been seen above, it had directed the Land Acquisition Collector to determine the amount of compensation under the 1894 Act and he had, vide his award dated 8-4-1977 (Exh.D-1), proceeded accordingly. Be that as it may, the 1973 Act was repealed the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Repeal Act, 1985, and by its section first proviso, where in a case an award had not been made under section 7 of the 1973 Act, at the time of the commencement of the Repealing Act, 1985, the compensation in such a case "shall be assessed, awarded and paid under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894". a was not stated before me that the petitioner proposed to proceed under section 3 of the Repealing Act, 1985, and here, the petitioner was being consistent with itself, for, as the course of events clearly shows, the petitioner had long decided not to proceed under the 1973 Act.

27. For these reasons, I find no merit whatever in the revision petition. Even if there were any merit I would have been, in the facts of the case, in the exercise of my discretion, disinclined to interfere. As has been held above, the Trust was clearly moved by an ulterior motive in abandoning the acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act and in proceeding under the 1973 Act. This was a mala fide , act; but for it, this litigation would not have commenced. Thereafter, also, the Trust had been changing its positions. :t is common knowledge that the prices of land have registered a phenomenal increase since the acquisition proceedings had been initiated and as it was the Trust, petitioner's predecessor-in-interest itself which was to blame for all that happened, the petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary relief.

28. The petition is dismissed with costs throughout. A.A./M-915/L