2026 PLP 996 (MLD)

Muhammad Naeem Anwar, J.

This criminal revision is directed against the judgment/order dated 12.07.2023, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Peshawar, whereby the appeal filed by the respondent was allowed, consequently, the order passed by the learned Special Magistrate (Assistant Commissioner, Tehsil Shah Alam, District Peshawar) was set aside and resultantly, the fine amount of Rs. 200,000/-, deposited by respondent No.1, was ordered to be refunded to him.

2. Learned Assistant Advocate General (AAG), appearing on behalf of the State, contended that a raid was conducted at the godown of the respondent, during which the accused/respondent was caught red-handed and a huge quantity of sugar was recovered from his premises, despite the fact that he was not an authorized dealer of sugar. He further submitted that, on the basis of his confession, the respondent was rightly fined an amount of Rs. 200,000/- by the Assistant Commissioner, acting as Special Magistrate. It was argued that the impugned judgment dated 12.07.2023, passed by the learned appellate Court, is contrary to the law and facts of the case and is without jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge was expressly barred. According to the learned AAG, the learned appellate Court failed to consider this legal bar and wrongly assumed jurisdiction; therefore, the impugned judgment is without lawful authority and liable to be set aside.

3. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the entire proceedings conducted by the Assistant Commissioner, from inception to conclusion, were not in accordance with law. It was argued that the mandatory procedural safeguards provided under the law were ignored, rendering the proceedings illegal. According to learned counsel, the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is well-reasoned, strictly in consonance with the statutory requirements, and does not call for any interference by this Court.

4. Arguments were heard at length and the record of the case gone through.

5. The record reflects that, on a complaint allegedly made by the public at large, a raid was conducted at the shop/godown of the accused/respondent, where a large quantity of sugar bags along with urea was allegedly recovered, for which he was allegedly not an authorized dealer. Consequently, the respondent was arrested on 19.04.2023 by the Special Magistrate, Shah Alam, and sent to judicial lock-up, thereafter, as evident from the form filled in by the Assistant Commissioner, a fine of Rs. 200,000/- was imposed upon the respondent under sections 3 and 7 of the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1977 , read with section 3 of the COVID-19 (Prevention of Hoarding) Act, 2020 (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Act No. XLI of 2020) the Act, 2020 . The said amount was deposited, vide deposit slip dated 20.04.2023, purportedly on the basis of a plea of guilt. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal, which was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge, Peshawar, vide judgment dated 12.07.2023. Consequently, the order passed by the learned Special Magistrate was set aside and the amount deposited, vide Book No. 475, Serial No. 61 dated 20.04.2023, was ordered to be refunded, hence, the State, through the Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has filed the present criminal revision.

6. The Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977 empowers the district administration to take action against persons violating price control measures. Sections 3 and 6 lay down the regulatory framework, while section 7 prescribes punishment for contravention, extending up to three years imprisonment and fine of Rs. One lac. Section 11 provides that offences under the Act shall be tried by a Special Magistrate appointed under section 14A Cr.P.C., in a summary manner as provided in sections 262 to 265 Cr.P.C., with the express exclusion of the limitation contained in section 262(2) Cr.P.C. Chapter XXII Cr.P.C. (sections 260 265) governs summary trials. Section 262 Cr.P.C. provides that summary trials shall follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XX, except where otherwise provided. Ordinarily, subsection (2) limits imprisonment to three months; however, both the Act of 1977 and the COVID-19 (Prevention of Hoarding) Act, 2020 expressly exclude the application of this limitation, thereby permitting enhanced punishment while retaining the summary procedure. Similarly, section 3 of the Act, 2020 provides punishment up to three years imprisonment and heavy fine, section 6 declares offences cognizable and non-bailable, and section 8 mandates summary trial under sections 262 265 Cr.P.C., again excluding the restriction contained in section 262(2). Thus, while the trial remains summary, the procedural safeguards contained in sections 263 and 264 Cr.P.C. continue to apply.

7. Section 263 Cr.P.C. relaxes certain requirements only in non-appealable cases, whereas section 264 Cr.P.C. mandates that in appealable summary cases, the Court must record the substance of evidence and pass a reasoned judgment. A collective reading of Sections 260 to 264 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that although the law does not make it obligatory to frame a formal charge in summary trials, the accusation must nevertheless be clearly explained to the accused. This is essential to enable the accused to understand the precise nature of the allegations and to effectively defend himself. Failure to do so may cause prejudice to the accused and vitiate the proceedings. Likewise, under section 14A, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person in any case tried summarily in which a Special Magistrate appointed under section 14A passes a sentence of fine not exceeding five thousand rupees under the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977 (XXIX of 1977) or under any other Federal law or Provincial law relating to price control. But here in the instant case the accused/respondent has been imposed fine of rupees two lac, therefore, it is an appealable order and section 264, Cr.P.C. provides in clear terms that in appealable cases the Court shall record the substance of the evidence and also the particulars mentioned in section 263 and shall, before passing any sentence, record a judgment in the case. This legal position has been affirmed in a case Sadiq Masih v. The State (1993 PCr.LJ 547 Karachi) wherein it has been held that: --

