P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, C. J.‑The petitioner, Said Omar, was allotted an unregistered factory, known as the Punjab Indus trial Works, Badami Bagh, by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, in 1955. The previous allottee was Ghias‑ud‑Din respondent No. 3 and he was ordered to be dispossessed. Ghias‑ud‑Din appealed to the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner (Miscellaneous) who rejected the appeal He went up in revision (along with Abdus Salam respondent No. 4, who was his financing partner) to the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) but was unsuccessful. Before possession of the property could be delivered to the petitioner, however, the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 succeeded in obtaining an order from the Central Government to the effect that the delivery of possession be stayed. Before the order of the Central Government could reach the relevant authorities, possession had already passed to the petitioner. This fact being brought to the notice of the Central Govern ment, a direction was issued that the status quo ante be restored. The petitioner has therefore approached this Court for a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, mainly on the ground that the Central Government had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter. The Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) has been impleaded as respondent No. 2 in this peti tion while the Central Government is respondent No. 1. The petition came up for hearing before my brothers Abdul Aziz Khan and Ortcheson JJ. who passed an interlocu tory order maintaining the petitioner in possession of the property till further orders of this Court. A rule nisi was issued to the respondents. The Advocate‑General, Pakistan, has appeared on behalf of the Central Government, Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan for the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General), Lahore and Mr. Amjad Hussain for respondents Ghias‑ud‑Din and Abdus Salam. We have been taken through the relevant legal provisions by the learned counsel for the parties. The Rehabilitation Commissioner (General), it is agreed, passed a final order in his revisional jurisdiction under subsection (4) of section 13 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance (XIX of 1948), (herein after referred to as the Rehabilitation Ordinance). Section 13 makes provision for appeal, revision and review of orders in certain contingencies. Section 13‑A of that Ordinance empowers the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to specify the cases or classes of cases in respect of which a revision petition may be made to the Government against the order of any Rehabilitation Commis sioner or Rehabilitation Board. In pursuance of this section, Notification No. F‑2 (5)/52‑R‑1, dated the 24th April 1952, was issued by the Central Government, making revisions competent in certain specified class of cases to the Central Government. An order passed in proceedings under subsec tion (4) of section 13 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance is expressly excluded from the purview of this notification. By virtue of the provisions of section 13‑B of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, consequently, the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) must be regarded as final and it was not liable to be called in question in any judicial proceedings in any Court. So far as the Rehabilitation Ordinance is con cerned, it is conceded on behalf of all the respondents that the R. C. G.'s order could not be the subject of a further revision or review except under subsection (5) of section 13 itself, by the Rehabilitation Commissioner personally and to the extent indicated therein. It is, however, claimed on behalf of the Central Government that section 45‑A of the Pakistan (Admi nistration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as the Evacuee Property Ordinance) confers an overall controlling power on the Central Government in respect of the administration of evacuee property and the Government, therefore, was entitled to interfere in orders of allotments to correct errors in the interests of justice, even though such orders may have been finalised in revision pro ceedings before the Rehabilitation Commissioner. On the contrary, the petitioner's contention is that no such power exists in the Central Government. The question that falls for determination, therefore, is as to the true construction of section 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance. Our attention has been invited by the learned Advocate General to the provisions of section 4 (1) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, which is in the following terms:‑ "The provisions of this Ordinance and the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 (XV of 1949), and the rules made thereunder and shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with the Ordinance contained in any other enactment or in any instrument having effect by virtue of such enactment." The argument raised on behalf of the respondents is that sec tion 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance will prevail even if it conflicts with any provision of the Rehabilitation Ordi nance and that the order impugned has the legal sanction of that section. It may be useful to reproduce section 45‑A itself which runs as follows:‑ "The Central Government may, for the purpose of regu lating the administration of any evacuee property, make such order or direct such action to be taken in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Ordinance." The section was inserted in the Evacuee Property Ordinance by Act VI of 1951. The learned Advocate‑General and Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan have contended before us that this gives very wide powers to the Central Government in respect of the administration of evacuee property, including the power to disallot a particular individual and to allot Evacuee property to another. At the same time, they concede that the word "regulating", occurring in this section, is one of limitation and that the power conferred by the section is subject to the further limitation that the order or direction given should not be inconsistent with any of the other provisions of the Ordi nance. It is obvious, therefore, that the section does, not invest the Central Government with plenary or unrestricted powers. The word "administration" may fairly be held to include management of an evacuee property through an allottee. The real question, however, is as to the exact connotation of the word "regulating". This word is not defined anywhere in the Evacuee Property Ordinance. We have, therefore, to look to its dictionary meaning. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word "regulate" is assigned the following current meanings :-- "To control, govern, or direct by rule or regulations; to subject to guidance or restrictions; to adapt to circumstances or surroundings. To adjust, in respect of time, quantity, etc., with reference to some standard or purpose; especially to adjust (a clock, etc.) so that the working may be accurate." There are two other meanings given against this word which are indicated as obsolete. They read as follows:‑ "To bring or reduce (a person or body of persons) to order and to correct by control." The learned Advocate‑General at first attempted to take his stand on the last‑mentioned meaning, but when it was pointed out to him that this had grown obsolete, he agreed to confine himself to the other equivalents mentioned in the dictionary. Obviously, the first meaning mentioned by the lexico‑grapher was enapt in so far as an order setting aside an allotment is concerned. Such an order would not amount to "controlling, governing or directing by rule or regulations". Nor would it amount to "subjection to guidance or restriction or to adapta tion to circumstances or surroundings." The learned Advo cate‑General placed reliance on the equivalent "to adjust, in respect of time, quantity, etc. with reference to some standard or purpose". This meaning has reference primarily, as is indicated in the dictionary itself, to such mechanical instru ments as a clock, and the adjustment is to be in respect of time, quantity, etc. It would be extremely difficult to bring an order setting aside an allotment within the purview of this definition. It is obvious that this would require the existence of some objective standard or purpose and no such objective standard or purpose is mentioned in the present context. The impugned action cannot, in our opinion, be brought within the pale of any of the current definitions of the word "regulate". We are inclined to hold that the word "regulate" had been used either in the first or the second sense given above. If the idea behind the section was to confer wide powers of interference with particular orders regarding any evacuee property, the object could have been much more easily and simply achieved by omitting the word "regulating" altogether. This word cannot be regarded as redundant. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that redundancy must not be attributed unnecessarily to the legislature. The word "regulat ing", therefore, must be given its due meaning while construing the section. It is in fact the key word of the section. We have reached the conclusion that the section empowers the Central Government to issue orders or directions of a policy nature generally, regarding the administration of any evacuee property because only then could the administration be said to have been regulated. It is true that the use of the expression "any evacuee property" would seem to indicate that the order, or direction can relate to a single unit of evacuee property also. It is not, however, difficult to conceive of cases in which such directions may be found necessary in the national interest. For instance, in respect of an evacuee steel factory the Central Government might deem it expedient to direct that for a certain period of time, a particular type of steel will be produced to the exclusion of other varieties. Similarly in respect of other properties specific directions may be con sidered necessary in respect of the management of that pro perty. But we are firmly of the view that this power does not extend to interference with specific orders, passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities or the Custodian in respect of allotment of any particular evacuee property, after due judi cial hearing. The argument was advanced that this view of section 45‑A would make it an unnecessary provision in the face of section 47 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, which authorises the Central Government to promulgate rules for carrying out the purposes of the Ordinance by notification in the Official Gazette. Those rules, however, would be of a general charac ter, not confined to any particular unit of property. Section 45‑A appears to fill a lacuna in that respect inasmuch as it empowers the Central Government to issue similar directions or orders concerning the management of a single unit of property. We are fortified in this conclusion by reference to the position that emerges out of the Notification issued by the Central Government itself under section 13‑A of the Rehabi litation Ordinance. That Notification makes it clear beyond doubt that the Central Government was not prepared to allow any party to an allotment dispute to agitate the matter in revision before the