P L D 1957 (W (PLP)
MUHAMMAD AYUB DAR‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ATTOCK, CAMPBELLPUR and others‑Respondents
| Citation | P L D 1957 (W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Shafi and Habibullah Khan, JJ |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD AYUB DAR‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ATTOCK, CAMPBELLPUR and others‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | (e) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 170‑, (b) Natural justice‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1957 (W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: (e) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 170‑, (b) Natural justice‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1957 (W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Shafi and Habibullah Khan, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1957 (W (PLP) (MUHAMMAD AYUB DAR‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ATTOCK, CAMPBELLPUR and others‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Dr. Abdur Rahim assisted by Muhammad Abdullah for Petitioner.
- Ch. Muhammad Ali, Additional Advocate‑General for Respondents 1, 2 and 5.
- Kazi Abdul Wahab for Respondent 3.
- Date of hearing: 24th October 1956.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Punjab Municipal Act (III of 1911), Ss. 232 & 235
Concurrent jurisdiction of Deputy Commissioner and Commis sioner to suspend resolution of Committee‑Commissioner only confirming under S. 235 order of Deputy Commissioner‑Commis sioner not a necessary party to writ petition seeking to set aside Deputy Commissioner's order suspending resolution‑Civil Pro cedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, r. 3‑Vice‑President of Committee under whose presidentship suspended resolution was passed, whether has no locus standi to apply for writ. The order of the Commissioner which under section 235 only confirms the order of the Deputy Commissioner suspend ing a resolution of the Municipal Committee has no basis by itself. Hence, a writ petition which asks only for setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner is perfectly in order, because, if, on acceptance of such a petition, the order of the Deputy Commissioner is quashed, the order of the Commis sioner automatically ceases to have any effect. The Vice‑President under whose presidentship the reso lution suspended by the Deputy Commissioner was passed is entitled to make an application for a writ to, quash the order of suspension. Violated administrative by authorities consulting each other to make a decision where they are expected to take decisions independently. When the law confers a certain power on a certain authority then it is that authority which has got to exercise it, according to the established principles of fair-play and natural justice. If it is shown that the power has been exercised by such an authority not independently, but under instructions of some superior officer, then the exercise of such authority would, in the eye of law be a nullity. It would be more so if the superior authority happens to be the authority to whom the case has ultimately to be submitted for confirmation. When the law enjoins that a certain order should not take effect until it is confirmed by another authority then the law takes a precaution that the authority passing the order and the one confirming it should act independently of each other, and not in collabo ration with each other, and if that is not done, then it clearly amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. An executive authority or an administrative tribunal when it is called upon by the law to pass a certain order in its discretion must do so without being influenced by any extraneous and irrelevant considerations. If, however, such an authority or tribunal passes an order being influenced by such considerations, then it is wrong that it is a question of fact alone; it goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the officers concerned. (c) Hunger‑ strike‑Form of coercion‑Order passed under influence of‑Amounts to malice in law‑Against equity and justice. (d) Punjab Municipal Act (III of (1911), S. 232‑Condi tions laid down in section must be fully satisfied before Deputy Commissioner can suspend execution of resolution‑ Order suspending resolution influenced by hunger‑strike of person affected by resolution‑Order quashed. Powers of High Court not limited to only safeguarding constitutional rights. The powers of the High Court under Article 170 are very wide. They are not limited to cases of safeguarding constitutional rights as is implied from the words "for any other purpose" used in this Article. There is ample power vested in the High Court to issue directions to an executive authority when such an authority is not exercising its powers bona fide for the purpose contemplated by the law or is influenced by extraneous and irrelevant considerations and when injustice has resulted.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD SHAFI, J.