P L D 1986 Karachi 84 (PLP)

(c) In Syed Rashid Hussain v. Hussain Haji Ahmed (P L D 1973 Kar. 37), Mr. Dorab Patel, J., held in para. I 1 of the judgment :‑ "I have referred to these three authorities to show that the West Pakistan High Court had resorted to a very liberal construction of clause (a) of the subsection in order to prevent the object of the Ordinance being defeated 'by the draftsman's unskilfulness'. Applying the same principle to the present case, it seems to me that when an eviction application is tiled by co‑owners, the word "he" and his' in the clause can be read both as 'they' and as. 'any of them' as the context may require. (d) In institute of Radio Technology and others v. Pandorang Baburao (A I R 1964 Born. 212). interpreting au analogous provision in section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that the words "his own occupation" mean occupation by himself and all persons who are dependents on him. (e) In B. M. Lal v. Dunlop Rubber Company (A I R 1968 S C 175), the facts of the case were that the respondent's claim that they reasonably require the flat for their own occupation. The trial Court dismissed the suit. From these decrees, the respondents filed appeals in the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court held that "(i) a limited company can be a landlord within the meaning of section 13(I)(f ) and can reasonably require the premises for its own occupation. The words of clause (f ) of section 13(1) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (12), 1956 read as under :‑ "Where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held." The Supreme Court of India held as follows :‑‑ "The High Court rightly held that the respondents reasonably require the flats for respondent No. 2's own occupation through officers holding the flats on its behalf as licensee." Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 66 under the caption of "Beneficial Construction" states as follows :‑ "It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a Statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the Legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if they are fairly susceptible of it. The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words. If, however, there are circumstances in the Act showing that the phraseology is used in a larger sense than its ordinary sense, that sense may be given to it." The same learned author under the caption "Construction most agreeable to justice and reason" at page 183 observed as follows :‑ ."In determining either the general object of the Legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one." In Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims (2nd Edition) on page 1659, it is observed as under :‑ "The word 'occupation' has not been defined either in the Act or in the rules. It has, therefore, to be taken in its ordinary meaning. Occupation actually connotes more than mere possession, which may be actual or constructive. Occupation means actual holding. There must be holding actually by the person claiming to be in occupation of any accommodation or part thereof. So far as the dictionary meaning of the word 'occupation' goes it is not necessary that the person claiming to occupy should be living on it or using it as a residence." Again at page 1;660 the learned author observed :‑ ' "When the expression "occupation" is used with reference to the possession of property, it means that the owner is in actual physical enjoyment of the house, property or estate by himself, his agents or servants." The policy of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 in relation t eviction on ground of requirement for one's own occupation is indicated in clause (vii) of section

15. The Sind Rented Premises Ordinance being a restriction upon the relations between landlord and tenants and protect their interests in respect of rented premises within urban areas. What the Ordinance protects is only against increase in rout and unreasonable eviction. In interpreting the scope of clause (vii) I think those considerations will have to be borne in mind. , In Syed Rashid Hussain v. Hussain Haji Ahmed, Dorab Patel, J., with reference to the meaning expressed in the cases just referred to, held that the eviction application filed by co‑powders. the word 'he' and 'his' in the clause ‑can be read both as "they" and as "any of there". With respect, I am inclined to take the view that the words "his own occupation" should receive a liberal interpretation. If that is so, there i no reason why a different principle should apply to clause (vii) o section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. ‑ Here, I am concerned with the meaning of the expression "landlord". Should it in the light of', the passages extracted above by me circumscribed only to the personality of the landlord or should it be extended to a corporate body or company for its employees or staff ? The words "his own occupation" used in section. 13(3)(i)(a) of the repeated Ordinance, 1959 Land in clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 have to be construed liberally. In the instant case the eviction application seas not filed by an individual landlord but by the Eastern Express Limited, the owners of the flat i question which is a limited company incorporated under the Companies act, 1913 for accommodating its Senior categories of staff. I do not think that a beneficial construction would exclude a request by the appellant for being put in possession of the flat in question for the use an occupation by its staff. Accordingly I hold that the need of Eastern Express Limited to accommodate its senior categories of 'Staff would be the need of the landlord within the meaning of section 13(3)(i) of the repealed Ordinance or clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. In my view, therefore, the application for eviction is maintainable only fur accommodating the staff of the appellants and not for the staff of other subsidiary companies or group of companies. An employee in occupation of premises belonging to his master may be a tenant or a licensee. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth Edition, Volume 27, Article 14, page 23). Now it is settled law that a servant may be a licensee though he may not be in service occupation. I am of the view that the officers of the appellant's company have only a personal privilege with no interest in, the flats, which they can assign or sublet, and they cannot part with the possession to another. The appellants can file eviction application for accommodating their senior category of staff or on their behalf. I will now deal with the appeal on merits. The case of the appellants in the eviction application is that the appellants issued a letter. dated 31‑12‑1976 informing the respondent that they are the new landlords of the property bearing No. 2, Bath Island, Karachi. The appellants having purchased the property for accommodating certain categories of their senior staff and advising the respondent to hand over vacant possession of the flat in his occupation as the same was genuinely and bona fide required by the appellants. The appellants filed affidavit in‑evidence of Abdul Rab Malik manager of the appellants wherein it was averred that the building was purchased with the prime object of accommodating senior categories members of the staff and the respondent should hand over vacant possession of the premises as it was genuinely and bona fidely required by the appellants to accommodate certain senior categories of the staff for whom the appellants had to hire expensive accommodations and are not able to make use of their own property. The accommodation becomes equally needed, because the appellants are a large office with an extensive net work, doing extensive business. There are transfers in the country itself and it is necessary that the g appellants should have these premises. In fact, with a flat getting vacant the appellants have indented their own officers in these flats, which i itself proceed to assert the genuineness of the appellants claim. The manager of the appellants to a suggestion in cross‑examination replied that "we 30 or 40 senior officers in our firm cannot give names of all the officers as it is a big company. These officers are not of this company but its other groups of companies under the `main company. It is not a fact that the appellants company is a separate company but it is a subsidiary company of Forbes company. The manager of the appellants company to another suggestion replied that "there are four officers who are residing in this building. There are five officers in our subsidiary company including directors. Again says four officers residing in building belong to various groups of companies. It is correct that only officers of the other companies occupied the premises in building after our purchase. These officers also belong to various groups of the company, therefore 'they were provided accommoda tion there". The learned Rent Controller rejected the application on the ground that the premises could be ordered to be vacated if the same are required in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the use of his spouse or any of his children which is not so in this case. The finding of the learned Rent Controller is misconceived. In Abdul Rehman v. Ahmed Khan (P L D 1982 Kar. 532), a Division Bench of this Court held that the rights of the parties have to be regulated in accordance with the repealed Ordinance, 1959 but in procedure, that has to be adopted for the F disposal of old cases, would be under the new Ordinance. The dictum laid down in this case, was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court P L D 1983 S C

21. Mr. Virjee the learned counsel for the appellants:. has sought support from the dictum laid down in the case of Hussan han v. Mrs. Munawar Begum (P L D 1976 Kar, 832). It was held in the above case that the assertion or claim on oath by the landlord that he required the premises in dispute for his personal use, should be accepted by the Controller as bona fide if such claim or assertion, although by itself may be insufficient. yet is consistent with his averment in the application and not shaken in cross‑examination or disproved in rebuttal. I have reproduced the relevant extract from the evidence of the manager of the appellant in the principles enunciated in the abovementioned dictum and find that the same are not attracted in the facts of this case. The application for eviction discloses only one ground that the building was purchased for accommodating certain categories of their senior staff. The ground disclosed in the affidavit‑in‑evidence that the appellants had to hire expensive accommodations for certain categories of staff and are not able to make use of their own property. The other ground disclosed in the affidavit‑in‑evidence is that the appellants have a large office with an extensive net work, doing extensive business. There are transfers in the country itself and it is necessary that the appellant its should have these premises. In fact, with a flat getting vacant, the appellants have inducted his own officers in these flats, which in itself proceed to assert the genuineness of the appellants claim. The last ground disclosed is that the appellants are facing great hardship for want of accommodation and it would be unjustified for the respondent not to occupy for several months and keep the premises locked. It is by now well‑settled that the legislature wanted to make a provision for better control of premises and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenant therefrom. Section 13 of the Ordinance specifically enumerate the grounds which will entitle the landlords to evict their tenants, subsection (3) of section 13 contains one of such grounds that the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his occupation. Then subsection (4) of the said section 13 provides that when the landlord who has obtained the possession of the premises under section 13(3) relets the building or premises to any other person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within two months of such possession. It is clear that these provisions have been enacted solely for the benefits of the tenants who having regard to the lack of adequate accommodation were left at the mercy of the landlords, From the phraseology used in clause (i)(a) it is clear that the landlord has to prove that be requires the premises in good faith. The expression "requires in good faith" ha been considered by the superior Courts on several occasions. Broadly stated mere wish, convenience, whim or fancy of the landlord would no be enough to show that the landlord requires the premises in good faith". The landlord must allege and prove certain circumstances or facts whir go to prove his requirement what is meant by "requires in good faith" that the landlord requires the premise: for his reasonable needs and that he is not seeking eviction on the pretext of requiring additional accommodation with an oblique motive of realising some extraneous purpose. The word "requires" means that, there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to require premises for his own use and occupy the same. What is necessary is that he should need them for his own occupation. The. need has to be reasonable and bone fide. