P L D 1983 Lahore 383 (PLP)

This common judgment will dispose of the under noted civil revisions, and appeals namely :

1. Civil Revision No. 35 of 1983 2. do 37 of 1.983 3. do 38 of 1983 4. do 41 of 1983 5. do 44 of 1983 6. do 49 of 1983 7. do 51 of 1983 8. do 56 of 1983 9. do 57 of 1983 10. do 63 of 1983 , 11. do 66 of 1983 12. do 67 of 1983 13. do 70 of 1983 14. do 77 of 1983

15. Regular Second Appeal No. 25 of 1983 16. do 31 of 1983 17. do 37 of 1983 18. do 41 of 1983 filed by various persons against a number of judgments delivered by an Additional District Judge of Attock and a writ petition

19. Writ Petition No. 52 of 1981 filed by an aggrieved party against a judgment of a District Judge of Jhelum, whereby both these learned Judges dismissed their appeals on the ground that as no court-fees were paid on their respective memoranda of appeal, the same could not be treated as properly presented and preferred and that there were no appeals in the eye of law before them. In certain cases where the petitioners/appellants applied under section 149 and Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. read with section 28 of the Court Fees Act for permission to pay the requisite court-fees on their memoranda of appeal, they were dismissed as they were treated as having been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation.

2. Before taking-up the arguments addressed in this connection, I submit below the dates of the judgments of the appellate Court in respect of the cases which are before me :- Sr. No. No. of petition/appeal. Date of appellate Court's judgment.

1. C. R. No. 35 of 1983 9-2-1983 2. do 37 of 1983 10-2-1983 3. do 38 of 1983 9-2-1983 4. do 41 of 1983 9-2-1983 5. do 44 of 1983 9-2-1983 6. do 49 of 1983 10-2-1983 7. do 51 of 1983 9-2-1983 8. do 56 of 1983 30-1-1983 9. do 57 of 1983 10-2-1983 10. do 63 of 1983 10-2-1983 11. do 66 of 1983 25-1-1983 12. do 67 of 1983 29-1-1983 13. do 70 of. 1983 9-2-1983 14. do 77 of 1983 9-2-1983

15. R.S.A. No.25 of 1983 23-1-1983 16. do 31, of 1985 25-11-1983 17. do 37 of 1983 10-2-1983 18. do 4.1 of 1983 14-2-1983 19. do. P. No.52 of 1983 25-11-1980

3. Since all the above revisions, writ petitions and appeals relate to the interpretation of the Punjab Government's Notification No. 393-80/248-ST-I dated 4-2-1980 issued under section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, this common judgment will dispose of all the above revisions, writ petitions and appeals.

4. It is necessary and appropriate to first refer to the two notifications issued under section 35 of the Court Fees Act by the Punjab Government. The first Notification No. 5487-78/1800-ST-I dated 9-7-1978 reads as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to remit with effect from the Ist August, 1978, court-fee payable on plaints in civil suits under Article 1 of Schedule I when the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees and on complaints in criminal cases under Article 1(b) of Schedule II." The second Notification No. 353-80/248-ST-I dated 4-2-1980 read as follows "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the Governor of the Punjab in partial modification of the Punjab Government Notification No. 1487-78/1800-ST-I, dated the 9th July, 1978, is pleased to remit court-fee on any civil and revenue suits the value of the subject-matter whereof or of the relief claimed therein, does not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees, at all stages, in all Courts, including revenue Courts, and on complaints in criminal cases." Whilst on the subject, similar amendments brought about by the Sind and Baluchistan Governments in the same connection may also be referred. Section 2 of the Court Fees (Sind Amendment) Ordinance, XIII of 1.978, reads as follows : "Abolition of court fees in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Act VII of 1870), no court-fee shall be payable in a criminal case and, a case of civil nature the value of which does not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees." Section 2 of the North-West Frontier Province Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, XIV of 1978, reads as follows : "Abolition of court fee in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Court Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870) or any other law for the time being in force, or any rules or orders, no court-fee shall be payable in, or chargeable by, any Court in respect of (a) any criminal case ; and (b) any case of civil nature the value of the subject-matter whereof, or relief claimed wherein, does riot exceed twenty-five thousand rupees." The above mentioned Notifications and Ordinances issued relate to the measures taken by the Provincial Governments to abolish court-fees in respect of certain classes of cases, in view of the declared policy of the Federal Government to provide free justice up to a particular monetary ceiling.

