2018HCAJK1 (PLP)

M. TUBASSUM AFTAB ALVI, C.J.

The supra titled Writ Petition has been filed under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, whereby petitioner solicited a direction in the nature of mandamus against respondents jointly and severally to extend him full pensionary benefits as a retired Judge of the High Court.

2. Precise facts leading to the instant Writ Petition are that petitioner was elevated as Judge of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, vide Government notification dated 13th March, 2013. After attaining age of superannuation (sixty two years), petitioner was retired through Government notification dated 25th January, 2016. He was allowed leave encashment, however, respondents jointly and severally by misinterpreting a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, failed to grant him full pensionary benefits. The claim of petitioner is that his experience at Bar was liable to be treated towards length of service for the purpose of pension as a Judge of the High Court, which qualified him for grant of pensionary benefits. It is further maintained that withholding full pensionary benefits on the part of respondents, is without lawful authority; hence, petitioner constrained to file the instant Constitution Petition.

3. The Writ Petition has been resisted by respondents through written statement filed on 5th November, 2016. It is stated that petitioner was elevated as Judge of the High Court on 13th March, 2013, who availed status as such till 25th January, 2016, hence, his total rendered service was 02 years, 10 months and 12 days. Therefore, deficiency in qualifying service for the purpose of pensionary benefits, was 02 years, 01 month and 18 day. It is stated that Bar experience rendered by petitioner as an Advocate could not be counted towards his service as a Judge of the High Court. It is further averred that a Judge of the High Court is entitled to pay, pension and privileges after administering oath under the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, however, without elevation and administering oath petitioner was not entitled to receive pensionary benefits. It is stated that as per section 43(9) read with 5th Schedule of the Constitution Act, the Judges of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be entitled to the same salary, allowances, privileges and pension as are admissible to the Judges of the High Courts in Pakistan, whereas Judges of the High Courts of Pakistan are entitled to such privileges under Article 205 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with its 5th Schedule. It is further stated that in light of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan titled Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC 829], the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable, hence, prayed for its dismissal.

4. Barrister Hamayun Nawaz Khan, the learned Counsel for petitioner filed written arguments, wherein, it is submitted that petitioner was entitled to full pensionary benefits, irrespective of the length of service, in light of judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, titled Accountant General Sindh and others v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi and others (PLD 2008 SC 522) and not upon minimum rendered service of 05 years as held in case titled Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v. Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC 829]. He further contended that in pursuance of latter judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, supra, a Presidential Order was liable to be issued by the Government, however, no such Presidential Order has yet been promulgated by respondents and only previous Presidential Order i.e. High Court Judges (Leave, pension and Privileges) Order, 1997, is holding field, which allows, full pensionary benefits irrespective of length of service as Judge of the High Court. The learned Counsel maintained that the apex Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir allowed full pensionary benefits to a retired Judge of the High Court, who was elevated from subordinate judiciary vide Govt. notification dated 13th March, 2013, who had less than 05 years service as Judge of the High Court, as per reported judgment titled Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria v. Azad Government and others, (2015 SCR 1396), whereas petitioner was elevated from Bar, through the same Govt. notification dated 13th March, 2013; hence, he was also entitled to full pensionary benefit on the basis of principle of equality under the Constitution. He emphasized that experience of petitioner at Bar was liable to be treated towards length of service for the purpose of pension, because when service of a Judge of subordinate judiciary is treated towards length of service for the purpose of pension to a Judge of the High Court, then why practice of an Advocate of 10 years, who is elevated from Bar as Judge of the High Court, cannot be counted towards his length of service? He agitated that respondents committed gross violation of constitutional clause of equality while refusing pensionary benefits to petitioner, hence, craved for acceptance of Writ Petition. The learned Counsel, in support of his arguments, placed reliance upon the following authorities:- i. Accountant General Sindh and others v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi and others [PLD 2008 SC 522]. ii. Justice (R) Abdul Rashid Sulehria v. AJK Government and 3 others [2015 SCR 1396]. iii. P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and others [AIR 2014 SC 1619].

