P L D 1997 Supreme Court 84 (PLP)
and another‑‑‑Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN
| Citation | P L D 1997 Supreme Court 84 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J., Ajmal Mian, |
| Parties | and another‑‑‑Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1997 Supreme Court 84 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1997 Supreme Court 84 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J., Ajmal Mian,.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1997 Supreme Court 84 (PLP) (and another‑‑‑Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Al-Wahabul Khairi, Advocate Supreme Court
- Some of the salient points decided in the case of appointment of Judges (Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 314) are: that 'consultation' is defined as effective, meaningful, purposive, consensusoriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of Pakistan in respect of appointments of Judges in the High Court are to be accepted by the President/Executive in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded. Acting Chief Justices are not consultees within the Constitutional Scheme. Ad hoc and Acting Judges can be appointed in the Supreme Court only after sanctioned strength is exhausted. Vacancies to be filled ordinarily within 30 days and in extraordinary circumstances within 90 days. Senior most Judge in the High Court has legitimate expectancy to become Chief Justice and Additional Judges in the High Courts have legitimate expectancy to be made permanent Judges. Transfer of a Judge of the High Court without his consent and induction in the Federal Shariat Court is viotative of Article 209. Ten years active practice as Advocate of the .High Court is mandatory for a Member of Bar for appointment as a Judge in the High Court as against enrolment simpliciter. Judge of the Supreme Court may not be sent as Acting Chief Justice of a High Court.
- Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268 and Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 ref.
- Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 4 ref.
- Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192; Federal Government of Pakistan v. M.D.Tahir, Advocate 1990 SCMR 189 and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268 ref.
- Shahid Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court (on behalf of the President) (in Reference No.2 of 1996).
- Abid Hasan Minto, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (before 5-11-1996) with Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record and after 5-11-1996 Shahzad Jehangir, Attorney-General for Pakistan for Respondent No. l (In both Constitutional Petitions).
- Shahid Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.2 (in both Constitutional Petitions).
- S. Iqbal Haider, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record (after 5-11-1996) . for Respondent No.3 (in both Constitutional Petitions).
- S. Iqbal Haider, Attorney-General for Pakistan (before 5-11-1996), Shahzad Jehangir, Attorney-General for Pakistan (after 5-11-1996), Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, President Supreme Court Bar Association, Tariq Pervez, Advocate Supreme Court, President, Peshawar High Court Bar, Ejaa Yousaf, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan and A.-G., Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Addl. A.-G., N.-W.F.P., Zafar Pasha, A.G., Punjab, Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Addl. A.-G., Punjab, Rao M. Yousaf, Advocate on-Record, M.L. Shahani, A.-G., Sindh, Hamid Khan, Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of Pakistan Bar Council and M. Bilal, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (on Court's Notice).
- Zafar Awan, Advocate High Court, Agha Dilawar Khan and Shahid Orakazai, Journalist (from the Public).
- Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court : Amicus curiae.
- 2. Some of the salient points decided in the case of appointment of Judge! are; that 'consultation' is defined as effective, meaningful, purposive. consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of Pakistan in respect of appointments of Judges in the High Court are to be accepted by the President/Executive in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded. Acting Chief Justices are not consultees within the Constitutional scheme. Ad hoc and Acting Judges can be appointed in the Supreme Court only after sanctioned strength is exhausted. Vacancies to be filled ordinarily within 30 days and in extraordinary circumstances within 90 days. Senior most Judge in the High Court has legitimate expectancy to become Chief Justice and Additional Judges in the High Courts have legitimate expectancy to be made permanent .fudges. transfer of a Judge of the High Court without his consent and induction in the Federal Shariat Court is violative of Article 209. Ten years active practice as Advocate of the High Court is mandatory for a Member of Bar for appointment 'as a Judge in the High Court as against enrolment simpliciter. Judge of the Supreme Court may not be sent as Acting Chief Justice of the High Court. '
- U. Against cite backdrop of facts and events mentioned in above paragraphs three Civil Review petition Nos.32, 33 and 34 of 1996 were filed. Two of the were filed by Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Mainstay of Law and justice 19-5-1996 and third was filed by Governor of Punjab on 21-5-199 In these petitions review was sought of judgment of this Court in the case appointment of Judges on various grounds. On 19-5-1996, Reference was filed under Article 186 of the Constitution by the Federal Government, last page which showed that it was not signed by the President of Pakistan but was filed through Mr. Justice Muhammad Arif, Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice a Parliamentary Affairs, and settled by Qazi Muhammad Jamil, Attorney-Gene for Pakistan and was signed by both of them apart from Advocate-on-Record On office objection, Reference was returned for signature of the Preside which was done and then it was re-filed and numbered as Reference No. l/199 One common factor was noted in Reference No.l/1996 and Review Petition Nos.32 to 34/1996 that in the Reference six questions had been asked a identical questions of the same nature differently worded were raised in Civil Review Petitions mentioned above. Review Petitions were fixed for hearing before a Full Bench of seven Judges at Lahore and on 3-7-1996 Order was passed by this Court directing Federal Ministry of Law to produce record relating to confirmation of Additional Judges of Lahore and Sindh High Courts a day before the announcement of the Short Order on 20-3-1996 in the case of appointment of Judges on the next date of hearing. On 7-7-1996 Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned .Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioners, made a statement before: the Court that he had instructions to say that if the Bench was not re constituted, he would withdraw the Review Petitions. Request for re-constitution of the Bench was rejected by the Chief Justice in view of the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1978 SC 125 and in the result Review Petitions were dismissed as withdrawn.
- 7. Constitution Petition 23/1996 was filed by Al-Jehad Trust through Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi on 21-4-1996 under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with ten prayers relating to the functioning of judiciary including that in the appointments of Judges, apart from Chief Justices of the High Court and Supreme Court, authority on behalf of the Federal Government should be exercised only by President and any other view would run counter to the independence of judiciary. Record relating to the appointments of Judges o1 superior Courts is not privileged and should be shown on demand to the citizens and lawyers on the basis of right to information. Judge of the High Court should not be appointed as Law Secretary and Chief Justice of the High Court should not be appointed as Governor. In this petition order was passed for issuance' of notice to respondents. C.P. 54/1996 with title 'Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry. Advocate, Supreme Court v. Federation of Pakistan' was filed on 26-8-1996 under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Other respondents in this petition are: President of Pakistan, Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister and Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Pakistan. Prayer in this petition. is that petitioner seeks protection and enforcement of his Fundamental Rights under Articles 4, 14 and 25 with declaration from the Court that Prime Minister has no power/authority under Article 48 of the Constitution to interfere, in any manner, in the matters of appointments of Judges of superior Courts.
- 9. References Nos. l and 2 of 1996 end Constitutional Petitions Nos.23 and 54 of 1996 were placed for hearing before a Bench of three Judges on 9-10-1996. It was pointed out to the Court that President of Pakistan had been pleased to appoint Mr. Shahid Hamid, Advocate, Supreme Court to represent him in all matters relating to Reference No.l of 1996. Mr. Shahid Hamid informed the Court that since in Reference No.l of 1996 same questions are raised which were raised in Review Petitions Nos.32 to 34 of 1996 and the said Review Petitions were dismissed as withdrawn, President considers this Reference to have become infructuous and therefore has dissociated himself from that Reference. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, the then Attorney-General for Pakistan, present in the Court, stated that Presidential Reference was always filed on the advice of the Prime Minister and he as the Attorney-General representing the Federal Government had no instructions to withdraw the same, hence requested for time to obtain instructions. In Reference No.2 of 1996 Mr. Shahid Hamid appeared for the President and the learned Attorney-General stated that he had no nexus with that Reference and requested for time to seek further instructions from the Federal Government. It was noticed that in C.P. No.23/1996 and C.P. No.54/1996 common point involved was interpretation of Article 48 to the effect whether advice of the Prime Minister was binding or not on the President in respect of appointments of Judges in the superior Judiciary hence notices Were issued to the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan as contemplated under Order XXVII-A, Rule f , C.P.C. and also to the respondents in loth Constitutional petitions. The Court directed that the further hearing of these matters would come up before a larger Bench and M/s. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada and S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates Supreme Court were requested to assist the Court as amicus curiae. Hearing was adjourned to date in office.
- 10. Hearing of two References and two Constitutional petitions mentioned above carne up again on 20-10-1996 at Islamabad before a Bench of five Judges. In the meantime, Qazi -Muhammad Jamil had resigned and in his place Syed Iqbal Haider was appointed as Attorney-General for Pakistan. Syed Iqbal Haider appeared in Reference No. l of 1996 and Mr. Shahid Hamid appeared in Reference No.2 of 1996 and also appeared for respondent No.2 in C.P. No13 of 1996. In response to Court notice Syed lqbal Haider also appeared as Attorney-General for Pakistan and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, was present in the Court as amicus curiae. Syed lqbal Haider produced a copy of ex post facto approval by the Cabinet to Reference No.2 of 1996 filed by the President, copy is available on the record.
- 11. On 21-10-1996 Mr. M. Bilal, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, present in the Court informed that since the case was of utmost importance and involved questions of interpretation of Articles of the Constitution, which have nexus with Independence of Judiciary, hence he requested that representatives of the Bar Associations be invited to assist the Court. The request was accepted and such order was passed for issue of notices to the Presidents of Supreme Court Bar Association and Bar Associations of all the four High Courts and Advocates General of Provinces to assist the Court. Notice was issued to the Pakistan Bar Council to send a representative to assist the Court.
- 13. On 5th November, 1996, when the cases were fixed for hearing in the Court, Government of Prime Minister Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto was dismissed and National Assembly dissolved by proclamation of the President passed under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution. Time was sought by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto who was appearing for Federal Government and Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab, and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., to seek instructions from their respective Governments. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, learned amicus curiae present in the Court, also supported the request for adjournment to enable the other counsel to seek further instructions and requested that proper finding should be given by the Court on the point which is in dispute. In the circumstances, hearing was adjourned to a date after two weeks.
- 22. In C.P.23/1996 Mr. Habib AI-Wahabul Khairi, Advocate, is petitioner and in the case of appointment of Judges he was petitioner in C.P.No.29/1994 which was directly filed by him under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. In that petition he had prayed that Articles relating to the Judiciary in the Constitution may be interpreted and should be followed and acted upon to ensure and promote Independence of Judiciary. It was pointed out by him that his Fundamental Right under Article 18 of the Constitution relating to freedom of trade, business or profession has been violated as he practises law in the Courts and cannot perform his duties as a lawyer, satisfactorily if the Judiciary is not independent. He pointed out Pakistan Bar Council Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder and made reference to Rules 165 and 175-A to point out that it was duty of Advocates to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the appointments of Judges and if he showed lack of endeavour in that context he would be guilty of professional misconduct. His petition was held to be maintainable as it was being heard alongwith other matter in which common questions were involved. In C.P.29/1994 petitioner had not touched directly the question of applicability of Article 48 in respect of appointment of Judges as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution but this question was impliedly there as he had prayed for interpretation of Articles relating to the Judiciary as such. Secondly, question with regard to the applicability of Article 48 in that case was taken up by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Senior A.S.C., who appeared in that case as amicus curiae but was left out unattended to be decided later in some other case.
- of the Punjab on 21-5-1996, in which petitioner, Mr. Khairi, filed Miscellaneous Application No.359/1996 praying that alongwith the Review Petitions, his C.P. 23/1996 should also be heard together as subject-matter is the same, which involves interpretation of Articles relating to the Judiciary. Review Petitions were then dismissed as withdrawn. Special Reference No. l/1996 which contained same grounds as in Civil Review Petitions has been withdrawn. Special Reference No.2/1996 filed by the President contains prayer with regard to the interpretation of Article 48 vis-a-vis Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution to find out whether advice of Prime Minister is binding on President or not in respect of appointments in Superior Judiciary. This Special Reference No.2/1996 is declared maintainable. Hence, C.P.23/1996 is also maintainable. C.P.54/1996 is filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution by petitioner, Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, who is an- Advocate, and contains the same prayers requiring interpretation of Article 48 whether advice of Prime Minister is binding on President or not in respect of appointments in Superior Judiciary. Therefore, for reasons stated above we hold that both these petitions are maintainable.
- 25. In both petitions and Reference No.2 common point is of interpretation of Article 48 of the Constitution with emphasis to the effect whether advice of the Prime Minister as contemplated under Article 48(1) is binding on President in respect of appointments in the Superior Judiciary. Since C.P.23/1996 was filed first in point of time Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi, Advocate as petitioner, was heard first in the order of priority. In his petition there are several prayers, some of which have been repeated as they figured in his previous petition which resulted in the judgment in the case of appointment of Judges and he submitted that the prayers repeated in the present petition were not adverted to by the Court in his previous petition. In any case, in the preset petition since the main point is interpretation of Article 48 vis-a-vis appointments of Judges in the Superior Courts as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, he was asked to address the Court on the main point.