5. The North-West Frontier Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, XIV of 1978, has been the subject of judicial review in Shah Zullah v. Syed Shahabud-Din and another (P L D 1979 Pesh. 33), where it has been held that the language of section 2 of the said Ordinance is exhaustive and exemptes court-fees leviable in all Courts, including the High Court, not only under the Court Fees Act, 1870, but also under other laws for the time being in force, or under other Rules or Orders, and that even process fees are not payable.

6. The memoranda of appeal preferred by the petitioners before the appellate Court did not bear any court-fees at all. They were apparently preferred on the basis that court-fees thereon were exempt, on the strength of. the Punjab Government's Notification dated 4-2-1980. The learned Additional District Judge, Attock, who heard and dismissed these appeals, on the different dates which are given in para. 2 of this judgment, furnished similar reasons in all his judgments. Briefly, they may be stated as follows : He held that a suit was a proceeding which commenced with the presentation of a plaint in the Court of initial jurisdiction ; that an appeal was a proceeding which commenced with the presentation of a memorandum of appeal before an appellate Court or authority ; that as held in Mir Baluch Khan and others v. Mst. Lal Bibi and others (P L D 1972 S C 84) and Majlish Khan v. Naimdhar Khan and others (P L D 1967 Dacca 689), the word "suits" did not include "appeals" ; that the words "civil suits" and "at all stages' did not apply to appeals or memoranda of appeal ; that in section 35 of the Court Fee Act, there was no mention of any suit or any stage of a suit ; that the Provincial Government could only reduce or remit court-fees in respect of documents given in the Schedule to the Act, but could not reduce or remit court-fees in respect of suits ; and that as the Court Fees Act provided for fees to be charged on documents and not on proceedings, the Notification dated 4-2-1980 was ultra vires of section 35 of the Court Fees Act. 7. 1 have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the appellants, the respondents and the State and have also perused the record.

8. Apart from the learned counsel connected with the present cases, other counsel, connected with similar cases in which the same matter was involved, but which cases were not ripe for arguments, also presented their arguments. Mr. Gul Zarin Kayani, Mr. Bashir Abroad Ansari, Malik Muhammad Jafar, Sh. Zamir Hussain, -Sh. Zia-ud-Din, Mr. Khalid lqbal Qazi, Mr. Muhammad Munir Paracha and Mr. Karim Bakhsh, Advocates, addressed their arguments on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants. They contended that since all the present petitions and appeals, except one, arose out of regular suits filed in the regular civil Courts, in all of which suits court-fees had been computed under section 7 of the Court Fees Act, that the word "suits" in the said section must be deemed to include appeals. In this connection, various authorities were- cited to show that the word "suit" included an appeal, that an appeal was a continuation of a suit, that an appellate Court was a Court of re-hearing and not a Court of error, . and that the pursuit of a remedy through a suit and an appeal was nothing but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by one intrinsic unity and should be regarded as one legal proceeding. In this connection, the following cases were referred : Muhammad Anwar Khan v. The. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi (P L D 1978 Lah. 716); Dada Limited v. Pakistan (P L D 1959 (W. P.) Kar. 264) ; Flour Mills Employees' Union v. Karachi Steam Roller Flour Mills Co. Ltd. (P L D 1964 Kar. 587) ; Nirmal Kumar Chattapadhya and others v. Nazrul Islam and others (P L D 1982 Dacca 600) ; Juma Khan v. Mst. Gul Ferosha (P L D 1972 Pesh. 1); Malik Feroze Din and others v. Malik Muhammad Din (A I R 1937 Lah. 694) ; Laehmeshwar Prasad Shukul and o/hers v. Keshwar Lai Chaudhuri and others (A I R 1941 F C 5) ; Garikapatl Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and others (P L D 1957 S C (Ind.) 448); F. A. Khan v. The Government of Pakistan (P L D 1964 S C 520) ; Sayeedur Rehman v. Chief Election Commissioner, Dacca etc. (P L D 1965 S C 157) and Muzafjar Ali v. Muhammad Shoff (P L D 1981 S C 94). On the basis of these cases, it was contended that the word "suits" in section 7 of the Court Fees Act covered appeals and that the words "civil suits" in the Notification of 4-2-1980 covered appeals. It was also contended that the words "at all stages" and "in all Courts" covered every document filed in civil suits at every step in the proceedings, whether in the original jurisdiction or in review, revision or appeal. Lastly, it was contended that assuming this Court held that the court-fee on the appeals preferred by the petitioners before the District Judge, Attock, were not exempt, that the appeals should be remanded for rehearing, as the appellate Judge had not called upon the appellants before him to make good the deficiency in court-fees, as required by section 28 of the Court Fees Act, or decided the applications filed before him under section 149 read with Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. on correct judicial principles. In,this connection, Dyal Singh and others v. Ram Rakha and others (109 P R 1912) ; Muhammad Nawaz Khan and others v. Makhdoom Syed Ghulam Mujtaba Shah and another (P L D 1970 S C 37) ; Shah Nawaz and 6 others v. Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others (1972 S C M R 179) and Muhammad Siddique and 2 others v. Master Muhammad Ibrahim and 3 others (P L D 1981 Lah. 97) were cited.

