PLD 1969

P L D 1969 Karachi 60 (PLP)

Syed ALAM HUSSAIN AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
S. 1(3) read with Government of India Act, 1935, S. 102 as amended by India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946 and Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 & S. 5 (bb) as amended by Governor‑General's Order (No. 6 of 1949) and Supplementary Instrument of Accession (Khairpur State) Sched. Entry No. 4‑Evacuee Laws of Pakistan, held, applicable to Khair pur State.
Decided Date
Petition No. 825 of 1963, decided on 20th August 1968.
Honorable Judges
Qadeeruddin Ahmad and Dorab Patel, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1969 Karachi 60 (PLP)
Forum / Court S. 1(3) read with Government of India Act, 1935, S. 102 as amended by India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946 and Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 & S. 5 (bb) as amended by Governor‑General's Order (No. 6 of 1949) and Supplementary Instrument of Accession (Khairpur State) Sched. Entry No. 4‑Evacuee Laws of Pakistan, held, applicable to Khair pur State.
Bench Members Qadeeruddin Ahmad and Dorab Patel, JJ
Parties Syed ALAM HUSSAIN AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS Respondents
Primary Law JUDGMENT, It was argued that had the State of Khairpur intended to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan, it would have used the same language that was used by the Legislature of Pakistan in Entry No. 8. In other words counsel's contention was. that evacuee property should have been specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession. Since it was not, the power to legislate with respect to it should not be taken to have been surrendered by the State of Khairpur to the: Federation of Pakistan. In 1949, when evacuee laws were made, they were promulgated as emergency legislation, and, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects, which we have quoted in paragraph 9 above, there was a Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement; therefore, by the insertion of the said Entry in the Schedule to its Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur had used the widest possible language to cover any type of legislation that might be enacted in respect of evacuee property. We are, therefore, not able to agree with Mr. Brohi's contention that the Government of Khairpur did not intend to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan. The Instrument of Accession was a constitutional document intended to govern the relationship of an acceding state with the Federation of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Entries in its Schedule must be given the widest permissible interpretation. See in this connection the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay City (A I R 1955 S C 58). The facts of that case were that the appellant challenged the Capital Gains Tax imposed by the respondent Government on the ground that it was ultra vires of the powers of the respondent‑Government under Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. The only question for determination before the Court was whether a tax on Capital Gains could fall within the meaning of Entry No. 54 of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act which is as follows:
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1969 Karachi 60 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: JUDGMENT, It was argued that had the State of Khairpur intended to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan, it would have used the same language that was used by the Legislature of Pakistan in Entry No. 8. In other words counsel's contention was. that evacuee property should have been specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession. Since it was not, the power to legislate with respect to it should not be taken to have been surrendered by the State of Khairpur to the: Federation of Pakistan. In 1949, when evacuee laws were made, they were promulgated as emergency legislation, and, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects, which we have quoted in paragraph 9 above, there was a Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement; therefore, by the insertion of the said Entry in the Schedule to its Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur had used the widest possible language to cover any type of legislation that might be enacted in respect of evacuee property. We are, therefore, not able to agree with Mr. Brohi's contention that the Government of Khairpur did not intend to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan. The Instrument of Accession was a constitutional document intended to govern the relationship of an acceding state with the Federation of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Entries in its Schedule must be given the widest permissible interpretation. See in this connection the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay City (A I R 1955 S C 58). The facts of that case were that the appellant challenged the Capital Gains Tax imposed by the respondent Government on the ground that it was ultra vires of the powers of the respondent‑Government under Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. The only question for determination before the Court was whether a tax on Capital Gains could fall within the meaning of Entry No. 54 of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act which is as follows: as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1969 Karachi 60 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the S. 1(3) read with Government of India Act, 1935, S. 102 as amended by India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946 and Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 & S. 5 (bb) as amended by Governor‑General's Order (No. 6 of 1949) and Supplementary Instrument of Accession (Khairpur State) Sched. Entry No. 4‑Evacuee Laws of Pakistan, held, applicable to Khair pur State. bench comprising: Qadeeruddin Ahmad and Dorab Patel, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1969 Karachi 60 (PLP) (Syed ALAM HUSSAIN AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

JUDGMENT It was argued that had the State of Khairpur intended to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan, it would have used the same language that was used by the Legislature of Pakistan in Entry No. 8. In other words counsel's contention was. that evacuee property should have been specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession. Since it was not, the power to legislate with respect to it should not be taken to have been surrendered by the State of Khairpur to the: Federation of Pakistan. In 1949, when evacuee laws were made, they were promulgated as emergency legislation, and, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects, which we have quoted in paragraph 9 above, there was a Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement; therefore, by the insertion of the said Entry in the Schedule to its Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur had used the widest possible language to cover any type of legislation that might be enacted in respect of evacuee property. We are, therefore, not able to agree with Mr. Brohi's contention that the Government of Khairpur did not intend to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan. The Instrument of Accession was a constitutional document intended to govern the relationship of an acceding state with the Federation of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Entries in its Schedule must be given the widest permissible interpretation. See in this connection the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay City (A I R 1955 S C 58). The facts of that case were that the appellant challenged the Capital Gains Tax imposed by the respondent Government on the ground that it was ultra vires of the powers of the respondent‑Government under Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. The only question for determination before the Court was whether a tax on Capital Gains could fall within the meaning of Entry No. 54 of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act which is as follows:

Representation

  • Nasir Shahmir for Petitioners.
  • Sayed A. Shaikh and Wasim Rizvi for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
  • Mohanlal for Respondents Nos. 5 to 10.
  • Dastagir for Respondent No. 11.
  • Date of hearing : 11th June 1968.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XX, rr. 4(2) & Judgments by judicial and qausi judicial officers to be written so as to disclose working of mind of writer‑Defect in this respect, however, does not make order a nullity or capable of being ignored. It is true that judgments are expected to be written by all judicial and quasi‑judicial officers in such a manner as to disclose the working of the mind of the writer, but this does not mean that a defect in this respect makes the order either a nullity or capable of being ignored. (b) Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance (XV of 1949), S. 1(3) read with Government of India Act, 1935, S. 102 [as amended by India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946 and Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 & S. 5 (bb) as amended by Governor‑General's Order (No. 6 of 1949)] and Supplementary Instrument of Accession (Khairpur State) Sched. Entry No. 4‑Evacuee Laws of Pakistan, held, applicable to Khair pur State. The amendment of section 102 of Government of India Act, 1935 made by India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946, had empowered the Federal Legislature to make laws not only for the Provinces but for Pakistan "whether or not for a Province." These are important words which, cover the territories of acceding States. This was further clarified by the Governor General's Order No. 6 of 1949, which amended section 5 of the Government of India Act. The effect of this amendment was that, as from the 15th day of August 1947, Federal Laws could be extended to any areas that were included in the Federation of Pakistan. By virtue of the Supplement Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur was included in the Federation of Pakistan; therefore, under the provisions of section 102, read with section 5 (bb) of the Govern ment of India Act, the Government of Pakistan and the Federal Legislature were competent to make laws affecting evacuee pro perty in the State of Khairpur, provided the subject of evacuee property had been surrendered by that State in terms of its Instrument of Accession to the Federation of Pakistan. The subject of evacuee laws was clearly a matter that had a great bearing on Pakistan's relations with the Dominion of India within the meaning of the Entry No. 4 in the Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession of Khairpur. The Instrument of Accession was a constitutional document intended to govern the relationship of an acceding State with the Federation of Pakistan. Accordingly, the entries in its Schedule must be given the widest permissible interpretation. Writ Petitions Nos. 455‑R and 451‑it of 1952; Syed Haji Abdul Quddus and others v. R. A. & Co. Case No. F 2 (7)/591 Allah Ditta and 17 others v. Kimatmal Case No. F 3 (14)/00 and Seth Suglchand v. D. R. C. Case No. F 4 (186)/58 ref. Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay City A I R 1955 S C 58 rel. ORDER QADEERUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑Mr. Mohanlal has contended that our order to the effect that evacuee laws were applicable to Khairpur does not dispose of this petition, because the petitioners have sought a declaration that the orders of the Deputy Custodian, Additional Custodian and the Custodian of Khairpur, dated the 16th of November 1960, 4th of April 1962 and the 18th of June 1963, are without legal authority and of no legal effect, and that one of these orders, is not entirely based on the view that the evacuee law was not applicable to Khairpur. Counsel says that the Deputy Custodian had in his order dated the 16th of November 1960 considered on merits whether his clients were evacuees or not, and come to the conclusion that they were not. This being a decision on merits, it cannot lose Its value, merely on the ground that evacuee laws were applicable in Khairpur. According to Mr. Mohanlal, the order of the Deputy Custodian stands and perhaps re‑hearing of the appeal by the Additional Custodian should take place, since he did not decide the case on merits. This contention of Mr. Mohanlal is opposed by Mr. Sayed A. Shaikh who says that the order of the Deputy Custodian dated the 16th of November 1960 was made in disregard of the earlier order of Mr. Justice Kharal dated the 1st of December 1951 simply on the ground that the evacuee law was not applicable to Khairpur. Now that the evacuee law is found to have been in force in the territory of that State, the order of Mr. Justice Kharal cannot be taken to be such as could be ignored by the Deputy Custodian. If that order could not be ignored then the Deputy Custodian had no jurisdiction to hold the client of Mr. Mohanlal to be non‑evacuee. Mr. Mohanlal's reply to this contention of Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh is that the order of Mr. Justice Kharal dated the 1st of December 1951 is of no legal effect, because that order, according to him, was based simply on a reply given to him, by the Central Government in response to a reference which was made by him under section 3 of Ordinance XV of 1949. It was neither conclusive nor in accordance with the terms of that section.

2. Mr. Mohanlal has elucidated his contention by saying that the answer given by the Central Government to the reference made by Mr. Justice Kharal did not contain a statement that the clients of Mr. Mohanlal were evacuees. All that the Central Government did was to state the principle of law. Mr. Justice Kharal applied that principle of law, and came to the conclusion that his clients were evacuees, but while doing so, he has neither stated the facts nor discussed their effect, nor explained the applicability of the principle on which he has relied. The order made by him is a short one and runs as under:‑ "In accordance with the order contained in Refugee and Rehabilitation Ministry letter No. F. 22(158)/50‑P, dated 12‑10‑51, the applicant is an evacuee and therefore, his applica tion is to be rejected. No order as to costs." Mr. Mohanlal says that the above order is no order, because it does not satisfy the requirements of Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C., which, according to him, is applicable to the Custodian's Department under rule 11 of the Evacuee Property Rules, 1950. We enquired from counsel as to how does he say that it was necessary for the Custodian to make orders strictly fn accordance with Order XX, rule 4, and how can he say that if an order does not satisfy those requirements, then it can be ignored. Counsel has replied that there is no decision to which he can refer in support of the proposition that non‑observance of the provisions of Order XX, rule 4 can render an order defective to such an extent as to make it ignorable. As to the application of the provisions of Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C. to the Custodian's Department, he has merely relied on the said rule

11. That rule is as follows‑ "11 (1) For the purpose of framing, signing and verification of petitions, and in relation to proceedings involving the holding of an inquiry, so much of the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall, with such modification, if any, as the Custodian from time to time direct; be followed. (2) When holding an enquiry, the Custodian shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters. (a) the taking and enforcing of security; (b) injunctions; (c) the appointment of receiver; (d) attachment."

3. The above rule does not make Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C. applicable to, the Custodian's Department. It is true that judgments are expected to be written by all judicial and quasi‑judicial officers in such a manner as to disclose the working of the mind of the writer, but this does not mean that a defect 4n this respect makes the order either a nullity or capable oil being ignored. The order was made on the 1st of December 1951, and has never been challenged, nor even in these proceedings.

4. In view of the above situation, Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh has contended that the order of the Deputy Custodian, on which Mr. Mohanlal has relied dated the 16th of November 1960, was itself without jurisdiction. We are inclined to agree with this view, and accept Petition No. 825 of 1963 in terms of clause (e) of .‑paragraph 22 of the petition.

5. Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh, Mr. Mohanlal and Mr. Shahmir ,agree that in view of the above decision of Petition No. 825 of 1963, petitions Nos. 91 to 96 of 1964 stand decided automatically. `They are accordingly dismissed. The common question in all of these petitions is whether the evacuee laws of Pakistan applied to the State of Khairpur before its integration into the Province of West Pakistan. In all of these petitions, there is a common allegation that the Hindu owners had left Kbairpur in or about 1948, and returned to Khairpur in or about August 1949. During their absence, their ;properties were allotted to refugees under the Khairpur State Economic Rehabilitation Act of 1947. After their return to Khairpur, they applied to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Khairpur, Mr. A. R. Kharl, as he then was, for the return of their properties. Mr. A. R. Kharl enquired from the Government of Pakistan and from the Custodians of Evacuee Property of the ‑former Provinces of the Punjab and Sind as to what was the status, under evacuee laws, of persons who had left Pakistan and ;hen returned. The Central Government as well as the said CustoJians informed him that those persons who left Pakistan on account of the disturbances, remained evacuees on their .return. Accordingly, all the Hindu owners were declared .evacuees by various orders passed by Mr. Kharl in 1951 and 1952. These .orders were set aside by Changez, J. as a Custodian .on the ground that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not apply to ,the State of Khairpur.