- 27. Raja Muhammad Akram, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for petitioner in C.P.54/1996, contended that Article 48(1) of the Constitution is generally applicable with the exception of Three Categories. In First Category, there are cases in which President can act in his discretion. Such language is used in Article 48(6). Article 58(2)(b), Article 105(4), Article 213, Article 242(1)(1-A) and Article 243(2)(c). In the Second Category, there are Articles in which language used is such that advice under Article 48(1) becomes automatically not operative. Such Articles are: Articles 101, 92 and 93 in which there is self contained provision of advice. In the Third Category, there are provisions where President is to act without advice of the Prime Minister, on the basis of Constitutional compulsion. Article 91(5) provides that Prime Minister shall hole office during the pleasure of the President. If Prime Minister does not command confidence, can be required to have vote of confidence. Article 75 provides for assent of President on the Bills. Article 46 mentions duties of Prime Minister in relation to the President including communication of information to him. Article 56(3) enables President to address either House of the Parliament or both Houses assembled together. Under Article 243 Supreme Command of Armed Forces is vested in the President,
- 29. Mr. Shahid Hamid appearing for respondent No.2 in C.P.23/1996 and C.P.54/1996 and in Reference No.2/1996 stated that he supports fully the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners in both the petitions. He stated that the President regretted very much that he had no choice but to file the Reference. He and the Prime Minister held different views about the judiciary and the 'role of the President. In such circumstances, ibis views were opposed and there was delay .in the implementation of the judgment of this Court. President, as head of the State, has to keep his eyes and ears open to watch the State o1 affairs. Article 50 of the Constitution provided that there shall beta Parliament consisting of two Houses to be known as the National Assembly and the Senate. This Article was amended by P.0.14 of 1985 and now envisages that there shall be a Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan consisting of President and two Houses to be known respectively as the National Assembly and the Senate.
- 34. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto, Advocate Supreme Court, appeared for Federal Government and raised the following contentions: Firstly, what is the basic structure of 1973 Constitution and his answer is that it is Federal in character and Parliamentary in the form. He further stated that Constitution is not a dead letter but is an organic instrument which must be interpreted as such. Secondly, issue is not as to what are the powers of the President and Prime Minister but what are the Executive powers and where do they reside. He further stated that while describing such powers in the Constitution in the terminology different words are used, such as, 'advice', 'satisfaction' and 'consultation'. Thirdly, President is not to be placed at a pedestal higher than the Prime Minister in the set-up envisaged in the -Constitution as oath taken by them is identical. If political Government errs, correction is to be made by political sovereign by the method provided in the Constitution. Fourthly, Constitutional Petitions (C.Ps.23 and 54 of 1996) are not maintainable directly in the Supreme Court as petitioners have failed to show as to what are their Fundamental Rights which have been infringed.
- 37. Mr. Shahzad Jehangir contended that President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) in respect of appointments of Judges which are made under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied upon Eighth Amendment and submitted that executive authority now vests in the President and not in the Prime Minister as President is the Head of Executive and not the Prime Minister. Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General. Mr. M.L. Shahani, Advocate-General, Sindh, also adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General and additionally stated that Article 48 contemplates three situations: firstly, Executive functions of the Government which are covered by sub-Article (1) where advice of the Prime Minister is binding on the President; secondly, Constitutional functions and powers of President which are covered by sub-Article (2); thirdly, political functions which are covered by sub-Article (6) providing for referendum. He further stated that appointments of Judges of the superior Courts are covered by sub-Article (2) of Article 48. His supplementary contention is that in the appointments of Judges, relevant Articles contain consultative process which exclude the concept of advice of Prime Minister to be binding on the President. Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General N.-W.F.P., also adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General.
- 41. Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, addressed the Court and submitted that judgment in the case of appointment of Judges announced by short order on 20-3-1996 was not implemented by the Federal Government for the following reasons: Firstly, tenure of two Additional Judges, namely, Mr Justice Rana Baghwan Das of Sindh High Court and Mr Justice Javaid Nawaz Gandapur of Peshawar High Court was extended for six months against the recommendation of the Chief Justices of the High Courts and Chief Justice of Pakistan, who were in favour of their confirmation/permanent appointment and. had opposed extension. Secondly, from the Additional Judges of the High Court not confirmed in 1994, some were recommended for appointment by the Chief Justices but they were not so appointed by the Federal Government. Thirdly, during the process of implementation of the judgment asking for resignation of Additional Judges was strategy of resistance and defiance as resignations showed that appointments were made validly. In the process of regularisation and permanent appointments of Additional Judges seniority was not given. Learned counsel further submitted that appointment of Judges have nothing to do with basic structure of the Constitution or system contemplated thereunder. Parliamentary system had become dictatorship and proper system ensures checks and balances. Appointments in judiciary is a State function. Political affiliation should be deleted from the judgment in the appointment of Judges case. Advocates have right to fight political appointment. In the scheme of appointments of Judges in Superior Judiciary as enshrined in the Constitution power does not belong to Prime Minister. .
- 60. Now so far the first point is concerned the question is as to what is the basic structure of the Constitution of 1973 and what form of Government is contemplated therein. On this point there appears consensus among the learned Advocates appearing before us that seemingly Constitution of 1973 contemplates Parliamentary Form of Government. This is so stated even by Mr. Habib Al Wahabul Khairi, who has appeared before us as petitioner and he has stated categorically that Constitution of 1973 envisages Parliamentary- Form of Government but has Islamic provisions as well. He further contended that in respect of appointments in the Superior Judiciary President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister as contemplated under Article 48(1) of the Constitution for which he has given his own reasons- Mr Abid Hasan Minto Advocate Supreme Court, appearing for the Federal Government at the initial stage submitted that basic structure of 1973 Constitution is Federal in character and Parliamentary in the Form. Constitution is not a dead letter but is an organic instrument, which must be interpreted as such.
- 69. In fact, there is no cavil with the proposition that if there are two provisions in the same statute and one is general and the other is special, then while interpreting the provisions the presumption would be that the general provision was not intended to interfering with the operation of the special provision. In the case of Golden Oraphies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Director of Vigilance, Central Excise, Customs and Sales Tax 1993 SCMR 1635, the proposition mentioned above came up for consideration but it was in respect of entries in the First Schedule to the Customs Act and the controversy arose whether claim of appellants was correct that diaries manufactured by them did not fall under Heading 48.18, Pakistan Customs Tariff but were covered by the description "printed books" listed under Heading 49.01 and thus exempt from levy of sales tax. It was held by this Court that it is not possible to treat. such diaries as outside the purview of Heading 48.18 and categorised them as "printed books" classified under Heading 49. In support of the proposition that in case of conflict between general provision and special provisions in the statute special shall prevail. Raja Muhammad Akram, counsel for petitioner in C.P. No.54/1996 has cited three cases which are distinguishable. In the case of Inspector-General of Police, Punjab and others v. Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich and others PLD 1985 SC 159, while laying down criterion for determining seniority of subordinate ranks of police force, it was held that Police Act, 1861 and Rules framed thereunder being special law shall prevail over Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974
- 72. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned counsel for petitioner in C..P.54/1996 submitted that there are three categories providing for exercise of powers by the President. In the first category, the President can act in his discretion. In the second category language used is such that advice is excluded by implication. In the third category, Article 48(1) would not apply. On the subject of appointments he further mentioned three categories. In the first category President can act in his discretion. In the second category the President has to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the third category President has to make appointments after consultation with. According to the learned counsel appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 fall in the third category where appointments are made by the President after consultation with. Since consultative process is provided specifically hence advice of the Prime Minister to the President as contemplated under Article 48(1) is not attracted.
- 78. There is similarity in the provisions relating to appointments of Judges in - the Constitutions of India and Pakistan. In the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 268) it is held that President is obliged to act in accordance with advice of Council of Ministers circumscribed by the condition that advice given must be in accordance with Articles 124 and 217, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Likewise, in Pakistan this Court has also in the case of appointment of Judges reported as Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) has considered in great detail all the Articles relating to the judiciary and has held that in such appointments recommendation of Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of Pakistan are to be accepted and acted upon by the President/Executive in the absence of concrete and valid reasons to be recorded., We have interpreted the relevant provisions in the Constitution keeping in view the preamble, Article 2A, Islamic provisions in the Constitution and independence of judiciary and separation of judiciary from Executive as is contemplated under Article 175(3) of the Constitution. In the circumstances, to the performance of Constitutional duties, it is to be seen that provisions in the Constitution relating to the appointments of Judges are now to be construed in the light of the judgment which holds the field.
- 82. Mr. S.M. Zafar, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court submitted that Eighth Amendment is passed try the National Assembly under the shadow of Martial Law and notwithstanding the fact that Members of the National Assembly were elected on non-party basis, Constitution with Eighth Amendment included has become foundation of our national legal order. Constitution of each country is according to its own aspirations Quoting from Constitutional Interpretation by Philip Babbitt at page 12, he stated that Constitutional modalities are the ways in which legal provisions are characterized as true from Constitutional point of view. He named six such modalities. Firstly, the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution), Secondly, textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average contemporary man on the street), thirdly, structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); fourthly doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent), fifthly ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected to the Constitution), and sixthly, prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefit of a particular rule). It was submitted by the learned counsel that important modality is structural argument which means inferring from relations that Constitution creates inter sc to various structures with which Constitution is concerned, Articles 177 and 193 in our Constitution of 1973 which call for interpretation pertain to judicial structure requiring interpretation which would be applied to the whole structure. In such circumstances, there is no substance in the argument that in the appointments of Judges contemplated in our Constitution, since Prime Minister is not mentioned specifically, then role is completely excluded. Learned counsel then referred to various Articles of the Constitution under the Chapter of Judicature which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and need not be repeated.
- Whereas Constitution Petition No.54 of 1996 has been filed by a practising Advocate, in which he has sought the following relief:---
- Messrs Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, S.M. Zafar, Hamid Khan, Vice President of the Pakistan Bar Council on behalf of the Pakistan Bar Council, Muhammad Akram Sheikh, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, M.L. Shahani, Advocate-General Sindh, Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab, and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate General, N.-W.F.P., appeared as amicus curiae.
- The learned Additional Advocates-General, Punjab and N.-W.F.P. adopted the arguments of the learned Attorney-General, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir.
- (iv) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268
- 12. Before dealing with the above question, I - may take up another preliminary submission of Mr. Iqbal Haider, namely, that since the above mutual agreement entered into between the then President and the then Prime Minister contained a detailed agreed procedure as to the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the superior Courts and as a Bench of this Court comprising Full Court, on the basis of the above agreement, disposed of Civil Appeal No.486 of 1989 on 10-12-1989 through the judgment in the case of Federal Government of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate and others 1990 SCMR 189, there does not exist any doubt or dispute as to the mode of appointment of the Judges of the superior Courts and, therefore, the above Constitution petitions and the Special Reference are not warranted. In order to appreciate the above contention, it may be pertinent to point out that a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of M.D. Tahir v. Federal Government and 12 others 1989 CLC 1369, while dismissing a Constitution petition in limine, held that the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution was not necessary for the appointment of Judges in the superior Courts for the following reasons:---
- According to Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, learned Attorney-General, the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts fall under clause (2) of Article 48 and, therefore, Prime Minister's advice is not required. The same argument was adopted by the learned Additional Advocates-General, Punjab and N.-W. F. P.
- Whereas the learned Advocate-General Sindh, Mr. M.L. Shahani, besides adopting the arguments of the learned Attorney-General, has submitted that Article 48 provides for three situations, namely, (1) executive functions which are covered by Article 48(1), Constitutional functions of the President which are covered by Article 48(2) and political functions which are covered by. Article 48(6). '
- I am unable to subscribe to the above broad proposition of law to the effect that the President is bound to act, on the Prime Minister's advice even when it is in violation of the certain provisions of the Constitution and the judgment' of the Apex Court. I am inclined to hold that if there is no ambiguity as to the law declared by the Apex Court, the President cannot in breach of such law act upon the advice of the Prime Minister as it will not only be violative of the judgment of the Apex Court but would also be in breach of the oath of office. The view which I am inclined to take, was also found favour with the Indian Supreme Court. J.S. Verma, J. in para 482 of his opinion who spoke for himself and also on behalf of his four learned brethren, namely, Yogeshwar Dayal, G.N.Ray, A.S. Anand and S.P. Bharucha, JJ. in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC page 268, relevant at page 432 while dealing with the corresponding Article i.e. Article 74 of the Indian Constitution observed as follows:---
- "Para. 29. I am inclined to hold that the distinction which was brought out by A.V. Dicey in 1885 between laws and conventions as to the enforcibility and non-enforcibility by the Courts is no longer holding the field. With the passage of time, the other eminent Jurists have not adhered to the above distinction. They have emphasised.the importance -of the Constitutional conventions for proper operating/functioning of the Constitutions. Jennings has put it very beautifully by explaining that the Constitutional conventions provide 'flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make the legal Constitution work; they keep in touch with the growth of ideas' . The above view has been reiterated by the other Professors/Jurists of international repute. Even the President of Indian Constituent Assembly. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while introducing a bill for the adoption of Indian Constitution in 1950, pointed out in his speech that 'many things which cannot be written in a Constitution are done by conventions. Let me hope that we shall show those capacities and develop those conventions'. The Indian Supreme Court, after reviewing the treatises on Constitutional law and the caselaw in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (supra) has held that there is no distinction between the "Constitutional law" and an established 'Constitutional convention' and both are binding in the field of their operation. I am also of the view that the Courts, whilc construing a Constitutional provision, can press into service an established Constitutional convention in order to understand the import and the working of the same, if it is not contrary to the express provision of the Constitution.
- SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--This judgment will dispose of .the abovementioned two Constitutional Petitions Nos.23 of 1996 and 54 of 1996 filed by AI-Jehad Trust,and Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate, respectively under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Constitution.' only) and Reference No.2 of 1996 filed by the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter to be called as 'the Reference' only) under Article 186 of the Constitution. The principal question agitated in all these cases relateq to the interpretation and scope of Article 48(1) of the Constitution with reference to Articles 177 and 193.