‑--Mr. A R. Salimi was the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Hazro. He submitted his resignation, but subsequently he withdrew it on the 2nd of July 1951, saying that his staff had promised to co‑operate with him in all matters. On the 11th of December 1955, he submitted another resignation to the President of the Hazro Municipality, saying that his domestic circumstances did not allow him to serve any more in Hazro and that he be permitted to resign. Mr. Muhammad baud, the President of the Municipal Committee, accepted this resigna tion on the 29th of December 1955, and ordered that the Head Clerk should take over the charge temporarily and the resignation put up before the Committee for approval . He further ordered that the post of the Secretary be advertised. On the 5th of January 1956, an ordinary general meeting of the Municipal Committee, Hazro took place at 10‑15 a. m. under the presidentship of Muhammad Ayub Dar, the vice‑President, and amongst other resolutions, it was resolved by Resolution No. 247 that the resignation of A. R. Salimi be accepted, the charge handed over to the Head Clerk and the post of the Secretary advertised in the papers. The information of the acceptance of the resolution was given to the Deputy Commissioner, Attock District at Campbellpur by D. O. No. 18/M. C. Hazro, dated the 11th of January 1956. On the 12th of January 1956, the Deputy Commissioner, Campbellpur, received a representa tion, dated 10th January 1956, from A. R. Salimi, alleging that on the night of the 19th December 1955, he was called by Seth Muhammad Daud, President Municipal Committee Hazro, at 7 p. m. at his residence and forced to tender his resignation. It was alleged that the President told him that this was desired by the Additional District Magistrate, Campbellpur, who did not want him to remain the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, any more. The resig nation was handed over to the President, but subsequently he was informed by the A. D. M. Campbellpur on the 20th of December 1955, that he was quite unaware of the affairs of the Committee and advised him to withdraw his resignation. He informed the President about all this, and at the same time gave him an application, with drawing the resignation. The President promised to return the resignation to him. On the 5th of January 1956, however, to his great surprise, the resignation instead of being returned to him was put up to the Committee by Muhammad Ayub Dar the Vice‑President, and was accepted by the majority of the votes in spite of his protests. He stated that no special meeting was called to consider his resignation, and that his resignation and its withdrawal were not included in the agenda. A. R. Salimi desired an impartial inquiry into the matter and asked the Deputy Commissioner to suspend the resolution of the Municipal Committee and at same time permit him to continue to work as the Secretary of the Municipal Committee. In the end of the application which was typed he added in his own hand writing that if his case was not considered by the authorities concerned he shall go on hunger‑strike till death from the 12th instant in front of the Municipal Office. A copy of this application was sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the President Municipal Committee, Hazro, directing the President to place the matter on the agenda as required by the Bye‑law No. 27 of the Business Bye‑laws of the Municipal Committee, Hazro. He further ordered that in the meantime, A. R. Salimi should continue to work as Secretary of the Committee. The President of the Municipal Committee, by letter No. 26‑M. dated Hazro, the 14th of January 1956, categorically denied all the allegations made by A. R. Salimi in his representation and asked the Deputy Commissioner to withdraw his order allowing A. R. Salimi to continue to work as the Secretary of the Municipal Committee. The President also threatened that if the Deputy Commissioner failed to withdraw his order, he along with seven Municipal Commissioners would tender their resignations from the membership of the Municipality in protest for the Deputy Commissioner's interference in the administration of the Committee at frivolous and false allegations of persons like A. R. Salimi. The Deputy Commissioner, Campbellpur, on the 14th of February 1956, acting under section 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, suspended the execution of Resolution No. 247, dated the 5th of January 1956. The order of the Deputy Commissioner may with advantage be reproduced here: " It appears from the application. dated the 10th of January 1956, of Mr. A. R. Salimi, Secretary Municipal Committee, Hazro that his resignation was obtained by the President Municipal Committed Hazro by fraud and deceitful means, and that he withdrew the resignation at a later stage. The resignation was however dropped on the agenda of the meeting held on the 5th of January 1956, all of a sudden and without necessary notice. The Secretary protested against this procedure, but his protest was also not recorded in these proceedings: He went on hunger‑strike as a protest against the decision of the Members who constituted the majority. On receipt of the above‑mentioned representation made by A. R. Salimi, the President was advised to reconsider the matter as required by Bye‑law No. 27 of the Business Bye‑laws of Municipal Committee, Hazro and to allow A. R. Salimi to continue as the Secretary of the Committee. The President refused to reconsider the matter The Committee's Resolution No. 247, dated the 5th of January 1956, in the circumstances is contrary to the public interests and its execution is likely to lead to a breach of the peace and encourage lawlessness. I, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on the