PLD 1957 (W (PLP)

B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.‑

This Letters Patent Appeal arises out of a suit for dissolution of marriage. A number of grounds for dissolution had been taken in the plaint, but the only one which found favour with the trial Court was that the defendant had falsely accused the plaintiff: of adultery. The trial Court decreed the suit on this ground, and the District Judge, on appeal, affirmed the decree In second appeal to the High Court it was not denied that a charge of adultery had been brought and that the charge was false, but it was contended before the learned. Single Judge that in accordance with the Muslim Law an accusation of adultery is not a ground for dissolution unless the procedure pres cribed by the Muslim Law relating to Li'an is complied with. This contention was rejected by the learned Single judge and in the appeal before us this contention is the sole point for decision. In order to be able to appreciate the exact questions that arise, I will first explain in some detail what is Li'an. In accordance with Sura XXIV (An‑Nur) Verse 4 of the Holy Quran, a person who accuses a woman of adultery is bound to produce four witnesses in support of his allegation and if he does not do so, he is liable to the punish ment for slander which is eighty stripes. I reproduce this Verse below :‑ "But as to those who accuse women of reputation of whoredom, and produce not four witnesses of the fact, scourge them with fourscore stripes, and receive not their testimony for ever; for such are infamous preveri cators." One Hilal‑Bin‑Umaiyyah accused his wife before the Prophet of having committed adultery with one Shirric‑Bin‑Samhas. For what happened in consequence of this accusation, I re produce in full the Hadith from Ibn‑Abbas :‑-- "Verily Hilal‑Bin‑Umaiyyah, confronted his wife before the Prophet, and accused her of adultery with Shirric‑Bin- Samhas. The Prophet said to him, 'Bring witnesses, or take eighty lashes upon your back.' Then Hilal said, 'O Messenger of God, when one of us sees a man upon his wife, must he go away to look for witnesses ? The Prophet said, 'Bring witnesses, or receive eighty lashes upon your back. Then Hilal said, 'I swear by God, who has sent you on earth, verily I am a teller of truth; and verily God will quickly send down an order which will save my back from being flogged." Then Gabriel brought ,a revelation in explanation of Li'an. The Hilal gave his oath, and the Prophet said, 'Verily God knows which of you is the liar; then do either of you repent.' Then the woman stood up, and made her oath; and when she came to May the anger of God be upon me if I he,' the people present forbade her repeating it, and said. 'Verily this fifth asseveration is a cause of punishment.' Ibn‑Abbas says, 'Then the woman stopped, so that we imagined she would not repeat it; after which she said, I will not disgrace my family all my life ; and she finished the fifth asseveration; and the Prophet ordered a separation, and said, 'See the woman, if she brings a child with eyes the colour of antimony, large buttocks, and fleshy legs, it is for Shirric -Bin‑Samhas (because he was of this description): Then the woman brought forth such a child ; and the Prophet said, 'Verily, had not there .been an order about it in the book of God, I would have done with the woman what I would have done." The Verse referred to in this Hadith which was revealed at that time, and in compliance with which the oaths were taken, is the following :‑ "They who shall accuse their wives of adultery, and shall have no witnesses thereof besides themselves; the testimony which shall be required of one of them shall be, that he swear four times by God that he speaketh the, truth," The procedure which is prescribed in this verse for taking an oath and calling for the wrath of God is called Li'an. Li'an means imprecation. The original object of this procedure was not the dissolution of the marriage tie. According to Muslim jurists, Li'an was allowed to the husband as a substitute for four witnesses ; so that his evidence taken in this manner had the same effect as the testimony of four witnesses ; at the same time, Li'an was a substitute for the punishment for slander, for the curse of God is regarded as a severer punishment than eighty stripes. The wife was allowed Li'an because otherwise, on account of the oath of the husband, the charge of adultery would be established against her and she would be liable to capital punishment. Her oath would save her from that punishment and it would also be a substitute for that punishment for the wrath of God which she invoked is regarded as worse than death. At the end of the proceedings in the Hadith referred to above, the Prophet had, however, ordered separation, and although originally