P L D 1997 Lahore 499 (PLP)

‑‑‑‑S. 3(f)‑‑‑"Public purpose"‑‑‑Definition‑‑‑"Public purpose" which has not been defined in its generic sense in S.3(f), Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an expression which is a relative term and will depend and vary from one particular set of facts and circumstances to another such set‑‑‑"Public purpose" is an object in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned‑‑‑ "Public purpose", however, will have to be a purpose which is in furtherance of the general interest of the community at large as opposed to the particular interest of an individual but at the same time "public purpose" does not cease , to be so simply because incidental benefits will ensure to private individual.‑‑[Words and phrases]. Dr. M. Nasim Javed v. Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. PLD 1983 Lah. 552; Nichol's Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, 5.7.222 and Muhammad Akbar v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi PLD 1976 Lah. 747 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 24‑‑‑Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Preamble‑‑‑Protection of property rights‑‑‑Land acquisition‑‑‑No property can be acquired compulsorily or taken possession of save for a public purpose. (c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Preamble, Ss.4 & 5‑‑‑Object of the Act‑‑‑Acquisition of land‑‑‑Public purpose‑‑‑Notifications of intent of acquisition and its confirmation by Provincial Government‑‑‑Procedure‑‑‑Whenever a deviation is to be ma, from the normal procedure for acquiring land through private negotiations and sale through the methodology of acquisition it must necessarily be for "public purpose" ‑‑‑Provincial Government, on being satisfied that land in any locality is either needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, is empowered to publish a notification to that effect in the official Gazette in order to put those who are affected or likely to be affected on due notice‑‑‑Such declaration of intent is to be confirmed by way of a second notification under S.5 of the Act "at any time"‑‑‑Phrase "at any time"‑‑‑Meaning.‑‑[Words and phrases]. The raison d'etre, i.e., the reason for the existence of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and as stated in its preamble is for the acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. In other words, whenever a deviation is to be made from the normal procedure for acquiring land through private negotiations and sale through the methodology of acquisition it must necessarily be for a public purpose. The, question of determining the amount of compensation will only come later. Part II of the Act deals with acquisition and section 4 of the Act empowers the Provincial Government on being satisfied that land in any locality is either needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, to publish a notification to that effect in the official Gazette. Thus, the initial notification under section 4 of the Act is only in the nature of a preliminary notification and the intent of the Provincial Government which it must publish in the ,official Gazette in order to put those who are affected or are likely to be affected on due notice. This declaration of intent is to be confirmed by way of a second notification under section 5 of the Act by stating in clear and unequivocal terms that a particular land is needed for a public purpose for a Company. This definite statement has to be made "at any time" after the initial notification under section 4, by having this second notification also published in the official Gazette, stating therein all the necessary details of the land to be acquired and giving public notice. No time has been fixed between the preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act and the second notification under section 5 of the Act. The words used in section 5 of the Act are "at any time". (d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 48‑‑‑Withdrawal from acquisition‑‑‑Where a sovereign has chosen to exercise the power of eminent domain for the acquisition of land, it also retains the powers to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken‑‑‑Only method for bringing acquisition proceedings to an end given by the Act is that Government itself brings same to an end. Where a sovereign has chosen to exercise the power of Eminent Domain for the acquisition of land, the sovereign also retains the power to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken by virtue of section 48 of the Act. In other words one method for bringing acquisition proceedings to an end given by the Act is that the Government itself brings it to an end. Apart from this method given in the Act there is none other. (e) Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Rr. 7 & 8‑‑‑Acquisition of land‑‑‑Definite and fixed period of time has been given both under Rr.7 & 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑Where the acquisition is for the benefit of a company, requirements as mentioned in R.7, Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 have to be fulfilled under R.8 of the said Rules. Where the acquisition is for the benefit of a Company, the same requirements as mentioned in Rule 7 of the Rules have to be fulfilled under Rule

