P L D 1958 Dacca 605 (PLP)

"Accordingly, the authorities . . . . . establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject- matter is, if no defects appear on the face of it, to be taken as .conclusive of the facts stated therein ; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found. There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction, to determine whether there is non‑payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is non- payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if the Controller may be assumed to have wrongly decided the question of non‑payment of rent, which by no means is clear, his order cannot be questioned in a Civil Court". In the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar and another v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi it has been held "The remaining three questions canvassed before us unless they are of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated the 13th May, 1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject‑matter of a writ of certiorari ; it is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject‑matter, so that the inferior Court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of it. It may also arise‑from the absence of some essential preliminary or upon the existence of some particular facts collateral to the actual matter which the Court has to try and which are conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it. But once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but, while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly".

15. From all the aforesaid authorities it appears to me that once an inferior Court or tribunal or body is vested with power to decide its jurisdiction and thereafter it adjudicates upon the matter, the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to question the decision unless there was fraud practised on it or it had no jurisdiction, fiscal or territorial, or such other questions which may affect jurisdiction. Having this principle in view, I am to decide whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction has been ousted in the circumstances of the case before me.

16. If we turn to the preamble of the B. A. D. Act, we find the following "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the indebtedness of agricultural debtors and to amend the law governing the relations between agricultural debtors and their creditors". This preamble goes to show that the Act is meant for relief of the agricultural debtors and for amending the law governing the relations between agricultural debtors and their creditors.

17. By subsection (8) of section 2 `debt' has been defined as follows "debt" includes all liabilities (incurred prior to the first day of January 1940), of a debtor in cash or in kind, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court or otherwise, and whether payable presently or in future, but does not include the following (i) any amount the liability for the payment of which is only contingent ; (ii) any rent not due at the time when a Board determines the amount of debt under section 18 ; (iii) any share of the produce of land payable on account of land cultivated under the system known as adhi, barga or bhag; `Debtor' has been defined in subsection (9) of the same Act as follows : "debtor" means a debtor whose primary means of livelihood is agriculture and who‑ (a) is a raiyat or any under‑raiyat, or (b) cultivates land himself or by members of his family or by hired labourers or by adhiars, bargadars or bhagdars ; and includes a group of persons who join in making an application under the provisions of subsection (1) or section 9". `Loan' has been defined in subsection (10) of the same section as follows Loan' means a loan whether of money or in kind, and includes any transaction which is, in the opinion of a Board, in substance a loan". `Board' has been defined in subsection (5) of section 2 as follows " Board means a Debt Settlement Board established under subsection (1) of section 3, and includes an officer or the Collector authorised under the proviso to section 4" ; Section 7 defines the powers of the Board. Section 8 provides for procedure for filing an application by a debtor for settlement of his debt as well as by the creditor. Section 11 indicates what particulars of debts are to be included in the application under section

8. Section 13 empowers the Board to invite further statements of debts while issuing notice under subsection (2) of section

12. Section 15 gives the Board the power to attempt for any amicable settlement of debt and section 18 gives the Board power to decide whether the debt exists and determine its amount, if there is any doubt or dispute as to the existence or amount of any debt. Section 20 provides "If any question arises in connection with the proceedings before a Board under this Act whether a person is a debtor or not (or whether a liability is a debt or not) the Board shall decide the matter". From the provisions in the aforesaid sections, it appears to me that the Debt Settlement Board has been only clothed with jurisdiction to investigate those transactions which in its opinion are debts and has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 8 when there is no existence of debt inasmuch as the existence of debt is sine qua non for clothing the Board with x jurisdiction as held in the case reported in 5 D L R 1 corres ponding to P L R 2 Dacca

593. Furthermore, when the Board decides that there is no debt, it loses its jurisdiction over the application and any order passed in this behalf is not binding on the Civil Courts though it may be binding before the Board, so far as the parties are concerned.

18. This view of mine is also supported by the provisions of the Act in some other sections. The provision of subsection (4) of section 18 takes away jurisdiction of the Civil Court "When the Board has determined under subsection (2) the amounts of the principal of a debt due from a debtor and of the arrears of interest due thereon, the decision of the Board in this respect shall not be questioned in any Civil Court or in any manner other than that provided in this Act". From section 21, it appears that when a creditor does not accept an offer made by the debtor which in the opinion of the Board is fair and such as the creditor ought reasonably to accept, the Board, if it is so empowered under section 7, instead of passing any other order which it is competent to pass, may grant to the debtor a certificate in the prescribed form in respect of the debt to which the offer relates". On grant of a certificate, the Civil Court has power to entertain a suit in respect to that debt subject to this that the Court shall not award any costs in the suit or any interest on the debt after the date of such certificate.