intended for making available to the spouses a special form of testimony so as to save them from punishment for slander and adultery, Li'an subsequently came to be utilised by the wife for obtaining divorce in the Courts of Muslim Qazis. Whey: the husband brought a charge of adultery against a wife she would approach the Qazi who would force the husband either to retract the accusation or to take an oath. If he withdrew the accusation he would suffer punishment for slander. If he chose to take the oath, the procedure for Li'an would follow and a dissolution would be granted. In pre‑Partition India the doctrine of Li'an had always been considered as implying that a false charge of adultery brought by the husband against the wife would entitle the wife to a decree for dissolution. The contention of the appellant before us is that the separation of the spouses in the case of Li'an was the result not of the accusation of adultery but of compliance with the procedure of Li'an. The Prophet had, it is urged, ordered separation because the husband and the wife having invoked as against each other the curse and wrath of God, it was no longer possible for them to live amicably together as husband and wife ; and, as dissolution was the result only of the imprecation, compliance with the procedure of an would be essential before a dissolution is ordered by the Courts in Pakistan. Li'an, it is pointed out, means imprecation and it will be wrong to say, when there is no imprecation that dissolution is in accordance with the law of Li'an. It is also contended that apart from Li'an, an accusation of adultery does not in itself constitute a ground for divorce in Muslim Law. It will be proper to reproduce at this stage the words which the Prophet had used while ordering separation in the case of a Li'an. We quote them from a Hadith by Ibn‑Omer who said:‑-- "Verily the Messenger of God said to a man and woman, that had been confronted, Your account is with Goes one of you is a liar.' Again lie said to the man, 'This woman is forbidden you for ever' The man said, 'O Messenger of God! what is the case with respect to the money I settled upon her ? He said, It is not yours, it you have said true; it is gone in lieu of the use you have had of her; but if you have lied, then it is much further from you.' " It is true no doubt that the order of the Prophet related to the imprecators, abut what was the ground on which the order was passed ? Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that it was the impossibility of future harmonious marital life. I agree that this was the true ground for dis solution and that this is a correct criterion to adopt for deciding whether a dissolution should be ordered. But if we apply this criterion what would be the result in case of an accusation of adultery ? Can it be said that har monious marital life is possible even though the husband brings a charge of adultery against his wife and persists in it while the wife denies that charge ? Few things can be more cruel than forcing a wife to live with a husband who accuses her of adultery without reasonable grounds. I am unable to see how the difference between the spouses that is created by the bringing of a charge of adulteries stands in need of a ceremony of imprecation in order to be of sufficient force to render harmonious conjugal life impossible. And if we examine a little closely the argument of learned counsel we find that he has taken up a position which is untenable. It is not his contention that dissolution occurs because by the oath the accusation of the husband takes a very solemn form. According to him, even after the husband has taken an oath, the wife is not entitled to divorce even though she denies the accusation, because, according to him, it is the procedure of Li'an which results in the dissolution and that procedure is complied with' only when the wife too has taken an oath. The un ten- ability of the position taken up by learned counsel for the appellant would also appear if we consider all its implica tions. One of the implications would be that if the husband brings a charge and persists in it and yet when he is called upon to take an oath refuses to do so, end the Court finds the charge unproved or even false, the wife would not be entitled to a dissolution. Then, if he brings a charge and instead of taking the oath brings four witnesses to support his statement, and the wife either takes the oath or brings witnesses to prove her innocence, there would be no dissolution. There is no reason why the bringing of witnesses instead of taking the oath should make any difference to the situation for the oath is only a sub stitute for the production of witnesses. Another result of the contention of learned counsel would be, that; in cases where, under the Muslim