P I, D 1969 Dacca 522 (PLP)

(b) all property vested in the Board shall vest in such person, such manner, as the Provincial Government may direct." From a reading of this section it will appear that after an order of supersession is passed, the control of the affairs of the Board is taken over and run in accord ance with the terms contained in such order. Apart from that, there does not appear to be any indication or any direct pro vision in this connection to suggest that the employees or other functionaries of the Board will change their character and will automatically come to acquire the status of Government servants as contemplated in Article 181, clause (ii) of the Constitution of 1956. This Bengal Act VII of 1930 shows that the Board is a separate entity and will have its own personnel and well defined sphers of activities and its status will remain distinct and separate from the regular Government agency. Section 66 (2)(1) provides that rules may be framed in providing" conditions of appointment, punishment or dismissal of the staff of the Board under section 26." Section 26 of this Act provides that the Board itself could appoint such staff of officers and servants as may be considered necessary by the Board for carrying out its duties under this Act and the Board is entitled to fix their salary and other remuneration. Subsection (2) of this section lays down that it is the Board which is entitled to punish or dismiss its staff. Section 14 of this Act clearly confers the status of a body corporate on' the board and lays down that it shall always have perpetual succession and a separate and distinct entity: Section 14 runs as follows: ‑ "

14. Every Board shall be a body corporate by the name of the District School Board of (name of District)," shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall by the said name sue and be sued, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and, subject to the prescribed conditions, to transfer any property held by it and to contract and do all other things necessary for the purposes of this Act." Reading these provisions of the Act of 1930 it becomes clear that the perpetual succession of the Board is not disturbed even by an order of supersession. An order of super session may remove all elected and appointed members of the Board, but the administrator who is appointed in their place exercises authority for and on behalf of the Board, vide section 22 (2) (a). None of the other provisions of the Act of 1930 is kept in abeyance during the period of supersession. As such it cannot be said that the staff of the Board undergoes a complete metamorphosis by virtue of an order of supersession. They are the employees of the Bo4rd and continues to be so even after an order of supersession, though the personnel of the Board yield ground to a new personality or personalities. This alone cannot be a ground of holding that the bundle," of rights and liabilities and the status of such employees of the Board undergo a complete change on the passing of an order of supersession and they again revert back to the original state as soon as such order of supersession is lifted. The Act of 1930 has nowhere indicated in its provisions such intention of the Legislature. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view of the lower appellate Court that the employees of the School Board became servants under the Government and became entitled to the advantage under clause (ii) of Article 181 of the Constitution of 1956 on the passing of an order of supersession is clearly erroneous and as such cannot be sustained. It has been next argued by the learned Advocate for the, appellant that the Court of appeal below erred in law in holding that rule 77‑A of Chapter IV of Bengal Boards Miscellaneous Rules 1934 is also applicable in the case of the plaintiff and this also entitles him to receive a second show‑cause notice against the proposed penalty from the authority entitled to impose punishment. Rules under section 66 (2) (t) of the Act of 1930 were framed by Notification No. 1176‑C/Edn., dated 10th July 1945, regarding the conditions of appointment, punishment or dismissal of the staff of ‑the Board. According to Rule 10 of these Rules the staff of the Board could be visited with five kinds of penalties including one of dismissal. Rule 12 of these Rules provided that disciplinary enquiry shall be conducted and shall proceed on the lines described in paragraph 77, Chapter I V of Bengal Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1934: Rule 77 of Chapter 1V of Bengal Boards Miscellaneous Rules, 1934, however, does not mention anywhere that show‑Cause notice against the proposed penalty has to be given to the delinquent officer in question. This requirement is, however, clearly mentioned in Rule 77‑A of the Board's Miscellaneous Rules but rule 12 of the Rules promulgated on 10th July 1945, have made the Board's Miscellaneous rule 77 alone applicable and not rule 77‑A. Apart from that, rule 77‑(A) of the Board's Miscellaneous Rules itself mentions in the opening words of this paragraph that the same is only applicable in cases of Govern ment servants of a particular category. From all this it will appear that the right of receiving second show‑cause notice concerning the proposed penalty was not specifically enjoined E in the case of a departmental proceeding concerning the employees of a School‑ Board. There is another additional reason as to why the above conclusion should be reached. Rule 15 of the Rules published on 10th July 1945, is as follows: - "No Government servants employed under a Board may be dismissed or removed from such employment without the sanction of the provincial Government." This Rule clearly mentions that some Government servants may be employed on deputation in the services of the Board and the protection of this Rule is applicable with regard to such employees. Had it been a case that the employees of the School Board are all Government Servants, then this Rule would have been clearly redundant. Considering these aspects of the matter we are of the view that there was no mandatory provisions of law requiring an issuance of a second show‑cause notice on the plaintiff affording him an opportunity to show cause against the penalty proposed to be imposed. Mr. Shamsul Haque Choudhury appearing on behalf of the plaintiff ‑respondent has urged that even though the constitutional safeguard as contained in clause (2) of Article 181 be not available, still the principles of natural justice require that the plaintiff should be given full opportunity to show‑cause against the proposed action. On the facts disclosed in this case it will appear that no prejudice has been caused to the plaintiff on that score. The School Board was superseded on 11‑4‑

