P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This is an application under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act by one Shahab Din alias Punnoo Khan against whom the District Tribunal of Lyallpur has passed an order declaring him a goonda under section 13 of the Act and also ordering him to execute a bond under section 14 of the Act in the sum of Rs.2,000 with one surety in the like amount, to be of good behaviour for a period of six months. By virtue of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police have been constituted a Tribunal. This Tribunal is empowered to initiate proceedings under the Act against any person on the report of a police officer and to declare that person a goonda or a 'dangerous goonda. This mere declaration does not appear to have any liability attached to it except that certain other orders under section 14 of the Act, directing him to execute a bond or restricting his movements, can be passed. The pro ceedings before the Tribunal are provided in section 4 of the act, to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the Tribunal is not bound by rules of evidence and is empowered to examine witnesses either on affidavit or in the absence of the person complained against, and to keep any part of the record secret. The procedure before the Tribunal is to be one provided for summary trials in the Criminal P. C. I quote below the relevant sections of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act. (After reproducing section 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18 and 29 of the Act, the judgment proceeded). The point taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the Tribunal were not entitled to pass an order without giving any reasons and without even specifying under what clause of section 13 they held the petitioner to be a goonda. The order declaring him goonda simply says:‑ "Whereas we, S. M. Shaft‑ul‑Azam, and Makhdum Muhammad Ramzan Shah, the members of the District Tribunal, constituted under subsection (1) of section 2 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act (XIV of 1951), for the Layallpur District, are satisfied that Grounds exist for declaring Shahab Din alias Punnoo Khan son of Jalal Din caste Dogar, aged 27/28 years, agriculturist resident of Chak No. 99 R. B. a goonda under subsection (1) of section 13 of the said Act, we hereby declare the said Shahab Din alias Punoo Khan, a goonda and we direct under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act that the said Shahab Din alias Punnoo Khan shall execute a bail bond in the sum of Rs.2,000 (two thousand only) with one surety in the like amount to be of good behavior for a period of six months or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the same period. This declaration shall be notified publicly in the manner prescribed in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub‑rule (2) of rule 7 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Rules, 1951. The aforesaid Shahab Din alias Punnoo Khan shall be placed on the list of goondas maintained in the office of this Tribunal, and a copy of this order shall go to the Probation Officer, Layallpur, as well as to Police Station Khurrianwala. A copy shall also be forwarded to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Punjab Criminal Investigation Depart ment, for information." This order, it will be observed, neither states the grounds of the order nor refers to the clause of section 13, which applies to the case of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that by virtue of section 10 of the Act the procedure is to be that of summary cases, and section 263 of the Criminal P. C., which relates to the record of the trial of summary cases where there is no appeal, provides that in case of conviction a brief statement of reasons there for has to be given. Learned counsel relies on the fact that proceedings are judicial proceedings and that a revision to the High Court is provided for. Learned counsel for the Crown contends, on the other hand, that section 10 relates only to the trial up to the stage of the final order, the final order being provided for in section

13. He relies upon the fact that the Tribunal is not bound by rules of evidence and can keep any portion of the record, secret. He relies further on the fact that in section 18 material irregularity is omitted and the last portion of section 18 does not say that the High Court is to set aside the order but only to give directions for rectification of the order. The intention, he says, is to limit the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Let me state at once that the mere fact that ' trial ' is governed by a particular procedure would not in all cases imply that the final order was so governed. For instance, in the Criminal P. C., the provisions relating to trials in summons and warrant cases do not include any provision relating to the judgment which is dealt with in a separate chapter. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Basil Ranger Lawrence v. Emperor (A I R 1933 P C 218), for the proposition that judgment is part of a trial. The proposition hardly needs support from an authority. A trial is properly concluded only by a judg ment. That, however, would not mean, as I have stated above, that every reference to a trial necessarily involves a reference to the culminating portion of the trial and the fact that according to section 10 the procedure is to be that of summary trial may not have been sufficient by itself for holding that the provisions of the Criminal P. C., relating to the recording of a finding are attracted particularly in view of the fact that there is a separate section in the Act for final orders, i. e., section