Law, Li'an is not possible, there would be no ground for dissolution. Under the Hanfi Law, there is no Li'an in a case where the wife is a Kitabia, or. a slave girl, or a minor, or an insane person. So, in respect of all these, the husband would be able to bring false charges without incurring any liability in respect of the marital tie. Then, suppose he brings a false charge but denies when the wife approaches the Court that he ever brought a charge, and it is proved that in fact he did bring a charge and that the charge was false. Should the woman be placed in a worse position just because he not only brings a false charge but at the same time makes a false statement denying that he brought one? I cannot agree that the intention of the Law Giver of Islam was that in cases which we have illustrated above there should be no right in the wife to get the marital tie dissolved. There are no grounds why dissolution should be refused in those cases if it is to follow in a case where the procedure of Li'an is complied with. Marriage is not, in Islam, an act so irrevocable that one may be forced to say to the wife: "You are unlucky. True you are not to blame, and you are being subjected to an intolerable life, but we cannot help it''. The law gives I sufficient powers to the Qazis to dissolve it its case married life will be intolerable for the wife. The Hadith of the Prophet, on which the jurisdiction of the Qazis to dissolve a marriage is based, is stated at page 519 of Ameer Ali's Muhammadan Law, Volume II. It runs :‑- "If a woman be prejudiced by a marriage, let it be broken off." (Hadith from Sahih‑ul‑Bukhari). We are prepared to agree with learned counsel for the appellant that in cases where marriage is dissolved on) account of an accusation of adultery by the Courts in Pakistan, it is technically not a case of Li'an for there has been no imprecation, but Li'an has always been understood in this sense in pre‑Partition India, and it cannot be said that this is an improper use of the term once it is conceded that dissolution is the result in the case of Li'an, of the accusation. It is because the term was understood in this sense in pre‑Partition India that in the Central Shariat Act of 1937 (and after Partition in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act of 1951) Li'an is referred to as one of the grounds of `dissolution. The reference in these Acts to Li'an can be only to dissolution for accusation for adultery for the procedure of Li'an cannot, under the existing law, be applied at all. The practical impossibility of the observance of the procedure of Li'an is one of the arguments against the appellant and there is reference to it later in this judgment. We are of the opinion that the order of separation which, was passed by the Prophet in the case of imprecators was based truly on a charge. of adultery being made and persisted in and was not due to the mere compliance with a form of procedure. In this interpretation we are supported not only by cases decided by Courts of pre‑Partition India, and by the opinions of commentators on Muslim Law, but even the opinion of at least one ancient Muslim Jurist, Abu‑Ubaida, one of the Tabe in. He was of the opinion (vide page 207 of Sahih Bukhari mae Sharae Fatah‑ul‑Bari) that the dissolution takes place by the Qasaf, i.e. slander. The question put to him was as to when dissolution takes place in the case of Li'an. Ameer Ali, at page 530 of his Muhammadan Law, Volume II, is of the opinion that an accusation of adultery is by itself sufficient, without a compliance with the procedure of Li'an, to entitle the wife to a dissolution of marriage and he cites two cases where Muslim Qazis dissolved marriages on such accusations without regard to the procedure of Li'an. This is what he says :‑-- "It must be added, however' that it is not necessary to comply with all the formalities of La'an in order to obtain a valid dissolution of the marriage tie on the ground of the wife's infidelity. "When a false accusation is preferred against a woman, and the husband is unable to establish the charge, the woman is entitled to claim a divorce from the Court. Two cases are cited by Sautayra on this subject. In the first case Yehia bin Muhammad accused his wife of misconduct. She denied the charge, and cited him before the Kazi to establish it by formal evidence. On failure of the husband to do so, an order was made, at the instance of the wife, dissolving the marriage. "In the other case, which was decided by the Court of Algiers on the 13th of February 1871, the husband demanded a cancellation of the contract, on the ground that the wife had been guilty of immorality prior to her marriage. The wife denied his allegation and claimed a divorce. The husband failed to establish the accusation, and the Kazi accordingly pronounced a divorce in favour of the wife". Wilson, in his Muhammadan Law, regards Li'an, apart from that which belongs to the law of evidence, as entitling a wife to dissolution on a charge of adultery. Paragraph 76 of his Muhammadan Law runs :‑ "The fact of a husband having falsely charged his wife with adultery, will entitle her to claim a judicial divorce, without prejudice to any proceedings for defamation which she may be advised to institute, and independently of the result of any such proceedings". and he adds :‑