- At this stage, it appears necessary to mention another important fact. The reference before this Court was filed by the President through a private counsel Mr. Shahid Hamid, Advocate, instead of Attorney-General of Pakistan. The then Attorney-General, Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, challenged the maintainability of the Reference on the ground that it was tiled without the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution which was necessary. Mr. Iqbal Haider, who succeeded Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil as Attorney-General of Pakistan during the pendency of the Reference, however, made a statement before this Court on 21-10-1996 that he would not object to the maintainability of the Reference as the Cabinet accorded ex post facto approval to the filing of the Reference before this Court. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the :hen Attorney-General also placed on re-rd the decision of the Cabinet which was to the following effect:-
- 5. We have heard Mr. Shahid Hamid for the President, Mr. Habib Wahabul Khairi for Al-Jetiad Trust, Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram for Zafar lqbal Chaudhry, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, Attorney-General for Federation, Mr. VI.L. Shaham, Advocate-General Sindh. Mr. Shabbar Raza, Additional Advocate-General Puniab, Mr. Shah Jehan fusutzai, Additional Advocate General, N.-W.F.P., Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, President of Supreme Court Bar Association on Court notice and Mr. Iqbal Haider for the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Besides hearing the abovementioned learned counsel for the parties, we also heard Mr. Agha Dilawar Khan and Mr. Shahid Orakzai, the two gentlemen who claimed to be interested in the controversy as a member of the public. In the end, the two learned amicus curiae, Mr. S.S. Pirzada and Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates of Supreme Court, appointed by the Court and Mr. Hamid Khan, Advocate, Vice-Chairman, Pakistan Bar Council as a representative of the Bar Council placed their views before us with regard to the controversy arising in these cases.
- 8. Mr. Iqbal Haider also. contended that a similar controversy had arisen in 1989 when Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was holding the office of President and Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister, but the controversy was resolved through a mutually agreed farmula which was sanctioned by this Court as is evident from the judgment reported as Federal Government of Pakistan v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate 1990 SCMR 189. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the. learned counsel, relying on the order of this Court in M.D. Tahir, Advocate's case supra, contended that on the face of existence of this agreed formula between the two highest functionaries of the Constitution which also bore the seal of this Court, the issue regarding exercise of power by the President to the exclusion of Prime Minister cannot be reopened and reagitated. Mr. Iqbal Haider further contended that in any case, after the decision of this Court in the Judges' Case, this controversy is no more a live issue.
- 10. The learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, Mr. Shabbar Raza, Mr. M.L. Shahani, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General of N.-W.F.P. adopted the arguments of learned Attorney-General.
- 11. Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, the learned President of Supreme Court Bar Association contended that appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts do not fall within the functions of the Government so as to attract the provisions of advice contained in Article 48(1) of the Constitution. The learned counsel contended that the power to appoint Judges of the superior Courts under the Constitution does not belong to political arena and therefore, its exercise by the President, who does not belong to any political party, will keep the institution of judiciary away from political influences. The learned counsel further contended that the past experience shows that the exercise of this power
- 12. Mr. S.S. Pirzada, the learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and amicus curiae, in his usual lucid and persuasive style took us through the conventions followed by the. British Rulers of the Sub-continent in pre independence period in making appointments to the higher judiciary, the historical background of Constitution making in India and Pakistan in post independence period with special reference to the Constitutional provisions relating to the appointments of Judges in superior judiciary, and the latest trend in the United Kingdom reflected in the report of the Committee of the House o1 Commons submitted on 5-6-1996 favouring exclusion of the role of Prime Minister in the process of appointment of Judges of superior Courts. Mr. Pirzada contended that the conventions followed by the British Rulers in the Sub-continent in pre-independence period in the appointment of Judges o1 superior Courts provide a safe guide for interpretation of the provisions of out Constitution relating to the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts. Mr. Pirzada pointed out that the conventions in this behalf set by the Britishes were continued to be followed in India in post-independence period up to 4-11-1947 which were drastically changed thereafter but at the end of the day the Indian Supreme Court had to rule in the case of S.C. Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268, that in the matter of appointment of Judges of the superior judiciary the President though acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers but such advice must be in accordance with the provisions of Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Indian Constitution as construed by the Indian Supreme Court in S.C. Advocates-on-Record's case, to keep the institution of judiciary independent and free from political influences.
- 1.8. Before considering the above contentions I would. like to dispose of one of the contentions raised by Mr. Iqbal Haider that after the decision of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate, and subsequent decision in the case of Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan the controversy raised in the presidential reference and in the two petitions is no more a live issue on which a pronouncement of this Court is necessary.-
- 19. The decision in the case of M.D. Tahir, Advocate,, supra, relied by Mr. Iqbal Haider arose out of the judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in Writ Petition No.589 of 1989 filed by M.D. Tahir, Advocate to challenge the appointments of about 12 Judges of Lahore High Court which were made by the President without the advice of Prime Minister. The learned Judges of the High Court while dismissing the above writ petition summarily, held that the executive authority of the Prime Minister under Article 48 of the Constitution did not extend to the appointments of High Court Judges as Article 193 ibid makes no mention of the Prime Minister among the consultees. It was also held in that case by the learned Judges of Lahore High Court that the provisions relating to the appointment of Judges contained in Article 193 ibid laid down a special procedure and therefore, to, that extent the provisions of Article 48(1; which was general in nature did not apply. The Federation filed an appeal before this Court against the above decision of Lahore. High Court. It appears that during the pendency of the above appeal a comprmise was reached between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (who was the then President of Pakistan) and Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto (who was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan) and as a result of this compromise between the two high functionaries of the Constitution the Court allowed disposal of the appeal in terms of the following order:--
- Two learned members of the Bench, (Abdul Kadir Shaikh and Zafar Hussain Mirza, JJ.), which decided the case of Federal Government. of Pakistan v. M.D. I Tahir, Advocate, supra, however, had reservations to the . disposal of the
- 1 am, therefore, of the view that neither the decision of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. M.D Tahir, Advocate, nor in the case of Al Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) come in the way of adjudication of the Presidential Reference or the two Constitutional petitions in so far they raise the question of interpretation of Articles 4$, 177 and 193 of the Constitution.
- 20. I now proceed to consider various contentions raised in the above cases. Mr. Shahid Hamid, the learned counsel for the President took us through almost all the Articles of the Constitution, whereundei: the President exercises some power. I, however, do not propose to undertake examination of all these Articles here as this exercise is not only unnecessary but also'beyond the scope of the present proceedings. I have already mentioned earlier all the contentions in' details raised in these cases. To summarise these contentions, Mr. Shahid Hatnid, Mr. Habib Wahab-ul-Khairi, Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, Mr. Shaikh Akram, the learned counsel in those cases supported the proposition chat the President white appointing the Judges of the superior Courts in exercise of his power under Articles 177 and 19~ of the Gonstitutsnn is neither hound by The advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution nor such an advice is necessary. The learned Attorney-General of Pakistan,, and respective Advocates-General and Additional Advocates-General of the Provinces of Sindh, Punjab and N.-W..F.P. also supported this proposition. One of the learned amicus in the case Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada also supported the above proposition.
- Similar 'observations were made in the case of S.C. Advocates-on Record v. Union of India, supra, by the Indian Supreme Court, which were as follows:---
- 29. This Court in the ease of Al-Jehad Trust, supra, ruled that the opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of a High Court as to fitness and suitability of a candidate far judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the executive/President. It was further held in that case that appointment of a person found unfit and unsuitable far judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of High Court concerned, would riot be a proper exercise of power under the relevant Articles of the Constitution. This Court also fixed the time frame for filling the permanent vacancies occurring in the offices of Chief Justice and Judges not later than 30 days and for a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reason, within 90 days an permanent basis. The advice of the Prime Minister to be binding an the President must be in line with the abase ratio in the ease of AI-Jehad Trust. The Supreme Court of India in the case of S.C. Advocates-an-Record v. Union of India, supra, in order to ensure proper compliance of the judgment and to prevent undue delay in the process of appointment of Judges made the following observations.-_-
- 32. Before concluding, I would like to record my appreciation for the valuable and able assistance rendered by the two learned amcius curiae, Mr. S.S. Pirzada and Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates of this Court, in resolving the legal issue referred to this Court for opinion. I may also mention here that Mr. S.S~. Pirzada, in spite of his other professional engagement, regmlariy attended the proceedings of these cases and was available in the Court most of the time for assistance:-I also thank Mr. Hamid Khan, Advocate, the Vice-Chairman of Pakistan Bar Council and Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, the President of Supreme Court Bar Association for placing before the Court the views of their respective associations. The above are the reasons in support of short order announced on 4-12-1996.
- Constitution Petition No .54 of 1996 (Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry ,Advocate v Federation of Pakistan and others ) was instituted on 26th of august 1996 praying In view of the above , it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon ble Court may very graciously issue necessary direction for protection and
- "This Court in the case of AI-Jehad Trust, supra, ruled that the opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of a High Court as to fitness and suitability of a candidate for judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the Executive/President. It was further held in that case that aappointment of a person found unfit and unsuitable for judaeshin by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of High Court concerned would not be a mover exercise of power under the relevant Articles of the Constitution. This Court also fixed the time frame for filling the permanent vacancies occurring in the offices of Chief Justice and Judges not later than 30 days and for a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reason, within 90 days on permanent basis. The advice of the Prime Minister to be binding on the President must be in line with the above ratio in the case of Al-Jehad Trust. The Supreme Court of India in the case of SC Advocates-on Record v. Union of India, supra, in order to ensure proper compliance of the judgment and to prevent undue delay in the process of appointment of Judges made the following observations:---
Judgment & Decree
SAJJAD ALI SHAH, C.J.--In order to comprehend importance of the points involved in these matters for adjudication, it is essential to record the facts in the background., On 20th March, 1996, this Court passed Short Order whereby C.P. 29/1994 and Civil Appeal 805/1995 filed by Al-Jehad Trust through Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi, were allowed after interpreting relevant Articles in the Constitution pertaining to judiciary and laying down criteria for appointment of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts as envisaged it the Constitution. Later, detailed reasons were released in support of the Short Order on 3-4-1996. These cases have come to be popularly known a: ' appointment of Judges case' and the main judgments and Short Order therein are reported in Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 199E SC 324.
2. Some of the salient points decided in the case of appointment of Judge! are; that 'consultation' is defined as effective, meaningful, purposive. consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of Pakistan in respect of appointments of Judges in the High Court are to be accepted by the President/Executive in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded. Acting Chief Justices are not consultees within the Constitutional scheme. Ad hoc and Acting Judges can be appointed in the Supreme Court only after sanctioned strength is exhausted. Vacancies to be filled ordinarily within 30 days and in extraordinary circumstances within 90 days. Senior most Judge in the High Court has legitimate expectancy to become Chief Justice and Additional Judges in the High Courts have legitimate expectancy to be made permanent .fudges. transfer of a Judge of the High Court without his consent and induction in the Federal Shariat Court is violative of Article
209. Ten years active practice as Advocate of the High Court is mandatory for a Member of Bar for appointment 'as a Judge in the High Court as against enrolment simpliciter. Judge of the Supreme Court may not be sent as Acting Chief Justice of the High Court. '
3. After passing of Short Order on 20-3-1996 and before the detailed reasons were released on 3-4-1996 some steps were taken towards the implementation of the judgment. On 25-3-1996, in the Full Court Meeting of Supreme Court, decision was taken not to include in the Roster Ad hoc Judges till their regularization or otherwise. On this account six Judges of this Court were affected. On 28-3-1996 two Acting Chief Justices of Lahore and Sindh High Courts respectively were recalled to work in the Supreme Court as permanent Judges. On 28-3-1996, the then Prime Minister, Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, commented adversely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the appointment of Judges case, in the National Assembly and that speech was televised and published in news media. On 31-3-1996, one Acting and two Ad hoc Judges of the Supreme Court were confirmed/made permanent. After release of detailed judgments on 3-4-1996, meeting of the Committee of Chief Justices took place in Islamabad to consider ways and means to implement the judgment and it was left open to the Chief Justices of the High Courts and Federal Shariat Court to take appropriate action in that respect.
4. On 4-6-1996, two notifications were issued extending for six months terms of appointments of Mr. Justice Rana Baghwan Das of Sindh High Court and Mr. Justice Javaid. Nawaz Gandapur of Peshawar High Court in spite of the fact that the Chief Justices recommended their confirmation. On 6-6-199) meeting of the Committee of the Chief Justices took place in Lahore High Con to survey progress of implementation of judgment and consider the effect of extension of two High court judges against the recommendations of the Chief Justices. On 8-6-1996, meeting of the Committee of Chief Justices took puce Murree and with the consent of all decision was taken in consequence where Additional Judges, who were not recommended for regularisation were laid o with effect from 16-6-1996 (9 from Lahore, 5 from Sindh and 3 from Peshawer High Courts).