19. In my opinion, the provisions in section 21 conclusively go to show that though a Board may hold that a particular debt is a debt and thereafter grant a certificate to the debtor, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted thereby as the Civil Court can entertain a suit in respect of the debt decided to be a debt by the Board. So, mere holding of a transaction to be a debt does not automatically ,debar the Civil Court from enter taining a suit in respect of such debt.

20. Thereafter comes the provision of section 33 whereby it has been provided that "no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain a suit, application or proceeding against the debtor in respect of (a) any debt included in an application under section 8 or section 37‑A or in a statement under subsection (1) of section 13, proceedings in connection with which are pending before a Board or an Appellate Officer or a District Judge or an Additional District Judge ; or (b) any debt for which any amount is payable under an award except in accordance with the provisions of subsection (5) of section 29".

21. This clearly goes to show that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted only when the application or any proceeding) is pending before the Board or when it has been incorporated in an award.

22. Section 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act provides for stay and abatement of suits and proceedings and for a notice to be issued for the said purpose and when the notice has been issued the suit or proceeding shall be stayed until the Board has either dismissed the application in respect of such debt or made an award thereon or until the Appellate Officer has disposed of such appeal or the District Judge or the Additional District Judge has disposed of such applica tion for revision, and if the Board or the Appellate Officer or District Judge or Additional District Judge includes any part of such debt in clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 25 in the award or decides that the debt does not exist the suit or pro ceeding shall abate so far as it relates to such debt.

23. The aforesaid provisions in my opinion go to show that though the subject‑matter of the suit or proceeding may be included in an application, yet the suit or proceeding in relation to that portion that is not included in clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 25 in the award or is not decided that it does not exist, does not abate and the suit or proceeding shall proceed after the determination by the Board or the Appellate Officer or the District Judge.

24. Section 35 of the Act operates as a bar to execution of certain decrees and certificates by providing that "no decree of a Civil Court or certificate under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, shall be executed‑ (i) for the recovery of a debt included in an application under section 8 or in a statement under subsection (1) of section 13, until‑ (a) the application has been dismissed by the Board in respect of such debt ; or (b) an award in which such debt is included has ceased to subsist under subsection (5) of section 29 ;" These provisions, go to show that no decree or certificate for a debt included in an application under section 8 or included in a statement under subsection (1) of section 13, can be executed so long as the application has not been dismissed, or the award in which such debt has been included has not ceased to subsist under subsection (5) of section

29. But once the application under section 8 is dismissed or the award in which such debt was included ceases to subsist the Civil Court or the Certificate Officer has power to proceed with the execution of the decree or the certificate proceeding.

25. Lastly, comes section 36 by which certain decree or portion of decree which is (a) inconsistent with any order passed by a Board under subsection (2) of section 13 regarding any debt or with any determination by the Board under section 18 of the principal and the arrears of interest of any debt included in a subsisting award ; or (b) it relates to a debt the documents in respect of which being in the possession or under the control of the creditor have not been produced before the Board and marked by the Board as required by section 14 unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Civil Court that there were sufficient reasons for non‑production of the documents before the Board", has been made a nullity.

26. In my opinion, all the aforesaid provisions bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to debts which have been included in an application under section 8 or included in a statement under section 13 (1) or included in an award. Even in that case also, the Civil Court will assume jurisdiction when the application has been dismissed or when the debt is not incorpo rated in an award.

27. Coming next to the provision of section 20 of the Act on which Mr. Guha relied so much, my opinion is that this section only enables the Board to come to decision whether the Board has jurisdiction and whether it will assume jurisdiction or not and, if the Board is satisfied that the‑applicant is a debtor and that a certain transaction is a liability, in that case it may assume jurisdiction and determine the existence or amount of any debt. If the decision of the Board be in favour of the applicant under section 8 of the Act, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to question c that though that decision may be right or wrong. But, if on the other hand, the Board finds that the applicant is not a debtor or a particular transaction or liability is not a debt within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act though that determination may be right or wrong the 'Civil Court's jurisdiction will not be ousted because the Civil Court's jurisdiction has not been either expressly or impliedly taken away by the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act in such circumstances.

28. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are restored.

29. Leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent prayed for is granted. K. B. A. Appeal allowed.