"The above appears to be the net result of the Muhammadan rules representing Li'an, after striking out all that properly belongs to the law of Evidence on the one hand or to the Criminal Law on the other". Discussing the position of Li'an in India, he continues :‑ "Inasmuch as the modern law of British India provides no punishment for conjugal infidelity on either side, and does not admit of Muhammadans being examined on oath. it may seem at first sight that the whole law of Li'an must be considered obsolete ; but, on the other hand, if we take the essential principle of the institution to be that an unretracted accusation of this kind renders proper conjugal affection impossible it appears to be a principle which our Courts may very reasonably enforce, as a useful counter poise to the liberty of divorce allowed to the husband". In Mst. Rahiman Bibi v. Fazal (A I R 1927 All. 56) Sulaiman, J. had to, deal directly with the question whether the jurisdiction of the Qazi to dissolve a marriage arises out of the procedure of the accusation. He has not dealt at any length with this question but he did say:-- "The learned counsel for the respondent in support ing the decree has however argued that under the Muhammadan Law the jurisdiction of the Qazi to effect a divorce arose out of the oath taken by the husband and not out of the accusation made by him. It is impossible to accept this contention because the cause of action for the wife to appeal to the Kazi and seek relief for divorce arose out of the accusation of the husband. The procedure as to the taking of the oaths in the course of the trial was a method of proof only and could not confer on the Kazi jurisdiction which existed before the trial began". In Zafar Husain v. Ummat‑ur‑Rahman (I L R 41 All. 278) it was held that :‑ (a) Courts in India had taken the place of Muslim Kazis ; (b) the Muslim Law of evidence was inapplicable ; and (c) the wife was entitled to a divorce in case the accusa tion was proved untrue. This was followed in Muhammad Husain v. Mst. Begam Jan (A I R 1927 Lah. 155). Other cases in support of this proposition are Mst. Fakhre Jahan Begum v. Muhammad Hamidullah Khan (I L R 4 Luck. 168), Kabil Gazi v. Madari Bibi (A I R 1933 Cal. 630) and Khatijabibi Umarsaheb v. Umarsaheb Ansarsaheb. (A I R 1928 Bom. 285). The contention that the procedure of Li'an should bet complied with before a decree for dissolution is granted its without force also for the reason that the procedure for Li'an was the result of circumstances which no longer exist. This procedure would be wholly out of place in the present state of the law, and, at the same time, there would be no jurisdiction in the Civil Court to compel compliance with it. The procedure of Li'an was the result of the Law of Islam relating to slander and adultery. It was a concession shown to the husband and the wife. Before the Pakistan Courts the husband does not ask for such a concession and the wife does not stand in need of any for adultery of the wife is not punish able at all. Nor has the Civil Court the authority to force any person to take an oath in the form prescribed by Li'an anal to send him to jail for refusing to take such oath. This impossibility of compliance with the procedure of Li'an is by itself an argument in favour of the contention that an accusation of adultery without recourse to the procedure of Li'an is a good ground for dissolution. One matter requires explanation. The authorities which we have cited above speak of a false charge of adultery. None of them. however, discusses the question of onus as to the falsity of the charge. The correct position appears to us to be that the case of the wife should be that the charge against her is not true but she is not bound to prove the falsity of the charge. It is for the husband to show that the charge is true if that be his case. So a dissolution is to be based on a charge of adultery which is denied and which is not proved to be true. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that should we hold in favour of the proposition that an accusation for adultery is a good ground for dissolution, we should delete the word "false" from the proposition which is laid down in commentaries on Muslim Law and in judgments and should say that a mere charge of adultery will furnish ground for dissolution. He points out the Prophet had not based his decree of separation on the ground of the falsity of the charge. He had simply said: "One of you is a liar" and the reason for separation was the impossibility of a harmonious married life in the presence of a charge of adultery, which reason would be there whether the charge was true or false. Now, although the Prophet did not find the charge to be false he did not, at the same time, find the charge to be true and it will not be correct to infer that had the charge been proved to be true he would still have ordered dissolution if the husband did not ask for it. The argument that a happy married state is not possible even in the case of a true accusation is also not of any compelling force for to grant divorce in the case of a true accusation would result in virtually granting the power of divorce to the wife who would simply have to commit adultery, an act which is not an offence so far as she is concerned, in order to get a dissolution. The law cannot allow her to take advantage of her own wrong. I have been stating that dissolution of marriage would occur where a charge is made and persisted in. It would be proper for me to explain what exactly I mean. If a husband brings a charge on strong grounds 'and on coming to know that he has only been misled retracts the charge bona fide and in all sincerity, and not merely as a device to defeat the suit of the wife, that may be a good ground for not decreeing dissolution. This locus psenitentiae would, however, be available only in a case where originally the charge is brought on, good and strong grounds. If the charge was brought on flimsy grounds, we would not agree that even a sincere retraction would defeat the suit of the wife. In such a case the question of dissolution would have to be decided according to the circumstances of a particular case and we would not lay down any hard and fast rule. This appeal is dismissed with costs. KAYANI, J.‑

The trouble in this case is that while La 'an is a recognized form of divorce, it only means "the invocation of a curse or (La'nat)". It is, therefore, natural to think that divorce in this form must be accompanied by some sort of an imprecation or curse. What we have to decide is whether the cause of the divorce lies in the accusation of adultery or in the curse. A man may invoke on himself the curse of God a thousand times without conferring a title on his wife to claim a divorce. The sub stance of the claim, therefore, lies in the accusation the form is in the imprecation. But this is not an injunction of the Quran. It is only a reported practice or Sunnat of the Prophet based on a Quranic text which was intended for an entirely different situation. We should immediately attend to this text Verse 2.‑As for the adulteress and the adulterer, flog each of them with a hundred stripes; and let not com passion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by God, if you believe in God and the Last Day: and let a party of the Believers witness their punishment. Verse 3.‑The adulterer shall marry none but the adulteress or the Un‑Believer and the adulteress shall marry none but the adulterer or an Un‑Believer. To the Believers, such a thing is forbidden. Verse 4.‑As for those who bring a false accusation (of adultery) against chaste women and do not bring four witnesses, flog them with eighty stripes ; and never again accept their testimony, for such men are the trans gressors :‑ Verse 5.‑Unless they repent thereafter and reform ; for Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. Verse 6.‑And as for those who falsely accuse their own wives and have in support no evidence but their own, their solitary evidence can be received if they take oath four times on Allah that they are solemnly telling the truth. Verse 7.‑And the fifth oath should be that they solemnly invoke the curse of God on themselves if they tell a lie. Verse 8.‑But it would avert punishment (for adultery) from the wife if she take oath. four times that her husband is telling a lie. Verse 9.