55. It is unfor tunate that no paper relating to such supersession has been forth coming. But it is accepted by both the parties that the superses sion did take place on this date and Mr. Hasan Nawab Additional District Magistrate was appointed the administrator of this Board at the relevant time. On 7‑1‑56, Mr. M. B. Haque, the local Auditor submitted an audit report‑Exh. E wherein the objection relating to the misappropriation of Rs. 25 was reported to the Additional District Magistrate. Mr. Hasan Nawab, who was the Administrator of the School Board, drew up proceeding Exh. F, against the respondent on 10‑1‑1956, and issued a show‑cause notice Exh. F on the plaintiff asking him why he should not be dismissed from the Board's service for misappropriation of Rs. 25 Exh. F runs as follows: ‑ "(1) Whereas you Moulvi. Md. Atiqullah, Clerk District School Board, Mymensingh, took Rs. 25 (Rs. twenty‑five) for purchase of Postage stamps against Voucher No. 2674, dated 2‑12‑55 but no purchase of stamps appears to have been made and no entry of the same made in the Stamp Stock Registrar. Hence, it appears that the said amount of Rs. 25 was mis appropriated by you. (2) Whereas on the alleged ground of misappropriation of the said amount by you from the Board's Fund, you have already been placed under suspension as per this Office No. 3042 dated 7‑1‑56. (3) Whereas the explanation already submitted by you does not make your position clear, you are, therefore, asked to show cause by 16‑1‑56 why you should not be dismissed from the Board's service for misappropriating or temporarily mis appropriating Rs. 25 of Board's fund." The plaintiff thereafter showed cause Exh. A on 16‑1‑1956 wherein he admitted that he purchased the said postage stamps worth Rs. 25 but no entry was made in the register through mistake. On receipt of a reply, the Administrator appointed Mr. S. Ahmed, District Inspector of Schools as the Enquiring Officer to hold enquiry in the matter. He submitted his report to the Administrator on 9‑2‑

56. The enquiry report is Exh. H, in this case and it shows that on 31‑3‑56 the Enquiring Officer forwarded a copy of his report to the respondent asking him to show cause why action should not be taken against him. The reply of the plaintiff is Exh. A (I) wherein he stated that his note dated 7‑1‑56 in the audit sheet is not correct and the same was written by him out of nervousness. He however, prayed for making further enquiry for finding out the real state of affairs in the matter. After receiving this reply the Enquiring Officer submitted his comments Exh. 1 dated 12‑4‑56 to the Administrator. The Enquiring Officer recommended dismissal of the plaintiff. On receipt of this report from the Enquiring Officer alongwith the representation and the statement from the plaintiff the Administrator perused the same and passed an order of dismissal against the plaintiff on 21‑4‑

56. From a discussion of the above facts and circumstances and particularly from the notice contained in Exh. F it will appear that the plaintiff was never left in doubt as to the nature of the allegations levelled against him as well as the thinking of the authority about taking action of dismissal against the plaintiff. Apart from this, the plaintiff himself admitted in his evidence in this case that he was well aware about the nature of the proceeding against him as well as the proposal of dismissing him from service. He stated in his cross‑examination as follows: ‑ "D. I. of School sent a notice to me to show cause why I should not be dismissed from service. I submitted explana tion in writing on 11‑4‑56, I presented myself before the D. I. I stated on 11‑4‑56 that I had nothing to say besides the statement made in the application." From all these it will appear that the principle of natural justice was adequately followed in meeting out the punishment awarded lo the plaintiff and he cannot be heard to complain on the score. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he was not given any opportunity to adduce evidence in his defence. Both the Courts below have found against the plaintiff on this score. The explanation submitted by the plaintiff did not specifically mention as to which witness was required to be called and on what points. A vague request on behalf of the plaintiff with regard to unnamed witnesses cannot be a ground for subsequent complaint. Under this circumstances we do not find any reason to depart from the finding arrived at on this ground by the Court below. There is another aspect of the matter, which needs a passing notice. When the plaintiff filed the suit he stated in paragraph 1, of his plaint that the District School Board had already been abolished by East Pakistan Act XXVIII of 1957. Section 2 (1) of the said Act provided that the District School Boards constituted under the provisions of the Bengal (Rural) Primary Education Act, 1930 ceased to exist with effect from the date of coming into force of the Act XXVIII of 1957. There was no provision in this Act itself as to whether the previous employees of the District School Board were to be taken and retained in any department of the Government. Under these circumstances, it will appear that the prayer of the plaintiff on the date of the institution of the suit that the plaintiff's service stands unaffected its strictly not maintainable. Under these circumstances it will be obvious that the decree passed by the lower appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff is not sustainable and as such the same is set aside. It is, therefore, ordered that the appeal be allowed; the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, 1st Court Mymensingh, be set aside and those of the trial Court be restored. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case we made no order as to costs. M. R. KHAN, J.‑‑I agree. A. E./S. A. H. Appeal allowed.