5. In spite of the decision taken by the Committee of the Chief Justice with regard to the laying off of Judges in the High Courts, affected Judges continued to enjoy fringe benefits connected with such posts and were not officially de-notified. News item appeared in Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpind on 4-8-1996 that the Prime Minister would call affected Judges and ask them to resign and such Judges would be accommodated in other Government departments. Mr. Justice Shaft Muhammadi was Judge of Sindh High Court and at the relevant time was working as Judge of the Federal Shariat Court. He was not to be regularised and was laid off. He was allowed to work in the Court After hearing bail application in a criminal matter, he passed order dated 10-7-1996 in which he made adverse comments on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the appointment of Judges case, in an insolent manner. Criminal Petition No.26/1996 was filed in this Court for cancellation of bail and copy of, the detailed order was also produced. That order was published in the newspapers as well. Finally, notice of contempt of Court was issued to the learned Judge. The contempt matter is still pending, ultimately, learned Judge resigned on 1-9-1996 and his resignation was accepted by the President of Pakistan and in consequence he ceased to hold office as a Judge of Sindh High Court as also of the Federal Shariat Court. ' U. Against cite backdrop of facts and events mentioned in above paragraphs three Civil Review petition Nos.32, 33 and 34 of 1996 were filed. Two of the were filed by Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Mainstay of Law and justice 19-5-1996 and third was filed by Governor of Punjab on 21-5-199 In these petitions review was sought of judgment of this Court in the case appointment of Judges on various grounds. On 19-5-1996, Reference was filed under Article 186 of the Constitution by the Federal Government, last page which showed that it was not signed by the President of Pakistan but was filed through Mr. Justice Muhammad Arif, Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice a Parliamentary Affairs, and settled by Qazi Muhammad Jamil, Attorney-Gene for Pakistan and was signed by both of them apart from Advocate-on-Record On office objection, Reference was returned for signature of the Preside which was done and then it was re-filed and numbered as Reference No. l/199 One common factor was noted in Reference No.l/1996 and Review Petition Nos.32 to 34/1996 that in the Reference six questions had been asked a identical questions of the same nature differently worded were raised in Civil Review Petitions mentioned above. Review Petitions were fixed for hearing before a Full Bench of seven Judges at Lahore and on 3-7-1996 Order was passed by this Court directing Federal Ministry of Law to produce record relating to confirmation of Additional Judges of Lahore and Sindh High Courts a day before the announcement of the Short Order on 20-3-1996 in the case of appointment of Judges on the next date of hearing. On 7-7-1996 Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned .Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioners, made a statement before: the Court that he had instructions to say that if the Bench was not re constituted, he would withdraw the Review Petitions. Request for re-constitution of the Bench was rejected by the Chief Justice in view of the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1978 SC 125 and in the result Review Petitions were dismissed as withdrawn.
7. Constitution Petition 23/1996 was filed by Al-Jehad Trust through Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi on 21-4-1996 under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with ten prayers relating to the functioning of judiciary including that in the appointments of Judges, apart from Chief Justices of the High Court and Supreme Court, authority on behalf of the Federal Government should be exercised only by President and any other view would run counter to the independence of judiciary. Record relating to the appointments of Judges o1 superior Courts is not privileged and should be shown on demand to the citizens and lawyers on the basis of right to information. Judge of the High Court should not be appointed as Law Secretary and Chief Justice of the High Court should not be appointed as Governor. In this petition order was passed for issuance' of notice to respondents. C.P. 54/1996 with title 'Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry. Advocate, Supreme Court v. Federation of Pakistan' was filed on 26-8-1996 under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Other respondents in this petition are: President of Pakistan, Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister and Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Pakistan. Prayer in this petition. is that petitioner seeks protection and enforcement of his Fundamental Rights under Articles 4, 14 and 25 with declaration from the Court that Prime Minister has no power/authority under Article 48 of the Constitution to interfere, in any manner, in the matters of appointments of Judges of superior Courts.
8. President of Pakistan has filed Special Reference No.2 of 199( on 25-9-1996 under Article 186 of the Constitution. It is stated in the said Reference that the President as the appointing authority of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts has the Constitutional duty to make suck appointments. Since it is mentioned in the Objectives Resolution watch is no only reflected in Preamble but is now substantive part of the Constitution in the shape of Article 2A, which provides that Independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured, question has teen trained fear opinion of the Supreme Court to the effect whether or not the powers of the President to make appointments of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) of the Constitution. It would be pertinent here to mention that Article 48(1) envisages that in the exercise of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. '
9. References Nos. l and 2 of 1996 end Constitutional Petitions Nos.23 and 54 of 1996 were placed for hearing before a Bench of three Judges on 9-10-1996. It was pointed out to the Court that President of Pakistan had been pleased to appoint Mr. Shahid Hamid, Advocate, Supreme Court to represent him in all matters relating to Reference No.l of 1996. Mr. Shahid Hamid informed the Court that since in Reference No.l of 1996 same questions are raised which were raised in Review Petitions Nos.32 to 34 of 1996 and the said Review Petitions were dismissed as withdrawn, President considers this Reference to have become infructuous and therefore has dissociated himself from that Reference. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, the then Attorney-General for Pakistan, present in the Court, stated that Presidential Reference was always filed on the advice of the Prime Minister and he as the Attorney-General representing the Federal Government had no instructions to withdraw the same, hence requested for time to obtain instructions. In Reference No.2 of 1996 Mr. Shahid Hamid appeared for the President and the learned Attorney-General stated that he had no nexus with that Reference and requested for time to seek further instructions from the Federal Government. It was noticed that in C.P. No.23/1996 and C.P. No.54/1996 common point involved was interpretation of Article 48 to the effect whether advice of the Prime Minister was binding or not on the President in respect of appointments of Judges in the superior Judiciary hence notices Were issued to the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan as contemplated under Order XXVII-A, Rule f , C.P.C. and also to the respondents in loth Constitutional petitions. The Court directed that the further hearing of these matters would come up before a larger Bench and M/s. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada and S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates Supreme Court were requested to assist the Court as amicus curiae. Hearing was adjourned to date in office.
10. Hearing of two References and two Constitutional petitions mentioned above carne up again on 20-10-1996 at Islamabad before a Bench of five Judges. In the meantime, Qazi -Muhammad Jamil had resigned and in his place Syed Iqbal Haider was appointed as Attorney-General for Pakistan. Syed Iqbal Haider appeared in Reference No. l of 1996 and Mr. Shahid Hamid appeared in Reference No.2 of 1996 and also appeared for respondent No.2 in C.P. No13 of 1996. In response to Court notice Syed lqbal Haider also appeared as Attorney-General for Pakistan and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, was present in the Court as amicus curiae. Syed lqbal Haider produced a copy of ex post facto approval by the Cabinet to Reference No.2 of 1996 filed by the President, copy is available on the record.
11. On 21-10-1996 Mr. M. Bilal, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, present in the Court informed that since the case was of utmost importance and involved questions of interpretation of Articles of the Constitution, which have nexus with Independence of Judiciary, hence he requested that representatives of the Bar Associations be invited to assist the Court. The request was accepted and such order was passed for issue of notices to the Presidents of Supreme Court Bar Association and Bar Associations of all the four High Courts and Advocates General of Provinces to assist the Court. Notice was issued to the Pakistan Bar Council to send a representative to assist the Court.
12. On behalf of the Federal Government in Reference No. l of 1996 Raja Muhammad Bashir, learned Deputy Attorney-General filed .M.A. No.657 of 1996 with prayer for constitution of Full Court for hearing of the two References and two C.Ps. Since the prayer related to the constitution of Bench, which is the exclusive function of the Chief Justice, the application was heard in Chamber by the Chief Justice and the request was rejected vide Order dated 23-10-1996 on the ground that it was not necessary to constitute Full Court for hearing of References in view of the case-law on the subject. Hearing of the matters by Bench of five Judges resumed and made progress. On 29-10-1996 Syed lqbal Haider, Attorney-General for Pakistan, filed an application praying that compromise dated 18-12-1989 arrived at between the then President, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Prime Minister, Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto be placed on the record. It was ordered that application be registered, notices be issued to the petitioners in the two Constitutional petitions and respondent No. 2.
13. On 5th November, 1996, when the cases were fixed for hearing in the Court, Government of Prime Minister Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto was dismissed and National Assembly dissolved by proclamation of the President passed under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution. Time was sought by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto who was appearing for Federal Government and Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab, and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., to seek instructions from their respective Governments. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, learned amicus curiae present in the Court, also supported the request for adjournment to enable the other counsel to seek further instructions and requested that proper finding should be given by the Court on the point which is in dispute. In the circumstances, hearing was adjourned to a date after two weeks.
14. On 23-11-1996_ Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, appeared in the Court as new Attorney-General for Pakistan and stated that he represented the Federal Government arid had instructions to say that' lad wanted to withdraw Reference No. I of 1996. As a consequence the Reference stood withdrawn. .
15. Syed lqbal Haider filed two applications in two C.Ps.23 and 54 of 1996, on behalf of Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, who was impleaded as respondent No.3 in her capacity as Prime Minister of Pakistan and prayed that she be allowed to remain as respondent No.3 in her private capacity and to contest the proceedings. Prayer was allowed to that extent and Mr. Iqbal Haider was also allowed to appear for her.
16. Above narrative of facts shows that Reference No. l / 1996 stands withdrawn and Reference No.2/1996 filed by the President of Pakistan through his private counsel, Mr. Shahid Hamid, has been accorded ex post facto approval by the Cabinet as has been informed by Syed lqbal Haider, the then Attorney-General for Pakistan. In this Reference apparently now there is no objection front any quarter so far as its maintainability is concerned. One thing; is very clear in this Reference as it stands now that the President of Pakistan is represented not by Attorney-General who normally represents the Federal Government which includes both President and Prime Minister and instead of that President is represented by private counsel and there is approval by the Cabinet and copy of such ex post facto approval is brought on the record by the Attorney-General of Pakistan who, now seemingly represents only the Prime Minister. This fact in itself shows the extent of gulf of differences between President and Prime Minister who have both taken up contrary stands on the question of interpretation of Article 48(1) of the Constitution vis- -vis appointments in the Superior Judiciary on the question whether advice of the Prime Minister is binding on the President or not.
17. In the Memorandum of Reference No.2/1996 filed by the President of Pakistan it is stated that after tile judgment of 20-3-1996 in the appointment of Judges case, in the process of implementation of tile judgment, some directions have been complied with and the others have not, particularly in respect of the Judges who were not recommended for regularisation and the Chief Justice of Pakistan wrote to the President to intervene to break the deadlock. As against that the then Prime Minister took up the position that there was no deadlock and she was tile head of the Government of which the Chief Justice was a part and the Government was consulting him in spite of the fact that his own position was disputed through a petition pending before the Peshawar High Court arid steps were being taken to decide the cases of the Judges who were not recommended for regularisation. From the Memorandum of Reference No.2t f 996 relevant portion at pages 13 and f2 is reproduced as under: "The .fudges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are holders of Constitutional office. The requirement and mandate of the Objective Resolution, which now forms a substantive part of the Constitution, is that such appointments be made in order to fully secure the independence of the judiciary. It is therefore a moot point whether the President's power to make such appointments is subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) which prescribes that in the exercise of his functions the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. In this matter, the following points need consideration:
(i) the appointments to the Constitutional offices forming part of .the judicial organ of the State, would appear to be a sacred Constitutional duty and not the exercise of an executive function; (ii) the appointments of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are to be made by the President after consultation with named Constitutional consultees. It appears prima facie that the power to make these appointments after such consultation is within the ambit and scope of Article 48(2) on the Constitution. (iii) As events since the announcement of the Supreme Court Judgment in the Al-Jehad Trust case have shown, the prime Constitutional objective of securing the independence of the judiciary requires that the President should be the effective appointing authority for Judges forming part of the Judicial organ of the State, in accordance with the judgment given in that case. " The above quote shows clearly that in respect of appointments of Judges in the superior Courts the President wants to know whether he is bound by the advice of the Prime Minister as contemplated under Article 48(1) of the Constitution or such appointments are covered by Article 48(2) in which President has been given power to act in- his discretion without advice of the Prime Minister. Article 186 of the Constitution, which relates to the advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contemplates that if at any time, the President considers that it is desirable to obtain opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers to be of public importance, he may refer the question to the Supreme Court for consideration. Concept of advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court goes back and originates from section 213 of Government of India Act, 1935, under which Governor-General could send a question of law, which was of such a nature and of such public importance to the Federal Court for consideration, if it was considered by him to be expedient to do so. After partition when Pakistan came into existence, in our first 1936 Constitution provision was made for advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme court under Article 162 to enable the President. to obtain opinion from the Supreme Court of Pakistan if it appeared to him that question of law has arisen or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance. In our 1962 Constitution Article 59 provided that the Presented, if he considers desirable tee obtain the opinion on any question' of law which he considers of public importance he may refer the question to the Supreme Court for consideration. 'The same provision is written in 1973 Constitution. Opinion-of-the Supreme Court is just opinion with explanation on the question of law and is not of binding nature and it is up to the President or the Federal Government to act upon it or not.
18. What is question of law which President considers to , be of public importance would vary from case to case. In some cases it can be a question of law and of public importance in which Federal Government as a whole is interested to make enquiry without there being any difference of opinion between President and the Prime Minister.
19. For such a situation,, which is the normal course, it is indisputable that advisory jurisdiction of the supreme Court can be invoked by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. With the exception of 1962 Constitution which envisaged exclusively Presidential Form of Government, our Constitution of 1956 and present Constitution of 1973, both provide for Parliamentary Form of Government with Federal Government composed of President and the Prime Minister.