9. Apart from the learned counsel for the respondents connected with the present cases, other counsel, connected with similar cases in which the same matter was involved, but which eases, were not ripe for arguments, also presented their arguments. Khawaja Muhammad Yousaf Saraf, Advocate, presented the leading arguments, followed by Mr. S. M. Naeem Advocate. According to Kh. Saraf, a suit did not include an appeal, for the purposes of Court Fees Act, and wherever a Provincial Legislature desired such a construction, a special definition was added to section 2 of the Court Fees Act, as was done by the Provinces of U. P., Orissa and Bengal. In this connection, learned counsel referred to the special definition incorporated in section 2 of the Court Fees Act by the said Provincial Governments to include in the definition of "suit", the concept of appeal. Learned counsel also submitted that the view. of some judges that a "suit" included an appeal or that an appeal was included within the word "suit", was perhaps a careless expression of the principle that an appeal was a continuation of a suit. Learned counsel further contended that the principle that an appeal was a continuation of a suit, was only relevant for the purposes of certain distinct matters, such as lis pendens, limitation, res judicata, consideration of fresh facts or change of law at the appellate stage, etc., as is apparent from the following cases : Balkishan and another v. Kishan Lai (I L R 11 All. 148) Ram Saroop and others v. Board of Revenue. Uttar Pradesh, Allahbad and another (A I R 1954 All. 639) Farkhundali Nanhay v. V. B. Potdar and another (A I R 1962 Bom. 162) and Provas Chandra Poddar v. Visyaraju Kasf Viswanatham Raju and another (A I R 1962 Orissa 149). Learned counsel submitted that such a principle could not freely be applied to the Court Fees Act. With regard to the words "at all stages" appearing in the Notification of 4-2-1980, learned counsel conceded that these words related to the stage after the institution of the suit, right upto the date of final decision, and covered documents filed during this period, but contended that it did not include the stage of revision and appeal. As regards the words "in all Courts" appearing in the said Notification, learned counsel submitted that the draftsman used these words in the light of the provisions in the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, where the classes of Courts were defined in section 3 of the said Ordinance and the scope of the jurisdiction of the District Judge was limited to original jurisdiction only as stated in section 7, and that, therefore, the revisional and the appellate jurisdictions were not covered. It was also suggested that the words "including revenue Court" were added in the Notification, as section 3 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, only covered civil Courts.

10. On behalf of the Provincial Government Mr. Khalil Ramdey, Assistant Advocate-General Punjab, submitted that the impugned Notification covered all documents which were chargeable to court-fees, if they were filed in any civil or revenue suit, right from the date of its first institution through every step during its trial in the original jurisdiction and through every step during the proceedings in the review, revisional or appellate jurisdictions and court-fees on all such documents stood remitted. He submitted that he had instructions to state that the Provincial Government stood by the said Notification to this unlimited extent. He further submitted that he had further instructions to state that the Provincial Government was already drafting an Ordinance to remove all misgivings or anamolies arising out of the wording of the second Notification and that the said Ordinance was expected to be introduced at an early date.