2. To appreciate the contentions of the parties in this .regard, it is necessary to refer briefly to the relevant constitutional .and legal developments in Khairpur. The Ruler of Khairpur signed an Instrument of Accession to, join the Federation of Pakistan on 3rd October 1947, and this accession was accepted ,by the Governor‑General of Pakistan on the 9th .of October 1947. The Schedule to the Instrument of Accession contained a list of those subjects with respect to which the Federation of Pakistan could make laws for the State of Khairpur. That Schedule did not include the subject of evacuee laws. On the 14th of February 1949 the ruler of Khairpur executed a supplementary Instrument of Accession. The Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession contained a list of the subject with respect to which the Federation of Pakistan could make laws for the State of Khairpur. The relevant entry (hereafter called the said entry) in that list, which dealt with External Affairs, stood as follows: "(4) A11 relations with other Dominions or countries and all' matters relating thereto or having a bearing thereon."

3. Thereafter, by a notification dated 1st March 1949,. published in the Gazette of Khairpur, the Government of Khairpur announced that the Ordinances of Pakistan called Pakistan Ordinance No. XVIII of 1948 and Pakistan Economic: Rehabilitation Ordinance No. XIX of 1948 would apply, together with the rules framed thereunder, to Khairpur State, by virtue of clause 3 of the Instrument of Accession, with effect from 20th October 1948. By another notification published in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 15th November 1949, the Government of Pakistan, announced that it had appointed the Chief Minister of Khairpur as the Rehabilitation Commissioner from 20th August 1948 and, Mr. A. R. Kharl, Chief Judge of Kbairpur State, as the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Khairpur. By a subsequent notification, published in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 19th October 1952, the Government of Pakistan announced that in exercise of the powers conferred by Ordinance XV of 1949, it was pleased to delegate to the Government of Khairpur its powers exerciseable under, section 5 of that Ordinance to appoint Deputy Custodians and Assistant Custodians of Evacuee Property. Finally, with the creation of the Province of West Pakistan, the State of Khairpur became a part of the Province.

4. We have pointed out that in 1951 and 1952, the Custodian of Khairpur had declared all the properties of the Hindu owners to be evacuee. No appeal or revision whatsoever was filed against those orders. But in or about March 1957, after the creation of the Province of West Pakistan, the Hindu owners made applications under section 22 of the Pakistan Administration, of Evacuee Property Act of 1957, being Act XII of 1957, for declaration that they were not evacuees. These applications were heard by Mr. S. K. Ghori, the Deputy Custodian, Khairpur, who took the view that the Applicants were not evacuees; therefore, he declared them non‑evacuee, subject to the approval of this, view by the Custodian. Those cases were heard by the Additional Custodian; who did not agree with the view taken by the Deputy Custodian. . However, as many such cases had come to him for confirmation of the orders of the Deputy Custodian, he referre& all of them to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan. They were heard by Mr. Justice A. R. Changez as a Custodian. He referred to certain orders passed by Mr. Justice Masood. Ahmad as a Custodian of Evacuee Property, and to a judgment given by Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad in Writ Petitions Nos. 455‑R and 45 i‑R of 1952 as a Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan: at Lahore, in which he had held that evacuee laws did not: extend to the States which had acceded to the Federation of Pakistan.

5. We shall, therefore, firstly examine the findings of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad. In Syed Haji Abdul Quddus and, others v. R. A. & Co. (Case No. F. 2(7)/59), the question before him, in his capacity of a Custodian of Evacuee Property, was whether the evacuee laws applied to Baluchistan. He made the following observations:‑ "The various Instruments of Accession executed by the acceding States, including the former Kalat State, did not, however, empower the Federal Legislature to legislate on the subject of administration of evacuee property, and, therefore, it is doubtful if the Federal Legislature could make this law applicable to the acceding States. However, this is not a matter with which I am concerned in this case." In Allah Ditta and 17 others v. Kimatmal (Case No. F. 3(14)/60) which was a case from Khairpur, Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad referred to his previous observations, quoted above, and stated as follows:‑ "Since that order was passed, I (have) examined the position again, and am still of the view that though by subsection (3) of section I of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, that law was extended to the acceding States, the Central Legislature and the Governor‑General had riot been given powers under the various Instruments of Accession executed by the acceding States, to extend any such law to them, though by amending section 102 of Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature had acquired the power to legislate on this subject for the Provinces." In another case from Khairpur, namely, Seth Suglchand v. D. R. C. (Case No. F. 4 (186)/58), Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad followed the view expressed by him in the above‑mentioned cases, and again held that evacuee laws did not apply to the acceding States. He observed as under:‑ ".. . . it was doubtful if the Federal Legislature could apply the Evacuee Property Law to the acceding State, because this was not one of the subjects mentioned in the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler of the Khairpur State by which Legislature authority was conferred by the Federal Legislature." Pinally, in Writ Petition No. 455/R of 1952, Mr. Justice Masood Ahmed observed that:‑ "The validity of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, by which it was made applicable to the Acceding States, is, therefore, very . doubtful, and hence for the purpose of deciding this case, the provisions of that Ordinance will have to be overlooked." Unfortunately, none of these orders and judgments contain the reasons for which Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad took the view that under the respective Instruments of Accession, the subject of evacuee laws was not transferred by the Acceding States to the Federation of Pakistan. He presumed that it was not transferred because it was not mentioned by name. No appeals were filed against any of them, therefore, Mr. Justice Changez Held that he was bound by the views of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad expressed both as a Custodian and as a Judge of this Court. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Changez declared that the properties of the Hindu owners were not evacuee.