20. Article 90 of our 1973 Constitution envisages that the Executive Authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Article 99 provides that all Executive actions of the Federal Government shall be expressed to be-taken in the name of the President. In E exercise of powers conferred by both these Articles, the Federal Government has' made Rules of Business of 1973 under Schedule V-B, Rule 15-A(1), list is made of cases requiring orders of President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Entry No.54 specifically mentions Reference to the Supreme Court on any question of law to be filed under Article 186, which is to be done on the advice of the Prime Minister. The only difference in the Reference under consideration before us, is that initially it was filed by the President without the advice of the Prime Minister as he wanted to find out whether advice of the Prime Minister is binding upon him or not as contemplated under Article 48(l) of the Constitution in respect of the appointments of Judges in the Superior Courts. Earlier, Reference No. 1 of 1996 was -filed by the Federal Government in .the Supreme Court which was not signed by the President and when it was returned by the Office of the Supreme Court with such objection, only then it was signed by the President and re-filed. This only shows differences prevailing between the President' and Prime Minister on the question whether advice of the Prime Minister is binding upon President or not in respect of appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary and particularly in view of implementation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of appointment of Judges. However, even in Reference No.2 of 1996 during the hearing in the Court ex post facto approval was obtained from the Cabinet and such copy was, brought on the record. So, it can be safely said that maintainability of Reference No.2 of 1996 is not open to question on any ground. Moreover, the same question of law upon which opinion of this court is being sought under advisory jurisdiction is also if pending before us in the adjudicatory jurisdiction in C.P.23/1996 and C.P.54/1996 which are being heard alongwith this Reference. Finding of this Court rendered under adjudicatory jurisdiction is binding upon all and can be considered as opinion rendered under the advisory jurisdiction as well.
21. Before we take up merits, it would be pertinent to point out that issue of maintainability of Reference No.2/1996 is finally clinched as is held in paragraph 20 (at page 15) of this judgment. Now, so far maintainability of C.P. 23/1996 and C.P.54/1996 is concerned such objection is raised by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto, who appeared for the Federal Government before Proclamation of dissolution was issued by the President. This objection was vociferously re-agitated by Syed Iqbal Haider who appeared for Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, who contested the proceedings in her private capacity after she ceased to be the Prime Minister.
22. In C.P.23/1996 Mr. Habib AI-Wahabul Khairi, Advocate, is petitioner and in the case of appointment of Judges he was petitioner in C.P.No.29/1994 which was directly filed by him under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. In that petition he had prayed that Articles relating to the Judiciary in the Constitution may be interpreted and should be followed and acted upon to ensure and promote Independence of Judiciary. It was pointed out by him that his Fundamental Right under Article 18 of the Constitution relating to freedom of trade, business or profession has been violated as he practises law in the Courts and cannot perform his duties as a lawyer, satisfactorily if the Judiciary is not independent. He pointed out Pakistan Bar Council Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder and made reference to Rules 165 and 175-A to point out that it was duty of Advocates to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the appointments of Judges and if he showed lack of endeavour in that context he would be guilty of professional misconduct. His petition was held to be maintainable as it was being heard alongwith other matter in which common questions were involved. In C.P.29/1994 petitioner had not touched directly the question of applicability of Article 48 in respect of appointment of Judges as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution but this question was impliedly there as he had prayed for interpretation of Articles relating to the Judiciary as such. Secondly, question with regard to the applicability of Article 48 in that case was taken up by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Senior A.S.C., who appeared in that case as amicus curiae but was left out unattended to be decided later in some other case.
23. After the announcement of judgment in the case of appointment of Judges arising from C.P.29/1994, petitioner Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi, filed C.P.23/1996 on 21-4-1996 under Article 184(3) of the Constitution with prayer, inter alia, that advice of the Prime Minister is not binding on President in respect of appointment of Judges and record of appointments to be shown to him and strength of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts should be fixed by law. Federal Government filed Civil Review Petitions 32 and 33/1996 on 19-5-1996 and Civil Review Petition No.34/1996 was filed by the Governor of the Punjab on 21-5-1996, in which petitioner, Mr. Khairi, filed Miscellaneous Application No.359/1996 praying that alongwith the Review Petitions, his C.P. 23/1996 should also be heard together as subject-matter is the same, which involves interpretation of Articles relating to the Judiciary. Review Petitions were then dismissed as withdrawn. Special Reference No. l/1996 which contained same grounds as in Civil Review Petitions has been withdrawn. Special Reference No.2/1996 filed by the President contains prayer with regard to the interpretation of Article 48 vis-a-vis Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution to find out whether advice of Prime Minister is binding on President or not in respect of appointments in Superior Judiciary. This Special Reference No.2/1996 is declared maintainable. Hence, C.P.23/1996 is also maintainable. C.P.54/1996 is filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution by petitioner, Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, who is an- Advocate, and contains the same prayers requiring interpretation of Article 48 whether advice of Prime Minister is binding on President or not in respect of appointments in Superior Judiciary. Therefore, for reasons stated above we hold that both these petitions are maintainable.
24. In C.P.23/1996, fled by Al-Jehad Trust, respondent No.2 is President of Pakistan, who has been represented all along by private counsel, Mr. Shahid Hamid. In this petition respondent No.3 is Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister and at a later stage after she ceased to be Prime Minister, requested to be allowed to remain respondent No.3 in her private capacity and to contest the proceedings and her such request was accepted. She is represented by Syed Iqbal Haider.
25. In both petitions and Reference No.2 common point is of interpretation of Article 48 of the Constitution with emphasis to the effect whether advice of the Prime Minister as contemplated under Article 48(1) is binding on President in respect of appointments in the Superior Judiciary. Since C.P.23/1996 was filed first in point of time Mr. Habib Al-Wahabul Khairi, Advocate as petitioner, was heard first in the order of priority. In his petition there are several prayers, some of which have been repeated as they figured in his previous petition which resulted in the judgment in the case of appointment of Judges and he submitted that the prayers repeated in the present petition were not adverted to by the Court in his previous petition. In any case, in the preset petition since the main point is interpretation of Article 48 vis-a-vis appointments of Judges in the Superior Courts as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, he was asked to address the Court on the main point.
26. Mr. Khairi contended before us that our Constitution of 1973 as it stands now contemplates the Parliamentary. Form of Government but in respect of appointments of Judges of the superior Courts, advice of the Prime Minister is not binding on the President for the following reasons: Firstly, that Judiciary stands separated from Executive as provided under Article 175(3) of the Constitution means the whole judiciary and not the part to the extent of magisterial level. Secondly, in the Constitution on the subject of appointments of Judges in the superior judiciary special provisions exist with particular emphasis on Articles 177 and 193 to which general provision of Article 48(1) is not attracted, hence advice of the Prime Minister is-not binding on the. President. Thirdly, basic structure of the Constitution guarantees complete independence of judiciary. Fourthly, President of Pakistan has positive role in the Constitution to perform and is not a mere ceremonial head. 'Fifthly, citizens of Pakistan have right to see record of appointments of Judges, as right to information and secrecy in the matter of judicial appointments leads to misunderstanding, which can be avoided by making the appointments transparent. Mr. Khairi supplemented his arguments with a large number of rulings which may be adverted to at later stage when the relevant points are taken up for proper consideration.
27. Raja Muhammad Akram, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for petitioner in C.P.54/1996, contended that Article 48(1) of the Constitution is generally applicable with the exception of Three Categories. In First Category, there are cases in which President can act in his discretion. Such language is used in Article 48(6). Article 58(2)(b), Article 105(4), Article 213, Article 242(1)(1-A) and Article 243(2)(c). In the Second Category, there are Articles in which language used is such that advice under Article 48(1) becomes automatically not operative. Such Articles are: Articles 101, 92 and 93 in which there is self contained provision of advice. In the Third Category, there are provisions where President is to act without advice of the Prime Minister, on the basis of Constitutional compulsion. Article 91(5) provides that Prime Minister shall hole office during the pleasure of the President. If Prime Minister does not command confidence, can be required to have vote of confidence. Article 75 provides for assent of President on the Bills. Article 46 mentions duties of Prime Minister in relation to the President including communication of information to him. Article 56(3) enables President to address either House of the Parliament or both Houses assembled together. Under Article 243 Supreme Command of Armed Forces is vested in the President,
28. It is submitted that in respect of appointments also there are three categories and in the first category President acts in his discretion. In the second category he acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the third category he acts "after consultation with". Appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary (Articles 177 and 193) are regulated under the third category providing "after consultation with". Hence, when there are two provisions in the constitution from which cane is special and the other is general, then special will prevail. Raja Muhammad Akram also contended that in the Constitution of 1973 Article 48(3) provided that orders of the President required for their validity the countersignature of the Prime Minister. Sub-Article (3) was deleted by the Eighth Amendment Act of 1985. After that now Article 90 is to be read differently which provides that Executive Authority of Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officer. subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution.
29. Mr. Shahid Hamid appearing for respondent No.2 in C.P.23/1996 and C.P.54/1996 and in Reference No.2/1996 stated that he supports fully the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioners in both the petitions. He stated that the President regretted very much that he had no choice but to file the Reference. He and the Prime Minister held different views about the judiciary and the 'role of the President. In such circumstances, ibis views were opposed and there was delay .in the implementation of the judgment of this Court. President, as head of the State, has to keep his eyes and ears open to watch the State o1 affairs. Article 50 of the Constitution provided that there shall beta Parliament consisting of two Houses to be known as the National Assembly and the Senate. This Article was amended by P.0.14 of 1985 and now envisages that there shall be a Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan consisting of President and two Houses to be known respectively as the National Assembly and the Senate.
30. Acting under Article 56(2) President sent message to the Parliament ox, 23-9-1996 on the question of national importance on the subject of rampant corruption which gave the country had reputation and is being ranked as number two corrupt country in the world by international agencies. President suggested to the Parliament that it should make law on the subject of corruption which should apply to all including himself. The then Prime Minister objected on the ground that message could be sent by the president to the House of Parliament on we advice of Prime Minister as Contemplated under Article 48(1) of the Constitution. About implementation of judgment, she took the stand that Chief Justice of Pakistan cannot ask for implementation of the judgment as the Judge can only interpret the law and the judgment can be overturned by the Parliament. She further stated to this context that she is the head of the Government of which Chief Justice of Pakistan in only a part.
31. Mr. Shahid Hamid described powers of the President in seven categories as under: (1) Articles of the Constitution under-which President can exercise powers in his dis-creations . ` (2) Articles of the Constitution in which words "in his discretion" are not there but on the reading of which it is evident that the duty imposed and/or the right conferred is to be discharged by the President independently of the advice of the Cabinet by Prime Minister or that the President has either absolute or qualified discretion in such matters; . (3) Articles of the Constitution in which President is bound by the advice ("shall" and "may"); (4) Articles in which. functions to be performed by the President are subject to Article 48(1); (5) Articles of the Constitution in which President is to exercise powers either on the advice of Prime Minister or independently provided he is satisfied or forms the opinion that Constitutional basis exists for exercise of that power; (6) Articles in terms of which President is to exercise powers and discharge his duties with specified consultees and (7) Articles according to which a Constitutional duty is inspired as a sacred trust which is to be discharged through participatory consultative -- process; in the case of Supreme Court with consultation of Chief Justice of Pakistan and in the case of High Courts in consultation with Chief Justice of the High Court, Governor and Chief Justice of Pakistan. -
32. Mr. Shahid Hamid very laboriously took us through the amendments in the 1973 Constitution from the very beginning when the President was just a nominal head without powers and for validation his signature was to be countersigned by the Prime Minister, Later amendments were brought in the Constitution in order to make the President effective and in that process Article 48 was also amended and in sub-Article (1) words "shall be binding" in respect of advice of the Prime Minister to the President were dropped. Learned counsel described in great detail the changes made by the Eighth Amendment which were intended, inter alia, to give more powers to the President to strike proper balance in the powers of the President and the Prime Minister.
33. Mr. Shahid Hamid further submitted that in India Judicial appointments are trust and in Pakistan the concept is on higher pedestal because of Islamic provisions in the .Constitution and therefore such appointments are to be treated as sacred trust in the process of which extraneous consideration is a great sin. In the circumstances, such appointments are to be made under Article 48(2) and not under Article 48(1). In the judgment of appointment of Judges case time frame of 90 days is given for making appointments and Article 190 envisages that all Executive and Judicial Authorities shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Political element in judicial appointments can be avoided only when such appointments are made by President who is a political and is a better person to ensure stopping of political influence in the appointments.
34. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto, Advocate Supreme Court, appeared for Federal Government and raised the following contentions: Firstly, what is the basic structure of 1973 Constitution and his answer is that it is Federal in character and Parliamentary in the form. He further stated that Constitution is not a dead letter but is an organic instrument which must be interpreted as such. Secondly, issue is not as to what are the powers of the President and Prime Minister but what are the Executive powers and where do they reside. He further stated that while describing such powers in the Constitution in the terminology different words are used, such as, 'advice', 'satisfaction' and 'consultation'. Thirdly, President is not to be placed at a pedestal higher than the Prime Minister in the set-up envisaged in the -Constitution as oath taken by them is identical. If political Government errs, correction is to be made by political sovereign by the method provided in the Constitution. Fourthly, Constitutional Petitions (C.Ps.23 and 54 of 1996) are not maintainable directly in the Supreme Court as petitioners have failed to show as to what are their Fundamental Rights which have been infringed.