13. However, after giving the matter full consideration, I am of the opinion that the proper interpretation of section 10 would be to apply it to the finding as well. As already stated, although in the Criminal P. C., the provisions relating to summons and warrant cases do not include reference to the judgment, the provisions relating to summary trials do contain a reference to the judgment as well, and section 263, which provides for non‑appealable cases, directs that in case of a conviction a brief statement of the reasons there for has to be record. The other provisions of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act also lend support to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not the intention that the tribunal should merely make a declaration without giving any reasons. The proceedings are judicial proceedings and although the Tribunal is not bound by rules of evidence, it could not be said that it can reach a finding without any evidence at all. Although it is entitled to examine evidence even in the absence of the person com plained against and his counsel by virtue of section 6 of the Act, these are only exceptional orders for which reasons have to be recorded. The fact that reasons have to be recorded gives rise to another consideration. If reasons are to be recorded for the interlocutory orders, should we assume that for the ultimate finding the legislature did not intend a record of grounds. A still more important consideration is that it will be almost impossible for the High Court properly to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 18 if the Tribunal did not state the facts, which it finds proved and on the basis of which it acts. It may be that the Tribunal has found facts, which, as a matter of law, do not fall within any of the clauses of section

13. To give an example, suppose the Tribunal only finds a person visiting continuously a cinema but holds that such visits bring the case within a clause of section 13 and declares him a goonda, although such visits do not in fact bring the case within section

13. The order would be illegal for the Tribunal cannot misinterpret the law relating to its jurisdiction and it is for the High Court to decide whether a particular finding brings a person within a particular clause of section 13 or not. But if the Tribunal is not bound (A I R 1933 P C 218) to state the facts on the basis of which it declares a person a goonda, how will the High Court know that the Tribunal has passed the order only on account of visits to the cinema? Learned counsel for the Crown urges that a reference to the evidence will make it clear as to what evidence has been accepted. I do not agree. There may be evidence on the record of a number of facts relating to the person complained against and the Tribunal may have accepted only the evidence relating to the visits to the cinema. It should be remembered that according to section 13 the order is to be passed only if the Tribunal is 'satisfied' of the existence of facts, which bring the case within one of the clauses of section

13. It is only if those facts of which the Tribunal was 'satisfied' in fact bring the case within one of the clauses of section 13 that the order would be legal. Assume that in a case two kinds of evidence have been offered; one which in fact does bring the case within a clause of section 13, and the other which does not bring the case within any of the clauses. Assume next that the tribunal rejects the evidence with respect to that matter which would really bring the case within section 13 and accepts only that evidence which truly does not bring the case within section 13 but the Tribunal thinks it does. In that case the order would be illegal, for it would be based on a finding of facts, which do not bring the case within the law at all. The Tribunal would not in such a case be satisfied' of facts, which attract the operation of any clause of section

13. Yet the High Court would be unable to determine whether the order was legal. Another point which needs consideration is that it is only if the two members of the Tribunal are agreed as to proof of facts, which form the basis of the order that an order could legally be passed. If two sets of facts are presented to the Tribunal. each of which sets can by itself be the basis of an order under section 13 and one member of the Tribunal finds one set of facts as established while he rejects the other set of facts and the other member of the Tribunal accepts that set of facts which has been rejected by the other member and rejects the one accepted by him, there would be no legal basis for the order. For this purpose too it would be essential for the Tribunal to record the facts which it finds as having been proved. If I accept the interpretation put upon the section by learned counsel for the Crown and hold that a finding as to facts is unnecessary the High Court would be unable to set aside the order in cases where it may be absolutely illegal. Learned counsel for the Crown has argued that just as in the case of orders of Provincial Government under section 4 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, it makes no difference as to the clause under which the order has been passed and the High Court, acting under section 25 of the Act, is to uphold the order if it falls under any of the clauses of section 4 subsection (1), this Court when acting under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, is not concerned with the ground on which the order has been need and that it should uphold the order if the evidence can support a finding under any of the clauses of section