under section 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911; hereby suspend the execution of the Special Resolution of the Municipal Committee, Hazro. Enquiry will also be held in the matter." On the 20th of February 1956, Muhammad Ayub Dar, the Vice‑President of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, who presided over the meeting in which Resolution No. 247 was passed on the 5th of January 1956, put in a petition under section 223‑A of the Constitution Act, for a writ of certiorari against the Deputy Commissioner, Attock, Campbell pur, the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Mr. A. R. Salimi, Mr. Muhammad Daud, tire President of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, and the (government of West Pakistan, through the Chief Secretary, Lahore, praying that respondent No. 1's order, dated the 14th of February 1956, was based on a mistaken notion of official prestige and outside influence unconnected with Municipal Administration and constituted a fraud on the statute for ulterior motives, and should, therefore, be quashed. It was stated in the application that any other remedy or relief which this Court deemed fit and proper be afforded to the petitioner. Notices were Issued to all the respondents and the case came up for hearing before me on the 20th of March 1956, when a preliminary objection was raised by the learned Additional Advocate General that the Commissioner had not taken any decision in the matter and that, therefore, the writ petition was premature. I referred the case to be heard by a Division Bench of this Court, and in the meantime I ordered that the files be sent to the Commissioner so that he might take a decision in the matter as soon as it was possible for him to do. The Commissioner, Peshawar Division, acting under section 235 of the Punjab Municipal Act, confirmed the order of the Deputy Commissioner, dated the 14th of February 1956, on the 18th of September 1956. The Commissioner further very erroneously directed that expenses incurred by Muhammad Ayub, Senior Vice -President on the filing and the conduct of the writ petition to the High Court should not be a valid charge on the funds of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, as he had filed this in his individual capacity. When the case came up before the Division Bench for final hearing, preliminary objection was taken both by the learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for A. R. Salimi, that as the final orders had been passed by the Commissioner the petition, as it stood, should be rejected, and the petitioner directed to file another writ petition, praying that the order of the Commissioner as well be quashed. An application to this effect was also made by the Assistant to the Com missioner (Political, Peshawar Division, on the 22nd of October 1956, Under section 232 of the Municipal Act, the Commis sioner and the Deputy Commissioner have both got a concurrent jurisdiction to suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a Committee under the given circum stances. Under section 235 if the order of suspension of execution of certain resolution is made by the Deputy Commissioner then he has forthwith to forward it to the Commissioner and, when such an order is made by the Commissioner, he has to do the same to the Local Government. Both of them have got to make a statement of the reasons for making such order, and have also got to forward to the relevant authority such explanation, if any, as the Committee might wish to offer. The Commissioner or the Local Government, as the case may be, thereupon confirm, modify or rescind the order of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner. It is clear from the above provision of law that the order of the Commissioner which only confirms the order of the Deputy Commissioner has no basis by itself. Hence, the petition which asks in form, only for setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner is perfectly in order, because, if, on acceptance of such a petition, the order of the Deputy Commissioner is quashed the order of the Commissioner automatically ceases to have any effect. J he other preliminary objection taken by A. R. Salimi in his written statement was that Muhammad Ayub Dar, the Senior Vice‑President was not an aggrieved party and was not harmed in any way by the suspension of the resolution, and, therefore, he had no locus standi to move the High Court for the issue of the writ in question. The learned counsel appearing for A. R. Salimi did not say a word about this objection at the time of the arguments. 1n fact, he did not argue the case at all and contended himself by saying that he adopted fully the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General, who did not make any reference in his arguments to this pre liminary objection, be that as it may, Muhammad Ayub Dar the petitioner, is clearly a person entitled to make the application because the resolution which has been suspended by the Deputy Commissioner by the impugned order was s passed by the Committee of which the petitioner is not only a member, but is its Vice‑President, and was acting as the President at the time when the resolution was passed. Both the preliminary objections, therefore, have no foundation, whatsoever, and are thereby overruled. In order to understand this judgment it seems necessary to reproduce in verbatim section 232 of the Municipal Act of 1911 