5. Mr. Muhammad Noorullah Qureshi, the learned Counsel for respondents also filed written arguments, wherein, it is submitted that petitioner was elevated as Judge of the High Court on 13th March, 2013 and he availed status as such till 25th January, 2016, so his total service rendered as a Judge of the High Court was 02 years, 10 months and 12 days, hence, deficiency in qualifying service for the purpose of pensionary benefits, was 02 years, 01 month and 18 days. He further contended that experience rendered by petitioner as an Advocate could not be counted towards his service rendered as a Judge of the High Court. He pressed into service that a Judge of the High Court is entitled to pay, pension and privileges etc after administering oath under the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, however, without elevation and administering oath petitioner was not entitled to receive any pensionary benefit as a Judge of the High Court. The learned Counsel also maintained that as per section 43(9) read with 5th Schedule of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be entitled to the same salary, allowances, privileges and pension as are admissible to the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Courts in Pakistan, whereas the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Courts of Pakistan are entitled to such privileges under Article 205 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with its 5th Schedule; hence, reliance upon the case law of Indian Supreme Court, titled P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and others [AIR 2014 SC 1619], cannot be placed. He contended that in light of paragraphs 14, 16 and 29 of Presidential Order, 1997, petitioner could not be granted pensionary benefits. He maintained that even on the basis of case titled Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria v. Azad Government and others [2015 SCR 1396], petitioner is not entitled to pensionary benefits. He further agitated that in light of judgment of the apex Court of Pakistan titled Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC page 829], the instant Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.

6. We have gone through the contents of Writ Petition as well as written arguments of the learned Advocates for parties. A minute perusal of Writ Petition and written arguments of the learned Counsel for petitioner emerges the following moot points that:- i. Whether petitioner is entitled to pensionary benefits, irrespective of the length of service, in light of precedent case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan titled Accountant General Sindh and others v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi and others (PLD 2008 SC 522) and not upon minimum rendered service of 05 years as held in Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC 829]? ii. Whether in light of judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, reported in case of Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda, supra, a Presidential Order was liable to be promulgated by the Government, however, no such Presidential Order has yet been issued after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, hence, previous Presidential Order i.e. High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997, is holding field, which allows full pensionary benefits, irrespective of length of service as Judge of the High Court? iii. Whether in view of dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in case titled Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria v. Azad Government and others (2015 SCR 1396), through which full pensionary benefits were allowed to a retired Judge of the High Court, who was elevated from subordinate judiciary and had less than 05 years service, whereas petitioner was elevated from Bar, through the same notification; hence, pensionary benefits could be extended to him on the basis of principle of equality under the Constitution? iv. Whether experience of petitioner at Bar, without prejudice to other grounds, has to be treated towards length of service for the purpose of pensionary benefits, because when service of a Judge of subordinate judiciary is treated towards length of service for the purpose of pensionary benefits to a Judge of the High Court, then why practice of an Advocate of 10 years, who is elevated from Bar, could not be counted towards length of service, as a Judge of the High Court and whether solicited relief can be extended to petitioner in view of law laid down by the Indian Supreme Court in case titled P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and others [AIR 2014 SC 1619]?

7. We shall take up the aforementioned points one by one. However, before considering arguments of the learned Advocates, it is appropriate to reproduce section 43(9) of The Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which speaks as follows:- "43(9). The remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of Judge of High Court shall be as provided in the [Fifth Schedule]." The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution is reproduced as under:- "The Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be entitled to the same Salary, Allowances, Privileges and pension as are admissible to the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court in Pakistan." Same like manner paragraphs 14 and 16 of Presidential Order, 1997, relating to Pension of Judges of the High Court are also reproduced herein below:- "

14. Conditions or admissibility of pension: A Judge shall, on his retirement, resignation or removal, be paid a pension in accordance with the provisions of this Order if he has (a) completed not less than five years of service for pension and attained the retiring age; or (b) completed not less than five years of service for pension and, before attaining the age, resigned [or sought retirement]; or (c) completed not less than five years of service for pension and before attaining the retiring age, either resigned, his resignation having been medically modified to be necessitated by ill-health or been removed for physical or mental incapacity or been allowed by the President for sufficient cause to retire.