8. The acquisition must be for a public purpose both under the Act and Rule 7 is a sine qua non and there is no cavil with this proposition of law. However, both under Rule 7 as also Rule 8 of the Rules, a definite and fixed period of time has been given. Rule 7 makes it mandatory by providing that the Commissioner shall issue a Notification under section 5 of the Act not later than one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. However, the Board of Revenue may in its discretion extend the time for the issuance of the second notification under section 5 of the Act by a maximum period of 60 days. In other words, the maximum period of time between the first notification under section 4 of the Act and the second notification under section 5 of the Act commencing from the date of the publication is 14 months. Thereafter, by virtue of a deeming clause in Rule 7 of the Rules, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end and there is a similar deeming clause in Rule 8 of the Rules where the acquisition is for the benefit of a Company. (f) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 4 & 5‑‑‑Publication of notification and payment of damages‑‑‑Words "published" and "issued" ‑‑‑Distinction and meanings‑‑‑Word "published" having been employed in both Ss.4 & 5, Land Acquisition Act, 1894, publication had to be in the official Gazette to give public notice to those affected or likely to be affected‑‑‑Mere printing without issuing would not in law amount to "publication".‑‑[Words and phrases]. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 3rd Edn., Vo1.I, p.1051; Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Vol. III, 1944 Edn., pp.166 ‑‑ 167; New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary, pp.515, 807; Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, 10th Edn., pp.558 ‑‑ 843; Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Vol. IV, 1944 Edn., pp.438 and 439; Bengal Oil Mills Ltd. v. Dada Sons PLD 1964 Kar. 18; Entire American Law, ARC, Vol. LXXIII, p. 638; Province of East Pakistan v. Major Nawab Khawaja Hassan Askary and others PLD 1971 SC 82 and Muhammad Ishaque v. Chief Administrator, Auqaf, Punjab PLD 1977 SC 639 ref. (g) Interpretation of statutes‑ ‑‑‑‑ Deeming clause‑‑‑Principles for interpretation‑‑‑In each case, it would be a question as to with what object, the Legislature made the deeming provision. Agha Shaukat . Ali v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and another PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 445; Begum B.H. Sayed v. Afzal Jahan Begum and others PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lah. 967; Abdul Hakim Khan v. Mrs. Doreen Barker Ram PLD 1973 Lah. 466; Malik Muhammad Saleem and another v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 3 others PL13 1976 Lah. 1233; Begum B.H. Syed v. MSt.Afzal Jahan Begum and another PLIL 1970 SC 29; Messrs Usmania CT1ass Sheet Factory Limited, Chittagong v. Sales Tax Officer, Chittagong PLD 1971 SC 205; Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others PLD 1975 SC 397; Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary , Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad etc. v. United Sugar Mills Ltd., Karachi PLD 1977 SC 397; Molasses Trading and Export (Pot.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1993 SCMR 1905 and Siraj Din and 3 others v. Sardar Khan and 2 others 1993 SCMR 745 ref. (h) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ . , ‑‑‑‑S. 5 [as substituted for West Pakistani ‑‑‑Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, Rr.7 & 8‑‑‑Object of deeming clause in Rr.7 & 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑Phrase "at any time" used in S.5, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [as substituted for West Pakistan] not to be left to mean an unlimited period of time so that the payment of compensation may not be unnecessarily and unreasonably delayed‑‑‑"At any time" cannot be circumvented to mean one year it could possibly be substituted by the words "within reasonable time". The word "deemed", is used, great deal in modern legislation in different senses and it is not that a deeming provision is every time made for the purpose of creating a fiction. A deeming provision might be made to include what is the uncertain for the purpose of a statute, but in cash case, it would be a question as to with what object, the Legislature had made a deeming provision. The object of the deeming clause in Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules is to get on with and complete acquisition proceedings as expeditiously as possible. The object of the deeming clause in Rule 7 as also Rule 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 appears to be that the phrase "at any time" used in section 5 of the Act might not be left to mean art unlimited period of time so that the payment of compensation may not be unnecessarily and unreasonably delayed. But the phrase "at any time" cannot be circumvented to mean one year. It could possibly be substituted by the words "within reasonable time". Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board, Banglore (1980) 3 SC 358 and Al‑Jehad Trust and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324 ref. (i) Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Rr. 7 & 8‑‑‑Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S.55‑‑‑Rules 7 & 8, Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 having travelled beyond the purport and purpose of S.55, Land Acquisition Act, 1894, same were inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894‑‑‑Worst "guidance"‑‑‑Meaning.‑‑[Words and phrases]. The power to make Rules is subject to the condition that the Rules shall be consistent with the Act. In other words, the Rules shall be in furtherance of the Act. Secondly, the purpose of the Rules shall be a limited purpose, and the limited purpose will be, that the Rules shall be for the guidance of the officers in all matters connected with the enforcement of the Act. The rules cannot be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and they .are meant only for the guidance of those who have to work the Act. Under the pretext of "guidance" the purpose of the Act cannot be defeated, neither can the spirit of the Act be sacrificed at the altar of Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules. Rule 7 as also Rule 8 of the Rules have travelled beyond the purport and purpose of section 55 of the Act. Rule 7 as also Rule 8 are thus, inconsistent with the parent Act. {j) Interpretation of statutes‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ Vires of Rules under an Act‑‑‑Test. The tests to apply in considering whether rules are within the powers of the rule‑making authority under a statute are:‑‑ (1) Whether the rules are reasonable and convenient for carrying the Act into full effect? (2) Whether the rules relate to matters arising urldex the provisions of the Act? (3) Whether they relate to the matters not in the Act otherwise provided for? and (4) Whether they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act? The validity of rule may be determined not so much by ascertaining whether it confers rights or merely regulates procedure, but by determining whether the rule is in conformity with the powers conferred under the statute and whether it is consistent with the statute; reasonable and not contrary to general principles. Interpretation of Statutes by Bhawani Lal, p.59 ref. (k) Words and phrases‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ "Reasonableness"‑‑‑Connotation. The phrase "reasonableness" is an all pervasive phrase and escapes a clear cut legal definition. "Reasonableness" .will necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What may. be reasonable in one given set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another given set of circumstances. Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, Twelfth Edn., p.199; Artemious v. Procopiou (1966) 1 QB 878; Luke v. I.R.C. (1963) AC 557 and Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Honover (1957) AC 436 ref. (1) Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Rr. 7 & 8‑‑‑Provisions of Rr. 7 & 8 of Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 are only directory in nature and not mandatory‑‑‑Purpose of said Rules is to complete the acquisition proceedings without inordinate delay and to achieve the desired results as soon as possible‑‑‑Expression "as soon as possible"‑‑ Connotation.‑‑[Words and phrases]. Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules are only directory in nature and not mandatory. The purpose of both these Rules clearly seems to be to complete the acquisition proceedings without inordinate delay and to achieve the desired results as soon as possible. To do a thing "as soon as possible" means to do it within a reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time. In the performance of a public duty by public functionaries where a statute relates to the performance of a public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet not promote the essential aims of the Legislature, such prescription or rules seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance of those on whom the duty is imposed or, in other words, as directory only. When an Act or Rules ordered a thing to be done by a public body or public officer and pointed out the specific time when it was to be done, the Act or Rules were only directory and not mandatory and might be complied with even after the prescribed time. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 4th Edn., Vol. l, p.195; Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, Eleventh Edn., p.369; Montreal Street Ry. v. Normandin (1917) AC 170 and Simith v. Jones (1830) IB & Ad. 334 ref. (m) Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Rr. 7 & 8‑‑‑Power which the Government can exercise only through a conscious application of mind cannot be deemed to have been exercised by default under R. 7 or R. 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983. (n) Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Rr. 7 & 8‑‑‑Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S.55‑‑‑Provision of Rr. 7 & 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 being ultra vires the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were declared by High Court to be bad in law and were struck down as being of no legal effect leaving the competent Legislature to make suitable amendments by fresh legislation. (o) Maxim‑‑ ...... Cujus est instituere ejus abrogare": He that institutes may also abrogate.