under which the Deputy Commissioner purported to act in suspending the execution of Resolution No. 247, dated the 5th of January 1955:‑ "The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner may, by order in writing, suspend the execution of any resolution or order, of a Committee or a joint Committee, or prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done, or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the Committee, in the exercise of its powers tinder the Act, if, in his opinion, the resolution, or order acts in excess of the powers conferred by law or contrary to the interests of the public, or likely to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property or the execution of the resolution or the order, or the doing of the act, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace to encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons". The powers conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner under this section are as independent authorities and not as delegates. If the Deputy Commissioner takes a decision with regard to a certain resolution not as an independent authority, but on the advice and under the instructions of the Commissioner, then the order suspending the resolution is not really that of the Deputy Commis sioner, but in actual fact is that of the Commissioner. The submission of such an order by the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner for confirmation under section 235 of the Municipal Act in the circumstances is only a farce and has no legal significance whatsoever, All this amounts to a fraud on the statute, because it is against all established principles of natural justice and fair-play, that an authority which brings about passing of an order then should sit down to confirm it. When A. R. Salimi submitted his representation to the Deputy Commissioner on the 12th of January 1956, the latter forwarded the copy thereof to the President Municipality, Hazro, asking him to place this representation on the agenda as required by the Bye‑law No. 27 of the Business Bye‑laws of the Municipal Com mittee, Hazro, and directed that in the meantime A. R. Salimi should continue to work as the Secretary of the Committee. He did not take any decision with regard to the resolution as to whether it should be suspended or not. On the 14th of January 1956, the Deputy Commissioner passed the follow ing order:‑ "Mr. A. R. Salimi, Secretary, Municipal Committee; Hazro has put in a representation that he was forced under threats by the President, Municipal Committee, Hazro, to tender his resignation. I, therefore, appoint Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, Treasury Officer, Campbellpur, to please hold an inquiry immediately and submit his report to me." It appears that the Deputy Commissioner then had some talk on the telephone with the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, who directed him to stay the inquiry for the time being. On the 16th of January 1956, the Deputy Commis sioner Campbellpur addressed another memorandum to the President, Municipal Committee, suggesting once again that he should reconsider the matter as already directed by him in Letter No. 326 LFC/G, dated the 12th of January 1956. On the 16th of January 1956, the Deputy Commissioner, Campbellpur, ordered that the copy of Letter dated the 14th January 1956, from the President and his reply to him should be sent to the Commissioner. On the 19th of January 1956, the Deputy Commissioner addressed Memorandum No. 102/C to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, giving him the details of the case. He mentioned in this memorandum that A. R. Salimi had gone on hunger‑strike on the 12th instant. He went to Hazro on the 14th and on his advice A. R. Salimi gave up the hunger‑strike. He further informed the Commissioner that the President Municipal Committee instead of placing the matter before the Committee for consideration had asked him to withdraw his order allowing A. R. Salimi to continue to work as the Secretary, adding that if the order was not withdrawn, seven members of the Municipal Committee would tender their resignation from the Municipal Committee. In the end of this Memorandum, the Deputy Commissioner wrote the following sentences:‑ "I, therefore, submit the case to you for orders." A copy of this Memorandum was sent to Government, West Pakistan, Social Welfare and Local Government Department, Lahore, by No. 103/C. On the receipt of this Memorandum, the Commissioner wrote the following Memorandum No. 5057‑LG, dated Peshawar the 11th of February 1956, to the Deputy Commissioner, Campbellpur:‑ "Please refer to your Memorandum No. 102/G, dated the 19th of January 1956. From your letter No. 326, dated 12th of January 1956, addressed to the President, Municipal Committee Hazro, it appears that you are not satisfied with the action taken by the Municipal Committee and the manner in which the case has been handled by it The remedy seems to be that the powers available under section 232 of the Municipal Act may be exercised by you, and if you, consider an inquiry necessary, the Commissioner will depute an officer from here to conduct it." The notings on the file of the Commissioner No. A‑VI‑85 show that the Commissioner and his Assistant were con versing with the Deputy Commissioner right from the 25th of January up to the 28th of February 1956. It was as a result of the Commissioner's Memorandum