13. There is no analogy between the powers of the Provincial Government and the High Court under the Press (Emergency Powers) Act and those of the District Tribunal and the High Court under the Punjab Control of Goondas Act. Under section 25 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act the High Court has to go into the merits and to decide whether the words in respect of which action has been taken are of the nature described in any of the clauses of section 4 subsection (1). The clause under which the Provincial Government has taken action is not of any consequence. If the Provincial Government has taken action under one clause, the High Court would uphold the order even though that clause was wholly inapplicable if the impugned words do fall within some other clause. If the High Court had also to decide the correctness of the order under section 13 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act on the merits, the absence of the grounds of the order may not be very material. The order would be upheld if in fact the person complained against was found by the High Court to be a goonda. But the High Court cannot give its own finding on the merits while acting under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act. The condition precedent for the making of an order under section 13 is the satisfaction of the District Tribunal. If the District Tribunal is satisfied only under a particular clause of section 13 and the High Court comes to the conclusion that that clause is not applicable, the High Court is bound to set:D aside that order even if it be of the opinion that the evidence does disclose a case under some other clause, because it cannot; substitute its own satisfaction for that of the District Tribunal.1 It may seem paradoxical but is nevertheless true that there is reater need of a proper finding in a case where the High greater is to exercise revisional jurisdiction than in a case where it exercises an appellate jurisdiction. It should be obvious that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act is entirely different from that exercised by the High Court under section 25 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act. It should also be kept in view that in a case under the Press (Emergency Powers) Act we are not concerned with an order passed by a particular Tribunal which receives evidence, allows the party complained against an opportunity of defence and then passes a particular order. It has also been urged by learned counsel for the Crown that if I accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, the result would be that the whole of order which is passed under section 13 of the Act would have to be published because section 15 directs that the order is to be published in the gazette. I do not think any such result necessarily follows. Just as the sentence can be separated from the reasons for the sentence, in the same way 'the finding in a case under section 13 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act can be separated from the ultimate formal order that is passed. In fact if we look to section 263 of the Criminal P. C., the finding and the sentence are provided for in separate clauses. Therefore, the order which a Tribunal passes can be conveniently divided into two parts; the first recording the finding and the second final order ; or, after having recorded a complete judgment, the Tribunal can then pass a formal order, declaring a person to be goonda. This formal order only need be published in the gazette. The least that can be said in favour of the petitioner's contention is this. Two interpretations of section 10 are possible. One is that it applies only to the enquiry up to the stage that the finding is recorded. The other is that it also includes the finding within its scope. If both interpretations be possible, we should adopt that which advances the cause of justice. Little argument is needed for showing that the cause of justice would be advanced if the Tribunal is to record grounds also for its order. Learned counsel for the Crown admits that it is very desirable that grounds be recorded. He only contends that as a matter of law there being no express provision, proceedings should not be set aside merely on that ground. I am of the opinion that I should adopt a construc tion which, while it does not in any way curtail the jurisdiction of the District Tribunal, makes provision for a procedure that will be conducive to justice. The Punjab Control of Goondas Act confers a very exceptional jurisdiction. It enables the District Tribunal to declare a person a goonda even on the basis of evidence that is recorded in his absence. It is essential, therefore, that the exercise of the jurisdiction should, as far as possible, be in accordance with rules that will minimsie chances of injustice. Learned counsel for the Crown has also urged that the High Court has jurisdiction not for setting aside the order but for giving such directions as it may deem sufficient. I do not think that the wording of section 18 makes any difference to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The wording is probably deliberately wide and general, so as to enable the High Court to pass whatever order it thinks fit. Another aspect of the matter (apart from section 10) is this. Section 13 enacts that an order declaring a person a goonda shall be made if the Tribunal is `satisfied' of certain facts. Learned counsel for the Crown admits that it is essential for the Tribunal to record satisfaction but contends that it is sufficient for the Tribunal to say that it is satisfied of the person concerned being a goonda. Keeping in view that the High Court is to exercise a revisional jurisdiction and the order passed is not a mere executive order, I am of the view that the Tribunal should specify the ground on which it takes action. I hold that it is necessary for District Tribunal acting under the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, to record briefly the reasons for their order in accordance with section 263 of the Criminal P. C. The order of the Tribunal declaring the petitioner a goonda should be regarded as having been set aside and the Tribunal is directed, should it consider it proper, to record a fresh order embodying the reasons for its decisions. I have said it may do so only if it thinks proper because the period of six months for which the petitioner had furnished security for good behavior is drawing towards its close. A. H. Case remanded.