35. Hearing of the case was going on day-to-day basis when on the following day, i.e. 5-11-1996, news item was published in the newspapers that Federal Government of Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto was dismissed and National Assembly was dissolved by Proclamation of the President issued under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution and caretaker Federal Government was to be set up. In view of this development, Mr. Abid Hasan Minto requested for adjournment in order to find out whether the new caretaker Federal Government would retain him as counsel or not. In the circumstances, with the consent of all the counsel present in the Court, hearing was adjourned to a date after two weeks.
36. On the next date of hearing, Mr. Abid Hasan Minto was replaced by the new Attorney-General, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, who appeared for the Federal Government.
37. Mr. Shahzad Jehangir contended that President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) in respect of appointments of Judges which are made under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied upon Eighth Amendment and submitted that executive authority now vests in the President and not in the Prime Minister as President is the Head of Executive and not the Prime Minister. Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General. Mr. M.L. Shahani, Advocate-General, Sindh, also adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General and additionally stated that Article 48 contemplates three situations: firstly, Executive functions of the Government which are covered by sub-Article (1) where advice of the Prime Minister is binding on the President; secondly, Constitutional functions and powers of President which are covered by sub-Article (2); thirdly, political functions which are covered by sub-Article (6) providing for referendum. He further stated that appointments of Judges of the superior Courts are covered by sub-Article (2) of Article
48. His supplementary contention is that in the appointments of Judges, relevant Articles contain consultative process which exclude the concept of advice of Prime Minister to be binding on the President. Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General N.-W.F.P., also adopted arguments of the learned Attorney-General.
38. As stated above, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto after she ceased to be Prime Minister was allowed to contest proceedings in her private capacity and was represented by Mr. S. Iqbal Haider who submitted as follows: Caretaker Government has no mandate or legitimacy as this Government is subject to the confirmation by this Court. Attorney-General has no locus standi as the members of the caretaker set-up dd not represent the will of the people. Petitions under consideration are not maintainable as no Fundamental Rights of the petitioners are infringed. Mr. Iqbal Haider contended that in the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts' advice of the Prime Minister is binding on the President. If the advice is in conflict with the judgment in the appointment of Judges case then according to that judgment reasons to be assigned by the Executive for not accepting the recommendation of the Chief Justices are justiciable. It was further submitted by him that there was already consensus agreement between the Prime Minister and President (Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan) which provides for harmonious relationship not only between the President and Prime Minister but also among the three pillars of the State. In support reliance was placed on Articles 90 and 99(1) of the Constitution and Rule 15-A(1) and Entries Nos.31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 of Schedule V-B and Rule 15-A(2), Schedule VI of the. Rules of Business of 1973. Lastly, Syed lqbal Haider submitted that if President is given such powers by this Court then Federal character of the Constitution will break down.
39. Agha Muhammad Dilawar Khan, President of Pakistan Insaf Party appeared as a citizen on his own request and was allowed to address the Court. He supported the case of the petitioners and submitted that before -Eighth Amendment executive authority of Federation under Article 90 of the Constitution was to be exercised by the Federal Government through the Prime Minister who was treated as Chief Executive of the Federation. After the Eighth Amendment Article 90 was modified and it now provides that Executive Authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. He also pointed out Article 91 of the Constitution which envisages that there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers with Prime Minister as its head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. He drew the attention of the Court to Article 46 under which it is the duty of the Prime Minister to communicate to President all decisions of the Cabinet and proposals for legislation and furnish such information to him relating to the administration of affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation as the President nay call for clause (c) of Article 46 envisages that if President so requires he can submit any matter on which decision has been taken by Prime Minister or a Minister for consideration of Cabinet, which has not been considered by the cabinet. It wag pointed out by him that under Article 58(1) advice of the Prime Minister to the President to dissolve the National Assembly is not binding because it automatically stands dissolved at expiration of 48 hours. It was submitted by him that President can file Reference and agreement of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto with Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan is not valid and is violation of oath under the Constitution for which she can be disqualified.
40. Mr. Shahid Orakzai, journalist, requested the Court for hearing and he was allowed to address. It was stated by him that Reference No. 2 is not maintainable and there is no provision in the Supreme Court Rules for hearing of Reference. According to him President could not file Reference in, the Supreme Court without advice of the Prime Minister as in Article 186 there is no mention that he could do so in his discretion as is specifically mentioned in Article 48 (6) which provides for holding of referendum, which can be done by the President in his discretion or on the advice of the Prime Minister.
41. Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, addressed the Court and submitted that judgment in the case of appointment of Judges announced by short order on 20-3-1996 was not implemented by the Federal Government for the following reasons: Firstly, tenure of two Additional Judges, namely, Mr Justice Rana Baghwan Das of Sindh High Court and Mr Justice Javaid Nawaz Gandapur of Peshawar High Court was extended for six months against the recommendation of the Chief Justices of the High Courts and Chief Justice of Pakistan, who were in favour of their confirmation/permanent appointment and. had opposed extension. Secondly, from the Additional Judges of the High Court not confirmed in 1994, some were recommended for appointment by the Chief Justices but they were not so appointed by the Federal Government. Thirdly, during the process of implementation of the judgment asking for resignation of Additional Judges was strategy of resistance and defiance as resignations showed that appointments were made validly. In the process of regularisation and permanent appointments of Additional Judges seniority was not given. Learned counsel further submitted that appointment of Judges have nothing to do with basic structure of the Constitution or system contemplated thereunder. Parliamentary system had become dictatorship and proper system ensures checks and balances. Appointments in judiciary is a State function. Political affiliation should be deleted from the judgment in the appointment of Judges case. Advocates have right to fight political appointment. In the scheme of appointments of Judges in Superior Judiciary as enshrined in the Constitution power does not belong to Prime Minister. .
42. Mr. Hamid Khan, Vice-Chairman of Pakistan Bar Council while addressing the Court supported the proposition that advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution in respect of appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary is binding on the President. He traced the history of 1973 Constitution and amendments made there in from time to time including Eighth Amendment and submitted that changes were brought in the Constitution to strike balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister. He pointed out in detail provisions of Revival of Constitution Order (PO 14 of 1985) and Eighth Amendment Act (Act No.XVIII) of 1985 in order to show that in spite of such amendments character, of the Constitution giving Parliamentary Form of Government was not changed.
43. In order to appreciate question of interpretation of relevant Articles involved in these cases, it would be very essential to trace legislative history of our Constitution going back to period before the partition of the sub-continent. Before emergence of Pakistan, united India was governed by Government of India Act of 1935. Part IX of this Act relates to judicature and section 200 thereof envisages establishment and Constitution of the Federal Court and section 220 provides for Constitution of High Courts. Judges of the Federal Court and High Courts under that Act were to be appointed by the Governor General and there is no mention of consultation in the relevant provisions of appointment. Professor C.L. Anand has written a book with title 'Constitutional Law and History of Government of India of which 6th Edition in 1990 is published by Chief Justice H.N. Seth. This book contains a critical survey and in-depth commentary for understanding the legal background of the Constitution. It is stated in this book, in the commentary of section 220 of the Government of India Act, that appointments of all High Court Judges were crown appointments and they were neither Federal nor Provincial. Such appointments were in the unfettered discretion of the Crown. Ministers had nothing to do with the appointments. The chance of political influence being brought to bear in connection with the selection of Judges was thus completely excluded. At that time sub-continent of India was being ruled by the British as a colony. Hence all appointments of Judges were being made by the Crown through the Governor General.
44. Mr Sharifuddin Pirzada while tracing the history of Judiciary before Partition of India stated that until the Partition appointments Vf Judges' in the superior Courts were made on the recommendations of the chief Justices of India and the High Courts and such recommendations were accepted by the Governor and Governor-General of His Majesty. This practice was consistently followed with the exception of one or two instances. In one case, Justice Shad: Lal was the Chief Justice and made recommendations but the Governor noticed that names of Muslim Lawyers were not included. This happened in 1929 and discreetly such hint was made to Justice Shadi Lal, who sent names of two Muslim Lawyers who were Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Sir Abdul Qadir. Chief Justice opined about Sir Muhammad Iqbal that he is more a poet than a lawyer and about Sir Abdul Qadir that he is more a literate figure than a lawyer. Governor also sent his own observations and in the result Sir Abdul Qadir was appointed as Additional Judge. In such circumstances during those days Muslim Lawyers felt discriminated.
45. Another interesting incident is that Khawaja Nazir Ahmad was appointed as receiver in the litigation of S.M. Saleh and his relatives in connection with the partition of the property. Saleh became dissatisfied with the activities of the receiver and applied to have him removed. At the same time, F.I.R. was filed and the matter was being investigated as well. K.L. Gauba, a Barrister, represented Saleh in certain proceedings and sent a written complaint to the District Magistrate charging Khawja Nazir Ahmad, receiver, with a number of crimes. Finally High Court was approached for quashment of proceedings and stopping of investigation. Resultantly, High Court stopped the investigation. Appeal was taken to the Privy Council, where it was allowed and investigation was permitted to proceed. When complaint was made against Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, his name was duly recommended by the Chief Justice for elevation to the High Court and was in the drawer of Governor of Punjab. Chief Justice Sir Douglas Young was compelled to withdraw the recommendation and in consequence Mr Muhammad Munir, the then President of Income-tax Tribunal was appointed to the High Court Bench in the vacancy earmarked for Kh. Nazir Ahmad. Apart from the incidents mentioned above there was smooth sailing in the matters of appointments in the High Court and normally the recommendations of the Chief Justices were accepted.
46. After partition, in India attempt was made by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Home Minister in the Centre to control the Judiciary. In the book with title "President and the Indian Constitution" by Valmiki Chaudhry, it is stated that after the Independence Act but before the issue of Memo. by the Home Minister dated 4th November, 1947, the same procedure was followed with the elimination of the recommendation to the Secretary of the State. Memo. of the Home Ministry dated 4th November, 1947 laid down the procedure under which the Chief Minister of the State acting in consultation with the Home Minister as also the Home Minister in the Centre had to be consulted in the selection of a Judge of a High Court. When this procedure was communicated to the Provincial Governments and the High Courts, Chief Justice of Madras, Sir Frederick Gentle, put forward this as one of the reasons for his resigning from his post. He was supported in his protest by. Sir Archibal Nye, the then Governor of Madras. Both the Chief Justice and the Governor were of the view that the procedure of appointment would lead to political jobbery and affect the independence of the judiciary. Lord Mountbatten took up this matter with the then Home Minister, Sardar Valabhbhai Patel but the Chief Justice of India had agreed to the new procedure. Later, the Conference of the Chief Justices representing all Provincial High Courts of the Union of India was held on 26-3-1948 in which the procedure of appointment was disapproved and it was held that power would pass into the hands of political parties who will control and dominate the Governmental machinery and, therefore, extreme caution had to be exercised in evolving correct procedure for appointment of High Court Judges.
47. In India in the famous Sapru Report there are Constitutional proposals of which paragraph 259 relates to the appointments in the Supreme Court and the High Court. In sub-clause (3) thereof recommendations are as under: "(a) The Chief Justice of India shall be appointed by the Head of the State and the other, Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (b) The Chief Justice of a High Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Head of the Unit and the Chief Justice of India. (c) Other Judges of a High Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Head of the Unit, the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and the Chief Justice of India.
48. In Paragraph 261 of the Report it is stated that in the course of appointments High Court and Government concerned would be more or less interested parties in the matter, hence intervention of the Supreme Court and the head of the State would rule cut all possibility of the exercise of political part, influences. The imposition of such conditions may at a superficial view seem w be inconsistent with the theoretical autonomy of the Provinces. Independence of the High Court and of Judiciary is of supreme importance for satisfactory working of the Constitution and nothing can be more detrimental to the well being of a Province 'or calculated to undermine public confidence than the possibility of Executive interference with the strength and independence of the highest Tribunal of the Province.
49. In paragraph 288 of the Report, it is stated that the Union will be a Democratic Federal State and the Head of that State, who will replace both the Governor-General and the Crown Representative and might be given a suitable indigenous designation, if necessary, should exercise such functions as are given to him only on the advice of his Federal Ministry; barring a very few exceptional cases, to be specifically mentioned in the Constitutional Act, where discretion is given to him to act on his own or on the advice other than of the Federal Ministry (1) for avoiding political or communal graft, or, (2) for taking the initiative in the national interest, specially in exceptional and fast moving situations, such as, exists at the present day. Under Exception (1) will fall suggestions relating to the strength of High Courts and appointment and removal of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
50. Perusal of Sapru Report, as stated above, shows that endeavours were made suggesting making Judiciary Independent and particularly appointments of Judges free from political influence and for that reason Head of the State was involved in the process of appointments, who could be given discretion to act on his own or on the advice usher than that of the Federal Ministry These suggestions in the Sapru Report were not accepted in totality hence wren the constitution was promulgated in India Article 124 provided for establishment and Constitution of the Supreme Court envisaging that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the. High Courts in the estates as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains age of 65 years: provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted. Similar provisions were made in Article 217 of the Indian Constitution catering for appointment of Judges in the High Courts with terms and conditions mentioned therein.
51. The Constitution of India envisages Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic. Article 53 provides that executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Article 74 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advise the President, who shall, in exercise of his functions act in accordance with such advice. These provisions clearly show that in the Indian Constitution President in the performance of his Executive powers has to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and this is applicable in the appointments of Judiciary as well.