6. The petitions before us now challenge the view of Mr. Justice Changez. Mr. S. M. Sadiq, Mr. S. M. Shahmir, Mr. S. A. Shaikh and Mr. Wasim Rizvi have argued before us that by virtue of the said entry (item 4 of the Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession). the subject of evacuee laws was transferred by the Ruler of Khairpur State to the Government of Pakistan. On the other hand, Mr. Brohi, who appeared for some of the Hindu owners, supported the judgments of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad and Mr. Justice Changez, and argued that the subject of evacuee laws was not surrendered by the State of Khairpur to Pakistan. Mr. Mohanlal, who appeared for some of the Hindu owners, supported the arguments of Mr. Brohi, and further submitted that the Government of Pakistan did not have the authority to promulgate evacuee laws for the acceding States, in terms of the law of Pakistan.

7. We proceed to consider whether the Government of Pakistan was competent to legislate on the subject of evacuee property in the State of Khairpur. The legislative powers of the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, were set out in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. However, the Governor‑General was entitled under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 to declare the existence of a state of emergency if the security of the country was threatened by war or internal disturbances, and in the event of such a proclamation, the Federal Legislature had the power "to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial List." By an amendment in section 102 by the India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946, the power, of the Federal Legislature to make laws in an emergency, was extended "to make laws whether or not for a Province or any part thereof, with respect to any matters not enumerated in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule to this Act." Thus, the power of the Federal Legislature was extended territorially. After the creation of Pakistan, section 102 was again amended by the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act of 1948 on 16th July 1948, in view of the emergency that was created by the influx of refugees. The Governor‑General was authorised to declare state of emergency if the economic life of the country was threatened by war or internal disturbances or" circumstances arising out of any mass movement of population from or into Pakistan." The last portion of the provision should be carefully noted, because it is very wide. Finally, by the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1950, section 102 was further amended, and this amendment specifically empowered the Federal Government "to make laws, notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Act, relating to the custody, management and disposal of the property of any person concerned in any mass movement as aforesaid." This amendment was given retrospective effect from 16th July 1948. Thus, the federal Legislature had ample authority to legislate on the subject of evacuee property within the territories of the 'Federation.

8. The next question is, whether the Legislature had territorial jurisdiction to legislate with respect to evacuee properties situated in acceding States. We have already noted that the amendment of section 102 made by India (Proclamation .of Emergency) Act, 1946, had empowered the Federal Legislature to make laws not only for the Provinces but for Pakistan "whether or not for a province". These are important words which, in our opinion, cover the territories of acceding States. "This was further clarified by the Governor‑General's Order] o. 6 .of 1949, which amended section 5 of the Government of India Act. After its amendment, section 5 declared as follows:‑ "5. (1) There shall be united in a Federation by the name of Pakistan‑ (a) the Provinces hereinafter called Governor's Provinces. (b) any other area that may with the consent of the Federation be included in the Federation. (2) The fifteenth day of August 1947, is the date referred to in this Act as the date of the establishment of the Federation," The provisions of subsection (bb) were inserted by the Governor General's Order No. VI of 1949, and the said amendment was .declared to be with retrospective effect from the fifteenth day of August 1947. The effect of this amendment was that, as from the 15th day of August 1947, Federal Laws could be extended to .any areas that were included in the Federation of Pakistan. By virtue of the aforesaid Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur was included in the Federation of Pakistan; therefore, under the provisions of section 102, read with section 5(bb) C of the Government of India Act, the Government of Pakistan and the Federal Legislature were competent to make laws affecting evacuee property in the State of Khairpur, provided the subject of evacuee property had been surrendered by that State in terms of its Instrument of Accession to the Federation of Pakistan.

9. We shall now examine the question, whether the State of Khairpur had surrendered the subject. As pointed out above, the said entry has empowered the Government of Pakistan to control :‑ "All relations with other Dominions or countries and all matters relating thereto or having a bearing thereon." In 1949, India was a Dominion. The Hindus who migrated from Pakistan and the Muslims who migrated from India created gigantic problems for both countries. We take judicial notice of the fact that from time to time there were negotiations, conferences and agreements between the two Governments on questions of evacuee property left behind by Hindus in Pakistan .and by Muslims in India. In this connection, the statement of Objects and Reasons to the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 (by which section 102 of the Government of India Act was amended, empowered the Federal Legislature to meet the emergency created by the mass movement of population) is relevant. Alter referring to the problems created by the mass. movement of population between India and Pakistan the said statement declared: "In almost all its aspects the rehabilitation of refugees affects vitally the relations of Pakistan with India, above all in the settling of refugees in evacuees' houses, lands and businesses and in the adjustment between Pakistan and India of the value of the properties abandoned by evacuee from the two countries. Relations and agreements with other Commonwealth nations are a Central subject, and the permanency of any refugee. Re-settlement depends largely on the entering into and mutually carrying out of agreement between Pakistan and India. The framers of the Government of India Act, which is still the basic constitutional law of P4kistan, never had to contemplate the staggering problems that have resulted from the migration between Pakistan and India of over ten million people. In the Legislative Lists, therefore, there are no clear heads covering such migration or the problems of resettlement and rehabilitation. The implementation of any Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement would impinge on the Federal, Provincial and Concurrent Legislative Lists." Here it is relevant to refer by way of illustration to the Transfer of Evacuee Deposits Act, 1954 (VI of 1954) and the subsequent legislation on this subject. The preamble to Act VI of 1954 states as follows :‑ "An Act to provide, in pursuance of an Agreement with. India, for the transfer to that country of certain deposits belonging to evacuees, the reception in Pakistan of similar deposits belonging to refugees, and matters connected therewith." Under this Act, the Custodian was authorised, on the conditions: prescribed in the said Act, to receive deposits of refugees from India and to transfer the deposits of the evacuee from Pakistani to the Government of India. Further, the definition of `deposit' was very wide. It was defined to mean any movable property in the custody or under the control of any Court, and included securities, insurance policies and negotiable instruments. This. Act was later repealed, but substituted by a similar legislation. In these circumstances, it appears to us that the subject of evacuee laws was clearly a matter that had a great bearing on our relations with the Dominion of India within the meaning of the said entry in the Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession of Khairpur.

