1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

IHSANUL HAQ CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).‑‑The appellants are all Drug Inspectors. They were posted at various places in the Punjab and on account of inefficiency and misconduct were suspended vide order dated 5‑3‑1987. The appellants submitted a joint representation to Respondent No‑2 on 20‑5‑1987 for the withdrawal of the order of suspension and re‑instatement in service. Nothing was heard from the side of the Respondents. Thereafter, the appellants Nos.l, 3 and 4 submitted separate applications to the Respondent No.3 for their re‑instatement. Since nothing was heard, therefore, the appellants decided to invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal by filing the present appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The prayer reads as under:‑ "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the appeal of the appellants may kindly be accepted and, by declaring continuous suspension of the appellants from service to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, the respondents may kindly be ordered to re‑instate them with immediate effect. The appellants may also be awarded the costs of this appeal."

2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the paper book of the appeal and relevant provisions of law with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the appellant who has assailed the order of Respondent No.l, inter alia, on the following grounds:‑ (i) That the Respondent No.l being authority was not competent to suspend the appellants in view of the provisions of rule 6(1) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975.. It is added that in any case the continued suspension is illegal as the period has not been extended after expiry of three months. (ii) It was submitted that since six months have elapsed, therefore, the suspension for period of more than six months is against instructions issued through circular dated 18‑10‑1972. Since these instructions have the force of rules, therefore, the continuation of suspension after 3rd of September, 1987, is illegal. (iii) That the appellant No.2 has not been served with charge‑sheet. It is, however conceded that the other Respondents have been served with the charge‑sheets on the ground of inefficiency and misconduct.

3. Before proceeding to deal with the points raised by the learned Counsel. We asked the learned Counsel to satisfy us on the following points: ‑ (i) Whether the appeal is within time? (ii) Whether the appeal is competent?

4. The arguments of the learned Counsel on the point of limitation are two‑fold; firstly since the order is void because it has been passed by the 'authority', who had no justification under rule 6(1) to order suspension, therefore, there is no limitation against a void order. The learned Counsel in this behalf has referred to case of Ajmal Khan v. Secretary, Government of Punjab reported as 1986 P L C (C.S.) 423, because in that appeal order of suspension was passed by Secretary, who was not competent, therefore, order was struck down as void. It is not the case here. Moreover, the question of competency of appeal was neither raised nor considered by the Tribunal. Secondly, since the cause of action is recurring and continuous, therefore, appellant could file appeal at any moment.

5. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel and are least impressed by the arguments because the authority is very much competent to order suspension. The argument of the learned counsel that since authority had no jurisdiction, therefore, is void, fallacious and misconceived. The .relevant rule i.e. Rule 6(1) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 reads as under:‑ "In a case where civil servant is accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct, he may be placed under suspension by authority, or with the prior approval of the authority, by the authorised officer, or he may be required by the authorised Officer to proceed on leave."

6. It is clear. from the bare reading of the rule that not only the authority is competent to order suspension but also that if the order is passed by the authority, then it need not be renewed after every three months. Therefore, there is no force in the argument that the order of suspension is void ab initio or since it was not extended after three months, therefore, it has ceased to be operative and legal order. The case of Ajmal Khan does not advance the plea of the appellant.

7. The second argument is equally without force and made in utter disregard of the provisions of section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. This may be a good ground to invoke the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan or for filing a declaratory suit under section 42 of Specific Relief Act. The legislature in its own wisdom has given the right of app al to the Tribunal to a person aggrieved by the 'final order'. The a are three conditions precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the, Tribunal namely:‑ (i) There must be an 'order'; (ii) It must be 'final'; and (iii) The appellant must be aggrieved.

8. If we take into consideration the argument that it is a recurring cause of action and continuous process, then there will be another difficulty and the appeal will be rendered incompetent because in that case, the appeal will be against no order and what to talk of a final order. The learned Counsel tried to argue that the Tribunal has jurisdiction against every grievance. This argument is utterly misconceived and against the spirit, purpose and scope of section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act. The Tribunal can only interfere and exercise the jurisdiction if there is a definite order unlike constitutional jurisdiction where even failure to act in accordance with the law has been made amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction. There is very clear, subtle and definite distinction in the constitutional jurisdiction and jurisdiction of civil Courts on the one hand and this Tribunal on the other hand. This Tribunal is a Court of limited jurisdiction and has to assume jurisdiction only in given circumstances. The jurisdiction does not extend to correction of inaction or failure to discharge to legal duty on the part of the Government functionaries. In the present case the order of suspension was passed on 3‑3‑1987 while this appeal was preferred on 6‑10‑1987, therefore, the appeal is patently time‑barred. The appellants have not even cared to file application for extension of time.

9. The appeal is, also, liable to fall on the other ground because the order of suspension is neither punishment nor a final order. We may in this behalf refer to case of Muhammad Haroon v. WAPDA reported a5 P L D 1978 Lah. 1108. The relevant portion reads as under:‑ "This being the position the order suspending an employee is of a temporary phase and cannot be termed to affect the terms and conditions of his service, therefore, it would give no cause of action to the suspended. In the present case the petitioner's suspension from service was not a penalty and go cause of action has accrued to him to challenge it in a Court of Law."

10. The final order means an order, which is conclusive adjudication and which seals the fate of action. The suspension order, on the other hand,‑ is merely a transitory measure. The same is liable to be rescinded at any moment and in any case comes to an end with the conclusion of the disciplinary action. Therefore, the appeal is misconceived and incompetent. The 'final order' has been described in the Blacks' Law Dictionary Fifth Edition (1979), as under:‑ Final order.‑‑One which terminates the litigation between the parties an the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Richerson v . Jones, C . A . Pa.,5.51 F.2d 918,

921. See also Final decision. While the 'final decision' has been described as under:‑ Final decision.‑‑One which leaves nothing open to further dispute and which sets at rest cause of action between parties. Judgment or decree which terminates action in Court which renders it. One which settles rights of parties respecting the subject‑matter of the suit and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. The filing of signed findings and conclusions and order for judgment. Synonymous with final judgment or decree. In re Tiffany. 252 U.S.32, 40 S.Ct.239, 240, 64 L.Ed.443. Also, a decision from which no appeal or writ of error can be taken. U.S. v. Tod, C.C.A.N.Y. 1 F.2d 246, 251. "Final decision" which may be appealed is one that ends litigation on merits and leaves nothing for Courts to do but execute judgment. Kappelmann v. Delta Air Lines, Inc 176 U,S.App.D.C.163, 539 F.2d 165,

168. See also Final decision rule; Final disposition; Final judgment; Interlocutory Appeals Act; Judgment (Final Judgment); Res (res judicata).

11. This way from whatever angle we look the appeal is incompetent and barred by limitation. It may not be out of place to mention here that we have dealt with the points noted at Nos.l and 2, while the other points relate to the result of the disciplinary action against the appellants. We cannot pre‑empt the jurisdiction of the departmental authorities. Any deliberation on these points by us at this stage shall prejudice either of the parties. Therefore, we are not discussing these points.

12. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed as timed barred and incompetent as well as on merits in limine. M.Y.H./149/Sr.P Appeal dismissed.