mentioned above and the telephonic conversation which took place between the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner, that the former passed the order, suspending the Resolution on the 14th of February 1956. From the above facts it is clear that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was not his, but was in actual fact that of the Commissioner. When the law confers a certain power on a certain authority then it is that authority which has got to exercise it, according to the established principles of fair-play and natural justice. If it is shown that the power has been exercised by such an authority not independently, but under instructions of some superior officer, then the exercise of such authority would, in the eye of law be a nullity. It would be more so if the superior authority happens to be the authority to whom the case has ultimately to be submitted for confirma tion. When the law enjoins that a certain order should not take effect until it is confirmed by another authority then the law takes a precaution that the authority passing the order and the one confirming it should act independently of each other, and not in collaboration with each other, and if that is not done, then it clearly amounts to the violation of the principles of natural justice. An executive authority or an administrative tribunal when it is called upon by the law to pass a certain order in its discretion must do so without being influenced by any extraneous and irrelevant considerations. If, however, such an authority or tribunal passes an order being influenced by such considerations, then it is wrong that it is a question of fact alone; it goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the officers concerned. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner in this case in passing their respective orders seem to have fallen prey to the fiendish and cunning act of A. R. Salimi, who after tendering his resignation to the President of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, regretted it and wanted to withdraw the resignation, but when he was not allowed to do so, he resorted to hunger‑strike. On the 12th of January 1956, when A. R. Salimi submitted his representation to the Deputy Commissioner the office put up a note on the same day, making the following two suggestions:-- (1) that the Committee should be asked to reconsider the matter after placing the representation on the agenda, and (2) that the Secretary should be permitted to continue working and that in that ease, he would not go on hunger‑strike. The Deputy Commissioner on this note wrote an order in Vernacular, which, if translated into English, would be to the following effect:‑ "I agree. The Commissioner and the Deputy Secretary should immediately be informed." On the 14th of January 1956, the Deputy Commissioner directed the President of the Municipal Committee to pay the salary to A. R. Salimi for the month of December 1955. This order was passed in spite of the fact that A. R. Salimi owed to the Committee some money on account of the Flying Club Tickets. The same day, it appears, that the Deputy Commissioner asked the Assistant Medical Officer, Hazro, to attend on A. R. Salimi which the former refused to do. The Deputy Commissioner then took the trouble of taking the Medical Officer, Campbellpur, to A. R. Salimi, in order to render him the necessary medical aid. The Deputy Commissioner, by an order, demanded an explanation from the Assistant Medical Officer, Hazro, within three days of the receipt of that order. A copy of this order was sent to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, by No. 108‑HC‑G, dated the 16th of January 1956. The Assistant Medical Officer, Hazro, submitted his explanation which is at page 77 of the Deputy Commissioner's file, saying that the hunger‑strike of A. R. Salimi was due to a local party politics affair and it was inadvisable for him as a Government servant to interfere unless of course an Official order was given to him to that purpose. The Deputy Commissioner the same day asked A. R. Salimi to give up the hunger‑strike which the latter readily did. A. R. Salimi cunning as he seems to be, secured the services of some people who styled themselves as Secretaries of Anjuman‑i‑Islamia, Muhajir League, Jamait‑I- Islami and Muslim League to support his ill‑conceived cause and persuaded them to send telegrams to the Com missioner, Peshawar Division, to intervene, because as they put it Salimi's condition was deteriorating by his fasting, it may particularly be noticed, for one day only. Telegrams were also sent by the wife of Salimi as well as by himself. An, atmosphere was thus created by A. R. Salimi which tended the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner to act impulsively, rather than legally and wisely in the case. He seems to have taken an undue advantage of the kind and noble heartedness of the Commissioner of Peshawar Division. Hunger‑strike to attain some national object is understandable, but to resort to it in order to achieve one's personal and individual end is wicked and immoral in the extreme. It amounts to coercion, and if it is encouraged by the authorities concerned, it will lead to indiscipline and chaos in the country. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner by yielding to the threat of A. R. Salimi have enacted the drama of the famous fable where a naughty and spoiled child gets his object by threatening his widowed -mother that he would jump into the well if she did not satisfy his desires. The wise step which the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner should have taken in the circumstances was to leave A. R. Salimi to meet the end that he sought and left the matter at that. It would have, certainly been more conducive to discipline and good and efficient administration. Since the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in consultation and under the advice of the Commissioner was passed under the influence or extraneous considerations, namely, the hunger‑strike of Salimi. It amounts to malice in law, and should, in accordance with the well‑established principles of equity and justice be quashed. Again, when a discretion to pass a certain order is con ferred by any law on any administrative or executive authority then it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that such authority can exercise it indiscriminately or arbitrarily. He is not only expected to exercise this discretion inde pendently and without being influenced by any extraneous or irrelevant matter, but also expected to act in accordance with the recognised principles of natural justice, which means amongst other things that he should be impartial, acting good faith, and his act should have the appearance that justice has been done in the case. In addition, he should act reasonably as the circumstances of the case might require. His conduct should inspire confidence in the administration and should not under any circumstances bring it into ridicule. The Municipal Committee of Hazro, it seems, is an elected body. The President and the Vice‑President it appears, are also elected, and not nominated by Government. The Committee, the President and the Vice‑President, therefore, so long as a non‑confidence vote has not successfully been passed against them, must presume to enjoy the confidence of the public. It is against all established cannons of demo cracy for the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner to regulate the conduct of a Municipality by an executive order. Under section 232 of the Municipal Act, a Deputy Commis sioner cannot suspend the execution of any resolution duly passed, or an order legally made by a Committee, until and unless the resolution or order is in excess of the powers conferred by law on the Committee, or is contrary to the interests of the public, or likely to cause waste or damage of the funds of Municipal property, or is likely to lead to a breach of peace, or to encourage lawlessness, or to cause injury or annoyance to the public, or to any class, or body of persons. Since this section interferes with the working of the Committee, which is an elected body, by an executive order, it has to be construed very strictly. The Deputy Commis sioner has no jurisdiction, whatsoever, to suspend the execu tion of a certain resolution until and unless the conditions laid down in the section are fully satisfied. The Deputy Commissioner, while suspending the execution of the resolution, vaguely and in general terms observed in his order, dated 14th February 1956, that the resolution is contrary to the public interests, and its execution is likely to lead to a breach of the peace and encourage lawlessness. There is no indica tion, whatsoever, on this record, or in the affidavits filed by the different officers in this case, that the acceptance of the resignation of A. R. Salimi was in any way contrary to the public interests, or was likely to lead to a breach of the peace or encourage lawlessness. If anything was against the public interests, or was likely to lead to a breach of the peace and encourage lawlessness, it was not the acceptance of the resig nation of A. R. Salimi but the most cunning and unprecedented act of A. R. Salimi himself of going on hunger‑strike. It is he who should have been punished. He had in fact made himself liable to be proceeded against departmentally. A. R. Salimi, in his representation, had made some very serious allegations against the President and the Vice‑President of the Municipal Committee. It was not right on the part of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner to accept those allegations as gospel truth, simply because they had been made by A. R. Salimi, particularly when they were not supported by any affidavit or evidence. Under section 22 of the Punjab Municipal Act, it is the Local Government which has got the power to inquire into the conduct of any President or Vice -President and remove them from their office on the ground of abuse of their powers. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner, while accepting the allegations of A. R. Salimi in his representation and suspending the execution of the resolution virtually usurped the function of the Local Govern ment and held that the President and the Vice‑President had abused their powers, and that they were, therefore, liable to be dealt with under section 22 of the Municipal Act. In fact, it was the entire Municipal Committee which was guilty of abuse of the power, because it was the Committee which accepted the resignation of A. R. Salimi, and not the President and the Vice‑President, and, consequently, an action was called for to supersede this Committee under the relevant provisions of law. The Deputy Commissioner and the‑ Commissioner do not seem to have appreciated the seriousness of the affair and