10. When the Government of Khairpur executed the Supplementary Instrument of Accession, it was aware of the amendment of section 102 of the Government of India Act made by the Federal Legislature as well as of the statement of Objects and Reasons of the said amendment, which we have quoted. The Government of Khairpur, therefore, knew that legislation was needed not only for the settlement of refugees, but also for the purpose of implementing the Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement referred to in the statement of Objects and Reasons. Accordingly, when it amended the Schedule to the original instrument of Accession by vesting the Federal Legislature with the power to legislate on matters affecting Pakistan's relations with other Dominions and "all matters relating to or having a bearing thereon", it intended to surrender to the Federation of Pakistan the power to enact laws in respect of the property left behind by Hindu evacuees. This is confirmed by the conduct of the Governments of Khairpur as well as of Pakistan. Thus, in the Gazette of 1st March 1949 the Government of Khairpur declared that the evacuee laws of Pakistan had become applicable to the State of Khairpur by virtue of the Instrument of Accession executed by it. Later, with its consent, its Chief Minister was appointed by the Government of Pakistan as the Rehabilitation Commissioner under the Pakistan Evacuee Laws and similarly its Chief Judge was appointed as Custodian of Evacuee Property wader the Pakistan Laws. Subsequently, by a notification in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 15th December 1952, the Government of Pakistan delegated to the Government of Khairpur the power vested in the Government of Pakistan under the Evacuee Laws of appointing Deputy and Assistant Custodians of Evacuee Property in Khairpur, and this delegation of the power of the Pakistan Government was accepted by the Government of Khairpur. It is not without significance that by virtue of subsection (3) of section I of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 the Government of Pakistan declared that law to be applicable to the acceding States. In these circumstances, we can safely conclude that the Governments of Khairpur and of Pakistan had acted on the assumption that by the Supplementary Instrument of Accession, the Government .of Pakistan had the power to legislate on the subject of Evacuee Laws. Their implicit assumption gives significance to their words and decd.

11. Yet, in support of the judgments of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad and Mr. Justice Changez, Mr. Brohi has argued that the insertion of the said entry in the Instrument of Accession did not confer any power on the Federation of Pakistan to legislate in respect of evacuee property in Khairpur. Counsel said that in the original Instrument of Accession, the Government of Pakistan had the power only to legislate on external affairs, and to make treaties and agreements with other countries. That power, according to counsel, did not confer the power to make treaties and agreements with the Dominions; therefore, the said entry was inserted to enable the Government of Pakistan to enter into treaties and agreements with other Dominions. Assuming for the sake of argument, that this is correct, it does not strengthen counsel's argument that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not extend to the State of Khairpur, because by the insertion of the said entry, the State of Khairpur surrendered to the Government of Pakistan the power to legislate on all matters affecting the relations between Pakistan and the other Dominions and on all matters having any bearing on such relations. As pointed out above, India as well as Pakistan were interested in the property left behind by the migrants. As India was then a Dominion, Pakistan was entitled to legislate with respect to evacuee property in Pakistan by virtue of the said entry.

12. A reference was made during the addresses to Entry No. 8 in Schedule V of the Concurrent List of 1956‑Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The entry was as follows:‑ "Custody, management and disposal of evacuee property." "Taxes or income other than‑agricultural income." The contention of the appellant was that the meaning of the word 'income' as construed by the Courts, in various decisions excluded the concept of Capital Gain. In repelling this contention, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the words used in constitutional enactment conferring legislative power should be given the most liberal permissible construction. We respectfully agree with this view and cannot accept Mr. Brohi's argument that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not apply to the State of Khairpur, since they were not specifically mentioned in the said Entry.

13. The above decision disposes of the legal issues which are common to all of these petitions. Now we shall take up the petitions individually, or in convenient bunches to dispose of them finally.

14. The above conclusion was announced by us on 11th June 1968. The reasons for it are contained in the above judgment. A. E. Order accordingly.

Judgment & Decree

QADEERUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑Mr. Mohanlal has contended that our order to the effect that evacuee laws were applicable to Khairpur does not dispose of this petition, because the petitioners have sought a declaration that the orders of the Deputy Custodian, Additional Custodian and the Custodian of Khairpur, dated the 16th of November 1960, 4th of April 1962 and the 18th of June 1963, are without legal authority and of no legal effect, and that one of these orders, is not entirely based on the view that the evacuee law was not applicable to Khairpur. Counsel says that the Deputy Custodian had in his order dated the 16th of November 1960 considered on merits whether his clients were evacuees or not, and come to the conclusion that they were not. This being a decision on merits, it cannot lose Its value, merely on the ground that evacuee laws were applicable in Khairpur. According to Mr. Mohanlal, the order of the Deputy Custodian stands and perhaps re‑hearing of the appeal by the Additional Custodian should take place, since he did not decide the case on merits. This contention of Mr. Mohanlal is opposed by Mr. Sayed A. Shaikh who says that the order of the Deputy Custodian dated the 16th of November 1960 was made in disregard of the earlier order of Mr. Justice Kharal dated the 1st of December 1951 simply on the ground that the evacuee law was not applicable to Khairpur. Now that the evacuee law is found to have been in force in the territory of that State, the order of Mr. Justice Kharal cannot be taken to be such as could be ignored by the Deputy Custodian. If that order could not be ignored then the Deputy Custodian had no jurisdiction to hold the client of Mr. Mohanlal to be non‑evacuee. Mr. Mohanlal's reply to this contention of Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh is that the order of Mr. Justice Kharal dated the 1st of December 1951 is of no legal effect, because that order, according to him, was based simply on a reply given to him, by the Central Government in response to a reference which was made by him under section 3 of Ordinance XV of 1949. It was neither conclusive nor in accordance with the terms of that section.

2. Mr. Mohanlal has elucidated his contention by saying that the answer given by the Central Government to the reference made by Mr. Justice Kharal did not contain a statement that the clients of Mr. Mohanlal were evacuees. All that the Central Government did was to state the principle of law. Mr. Justice Kharal applied that principle of law, and came to the conclusion that his clients were evacuees, but while doing so, he has neither stated the facts nor discussed their effect, nor explained the applicability of the principle on which he has relied. The order made by him is a short one and runs as under:‑ "In accordance with the order contained in Refugee and Rehabilitation Ministry letter No. F. 22(158)/50‑P, dated 12‑10‑51, the applicant is an evacuee and therefore, his applica tion is to be rejected. No order as to costs." Mr. Mohanlal says that the above order is no order, because it does not satisfy the requirements of Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C., which, according to him, is applicable to the Custodian's Department under rule 11 of the Evacuee Property Rules, 1950. We enquired from counsel as to how does he say that it was necessary for the Custodian to make orders strictly fn accordance with Order XX, rule 4, and how can he say that if an order does not satisfy those requirements, then it can be ignored. Counsel has replied that there is no decision to which he can refer in support of the proposition that non‑observance of the provisions of Order XX, rule 4 can render an order defective to such an extent as to make it ignorable. As to the application of the provisions of Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C. to the Custodian's Department, he has merely relied on the said rule

11. That rule is as follows‑ "11 (1) For the purpose of framing, signing and verification of petitions, and in relation to proceedings involving the holding of an inquiry, so much of the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall, with such modification, if any, as the Custodian from time to time direct; be followed. (2) When holding an enquiry, the Custodian shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters. (a) the taking and enforcing of security; (b) injunctions; (c) the appointment of receiver; (d) attachment."