Central Government, after it had been dealt with finally under revisional powers, by the Rehabilita tion Commissioner (General) under section 13 (4) of that Ordinance. If the interpretation of section 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, contended for on behalf of the respondents, is acceded to, it would mean that whereas the Central Government had expressly provided for finality of the R. C. G's order, in respect of allotment orders passed in revi sional jurisdiction, and had thus precluded further hearing of the matter on the judicial side, non‑the‑less it contemplated the possibility of interfering in the matter on the executive plane without any obligation to hear anybody This involves an inconsistency which we would be reluctant to attribute to the Central Government. The learned Advocate‑General expressed his apprehension that if we adopt a narrow interpretation of section 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, there would be no machinery left for correction of errors made in the matter of allotments by the subordinate authorities. It may be that the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to confer finality on the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) in respect of allotments in the interest of certainty and to avoid delays in dealing with evacuee property. The remedy, however for any defect, if there be one, lies in the hands of Government itself as they can always amend the notification issued under section 13‑A of the Rehabilitation Ordinance and make even revisional orders of the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) in respect of allotments, open to further revision by the Central Government. We are not convinced, therefore, that the interpretation adopted by us would lead to any inconve nient consequences, such as are contemplated by the learned Advocate‑General. The scheme of the two Ordinances, which must be read together, apparently is that powers are vested in the Central Government to make appointments of certain functionaries and except where express power of control or revision is reserved in favour of Government, the legislature is content to leave final decision in the hands of the authorities below the level of the Government. The only section, which deals with the allotment of evacuee property in the Evacuee Pro perty Ordinance, is section 14. That confers power on a Rehabilitation Authority to allot any evacuee property to any person. A "Rehabilitation Authority" means, according to the definition item (8) of section 2, "any Rehabilitation Board, Rehabilitation Commissioner etc." appointed under the Rehabilitation Ordinance. It does not include Government. The learned Advocate‑General concedes that section 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance would prevent any interested person from approaching the Central Government direct for obtaining an allotment of an evacuee property without going to the subordinate relevant authorities. We are clear in our minds that no general power of control can be spelt out of~ section 45‑A such as could authorise the Central Government to interfere in particular orders of allotment. An allottee if not an administrator of evacuee property, may be described as an agent of the administrator who may be some officer appointed under the Evacuee Property Ordinance or the Rehabilitation Ordinance. A change of an administrator or his agent would be a far cry from regulation of the adminis tration of evacuee property. Mr. Fayyaz Ali also attempted to argue that another alter native and equally efficacious remedy by way of a suit for injunction was open to the petitioner against the Central Government even if the narrower interpretation of section 45‑A of the Evacuee Property Ordinance were to be adopted and, therefore, a writ petition would not lie. This argument omits to take notice of the pre‑emptory provisions of section 12 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, which would prevent any Civil Court from granting an injunction or passing any other order of whatever kind in respect of evacuee property. The argument is wholly devoid of force. It was next urged that the Central Government had not yet passed a final order in the case and only an interim order had been issued to the effect that the status quo ante before the allotment in favour of the petitioner, be restored so that the Central Government may eventually pass final orders. But the incidental power to issue an interim order could only rest on the foundation of a substantive power to e set aside an allotment order. This power, in our opinion, is not to be found within the four corners of the two Ordinances and, consequently, no such interim order can be upheld as valid. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order passed by the Central Government was entirely misconceived as it had no legal sanction behind it. It must, consequently, be ignored as a nullity in law. On this view, it is unnecessary to issue a writ to the Central Government. The Rehabilita tion Commissioner (General), however, has tried to support the Central Government's stand and, unless restrained, would carry out the illegal order issued by the Central Government. The petitioner is already in possession of the property allotted to him. We direct the issue of a mandamus to the Rehabilita tion Commissioner (General) calling upon him to maintain the petitioner in possession of the allotted property till such time as he can be ousted from possession by a lawful order. We further direct respondents Nos. 3 and 4 that they should not interfere with the possession of the petitioner till it is lawfully concluded. In view of the difficult nature of the legal question involved in the case, we make no order as to costs in this Court. A. H. Mandamus issued.