‑And the fifth oath should be that she solemnly invokes the wrath of God on herself if he is telling the truth. For those who read the Quran as a new book, this passage prescribes the punishment for adultery. Conse quentially it prescribes the punishment for slander, for an accusation of adultery may be false and it was necessary to protect chaste women. That is the intention of the fourth verse, which makes it clear that a person will be punished as a slanderer if he does not produce four good witnesses to support the charge. Then the question arises whether the husband also, who will naturally be without witnesses when he discovers an adulterer in his own house, should be required to adduce the same measure of evidence. To meet this exceptional situation, the sixth and seventh verses exempt the husband from the general rule and permit him to swear four times and to invoke the curse of God if he be a liar. This not only saves the husband from the punishment for slander but also makes the wife liable to the punishment for adultery as prescribed by the second verse. The eighth verse rescues her from this situation if she in her turn take the oath four times that her husband is making a false accusation, and the ninth verse requires her to invoke the wrath of God if he be truthful. If there is any difference between (which the husband !is called upon to invoke) and (which the wife is called upon to invoke), then it is clear that the procedure of La'an ends with the seventh verse, and ends by saving the husband from the punishment for slander. What follows is not a part of La'an and is intended merely to furnish the wife with a defence against the charge of adultery. But the story is that Hilal‑bin‑Umiyyah accused his wife of adultery with Shirric‑bin‑Samhas before the Prophet, and the Prophet said: "Bring witnesses or take eighty stripes upon your back." Then Hilal said: "O Messenger of God, when one of us sees a man upon his wife, must he go away to look for witnesses?" And the Prophet repeated his previous remark; whereupon Hilal protested that he was telling the truth, arid said: "Verily God will quickly send down an order which will save my back from being flogged." Thereupon Gabriel brought down a revelation in explanation of La'an. This was apparently in terms of verses 6 to

9. Forthwith the oaths were administered and the Prophet ordered a separation. Now, although the incident of Hilal is not questioned in substance‑I‑ have seen slightly varying versions of it if it happened thus, it means that verses 2 to 5 originally existed without verses 6 to 9 until Hilal's wife by her mis conduct put her husband and the Prophet in an embarrassing position so that if Hilal failed to produce the four witnesses required by verse 9, he was to take eighty stripes on his back and in addition permit his wife to persist in her misconduct so long as Hilal was not able to procure four witnesses in his own house. Without the story of Hilal, the eight verses of Sura‑i‑Nur ending with verse 9 furnish a complete code for the punishment of adultery and slander and for enabling the wife and husband to defend themselves in their peculiar circumstances against the two punishments respectively. It would, therefore, be an unhappy explanation of a Quranic law to say that the Quran would have insisted on a husband being flogged for his failure to produce four witnesses if Hilal's wife had not mercifully committed adultery and saved all future husbands from the drastic consequences of an almost indefensible situation. But I have digressed here merely to show how a story can be made attractive in detail by weaving it round the person of the Prophet. I do not deny the story of Hilal and the fact that he and his wife were required to take the oaths and were then separated. Nobody says that the separation was a part of the and nobody can say it was the requirement of the Quran. It is agreed that they Prophet thought it was impossible for them to live together happily thereafter, But did the unhappiness spring from the oaths or from the accusation of adultery? It may be argues that the accusation, bad enough in itself, was made worse by the, oaths. This would mean that if an accusation is made without an oath, it is harmless, but if it is made with a formal oath, it causes unhappiness to the parties and makes conjugal life miserable. This will dot be accepted as a good argument. But if I am not misled .by my inadequate notes, what Mr. Mahmud Ali contended mainly was that "La'an becomes necessary after the accusation of adultery", or that La'an was the prescribed procedure for obtaining a divorce. As regards the first contention, so far as the Quranic text goes, La'an becomes necessary only to save the husband's back from eighty good stripes. As regards the second contention, the matter is reduced to the level of procedure, and in the last resort, to the manner of recording evidence. That is not how our Courts in Pakistan record evidence. We do not say an accusation of adultery is proved by the husband taking four oaths and an impreca tion. Section 2 of the Evidence Act repealed "all rules of evidence not contained in any Statute, Act or Regulation, in force in any part of British India", including, obviously, the rules of Muhammadan Law relating to evidence. Mr. Mahmud Ali's contention that section 2 having itself peen repealed in 1938 revived the rules of Muhammadan law is without force, because these rules did not exist in 1938 (having been repealed by section 