3. The above rule does not make Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C. applicable to, the Custodian's Department. It is true that judgments are expected to be written by all judicial and quasi‑judicial officers in such a manner as to disclose the working of the mind of the writer, but this does not mean that a defect 4n this respect makes the order either a nullity or capable oil being ignored. The order was made on the 1st of December 1951, and has never been challenged, nor even in these proceedings.

4. In view of the above situation, Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh has contended that the order of the Deputy Custodian, on which Mr. Mohanlal has relied dated the 16th of November 1960, was itself without jurisdiction. We are inclined to agree with this view, and accept Petition No. 825 of 1963 in terms of clause (e) of .‑paragraph 22 of the petition.

5. Mr. Sayeed A. Shaikh, Mr. Mohanlal and Mr. Shahmir ,agree that in view of the above decision of Petition No. 825 of 1963, petitions Nos. 91 to 96 of 1964 stand decided automatically. `They are accordingly dismissed. The common question in all of these petitions is whether the evacuee laws of Pakistan applied to the State of Khairpur before its integration into the Province of West Pakistan. In all of these petitions, there is a common allegation that the Hindu owners had left Kbairpur in or about 1948, and returned to Khairpur in or about August 1949. During their absence, their ;properties were allotted to refugees under the Khairpur State Economic Rehabilitation Act of 1947. After their return to Khairpur, they applied to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Khairpur, Mr. A. R. Kharl, as he then was, for the return of their properties. Mr. A. R. Kharl enquired from the Government of Pakistan and from the Custodians of Evacuee Property of the ‑former Provinces of the Punjab and Sind as to what was the status, under evacuee laws, of persons who had left Pakistan and ;hen returned. The Central Government as well as the said CustoJians informed him that those persons who left Pakistan on account of the disturbances, remained evacuees on their .return. Accordingly, all the Hindu owners were declared .evacuees by various orders passed by Mr. Kharl in 1951 and 1952. These .orders were set aside by Changez, J. as a Custodian .on the ground that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not apply to ,the State of Khairpur.

2. To appreciate the contentions of the parties in this .regard, it is necessary to refer briefly to the relevant constitutional .and legal developments in Khairpur. The Ruler of Khairpur signed an Instrument of Accession to, join the Federation of Pakistan on 3rd October 1947, and this accession was accepted ,by the Governor‑General of Pakistan on the 9th .of October 1947. The Schedule to the Instrument of Accession contained a list of those subjects with respect to which the Federation of Pakistan could make laws for the State of Khairpur. That Schedule did not include the subject of evacuee laws. On the 14th of February 1949 the ruler of Khairpur executed a supplementary Instrument of Accession. The Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession contained a list of the subject with respect to which the Federation of Pakistan could make laws for the State of Khairpur. The relevant entry (hereafter called the said entry) in that list, which dealt with External Affairs, stood as follows: "(4) A11 relations with other Dominions or countries and all' matters relating thereto or having a bearing thereon."

3. Thereafter, by a notification dated 1st March 1949,. published in the Gazette of Khairpur, the Government of Khairpur announced that the Ordinances of Pakistan called Pakistan Ordinance No. XVIII of 1948 and Pakistan Economic: Rehabilitation Ordinance No. XIX of 1948 would apply, together with the rules framed thereunder, to Khairpur State, by virtue of clause 3 of the Instrument of Accession, with effect from 20th October 1948. By another notification published in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 15th November 1949, the Government of Pakistan, announced that it had appointed the Chief Minister of Khairpur as the Rehabilitation Commissioner from 20th August 1948 and, Mr. A. R. Kharl, Chief Judge of Kbairpur State, as the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Khairpur. By a subsequent notification, published in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 19th October 1952, the Government of Pakistan announced that in exercise of the powers conferred by Ordinance XV of 1949, it was pleased to delegate to the Government of Khairpur its powers exerciseable under, section 5 of that Ordinance to appoint Deputy Custodians and Assistant Custodians of Evacuee Property. Finally, with the creation of the Province of West Pakistan, the State of Khairpur became a part of the Province.

4. We have pointed out that in 1951 and 1952, the Custodian of Khairpur had declared all the properties of the Hindu owners to be evacuee. No appeal or revision whatsoever was filed against those orders. But in or about March 1957, after the creation of the Province of West Pakistan, the Hindu owners made applications under section 22 of the Pakistan Administration, of Evacuee Property Act of 1957, being Act XII of 1957, for declaration that they were not evacuees. These applications were heard by Mr. S. K. Ghori, the Deputy Custodian, Khairpur, who took the view that the Applicants were not evacuees; therefore, he declared them non‑evacuee, subject to the approval of this, view by the Custodian. Those cases were heard by the Additional Custodian; who did not agree with the view taken by the Deputy Custodian. . However, as many such cases had come to him for confirmation of the orders of the Deputy Custodian, he referre& all of them to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan. They were heard by Mr. Justice A. R. Changez as a Custodian. He referred to certain orders passed by Mr. Justice Masood. Ahmad as a Custodian of Evacuee Property, and to a judgment given by Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad in Writ Petitions Nos. 455‑R and 45 i‑R of 1952 as a Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan: at Lahore, in which he had held that evacuee laws did not: extend to the States which had acceded to the Federation of Pakistan.