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. Although the word "reasonable" does not appear in the Ordinance, the question o reasonableness is relevant in deciding the bona fides of the landlord. Mere wish or intention of the landlord is not sufficient to give him a right to evict. As already observed the Ordinance is promulgated with the avowed object of protecting the tenants against unreasonable eviction and at the same time it makes a provision that the landlord will be entitled to get the possession of their premises on the grounds enumerated therein. Subsection (2) of‑section 13 of the Ordinance further enjoins a duty upon the Controller to enquire into the requirement of the landlord and if Controller is satisfied that the requirement of the landlord will be met by occupation of the .premises, then he has to pass an order of eviction. Therefore, all the relevant factors will have to be objectively considered before such a question is decided by the Controller. In the application for eviction a vague ground was given that the appellants purchased property bearing No. 2, Bath Island, Karachi from the former landlords. Messrs Edulgee Dinshaw Limited. The said property was purchased for accommodating certain categories of their senior staff It has not been stated therein as to how many flats are in the building. In affidavit of their manager, the appellants repeated the same facts as stated in the eviction application. I am of the humble opinion that reading of the provision it is obvious that if the requirement of the appellants be genuine and it satisfied the Controller, it obtained the possession of the flat in question. Subsection (2)f clearly shows both affirmatively and negatively that the appellants itself if satisfied the Controller about its claim, before it can obtain .a order in its favour. The Controller is not satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion obviously the Controller must be satisfied about reliability of the claim made by it, an this can only be established by looking into the surrounding circumstances, such as that the building consists of actual number of flats and the number of certain categories of senior staff. Out of the flats in the building, the appellants have accommodated so many number of certain categories o staff. It is not enough that the appellants comes forward and state that it needs the flat in question for accommodating certain categories of senior staff. The subsection speaks. not of the bona fide, of the appellants but says, on the other hand, that the claim of the appellants that it requires the flat in question in good faith, that is to say honest in circumstances. It is impossible. therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the appellants. In the application of eviction a vague ground was given that it wanted for accommodating of certain categories of senior staff. It has not been stated as to number of senior staff and the number of flats in the property, For this purpose the appellants must put before the Controller all the necessary. details which are required for granting relief. On such vague allegation as made in the eviction application or the affidavit‑in‑evidence, the appellants cannot expect relief on the ground of requiring the flat in w question for accommodating certain categories of senior staff. The manager of the appellants in his cross‑examination stated that there are four officers including directors to the appellant's company. The appellants did not disclose that out of these four senior officers ho many of them were accommodating in the building. That itself shows that the application is lacking in bona fide and it cannot be said that the appellants have established its bona fide to accommodating senior categories of staff. A mere ipse dixit of the appellants that it required the flat in question for accommodating senior staff is not enough. It must be supported by valid reasons as to how it requirement is genuine and that is lacking in the present case. There is another important aspect of the case which although not taken into consideration by the Controller cannot be ignored. Under section 13(3)(a) a .landlord can obtain possession of the flat for its own occupation. It is" 'common ground that there are three requirements to make out a case of action for eviction under that provision, and indeed this is apparent from a bare reading of the subsection. In the present case the appellants averred that it required the flat in question for occupation of its staff. But the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely (a) that the landlord is not occupying another residential building in the area concerned, and (6) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. There is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with these latter conditions. The necessary consequence follows that not merely is there inadequacy of pleadings sufficient to make out a cause of action but total absence of proof of two vital requirements. The manager admitted in his cross‑examination that "the officers of the other companies occupied premises in building after our purchase". I am of the humble opinion that the statute benignly designed to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction has taken care to put restriction which must be rigorously construed to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The appellants have therefore, failed to fulfil the conditions prescribed by law for being entitled to be put in possession. For the foregoing reasons I find no merits in this appeal and would accordingly dismiss the same but leave the parties to bear their own costs. A.A. Appeal dismissed.