11. The Court Fees Act, 1870, is not exhaustive on the subject of courtfees. Court-fee is presently a Provincial subject and many Provincial enactments contain provisions relating to the levy of court-fees. Under section 6 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule to the said Act can be filed, exhibited or recorded in a Court, other than a High Court, or can be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there is paid a court-fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document, section 7 of the Court Fees Act gives the mode and manner of computation of fees payable in respect of certain suits. Section 8 deals with the computation of fee payable on a memorandum of appeal an order relating to compensation. Schedule I gives the court-fees payable on different types of documents stated in column 2 thereof which, are chargeable on an advalorem basis, whereas Schedule II shows the court-fees payable on different types of documents as specified in column 2 thereof which are chargeable with fixed court-fees. Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act gives the ad-valorem court-fees payable on plaints, written statements, pleading, a set off or counter claim, or memoranda of appeal (not otherwise provided for in the Court Fees Act), or cross-objections presented before the civil or revenue Courts except those mentioned in section

3. The general practice that the law governing the value of suits is the same that has to be followed for valuing the appeals, except in certain specific cases and in cases where this principle cannot be applied, is now too well known to be restated. If any authority is required for this view, Muhammad Anwar Khan v. Additional District Judge Rawalpindi and Abdur Rehman v, Karim Bakhsh (P L D 1981 Lab. 206) and' Chunni Lai and others v. Cheo Charan Lai Lalman (A I R 1925 All. 787) may be referred. But it must be stated that this practice cannot blindly be adopted in all cases, as it admits of difficulty in many.