5. We shall, therefore, firstly examine the findings of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad. In Syed Haji Abdul Quddus and, others v. R. A. & Co. (Case No. F. 2(7)/59), the question before him, in his capacity of a Custodian of Evacuee Property, was whether the evacuee laws applied to Baluchistan. He made the following observations:‑ "The various Instruments of Accession executed by the acceding States, including the former Kalat State, did not, however, empower the Federal Legislature to legislate on the subject of administration of evacuee property, and, therefore, it is doubtful if the Federal Legislature could make this law applicable to the acceding States. However, this is not a matter with which I am concerned in this case." In Allah Ditta and 17 others v. Kimatmal (Case No. F. 3(14)/60) which was a case from Khairpur, Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad referred to his previous observations, quoted above, and stated as follows:‑ "Since that order was passed, I (have) examined the position again, and am still of the view that though by subsection (3) of section I of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, that law was extended to the acceding States, the Central Legislature and the Governor‑General had riot been given powers under the various Instruments of Accession executed by the acceding States, to extend any such law to them, though by amending section 102 of Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature had acquired the power to legislate on this subject for the Provinces." In another case from Khairpur, namely, Seth Suglchand v. D. R. C. (Case No. F. 4 (186)/58), Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad followed the view expressed by him in the above‑mentioned cases, and again held that evacuee laws did not apply to the acceding States. He observed as under:‑ ".. . . it was doubtful if the Federal Legislature could apply the Evacuee Property Law to the acceding State, because this was not one of the subjects mentioned in the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler of the Khairpur State by which Legislature authority was conferred by the Federal Legislature." Pinally, in Writ Petition No. 455/R of 1952, Mr. Justice Masood Ahmed observed that:‑ "The validity of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, by which it was made applicable to the Acceding States, is, therefore, very . doubtful, and hence for the purpose of deciding this case, the provisions of that Ordinance will have to be overlooked." Unfortunately, none of these orders and judgments contain the reasons for which Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad took the view that under the respective Instruments of Accession, the subject of evacuee laws was not transferred by the Acceding States to the Federation of Pakistan. He presumed that it was not transferred because it was not mentioned by name. No appeals were filed against any of them, therefore, Mr. Justice Changez Held that he was bound by the views of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad expressed both as a Custodian and as a Judge of this Court. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Changez declared that the properties of the Hindu owners were not evacuee.

6. The petitions before us now challenge the view of Mr. Justice Changez. Mr. S. M. Sadiq, Mr. S. M. Shahmir, Mr. S. A. Shaikh and Mr. Wasim Rizvi have argued before us that by virtue of the said entry (item 4 of the Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession). the subject of evacuee laws was transferred by the Ruler of Khairpur State to the Government of Pakistan. On the other hand, Mr. Brohi, who appeared for some of the Hindu owners, supported the judgments of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad and Mr. Justice Changez, and argued that the subject of evacuee laws was not surrendered by the State of Khairpur to Pakistan. Mr. Mohanlal, who appeared for some of the Hindu owners, supported the arguments of Mr. Brohi, and further submitted that the Government of Pakistan did not have the authority to promulgate evacuee laws for the acceding States, in terms of the law of Pakistan.

7. We proceed to consider whether the Government of Pakistan was competent to legislate on the subject of evacuee property in the State of Khairpur. The legislative powers of the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, were set out in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. However, the Governor‑General was entitled under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 to declare the existence of a state of emergency if the security of the country was threatened by war or internal disturbances, and in the event of such a proclamation, the Federal Legislature had the power "to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial List." By an amendment in section 102 by the India (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1946, the power, of the Federal Legislature to make laws in an emergency, was extended "to make laws whether or not for a Province or any part thereof, with respect to any matters not enumerated in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule to this Act." Thus, the power of the Federal Legislature was extended territorially. After the creation of Pakistan, section 102 was again amended by the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act of 1948 on 16th July 1948, in view of the emergency that was created by the influx of refugees. The Governor‑General was authorised to declare state of emergency if the economic life of the country was threatened by war or internal disturbances or" circumstances arising out of any mass movement of population from or into Pakistan." The last portion of the provision should be carefully noted, because it is very wide. Finally, by the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1950, section 102 was further amended, and this amendment specifically empowered the Federal Government "to make laws, notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Act, relating to the custody, management and disposal of the property of any person concerned in any mass movement as aforesaid." This amendment was given retrospective effect from 16th July 1948. Thus, the federal Legislature had ample authority to legislate on the subject of evacuee property within the territories of the 'Federation.

8. The next question is, whether the Legislature had territorial jurisdiction to legislate with respect to evacuee properties situated in acceding States. We have already noted that the amendment of section 102 made by India (Proclamation .of Emergency) Act, 1946, had empowered the Federal Legislature to make laws not only for the Provinces but for Pakistan "whether or not for a province". These are important words which, in our opinion, cover the territories of acceding States. "This was further clarified by the Governor‑General's Order] o. 6 .of 1949, which amended section 5 of the Government of India Act. After its amendment, section 5 declared as follows:‑ "5. (1) There shall be united in a Federation by the name of Pakistan‑ (a) the Provinces hereinafter called Governor's Provinces. (b) any other area that may with the consent of the Federation be included in the Federation. (2) The fifteenth day of August 1947, is the date referred to in this Act as the date of the establishment of the Federation," The provisions of subsection (bb) were inserted by the Governor General's Order No. VI of 1949, and the said amendment was .declared to be with retrospective effect from the fifteenth day of August 1947. The effect of this amendment was that, as from the 15th day of August 1947, Federal Laws could be extended to .any areas that were included in the Federation of Pakistan. By virtue of the aforesaid Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur was included in the Federation of Pakistan; therefore, under the provisions of section 102, read with section 5(bb) C of the Government of India Act, the Government of Pakistan and the Federal Legislature were competent to make laws affecting evacuee property in the State of Khairpur, provided the subject of evacuee property had been surrendered by that State in terms of its Instrument of Accession to the Federation of Pakistan.

9. We shall now examine the question, whether the State of Khairpur had surrendered the subject. As pointed out above, the said entry has empowered the Government of Pakistan to control :‑ "All relations with other Dominions or countries and all matters relating thereto or having a bearing thereon." In 1949, India was a Dominion. The Hindus who migrated from Pakistan and the Muslims who migrated from India created gigantic problems for both countries. We take judicial notice of the fact that from time to time there were negotiations, conferences and agreements between the two Governments on questions of evacuee property left behind by Hindus in Pakistan .and by Muslims in India. In this connection, the statement of Objects and Reasons to the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 (by which section 102 of the Government of India Act was amended, empowered the Federal Legislature to meet the emergency created by the mass movement of population) is relevant. Alter referring to the problems created by the mass. movement of population between India and Pakistan the said statement declared: "In almost all its aspects the rehabilitation of refugees affects vitally the relations of Pakistan with India, above all in the settling of refugees in evacuees' houses, lands and businesses and in the adjustment between Pakistan and India of the value of the properties abandoned by evacuee from the two countries. Relations and agreements with other Commonwealth nations are a Central subject, and the permanency of any refugee. Re-settlement depends largely on the entering into and mutually carrying out of agreement between Pakistan and India. The framers of the Government of India Act, which is still the basic constitutional law of P4kistan, never had to contemplate the staggering problems that have resulted from the migration between Pakistan and India of over ten million people. In the Legislative Lists, therefore, there are no clear heads covering such migration or the problems of resettlement and rehabilitation. The implementation of any Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement would impinge on the Federal, Provincial and Concurrent Legislative Lists." Here it is relevant to refer by way of illustration to the Transfer of Evacuee Deposits Act, 1954 (VI of 1954) and the subsequent legislation on this subject. The preamble to Act VI of 1954 states as follows :‑ "An Act to provide, in pursuance of an Agreement with. India, for the transfer to that country of certain deposits belonging to evacuees, the reception in Pakistan of similar deposits belonging to refugees, and matters connected therewith." Under this Act, the Custodian was authorised, on the conditions: prescribed in the said Act, to receive deposits of refugees from India and to transfer the deposits of the evacuee from Pakistani to the Government of India. Further, the definition of `deposit' was very wide. It was defined to mean any movable property in the custody or under the control of any Court, and included securities, insurance policies and negotiable instruments. This. Act was later repealed, but substituted by a similar legislation. In these circumstances, it appears to us that the subject of evacuee laws was clearly a matter that had a great bearing on our relations with the Dominion of India within the meaning of the said entry in the Schedule to the Supplementary Instrument of Accession of Khairpur.