16. Pension of Judges not covered by paragraph 14: A judge who immediately before his appointment as such was a member of a civil service in Pakistan or was holding a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a Province and who does not fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 14 shall, on retirement, be entitled to such pension as would have been admissible to him in his service or post, had he not been appointed a Judge, his service as a Judge being treated as service for the purpose of calculating that pension." A bare reading of ibid paragraphs makes it abundantly clear that five years service, as a Judge of the High Court, is essential for the purpose of pensionary benefits.

8. The first point, therefore, is that whether petitioner was entitled to full pensionary benefits, irrespective of the length of service, in light of precedent case titled Accountant General Sindh and others v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi and others (PLD 2008 SC 522) and not upon minimum rendered service of 05 years as held in case titled Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC 829]? We have scrutinized precedents of the apex Court of Pakistan supra and found that the judgment titled Accountant General Sindh and others v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi and others (PLD 2008 SC 522), which was handed down by Mr. Justice Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, J, (as his lordship then was) on 6th March, 2008, through which, retired Judges of the High Court, who had less than five years service, irrespective of the length of service, were declared entitled to receive all pensionary benefits, was reviewed through precedent case titled Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2013 SC 829). The relevant extract of the latter precedent is reproduced as under:- "We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that for the preceding reasons and further reasons to be recorded hereinafter, the judgment under challenge falls in the category of per incuriam and makes it without jurisdiction and nullity in the eyes of law, as if it never existed at all." The apex Court, with regard to the length of service, also observed at page 944, in paragraph 67 of the aforesaid judgment as under:- "The gist of the discussion made in the above cited cases on the subject of pension is that it is a right which the Government servants or employees in different positions and different capacities earn in terms of the relevant statutory provisions applicable to their case, mostly depending upon their length of service. In any case it is not a State bounty which can be awarded to any individual outside the scope of the applicable statute, as a favour." Therefore, stance of petitioner that irrespective of the length of service, he might be granted pensionary benefits, in view of Full Court precedent case of Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v Federation of Pakistan and others [PLD 2013 SC page 829], cannot be extended to the Hon'ble retired Judge, as the said precedent was reviewed by the apex Court of Pakistan.

9. The next stance of petitioner is that in pursuance of latter judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, a Presidential Order was liable to be promulgated by the Government, however, the same has yet not been issued; hence, only previous Presidential Order i.e. High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997, is holding field, which allows, full pensionary benefits irrespective of length of service as Judge of the High Court, hence, he is entitled to full pension, has been considered. We would like to reproduce again relevant paragraph No. 14 of the Presidential Order, 1997, which reads as under:- "

14. Conditions or admissibility of pension: A Judge shall, on his retirement, resignation or removal, be paid a pension in accordance with the provisions of this Order if he has (d) completed not less than five years of service for pension and attained the retiring age; or (e) completed not less than five years of service for pension and, before attaining the age, resigned [or sought retirement]; or (f) completed not less than five years of service for pension and before attaining the retiring age, either resigned, his resignation having been medically certified to be necessitated by ill-health or been removed for physical or mental incapacity or been allowed by the President for sufficient cause to retire. Similarly paragraph 16 is also relevant, which is reproduced as under:-

16. Pension of Judges not covered by paragraph 14: A judge who immediately before his appointment as such was a member of a civil service in Pakistan or was holding a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a Province and who does not fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 14 shall, on retirement, be entitled to such pension as would have been admissible to him in his service or post, had he not been appointed a Judge, his service as a Judge being treated as service for the purpose of calculating that pension."