12. I now turn to the first Notification of 9-7-1978. This has been examined by this Court in Khuda Bakhsh case (P L D 1982 Lah. 218). The very wording of this old Notification shows that court-fees were remitted on plaints in civil suits under Article 1 of Schedule I when the amount or the value of their subject matter did not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees. The very word "plaints" shows that the remission was not intended to apply to written statements pleading, a set off or counter claim, or to memoranda of appeal (not otherwise provided for in the Court Fees Act), or to cross-objections presented in civil Courts except those mentioned in section 3 of the Court Fees Act. Though the word "suit" has not been defined in the Court Fees Act, 1869, or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 26 of the said Code clearly states that a suit stands instituted by the presentation of a plaint and Order IV, rule 1 thereof mentions that a suit stands instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such other officer as it appoints in that behalf. The word "civil" preceding the word "suit", obviously refers to disputes relating to civil rights between the parties. The words "plaints in civil suits" also show that the remission was not only intended in respect of court-fees payable on plaints presented in regular suits before the normal civil Courts, but also on plaints presented under special laws, where such laws provided for the institution of suits triable by Courts of justice. Thus, court-fees payable on petitions and applications, where proceedings stood initiated an the filing of such documents before civil courts of justice, were not exempt. Even court-fees payable on plaints in civil suits not falling under Article 1 of Schedule I, were also not exempt. 13. 1 now turn to the second Notification of 4-2-1980 modifying the first. This Notification was examined by this Court in Khuda Baksh's case but only to the limited extent of this finding out whether it could be applied with retrospective effect. Its other aspects were not examined in detail, as the cases before the High Court related to appeals preferred before the date of publication of this Notification. It is this second notification which is the subject matter of the present cases. This second notification, therefore, requires a proper examination. The wording of this notification clearly shows that court. fees is remitted inter alia on all civil and revenue suits, at all stags, in all Courts, provided the value of the subject-matter thereof or of the C relief claimed therein, does not exceed twenty five thousand rupees. The words "civil suits" and "in all Courts" clearly show that the remission is intended to cover documents filed in regular suits before the normal Civil Court and also in other suits provided under special laws, where such laws provide for the institution of suits through presentation of plaints and where such suits are triable by civil Courts. The word ."Court" has not been defined in the Court. Fees Act, but in view of section 6, the word refers to a "Court of Justice" I would not like to delve into the question whether a "Court of Justice" means a Court possessing the powers of a judicial Court, as opposed to a Court nor purely acting on judicial principles, but on considerations of policy, on which is a persona designata, because all the petitions before me arise of regular civil suits insituted in the regular civil Courts, except one, which also relates to a civil suit instituted before the Family Court, which has been treated as a Court possessing all the attributes of a judicial Court. However, on first impressions, the words "Court of Justice" in section 6 of the Court Fees Act give the impression that they are used in liberal sense to cover all Courts dispensing justice, whether strictly acting on judicial principles or on considerations of policy and would, therefore, cover tribunals as well. Nevertheless, this matter is not involved in the present cases and I would leave this matter for a proper determination to a future date, when such a question arises. For the present, it is sufficient to say that all documents filed in civil cases, which proceedings do not originate from presentation of plaints, are not exempt. The words "at all stages" refer to every step in the suit during its trial in the original jurisdiction and to every step in the proceedings in appeal. In Inayat v. All Bakhsh (P L D 19,69 Lab. 241) the words "at any stage" as appearing in Order VI, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were held to mean during the pendency of both suit and appeal, where the appeal stood admitted. In the notification, the words are "at all stages, in all Courts" and not merely "at any stage." Since we are dealing with court- F fees, every step in the litigation is relateable to every d,)cument filed at every stage therein. The whole expression "at all stages, in all Courts" cover all documents chargeable with court-fees, filed at any step in the proceedings in the original, review, revisional or appellate jurisdiction, where such proceeding originate out of civil suits and where such proceedings are before Courts o justice. - Every provision in a fiscal enactment has to be construed strictly and any ambiguity or doubt has to be resolved in favour of the subject. What is before me is a notification relating to remissions. There is no ambiguity in !he words "at all stages, in all courts". Assuming there is it can only be resolve , in favour of the exemptee. The language of the Notification admits of a liberal construction and it must be construed accordingly to carry out its purpose and intent. The Provincial Government has - conveyed its views in the matte through its Assistant Advocate-General. It itself has accepted the liberal interpretation. The language of the notification admits such an interpretation I have, therefore, no doubt that it remits court-fees on memoranda of appeals. 1 would, therefore, hold accordingly. 14: In view of my clear findings, as given above, that the very language of the impugned Notification covers all documents filed at the appellate stage, 1 need not go into the question as to whether a suit includes an appeal or an appeal is a continuation of a suit, so as to apply either principle to hold that the word "suits", in section 7 of the Court Fees Act, or the words "civil suits" in the second Notification, cover an appeal. Where the Legislature has wanted to use the words "memorandum of appeal" in section 7, it has done so, as under subsection (iv) thereof. Where a Provincial Government has decided to trial a suit as an appeal for all or any purpose of the Court Fees, Act, 1870, it has done so by adding a definition to section 2, as in the case of the Bengal, Orissa and the United Provinces. However, as stated in para. 11 above, a practice has grown that the law governing the value of suits has to be followed when fixing the valuation for the purposes of an appeal, but that is far from saying that the word "suit" must in all cases be deemed to 'include an "appeal". To universally apply any such principle to section 7 would be to attempt something rash and without the care and attention, as is required.