52. While, on the other hand, in Pakistan we were able to make and promulgate Constitution for the first time in 1956. Before that we relied upon the provisions of Government of India- Act, 1935, which was adapted by Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947. Federal Court of Pakistan war setup under Federal Court of Pakistan Order, 1948. The jurisdiction of Privy Council in respect of appeals and petitions from Pakistan was abolished by tire Privy Council (Abolition of Jurisdiction) Act, 1950. Pakistan succeeded iii framing the Constitution in 1956 called as the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956. Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada stated that when this exercise of making Constitution of 1956 was taken in hand, at that time and at the time of promulgation of the Constitution, Mr I.I. Chundrigar was the Law Minister. Ground work was done and reports on the Constitution making were considered. Mr.Sharifuddin Pirzada has stated before us that copy of Sapru Report was borrowed from him. It is understandable that detailed study might have been made on the subject because preparation and promulgation of Constitution is an extremely important task and the Constitution provides a proper system of governance.
53. In 1956 Constitution, Part IX relates to judiciary containing Articles 148 to 178, providing for setting up Supreme Court at its apex and High Courts in the Provinces. This Constitution provides that Chief Justice of Pakistan shall be appointed by the President and the other Judges shall be appointed by the President after. consultation with Chief Justice. Consultative process is provided for appointment of the Judges of the High Courts. Even at that time there was anxiety in the minds of the Constitution-makers to provide for the Independence of Judiciary. In this context, Late Mx. I.I. Chundrigar, who was then Law Minister, stated on the Floor of the Assembly (please refer Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1956, Volume I, Part II, page 1803), relevant portion of which is reproduced as under: " ... ... ...Then the Supreme Court Judges and the High Court Judges are not removable once they are appointed, except by following the procedure prescribed therein. This would in my humble opinion, completely safeguard the independence of the Judiciary and that is a matter which will really secure the rights of the people. Sir, the independence of the Judiciary is a principle very dear to the people of this country,, who believe that they receive justice from the Courts of this country and that their rights are safe in the hands of the Judges. The impartiality of Judges is one aspect of the nature of the Judge, of which another is independence. A Judge who is not independent cannot be impartial. The provisions in the Bill are intended to ensure the independence of the Judges and to preserve it in future as it is preserved at present. We have at the outset made provisions in the Constitution which make the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court final. We cannot give greater assurances to say that justice is given in Pakistan in a real and unpolluted form ... ... ... "
54. Comparison can be made between provisions relating to the Judiciary in 1956 Constitution (Articles 148 to 178) and Indian Constitution (Articles 124 to 217) and it would appear that language is more or less same with slight variation but the 'substance is same. It can be said without fear of contradiction that the view point in both Indian Constitution and 1956 Constitution of Pakistan with regard to the powers of Judiciary and procedure for appointment of Judges therein is sate including conscious endeavour for maintenance of independent of Judiciary. In both the Constitutions, the form of Government provided it Parliamentary. Article 37 in 1956 Constitution provided that there shall be s Cabinet of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. In the circumstances, is can be said that like in India, in our Constitution of 1956 because of Parliamentary Form of Government advice of the Cabinet of Ministers with Prime Minister at its head was a must to aid and advise the President in exercise of his functions including appointments in superior Judiciary.
55. In Pakistan 1956 Constitution was in force for a short time of two years and in 1958 martial law was promulgated and Constitution was abrogated. Till that time in the normal course, process of appointments of Judges went smoothly without interference from Prime Minister on political grounds except in one case where Mr. Suharwardi, as Prime Minister, bypassed the Chief Justice of Pakistan but when it was pointed out to. him, he made amends and rectified the situation. After promulgation of Martial Law and abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 late Field Marshall Ayub Khan minced no words and stated very frankly that Parliamentary Form of Government did not suit genius of the people of Pakistan and himself in 1962 gave Constitution to the people contemplating Presidential Form of the Government. This Constitution remained in force and on 25-s-1969 Proclamation was issued abrogating the constitution and declaring Martial Law. In the aftermath we lost East Pakistan, which declared independence and proclaimed itself as separate independent country called Bangladesh. in the remaining pan, West Pakistan, Interim Constitution of 1972 was promulgated on 21-4-1972 declaring the State of Pakistan as a Republic to be known as Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The form of Government was Presidential. Interim Constitution was operative till Permanent Constitution was promulgated on 12-4-1973 providing Parliamentary Form of Government.
56. In the original 1973 Constitution, Part VII relates to Judicature from Articles 175 to
203. So far as appointments of Judges are concerned the relevant Articles are 177 relating to the Supreme Court Judges and 193 relating to the High Court Judges. In the draft Constitution idea was mooted whether for appointment of Judge the Chief Justice .should recommend panel of three names and removal of Judges should be made through the Parliament. There was opposition during the debate and finally both ideas were dropped and Article 209 was inserted in the Constitution empowering Supreme Judicial Council to initiate proceedings in respect of removal of Judges. In the process of appointment of Judges with the exception of Chief Justice of Pakistan who is to be appointed by President without consultation, for appointment of other Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court consultative process is provided in the Constitution. Article 48 in the original Constitution envisages that in the performance of his functions, the President shall act on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding on him. Since the Constitution provided for Parliamentary Form of Government Article 48 also applied to the appointments of Judges in the superior Judiciary.
57. On 5-7-1977 Martial Law was promulgated in the country and the Constitution was held in abeyance. By Presidential Order XIV of 1985 Constitution was revived. General elections were held on non-party basis. On 11-11-1985 Constitution (Eighth) Amendment Act of 1985 was passed where under several provisions of the Constitution were amended. It is stated that there was bargain and Eighth Amendment was allowed to be passed in return of lifting of Martial Law. Unfettered powers of the Prime Minister as contained in the original Constitution were circumscribed to make the role of the President more effective to strike balance between the powers of the two.
58. Amendment was made in Article 48 and the words "such advice shall be binding on President" were deleted. Proviso was added that President may require the Cabinet or the Prime Minister to reconsider such advice and shall act in accordance .with advice tendered after such reconsideration. Sub-Article (2) was amended and President has been given power to act in his discretion in respect of any matters in which he is empowered to do so in the Constitution. For the first time President was empowered to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion and appoint a date not later than 90 days from the date of dissolution for holding of General Election to the Assembly and could appoint a caretaker Cabinet. Article 58 in the 1973 Constitution in original form enabled the President to dissolve the National Assembly only after Prime Minister has so advised. After amendment Article 58(2) in clause (a) empowered President to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion after vote of no-confidence has been passed against the Prime Minister and under (b) President can dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion if a situation has arisen in which the Government of Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary. In view of such amendments, it is being felt that President indirectly elected has become more powerful than Prime Minister who is directly elected and is considered as Head of the Executive in the Parliamentary Form of Government.
59. Now we come to brass-tacks. From the arguments and contentions raised arid advanced before us by learned counsel appearing for the parties and amicus curiae, the following pertinent points emerge categorically for consideration and adjudication: (1) What is the basic structure or complexion of the Constitution of 1973 from the point of view whether it envisages after Eighth Amendment Parliamentary Form of Government or Presidential? (2) Who is the Head of Executive after Eighth Amendment? (3)' Whether appointment of Judges in the superior Courts as envisaged in the Constitution is Executive power/action? (4) Is there conflict between general provision (Article 48) and special provisions (Article 177) and (Article 193) of the Constitution? (5) Is President bound by the advice of Prime Minister in respect of appointments of Judges? (6) What will happen, if judgment of the Supreme. Court in the case of appointment of Judges is not implemented?
60. Now so far the first point is concerned the question is as to what is the basic structure of the Constitution of 1973 and what form of Government is contemplated therein. On this point there appears consensus among the learned Advocates appearing before us that seemingly Constitution of 1973 contemplates Parliamentary Form of Government. This is so stated even by Mr. Habib Al Wahabul Khairi, who has appeared before us as petitioner and he has stated categorically that Constitution of 1973 envisages Parliamentary- Form of Government but has Islamic provisions as well. He further contended that in respect of appointments in the Superior Judiciary President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister as contemplated under Article 48(1) of the Constitution for which he has given his own reasons- Mr Abid Hasan Minto Advocate Supreme Court, appearing for the Federal Government at the initial stage submitted that basic structure of 1973 Constitution is Federal in character and Parliamentary in the Form. Constitution is not a dead letter but is an organic instrument, which must be interpreted as such.
61. In order to understand fully as to what is the basic structure of the Constitution of 1973, it would be pertinent to read not only the Constitution but other relevant documents, such as, Preamble, Constitution Bill, Report of the Constitution Committee, Debates and Amendments, if any, only then clear picture will emerge as to what is the basic structure of the Constitution. Preamble to the Constitution of 1973 reads as under: "Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; And whereas it is the will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order: Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people; Wherein the principles of 'democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions' and develop cultures; Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form 4 Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed; Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; . Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes; Wherein the independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured; Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation,' its independence and all its rights, including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air, shall be safeguarded; so that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity;" Article 1 of the Constitution contemplates that Pakistan shall be Federal Republic known to be Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as Pakistan. Article 2 provides that Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan. Part III of the Constitution refers to Federation of Pakistan and Article 41 contemplates that there shall be a President of Pakistan who shall be Head of the State and shall represent the unity of Republic. Article 48, as it originally stood in 1973 Constitution, provided that in performance of his functions, the President shall act on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding on him. Chapter II of the Constitution relates to Parliament composed of National Assembly and the Senate. In the Constitution itself is provided specifically that President is elected indirectly by electoral college while the Prime Minister, is elected directly by way of adult franchise and is leader of majority party in the Parliament.
62. Before 1973 Constitution, we had 1962 Constitution given to us by Field Marshall Muhammad Ayub Khan, which contemplated Presidential Form of Government. Interim Constitution of 1972 also envisaged Presidential Form of Government. . Before the promulgation of Constitution of 1973, all political parties represented in the National Assembly, took part in the deliberations and finally the Constitution was promulgated with consensus deciding upon Parliamentary Form of Government in which the question of autonomy of Provinces was also resolved. Therefore, there is no dispute about the fact that the Constitution of 1973, in its original shape, provided for Parliamentary Form of Government where Executive Authority vested in the Prime Minister and the President was just a nominal head of the State representing the unity of the Republic. Not only that but Article 48(3) required that orders of the President 'for validity were to be countersigned by the Prime Minister.
63. Now, the question arises as to what has been achieved by the insertion of Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, and whether it has changed the shape and basic structure of the Constitution from Parliamentary Form to Presidential. The answer to that is, no it has not. No doubt, Eighth Amendment Act, 1985, has amended a large number of Articles in the Constitution to strike balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister in order to give more effective role to the President. In consequence, Articles 48, 51, 56, 58, 59, 60, 75, 90, 91, 101, 105, 106, 112, 116, 130, 144, 152 and 270 were amended. Of course, this was done for the reason that Martial Law was imposed in the country in 1977 and Constitution was held in abeyance and in 1985 Constitution was revived, elections were held on non-party basis and then Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, was passed validating Proclamation of 5-7-1977 and all President's Orders and Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders including Referendum Order of 1984. It can be said that Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, was passed and in return Marital Law was lifted.
64. Now, if all the amendments made in the Eighth Amendment are studied minutely it would appear, candidly speaking that more powers have been given to the President to provide him an effective role but Parliamentary Form of Government is retained. Article 41 in the Constitution before Eighth Amendment provided in sub-Article (1) that there shall be a President of Pakistan who shall be the Head of State and shall represent the unity of the Republic and this provision remains in the same position after the Eighth Amendment. Article 41 originally contained six sub-Articles and RCO/P.0.14 of 1985 has made two amendments. Sub-Article (3) was amended to provide that the President shall be elected by the Members of the Provincial Assemblies in addition to Members of both Houses and sub-Article (7) was added. In Article 48 before Eighth Amendment, Sub-Article (1) envisaged that in performance of his functions, the President shall act on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding on him. -, This sub-Article is amended with deletion of words "and such advice shall be binding on him" and proviso has been added that the President may require the Cabinet or the Prime Minister to re-consider such advice and the President shall act in accordance with advice tendered after such re-consideration. Sub-Article (3) requiring orders of President to be countersigned by the Prime Minister for validity is deleted. These amendments inserted by Eighth Amendment Act, 1985, do not show that Form of the Government in the Constitution of 1973 has been changed from Parliamentary to Presidential.
65. Second point mentioned above is as to who is Head of the Executive I after the Eighth Amendment. Chapter III in the Constitution of 1973 defines the Federal Government. Before Eighth Amendment, Article 90(1) reads that subject to the Constitution, the Executive Authority of the Federation shall be exercise in the name of the President by the Federal Government consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers, which shall act through the Prime Minister, who shall be the Chief Executive of the Federation. After Eighth Amendment. Article 90(1) reads that the Executive Authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Now, the question arises for consideration whether modification in the language as provided in the amended Sub-Article (1) of Article 90 after Eighth Amendment has given Executive Authority of Federation to the President instead of Prime Minister or no difference is made as the Executive Authority of the Federation is still to be exercised by the President in accordance with the Constitution which includes Article 48(1) providing that in the performance of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Language used in Article 90(1) after Eighth Amendment is borrowed and bodily lifted from. Article 53 of the Constitution of India, and in India there is Parliamentary Form of Government and Article 53 is read with Article 74 in their Constitution and the latter Article provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advise the resident, who shall in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice so the answer is that under Article 90(1) executive authority is to be exercised by the President in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Constitution, which requires that President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister.