10. A reading of paragraph 14 of the aforesaid Presidential Order, 1997, clearly envisages that a Judge of the High Court, if he has completed not less than five years of service, shall be paid pension in accordance with the provisions of the said Order, whereas service of petitioner as Judge of the High Court is 2 years, 10 months and 12 days. However, where pension of a Judge is not covered by paragraph 14 of the aforesaid Presidential Order, then paragraph 16 of the said Order makes the controversy further clear that a Judge of the High Court who does not fulfil the condition laid down in paragraph 14, for pensionary benefits, shall be entitled to pension as would have been admissible to him in service or post had he not been appointed as a Judge of the High Court and his service as a Judge has to be treated as service for the purpose of calculation of pension. The aforesaid view is also fortified from case reported as Justice (R) Abdul Rashid Sulehria v. AJ&K Government and 3 others [2015 SCR 1396], wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, observed as under:- "The High Court has rightly observed that the appellant's case has to be dealt with under the provisions of paragraph 16 of the Presidential Order, 1997. However, in the impugned judgment the interpretation of paragraph 16 of the Presidential Order, 1997 does not appear to be consistent with the statutory provisions or the principle of administration of justice. According to the spirit of the referred statutory provision, a Judge of the High Court who does not fulfil the condition laid down in paragraph 14 shall be entitled to pension as would have admissible to him in service or post had he not been appointed as a Judge of the High Court. In this paragraph it is further mentioned that his service as a Judge has to be treated as service for the purpose of calculating the pension. The phraseology "had he not been appointed as Judge" used in this paragraph connotes the intention to avoid the anomaly of break in the service for the purpose of calculation of pension. It does not mean that his appointment as a Judge of the High Court shall become non-existent. The phraseology of the subsequent part of the paragraph clearly speaks that the service as a judge has to be treated as service for the purpose of calculating the pension, which in our considered view, means that his elevation as a Judge of the High Court would not result into break in his service rather he will be treated in service as not being appointed as Judge for the purpose of continuation of service. But for the purpose of calculating the pension, his service as a Judge has to be treated as service. For calculation of pension as a Judge of the High Court and civil servant or person in service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the statutory provisions are different." Thus, the stance of petitioner that under the High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997, he was fully entitled to all pensionary benefits, irrespective of length of service, does not seem to be consistent with aforementioned provisions of the Presidential Order, 1997. It is worthwhile to observe that said Presidential Order was neither set aside by the apex Court of Pakistan in Accountant General Sindh and others' case supra nor repealed; hence, question of fresh Presidential Order on the subject was not arisen, hence, contention is overruled.