15. I now turn to some of the observations and findings given by the appellate Judge, in arriving at the final conclusion, which he did. The learned Judge first found that as suits were proceedings which commenced with the presentation of plaints and appeals were those which commenced with the presentation of memoranda of appeal, that the word "suit" did not include appeals. The learned appellate Judge then referred to one case of the Supreme Court and another of the Dacca High Court to support his findings. In the first place, the distinction drawn between suits and appeals by the appellate Judge has apparently arisen from an observation in Muhammad Anwar's case where the "plaint" and "memorandum of appeal" were held to be two distinct documents for the purposes of court-fees. This, however, does not mean that the practice that the law governing the value of suits is the same that has to be followed for valuing appeals, except in certain cases, as already stated, cannot be applied in appropriate cases. The two cases cited by the Additional District Judge are distinguishable. 1n Mehr Baluch Khan's case the word "sued", as appearing in section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was held not to cover an appeal. By the very wording of the section and the nature of the case, the principle that a "suit" included an ';appeal" was held as not applicable to the case in hand. This, however, does not negate the principle that an appeal is a continuation of a suit; which has been hid down by this and other High Courts in many cases. In Majlish Khan's case the word "suit", appearing in section 6 (2) of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, I of 1964, as amended was held in the particular circumstances of the case as not including an appeal, as the embargo contained in the said section related to prosecution of suits and not prevent members of the minority communities to defend themselves against suits brought against them. The case proceeded on totally distinguishable facts and, therefore, cannot be held to be an authority for the general proposition that an appeal is a continuation of suit. The view of the appellate Judge must, therefore, be rejected. As regards the observation of the appellate Judge that the words" civil suits" and the words, "at all stages" did not cover an "appeal", the same stands refuted by my findings, as given above. These words, with the further words "in all Courts", clearly cover appeals. The finding of the appellate Judge that as the Schedule to the Court Fees Act only covered documents and as the Government could only remit fees on documents, no remission could be granted under section 35 in respect of suits generally, to cover every step in the litigation up to the appellate or revisional stage, the same is incorrect, as it suffers from too rigid an approach, it is true that the Notification could have given a long list of documents as were chargeable to. duty under the Court Fees Act, 1870, and stated that court-fees thereon stood remitted if they were filed in any civil or revenue -suit, the value of the subject-matter whereof or of the relief claimed therein, did not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees, at all stages, in all Courts, including the review, revisional and appellate Courts. But the Notification, as it stands clearly indicates that court-fees on all documents, which are chargeable to court-fees if they are filed in any civil or revenue suit, right from the date of its first institution through every step during its trial in the original Court and through every step during proceedings in the review, revisional or appeal late Court, stand remitted. Instead of bringing out a notification giving therein a long list of documents to be exempted, which would have been Ion and confusing, the present form has been adopted, to serve the ends of being brief and yet being clear. So long as the intention of the Government is clear, the Notification cannot be defeated on technicalities. In Chandappa v, Sadruddin Ansari (A I R 1958 Mys. 132), where the former Government of Hyde rabad had issued a Notification under section 39 of the Hyderabad Court Fees Act (which is more or less analogous to section 35 of the Court Fees Act) exempting all displaced and destitute persons from the payment of court-fees under Schedules I and 11 of the said Act, an objection was taken that the said Notification was ultra vires of section 39, as its application could not be made class-wise. The objection was overruled on the ground that full power was vested with the Government to watch its interests and if it could reduce or remit the fees for all persons living within a given area, it could do so for a section of the same. Here also, by general language, court-fees payable on a large section of documents filed in Court proceedings, is being exempted. The exercise of the larger powers contained in section 35, includes the exercise of the lesser. The whole includes the part. The Provincial Govern ment also, which has been represented by one of its senior law officers, has not challenged the Notification, but rather has advocated its liberal interpretation. The findings of the' appellate Judge, that the Notification was ultra vires of section 35 of the Court Fees Act, is incorrect and must be rejected.

16. For the foregoing. reasons, all these revision petitions and regular second appeals, as stated in para. 1 above, are accepted and the impugned judgments of the first appellate Court are set aside. All the regular first appeals are remanded back for decision on their merits. Since the learned Additional District Judge, who heard and decided these appeals, is no longer posted at Attock District, all the first appeals shall be transmitted to the learned District Judge, Attock, who shall hear the same himself or mark it for disposal to any other Additional District Judge posted in his district.

17. As regards Writ Petition No. 52 of 1981, the same relates to an appeal from the judgment of the Family Court, Chakwal. Suits under the Family Courts Act 1964, originate out of presentation of plaints. The Family Court and the District judge, who hears an appeal from a decision of Family Court are Courts in the strict sense, possessing all the powers of giving judicial decision. See Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din (P L D 1968 Lah. 987). The original and the appellate Courts, under the Family Courts Act, are Courts of justice for the purposes of the Court Fees Act. The Notification of 4-2-1980, therefore, covers the' memorandum of appeal filed before the District Judge from the order of the Family Court. In these circumstances, the impugned judgment -of the District Judge, Jhelum, to the extent that he decided that the memorandum of appeal before him was not exempt from court-fee, is without lawful authority and is, therefore, set aside. The regular first appeal of the petitioner shall be remanded to the District Judge Jhelum, for decision on merits. There shall be no order as to costs. M. A. K. Cases remanded.