8. Section 260, Cr.P.C. deals with summary trials. Section 262, Cr.P.C., lays down that in summary trials the procedure prescribed in Chapter XX shall be followed, except as hereinafter mentioned. Section 263, Cr.P.C., dispenses with the recording of evidence and the drawing up of a formal charge, in cases where there is no appeal. However, in such cases also the Court should be careful to prepare the statement as required under this section. Section 264, Cr.P.C. provides in clear terms that in appealable cases the Court shall record the substance of the evidence and also the particulars mentioned in section 263 and shall, before passing any sentence, record a judgment in the case. From a combined reading of the above sections it is apparent that although it is not obligatory to frame a formal charge, it is necessary to do so to enable the accused to understand what the matter is upon which he has to show cause, and then to meet the case put up against him. It was obviously for this reason that a similar view was taken in the case of Shamshad Ahmad v. The State reported in 1991 PCr.LJ 1012. Two cases of Indian jurisdiction, viz. Mukandi Lal v. State through Municipal Board, reported in AIR 1952 All. 212, and New Raginaya Goods Mart and another v. State reported in AIR 1960 J&K 108 also support this view. Similarly in the case of Noor Ahmad v. The State (1984 PCr.LJ 1608 Lahore) it has been held that:-

6. Section 262, Cr.P.C. provides that in summary trials, the procedure prescribed in Chapter XX shall be followed. Subsection (2) of this section provides that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under Chapter XXII pertaining to summary trials. Section 243, Cr.P.C. provides that if an accused admits having committed the offence, of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him. In the copy of relevant portion of the Summary Register placed on the file, the confession of the petitioner is recorded as `pleads guilty". This kind of confession is not in conformity with the provisions contained in section 243, Cr. P. C.

8. In the instant case, perusal of the record reveals that the Petitioner-State, along with the revision petition, has only annexed the impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge and has failed to place on record the proceedings of the learned Special Magistrate, including the complaint, order of conviction, or any proper record of the summary trial. In this backdrop, the records of both the learned appellate Court and the trial Court were summoned. While the record of the learned appellate Court was received, the record of the learned trial Court (Special Magistrate), despite repeated directions, was not made available. This Court has also examined the record of the appellate court; however, except for the printed receipt of the deposit slip of the fine, no other document is available on the file. The only document annexed with the petition and available before the Court is the receipt of deposit of fine, which is a printed proforma, filled in by hand. In the column relating to the statement of the accused, it is merely recorded as follows: Neither any complaint allegedly filed by the public at large is available on the record, nor any statement of allegations, show-cause notice, or record of trial proceedings, if any, even no formal order of conviction appears to have been passed by the learned Special Magistrate. In the printed form too, it is not clear as to whether the accused/petitioner was convicted and sentenced under the Act 1977 or Act, 2020. In these circumstances, a printed form regarding the deposit of fine, containing a bald endorsement such as pleads guilty or a vague statement, by no stretch of imagination satisfies the mandatory requirements of law. Such an endorsement neither constitutes a lawful confession nor can it be treated as a valid judicial order passed in accordance with the mandatory provisions of law, and as such, the entire proceedings stand vitiated. Likewise, Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 guarantees the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process, and it applies to every statute and proceeding, even where the law is silent. Due process requires that a person must receive notice of proceedings, be given a reasonable opportunity to defend, be tried by an impartial and honest forum, and that such forum must be of competent jurisdiction. This principle is intrinsically linked with the constitutional right of access to justice and fair adjudication. The doctrine of due process imposes a duty upon courts, tribunals, and executive authorities to follow lawful procedure, afford parties a fair chance to present their case, examine witnesses, and produce evidence. Even where procedural law is silent, the minimum standards of fairness under Article 10-A must be observed, failing which the entire proceedings become unsustainable. In the present context, these essential requirements of due process are conspicuously absent in the present case. In the case of Qamar ul Islam v. Additional District and Sessions Judge Karachi (2019 PCr.LJ Karachi 841) it has been held that the summary trial is also meant to provide a complete right of fair-trial hence involvement of an accused for an offence, falling within meaning of Chapter-XXII of the Code, would never be sufficient to award sentence on mere assumption but requirement of fair-trial shall always to be satisfied.

9. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the learned Sessions Judge committed no illegality or jurisdictional error in entertaining and allowing the appeal. The impugned judgment is well-reasoned, lawful, and based upon correct appreciation of the statutory provisions and settled legal principles. Accordingly, this criminal revision, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. JK/50/P Revision dismissed.