having been led away by the hunger‑strike of A. R. Salimi, they took a most serious step by suspending the execution of the resolution. In my view, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was not reasonable as the circumstances of the case required. On the contrary, it was discriminatory and arbitrary and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. It strikes me not a little remarkable, that the Commissioner should have taken exception to the attitude of the Vice‑President, threaten ing to resign if the Deputy Commissioner did not withdraw his order permitting A. R. Salimi to work as the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, and not to the shocking and detestable conduct of A. R. Salimi himself. The advice which had been addressed to the President and the Vice- President in the order of the Commissioner dated the 18th of September 1956, that their relations with the Head of the District should be cordial and reciprocally co‑operative, and not of defiance and threat should, in my view, have been addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, because it is he who did not co‑operate with the Municipality and wanted to inflict A. R. Salimi upon it against its desire and wishes. It is true that the Deputy Commissioner did ask the President to place the representation of A. R. Salimi on the agenda and have it considered by the Municipality under Bye‑law,
27. This law is imperative in its terms and prohibits any matter on which the Committee has recorded a resolution to be put up before it for discussion except after the lapse of six months of the date of the resolution or unless it is included in the agenda or without the permission of the President. The Deputy Commissioner has been given no power, whatsoever, to ask the Committee to place a certain matter on the agenda under this Bye‑law or under any other provision of law and reconsider it. The Deputy Commissioner, therefore in giving this order exceeded his powers. Again, his order, asking the Committee to permit A. R. Salimi to continue to work as the Secretary was certainly an order which is completely un warranted by law and against all principles of natural justice and equity. A. R. Salimi as well as the Deputy Commissioner both objected to the consideration of the question of the resignation of A. R. Salimi by the Committee in their meeting of the 5th January 1956, on the ground that it was not placed upon the agenda. Both these persons, however, seem to have lost sight of Bye‑law 9 of the Business Bye‑laws which runs as under:‑ "The items on the agenda shall be dealt with in their order; provided that the Chairman, with the consent of the majority of the members present may vary such order or bring before the meeting any matter not included in the agenda." This matter presumably was considered, by the Members of the Committee, as in accordance with law, because no member of the Committee has come forward to say that the Committee had no jurisdiction whatsoever to accept the resignation of A. R. Salimi on that particular date. The allegations made by A. R. Salimi that the resignation was extracted out of him by deceitful means by the President is on the face of it ridiculous and absurd. The resignation was handed over to the President on the 19th of December 1955. It was considered by him on the 29th of December 1955, that is ten days later. It was then put up before the Committee on the 5th of January 1956, A. R. Salimi did not come forward with his preposterous allegations against the President until the 12th of January 1956, when he handed over to the Deputy Commissioner, his representation dated the 10th of January 1956. His silence until the 10th of January 1956, if that date be taken as the date on which he for the first time levelled certain charges against the President, takes the foundation out of those allegations and proves them as false. The learned Additional Advocate General has objected to the jurisdiction of this Court to quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner under Art. 170 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. His argument seems to be that a writ of certiorari can only be issued if the administrative order involves the infringement of the constitutional rights. In my view, the powers of the High Court under Art. 170 arc very wide. They are not limited to cases of safeguarding the, constitutional rights as is implied from the words "for any F other purpose" used in this Article. There is ample power vested in this Court to issue directions to an executive authority when such an authority is not exercising its powers bona fide for the purpose contemplated by the law or is in fluenced by extraneous and irrelevant considerations and when injustice has resulted. In my opinion, there has been a violation of the fundamental principles of justice in this case and interference by this Court is not only warranted by law, but is urgently called for. I accept this petition, and quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner, suspending the execution of Resolution No. 247, dated the 5th of January 1956. The effect of this order is that the resignation of A. R. Salimi stands accepted, he is no more the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Hazro, and is not entitled to function as such. The respon dents will bear the costs of the petitioner Counsel's fee Rs.
100. HABIB ULLAH, J.‑
I agree. A.H. Petition accepted.