11. The third stance of petitioner is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, has allowed full pensionary benefits to a retiring Judge of the High Court, who was elevated from subordinate judiciary (vide Govt. notification dated 13th March, 2013), who had less than 05 years service as Judge of the High Court, through judgment titled Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria v. Azad Government and others (2015 SCR 1396), whereas petitioner was elevated from Bar, through the same Govt. notification; hence, he was also entitled to full pensionary benefits on principle of equality under constitution. Although appointment notification of petitioner and Justice (R) Abdul Rashid Sulehria, was issued on the same date, however, the case of petitioner is different from that of his colleague Judge. A perusal of record reveals that petitioner was appointed as Judge Family Court vide order dated 7th August, 1994, however, he refused to join service and at the time when he was elevated as Judge of the High Court, he was not holding any post or service in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, rather he was an Advocate, whereas Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria, remained Civil Judge, Senior Civil Judge, District and Sessions Judge as well as Judge Shariat Court, from where he was elevated as Judge of the High Court. In this regard, Fifth Schedule of the Constitution speaks that "The pension payable to every Judge of the High Court, who retires, after having put in not less than five years service as such, shall be at the following rates depending on the length of his service as Judge and total service, if any, in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir." The petitioner, prior to his elevation as Judge of the High Court, did not remain in service of AJ&K, so his case rests on different footings. It is imperative to observe that the calculation for pension to a Judge of the High Court has to be made in favour of a person who fulfils the conditions prescribed in paragraph 14 of the Presidential Order, 1997, whereas the pension of a Judge not covered by paragraph 14, may be calculated according to law dealing with the civil service pension. Our view finds support from the case titled Justice (R) Abdul Rasheed Sulehria v. Azad Government and others (2015 SCR 1396), wherein, it was held as under:- "The calculation for pension as Judge of the High Court has to be made in favour of a person who fulfils the condition prescribed in paragraph 14 of the Presidential Order, 1997, whereas the pension of a Judge not covered by paragraph 14 may be calculated according to law dealing with the civil service pension. In the Azad Jammu and Kashmir in this regard the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1971 amended up-to-date are enforced. The Government while exercising the powers vested in it has prescribed the mode of calculation of pension. According to the presently enforced mode, a person of civil services who retires after 1st July, 1986, his pension shall be calculated at the existing rate of last pay and emoluments drawn provided in the Finance Department of AJ&K Regulations, FD/R/(33)/81, dated 23.09.1986. Thus, it is clear that under the provision of enforced law regarding the civil servants pension, calculation has to be made on the basis of last pay drawn with only condition that such pay is drawn while holding the post on regular basis. As in the instant case, there is no dispute that the appellant held the post of Judge of the High Court on regular basis, thus, according to the provision of paragraph 16 of the Presidential Order, 1997, his service as Judge High Court has to be treated as service for the purpose of calculation of pension. Whereas according to the spirit of paragraph 29 of the Presidential Order, 1997 the statutory provision in this regard has to be interpreted favourable to the appellant. In this background, after collective appreciation of the provisions of paragraphs 16 and 29 of the Presidential Order, 1997 in juxtaposition with the Civil Services Pension Rules, 1971 and the Finance Department Regulations dated 23.09.1986, it can be safely concluded that the pension of the appellant shall be calculated on the basis of last pay drawn by him as judge of the High Court. The conclusion drawn by the High Court in the impugned judgment in this regard in our opinion is not based on proper interpretation of paragraph 16 of the Presidential Order, 1997. The High Court, thus, has fell in error of law while holding that the pension of the appellant has to be calculated on the basis of the presumptive last pay drawn as District and Sessions Judge. According to the hereinabove reproduced statutory provision, no such concept is admissible rather the term "last pay drawn" is very much clear which means the actual pay drawn."

12. As stated hereinabove that petitioner did not remain in service of AJ&K, prior to his elevation as Judge of the High Court, and his case is different from that of his colleague retired Judge; therefore, principle of equality does not attract in the given case.

13. Now, we advert to the last point, whereby petitioner while placing reliance upon a case law of Indian Supreme Court, titled as P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and others [AIR 2014 SC 1619], submitted that his experience at Bar was liable to be treated towards length of service for the purpose of pensionary benefits, because when service of a Judge of subordinate judiciary is treated towards length of service for the purpose of pensionary benefits to a Judge of the High Court, then why practice of an Advocate of 10 years, who is elevated from Bar, could not be counted towards his length of service, for the purpose of pensionary benefits, whereas 10 years practice of an Advocate and 10 years service of a judicial officer, are equal qualifications for appointment of a Judge of the High Court. We have scrutinized the precedent case supra and found that the Indian Government vide Amendment Act, 2005 (46/2005), added section 13A to the High Court and Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Condition Service) Amendment Act, 2005, which reads as under:- "Subject to the provision of this Act, a period of ten years shall be added to the service of a Judge for the purpose of his pension, who qualified for appointment as such Judge under sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) of Article 124 of the Constitution."

14. As per the aforesaid amendment, the Supreme Court of India, in the above case observed that for pensionary benefits, ten years' practice as an Advocate be added as a qualifying service for Judges elevated from the Bar. It was further held that in order to remove arbitrariness in the matter of pension of the Judges of the High Court elevated from the Bar, the solicited relief to be reckoned from 1st April, 2004, the date on which section l3A was inserted by the High Court and Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 2005 (46 of 2005). However, there is no such like amendment either in Pakistan or in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is settled principle of jurisprudence that duty of a Court is to interpret the law as it is and not as it ought to be. The rule of interpretation of statutory instrument is that attempt shall be made to give harmonious meaning and save every word of the Statute and not to destroy any of its provision. This Court is guardian of the Constitution and law, hence, a binding obligation is rest upon it to save and to give effect to every part and every word of the Statute. The apex Court of Pakistan in Reference No.01 of 2012 [Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973] (PLD 2013 SC 279), at pages 312 and 313, opined on the point as follows:- "

33. The Constitution, being a living organ for all times is to be interpreted dynamically, as a whole, to give harmonious meaning to every Article of the Constitution.