10. When the Government of Khairpur executed the Supplementary Instrument of Accession, it was aware of the amendment of section 102 of the Government of India Act made by the Federal Legislature as well as of the statement of Objects and Reasons of the said amendment, which we have quoted. The Government of Khairpur, therefore, knew that legislation was needed not only for the settlement of refugees, but also for the purpose of implementing the Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement referred to in the statement of Objects and Reasons. Accordingly, when it amended the Schedule to the original instrument of Accession by vesting the Federal Legislature with the power to legislate on matters affecting Pakistan's relations with other Dominions and "all matters relating to or having a bearing thereon", it intended to surrender to the Federation of Pakistan the power to enact laws in respect of the property left behind by Hindu evacuees. This is confirmed by the conduct of the Governments of Khairpur as well as of Pakistan. Thus, in the Gazette of 1st March 1949 the Government of Khairpur declared that the evacuee laws of Pakistan had become applicable to the State of Khairpur by virtue of the Instrument of Accession executed by it. Later, with its consent, its Chief Minister was appointed by the Government of Pakistan as the Rehabilitation Commissioner under the Pakistan Evacuee Laws and similarly its Chief Judge was appointed as Custodian of Evacuee Property wader the Pakistan Laws. Subsequently, by a notification in the Khairpur Gazette, dated 15th December 1952, the Government of Pakistan delegated to the Government of Khairpur the power vested in the Government of Pakistan under the Evacuee Laws of appointing Deputy and Assistant Custodians of Evacuee Property in Khairpur, and this delegation of the power of the Pakistan Government was accepted by the Government of Khairpur. It is not without significance that by virtue of subsection (3) of section I of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 the Government of Pakistan declared that law to be applicable to the acceding States. In these circumstances, we can safely conclude that the Governments of Khairpur and of Pakistan had acted on the assumption that by the Supplementary Instrument of Accession, the Government .of Pakistan had the power to legislate on the subject of Evacuee Laws. Their implicit assumption gives significance to their words and decd.

11. Yet, in support of the judgments of Mr. Justice Masood Ahmad and Mr. Justice Changez, Mr. Brohi has argued that the insertion of the said entry in the Instrument of Accession did not confer any power on the Federation of Pakistan to legislate in respect of evacuee property in Khairpur. Counsel said that in the original Instrument of Accession, the Government of Pakistan had the power only to legislate on external affairs, and to make treaties and agreements with other countries. That power, according to counsel, did not confer the power to make treaties and agreements with the Dominions; therefore, the said entry was inserted to enable the Government of Pakistan to enter into treaties and agreements with other Dominions. Assuming for the sake of argument, that this is correct, it does not strengthen counsel's argument that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not extend to the State of Khairpur, because by the insertion of the said entry, the State of Khairpur surrendered to the Government of Pakistan the power to legislate on all matters affecting the relations between Pakistan and the other Dominions and on all matters having any bearing on such relations. As pointed out above, India as well as Pakistan were interested in the property left behind by the migrants. As India was then a Dominion, Pakistan was entitled to legislate with respect to evacuee property in Pakistan by virtue of the said entry.

12. A reference was made during the addresses to Entry No. 8 in Schedule V of the Concurrent List of 1956‑Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The entry was as follows:‑ "Custody, management and disposal of evacuee property." It was argued that had the State of Khairpur intended to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan, it would have used the same language that was used by the Legislature of Pakistan in Entry No.

8. In other words counsel's contention was. that evacuee property should have been specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession. Since it was not, the power to legislate with respect to it should not be taken to have been surrendered by the State of Khairpur to the: Federation of Pakistan. In 1949, when evacuee laws were made, they were promulgated as emergency legislation, and, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects, which we have quoted in paragraph 9 above, there was a Pakistan‑India Evacuee Property Agreement; therefore, by the insertion of the said Entry in the Schedule to its Instrument of Accession, the State of Khairpur had used the widest possible language to cover any type of legislation that might be enacted in respect of evacuee property. We are, therefore, not able to agree with Mr. Brohi's contention that the Government of Khairpur did not intend to transfer the subject of evacuee laws to the Federation of Pakistan. The Instrument of Accession was a constitutional document intended to govern the relationship of an acceding state with the Federation of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Entries in its Schedule must be given the widest permissible interpretation. See in this connection the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay City (A I R 1955 S C 58). The facts of that case were that the appellant challenged the Capital Gains Tax imposed by the respondent Government on the ground that it was ultra vires of the powers of the respondent‑Government under Schedule VII of the Government of India Act. The only question for determination before the Court was whether a tax on Capital Gains could fall within the meaning of Entry No. 54 of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act which is as follows:- "Taxes or income other than‑agricultural income." The contention of the appellant was that the meaning of the word 'income' as construed by the Courts, in various decisions excluded the concept of Capital Gain. In repelling this contention, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the words used in constitutional enactment conferring legislative power should be given the most liberal permissible construction. We respectfully agree with this view and cannot accept Mr. Brohi's argument that the evacuee laws of Pakistan did not apply to the State of Khairpur, since they were not specifically mentioned in the said Entry.

13. The above decision disposes of the legal issues which are common to all of these petitions. Now we shall take up the petitions individually, or in convenient bunches to dispose of them finally.

14. The above conclusion was announced by us on 11th June 1968. The reasons for it are contained in the above judgment. A. E. Order accordingly.