2 in 1872), and nothing can come back to life which does not exist, unless it is revived by a legal fiction. Far from being revived by an N express provision, their continued demise was ensured by a general provision in section 6 of the General Clauses Act that the repeal of an enactment (here section 2 of the Evidence Act) "shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. Likewise, Mr. Mahmud Ali tried to build an argument on the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, and the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act, 1951. The former provided in section 2 that "notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions regarding intestate succession, . . . .marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zibar, li'an, khula and mubar'aat, . . .:. . . the rule of decision . . . . .shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)". The latter made the same provision, except that the various forms of divorce, namely, 'talaq, ila, zihar, li'an, khula and mubar'aat" were not specified. It is obvious that the intention was to switch over from custom to Muslim Law, and that thereafter the decision in tire matters specified was to be according to Muslim law. But Mr. Mahmud Ali contends that the express mention of the word ' La'an' (here spelt as Li'an) shows that the recognised procedure for La'an was to tie adopted as a rule of evidence. Until 1937, he argues, La'an was applied incorrectly because the formality of imprecation was not observed. After 1937, La'an was ineffective without the original procedure. I do not, however, think the intention of the various Shariat Acts was anything but to replace custom by personal law, and nobody has so far thought so. The mention of La'an among the various forms of divorce was by way of greater certainty. Divorce had been effected in British Indian Courts before 1937 according to Muslim law and La'an also was one of the recognized modes of divorce. It was also recognized that an accusation of adultery secured a right to a woman of obtaining a divorce, and the ceremony of imprecation had never been observed. If the intention of the Act of 1937 had been to introduce La'an particularly as a rule of evidence, something more relevant to the purpose would have been said than the mere enumeration of matters to which Muslim law would apply. And I think it was clear to everybody that the enumeration followed the language of section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, as far as was convenient. Left to myself, I would have no hesitation in holding that. a procedure whose adaptation has been recognized through the ages and which has become obsolete by our present laws F of evidence, should be allowed to remain obsolete because it does not possess any particular merit. The anomalies to which it may lead have been pointed out by my brother' Kaikaus. Even if we have become bound by the Muhammadan Law of evidence, we can adapt it to suit modern conditions and I am not trying to introduce an innovation. There are four recognized sources of Muhammadan Law, namely (1) the Quran, (2) Hadith (according to some, an interchangeable term with Sunnat,) (3) Qias (Reasoning by Analogy) and (4) lima' (Consensus of opinion among doctors of religion at a particular time in respect of some particular matter). So far as the Quran goes, I have no intention of interpreting its provisions, which are accepted generally as immutable, though in some details interpreted differently. The real difficulty comes to be faced with Hadith, which reports the Sunnat or practice of the Prophet. Apart from the fact that the authenticity of a Hadith in respect of a particular matter is seldom free from dispute even the established practice of the Prophet in certain matters was departed from by some of the Khulafa‑e‑Rashidin, particularly Umar. Quite a respectable number of such instances have been stated in an excellent treatise in Urdu entitled "The Principle of Law‑making in Islam", published by the Idara‑e‑Tuloo‑e -Islam, Karachi, from which I have derived great benefit. The correct attitude towards the interpretation of Muslim law as illustrated by Sunnat, if I may venture to give all opinion, would be to regard it as changeable in detail to suit the requirements of time and place. In fact, I am not giving an opinion, but indicating actual practice: It is not necessary for me to say here that the argument for Sunnat being based on revelation is not well founded. In any event, therefore, I would be inclined to hold that La'an in the present day. is a form of obtaining a divorce by the wife if the husband brings a false charge of adultery against her, and that it is not necessary for it to be attended by a formal imprecation. I agree in dismissing the appeal. K. M. A. Appeal dismissed.