34. The function of the Court, while interpreting the statute, is to discover the true legislative intent. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must strive to interpret the statute as to promote/advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary, the Court may even depart from the rules that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. The Constitution was framed by its Framers, keeping in view the situations and conditions prevailing at the time of its making, but being an organic document it has been conceived in a manner so as to apply to the situations and conditions which might arise in the future. The words and expressions used in the Constitution, in that sense, have no fixed meaning and must receive interpretation based on the experience of the people in the course of working of the Constitution." The same point came under consideration before the Karachi High Court, in case titled Nasir Raza Jafery v. M/s Macter Pharmaceutical (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director and 4 others [PLD 1998 Karachi 250]. At page 261 of the precedent case, it was observed as under:- "

16. Article 2-A of the Constitution, 1973 or for that matter, Objectives Resolution, were never treated to be as supra-Constitution. In the case of Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426 it was held, inter alia, that it is not open to Court to hold that a provision of Constitution can be struck down on the ground of its being violative of the Objectives Resolution. It is settled rule of the interpretation that the Constitutional provisions are to be read in context with its other provisions in order to promote the spirit of Constitution; to harmonise its various provisions; not to bring any ambiguity and not to destroy any of its provisions." An identical point was considered by the Lahore High Court, in case titled Pakistan Chest Foundation and others v. Government of Pakistan and others [1997 CLC 1379]. At page 1423 of the report, it was opined as follows:- "A bare perusal of paras. (a), and (c) shows that provisions of para. (a) are quite independent in themselves and they have no nexus with paras (b) and (c) nor para (a) is dependent on paras (b) or (c). In fact paras (a), (b) and (c) embody independent and self-contained provisions. The basic rule of interpretation is that if the language of any provision of the Constitution is plain then it does not require to be interpreted with meanings which are not evident from the language. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Similarly, effect has to be given to every part and every word of the Constitution. The Courts always avoid construction which renders any provision meaningless or inoperative and they must lean in favour of a construction which will render every word of the Constitution operative rather than making any word idle and nugatory. The language of para (a) of Clause (2) of Article 4 is plain and definite. It says that no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person can be taken except in accordance with law. Similarly, the language of Paras (b) and (c) is also plain and definite and they do not require the help of para (a) for their interpretation. If para (a) (ibid), is not an independent provision of law in itself, as Mr. Shahzad Jahangir wants me to interpret, but is to be read in conjunction with paras (b) and (c), then it will give rise to every anamolous situation. The result of such a reading would be that provisions of 'due process of law' as contained in paras (b) and (c) would stand restricted only to the five subjects, namely life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person. Such an absurdity has neither been intended nor it can possibly be imputed to the framers of the Constitution. I am, therefore, of the considered view that para (a) of Clause (2) ibid, is a self-contained provision and it has nothing to do with the other two paras (b) and (c). The import of the provisions of para (a) of clause (2) of Article 4 is that no action detrimental to the life, liberty body, reputation or property of any person can be taken unless such detrimental action has the backing of some law in existence." The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Lahore High Court, in case titled M. D. Tahir Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad [1995 CLC 752], wherein at page 763 of the report, it was opined as under:- "Following the principle of consistency and harmony while determining the vires, legality and effect of various provisions of the Constitution, all the provisions have to be read together in juxtaposition to each other. Therefore, when examining the legality of appointment in question on the touchstone of the existing Constitutional provisions, it cannot be said that the same is not in accord with the said provisions." Therefore, we are of the considered view that petitioner, Hon'ble former Judge of this Court, cannot be given the requisite relief on the basis of the afore-referred judgment of the Indian Supreme Court.

15. The crux of above discussion is that finding no substance in the instant Writ Petition, it is hereby dismissed, with no order as to the costs. MWA/49/HC(AJ&K) Petition dismisse