66. The third point is whether appointment of Judges is Executive power/action. This Court has already rendered authoritative judgment in the case of appointment of Judges in the superior Courts (PLD 1996 SC 324) in which all the Articles relating to judicature in the Constitution of 1973 have been interpreted to determine the scope of the word "consultation" in respect of appointments and such other allied matters. It is held as under: (i) ' The words "after consultation" employed inter alia in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution connote that the consultation should be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint or arbitrariness or unfairplay. The opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of a High Court as to the fitness and suitability of a candidate for Judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded. by the President/Executive. (ii) If President/Executive appoints a candidate found to be unfit and unsuitable for Judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, it will not be a proper exercise of power under relevant Article of the Constitution. , (iii) That the permanent vacancies occurring in the office of the Chief Justice and Judges normally should be filled in immediately by not later than 30 days but a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reason, should be filled in within 90 days on permanent basis. There is no doubt about the fact that appointment of a Judge as contemplated in the Constitution is an Executive action for the reason that final order is passed in the name of the President and in consequence Notification is to be issued as covered by Entries Nos.31(b) and 32 of Schedule V-B, Rule 15-A(1) of Rules of Business, 1973. 67. - The fourth point for consideration is whether there is conflict between Article 48 which is a general provision and Articles 177 and 193 which are special provisions in the Constitution providing scheme and procedure for appointment of Judges in the Superior Courts. The proposition with regard to the interpretation is that if there is conflict between general and special provisions, then special provision shall prevail.. In the case of M.D, Tahir v. federal Government and others (1989 CLC 1369,, Division Bench of Lahore High Court held that Prime Minister does not find mention in Article 193, amongst the persons after consultation with whom the President is required to appoint Judges and since this is special provision then it shall prevail over general provision contained in Article 48(I) of the Constitution which requires that President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister in the matter of appointments of Judges in the superior Courts as envisaged in Article 193 is unnecessary and not attracted. High Court dismissed writ petition of M:D. Tahir vide order dated 21-12-1988 which was authored by Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone (as he was then). In support of the provision reliance, was placed on the judgment in the case: Government of Punjab, Health Department v. Naila Begum (PLD 1987 Lahore 336) by Division Bench in Intra- Court Appeal which was allowed holding inter alia that if there is conflict between general and special provisions in the statute then special provision shall prevail over the general provision. Incidentally, the same learned Judge, Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone, was author of that judgment. After the dismissal in limine of writ petition of M.D Tahir in the High Court, Federal Government filed petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court on the ground that writ petition in the High Court was dismissed in limine which involved question of interpretation of Articles of the Constitution in which the Attorney-General of Pakistan was not heard as is contemplated under Order XXVII-A, .Rule 1, C.P.C. Leave was granted and finally it came up for. hearing before 11 learned Judges of this Court, who disposed of the appeal on the basis of compromise between the parties reached outside the Court. In the result paragraph 5 of the impugned order dated 21-12-1996 of Lahore High Court was excised 111 which it was mentioned that Article 48(1) being general provision will not apply to special provision of Article 193 and advice of the Prime Minister to the President is not attracted while considering the appointments of Judges of the High Court. Two learned Judges on the Bench, namely, Mr. Justice Abdul Kadir Shaikh and Mr. Justice Zaffar Hussain Mirza (as they were then) while agreeing with the conclusion recorded their separate notes in which it was observed by them that interpretation of provisions of the Constitution should be done on merits and the controversy should have been resolved instead of deciding the appeal on the basis of consent of parties.
68. Mr Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone who wrote two judgments as Judge of Lahore High Court mentioned in the preceding paragraph was elevated to the Supreme Court and was Member of the Bench which heard the case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473). The same point with regard to the interpretation of Article 193 in conjunction with Article 48 (1) of the Constitution carne up for consideration and the learned Judge considered the point in the light of his earlier decisions in the High Court and observed: Relevant paragraph 25 from pages 754 and 755 of the report is reproduced as under: "
25. With reference to other category of powers of the president Mr. S.M. Zafar dilated upon provisions under which the President acts in consultation with other Constitutional functionaries. Such provisions listed by him are Articles 72(1), 101, 177, 181, 193(1) and 218(1)(b). Article 72(1) relates to the making of the rules by the President its consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly concerning the joint sitting, and communication between two Houses of the Parliament. The other Articles relate to appointments of Judges of the superior Court except Article 218(1)(b) which covers the appointment of the members of the Election Commission. In the submission of Mr.Yahya Bakhtiar 'consultation' does not exclude applicability of Article 48(1) under which the President has to act on the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister, as the case may be. While in the High Court in M.D. Tahir v. Federal Government 1988 CLC 1369 in hearing a 'writ petition dismissed in limine, I had the occasion to construe Article 193(1) and did not consider the Prime Minister's advice as sine qua non for the validity of appointment of Judges of the High Court. After hearing Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, I feel that what he asserts can be another way of looking at Article 193(1) and this matter requires serious research. "
69. In fact, there is no cavil with the proposition that if there are two provisions in the same statute and one is general and the other is special, then while interpreting the provisions the presumption would be that the general provision was not intended to interfering with the operation of the special provision. In the case of Golden Oraphies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Director of Vigilance, Central Excise, Customs and Sales Tax 1993 SCMR 1635, the proposition mentioned above came up for consideration but it was in respect of entries in the First Schedule to the Customs Act and the controversy arose whether claim of appellants was correct that diaries manufactured by them did not fall under Heading 48.18, Pakistan Customs Tariff but were covered by the description "printed books" listed under Heading 49.01 and thus exempt from levy of sales tax. It was held by this Court that it is not possible to treat. such diaries as outside the purview of Heading 48.18 and categorised them as "printed books" classified under Heading
49. In support of the proposition that in case of conflict between general provision and special provisions in the statute special shall prevail. Raja Muhammad Akram, counsel for petitioner in C.P. No.54/1996 has cited three cases which are distinguishable. In the case of Inspector-General of Police, Punjab and others v. Mushtaq Ahmad Warraich and others PLD 1985 SC 159, while laying down criterion for determining seniority of subordinate ranks of police force, it was held that Police Act, 1861 and Rules framed thereunder being special law shall prevail over Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and Punjab Civil-Servants Appointment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1974, being general law. Same view is taken in the case of Neimat Ali Goraya v. Jaffar Abbas, Inspector/Sargent Traffic 1996 SCMR
826. In the case of Mst. Imam Bibi v. Allah Ditta and others PLD 1989 SC 384, it was held by this Court that section 19-A was added by Colonization of Government Lands Punjab (Amendment) Act--III of 1951, and the controversy arose whether newly-added section 19-A was expressly extended to Bahawalpur on the wordings of adaptation law of 1926, by which the Act with certain modifications was applied to Bahawalpur or otherwise which could not have the effect of incorporating the subsequent amendments as well. It was in that context, that effect of general law on special statute was considered and it was held that notification adding section 19-A neither creates nor curtails any right.
70. Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada while arguing the general propositions with regard to the conflict between the general and special provisions pointed out to us Special Reference No.1 / 1957 reported in PLD 1957 SC 219 under the Advisory Jurisdiction seeking opinion to resolve conflict between Articles 83 and 225 of 1956 Constitution. Article 83 empowered Governor to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Provincial Assembly which was a general provision and Article 225, special provision, provided that until a Provincial Assembly for the Province of East Pakistan was constituted, Provincial Legislative Assembly for the Province of East Bengal functioning immediately before the Constitution day shall exercise powers conferred, and perform the duties imposed upon, the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan It was argued that an Interim Assembly having been directed to function until a Provincial Assembly under the Constitution is constituted, whether the Governor could dissolve the latter Assembly under Article
83. It was held by this Court that on the construction of Articles 83 and 225 there can be no conflict between the two because whereas the Governor has the General power to dissolve a Provincial Assembly, the exercise of that power is negated by special provision which has operation for only a limited time. Article 83 in respect of the Governor's power to dissolve is thus subject to Article 225 and there is no repugnancy between them. In the case of State v. Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 the point for consideration was that where in a statute there are both general provision as well as special provision for meeting a particular situation, then it is the special provision which must be applied to that particular case or situation instead of the general provision. In the Interim Constitution of 1972, Article 281(1) declared valid all Proclamations, President's Orders, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders and all other Laws made as from 25-3-1969 and their, validity was made beyond question in any Court. Article 281(1) provided that all orders made, proceedings taken and acts done by any authority, or by any person, which were made, taken or done, or purported to have been made, taken or-done, on or after the twenty-fifth day of March, 1969, in exercise of the powers derived from any President's Orders, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, enactments, notifications, rules, orders or bye-laws, or in execution of any orders made or sentences passed by any authority in the exercise of powers as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be and always to have been validly made, taken or done. As against that Article 295 provided that where a law (including a President's Order, a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order) is repealed or is deemed to have been repealed by, under or by virtue of this Constitution the repeal shall not except as otherwise provided in the Constitution,
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; _ (b) affect the previous operation of the law or anything duly done or suffered under the law; (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the law; (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred 'in respect of any offence committed against the law; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment; or (f) affect the continuance of any body or authority constituted by or under such law, " This Court after consideration has held as under: "It is a well-established rule of interpretation that wherein a statute there are both general provisions as well as special provisions for meeting a particular situation, then it is the special provisions which must be applied to that particular case or situation instead of the general provisions. Applying this principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the provisions of Article 295 will have to be applied to the repealed legislative measures and thereunder it is significant that only acts 'duly done' or things 'suffered under the law' are protected. Acts done mala fide or without jurisdiction or acts which are coram non judice would clearly not be acts 'duly done' and, therefore, the protection would not extend to such acts. In either view of the matter, therefore, the conclusion to which I have arrived is that the validity given by clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution to acts done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers given by Martial Law Regulations and Orders since repealed or even in the purported exercise of those powers do not have the effect of validating acts done coram non judice or without jurisdiction or mala fide. Such an interpretation, in my view, not only gives full effect to the provisions of the Interim Constitution but also administers the will of the law-maker as far as it can be gathered from a harmonious reading of the provisions of clause (2) of Article 281 alongwith some of the other provisions of the same Constitution without departing from the well-recognised principle that the Legislature should not be imputed the intention of perpetuating or perpetrating an injustice."
71. In the context of what is stated above, it is to be seen whether really there is conflict between Article 48(1) and Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is to be done in M a responsible manner and is to be done in such a way that the Constitution is construed as a whole as an organic instrument and no part of it is rendered as redundant. If Constitution of 1973 is considered as a whole then reading of the Constitution indicates that it contains Federal Character and Parliamentary Form IN of Government. In Parliamentary Form of Government Prime Minister is Head of the Executive and all Executive actions are taken in the name of the President. i Article 48(l) envisages that in the exercise of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. This is to be read in conjunction with Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution so far as the appointments of the Judges of the Superior Courts are concerned. It will not be correct to say that Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are special provisions which do not attract application of Article 48 of the Constitution, which contains the basic characteristic of Parliamentary Form of the Government to the effect that the President has to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. This provision of Article 48(1) will be automatically attracted whenever the President is exercising' his functions unless the cases fall squarely under Article 48(2) of the Constitution in which it is stated that the President l shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is l empowered by the Constitution to do so. So either the President has no discretion but has to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister as contemplated. under Article 48(l) or can act in his discretion as contemplated under Article 48(2) of the Constitution.
72. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned counsel for petitioner in C..P.54/1996 submitted that there are three categories providing for exercise of powers by the President. In the first category, the President can act in his discretion. In the second category language used is such that advice is excluded by implication. In the third category, Article 48(1) would not apply. On the subject of appointments he further mentioned three categories. In the first category President can act in his discretion. In the second category the President has to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the third category President has to make appointments after consultation with. According to the learned counsel appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 fall in the third category where appointments are made by the President after consultation with. Since consultative process is provided specifically hence advice of the Prime Minister to the President as contemplated under Article 48(1) is not attracted.
73. Contention of Raja Muhammad Akram, as stated in the above paragraph, is not tenable for the reason that if advice of the Prime Minister is to be excluded because consultative process is provided in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, then this rule will have to be applied to all the provisions on the subject of appointments in Judiciary, which can be called judicial structure but could be extended to the whole structure of the Constitution. The rule will be that in the appointments if the President has to consult consultees and the Prime Minister is not mentioned then the Prime Minister has no role to play. Conversely, when the President is not required to consult, he shall have to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. Both cannot go together. Applying the rule stated above to the provisions relating to judicature, it would then make very interesting reading. For example, in Article 176, which provides for the constitution of the Supreme Court is provided that so many other Judges as may be determined by the Act of Parliament or until so determined may be fixed by the President. In this provision, consultation is not mentioned hence advice of the Prime Minister is attracted. Article 177 relates to the appointments of Chief Justice of Pakistan and so far his appointment is concerned consultation is not required which means Prime Minister has role to play. In the second part of the same sub-Article (1) the President is authorised to appoint other Judges after consultation with Chief Justice. This shows that in the appointment of Chief Justice of Pakistan Prime Minister has a say but in the appointments of other Judges of the Supreme Court the Prime Minister has no say. Article 180 provides for appointment of Acting Chief Justice and because consultation is not mentioned hence Prime Minister will have a say. Article 181 relates to appointments of Acting Judges in the Supreme Court and since word consultation' is not used therefore Prime Minister will have a say. Article 182 relates to the appointments of Ad hoc Judges and here the initiative is to be taken by the Chief Justice of Pakistan. In clause (a) the consultation is not mentioned, so advice of Prime Minister will be attracted and in clause (b) consent of the Chief Justice of the High Court is mentioned, so advice of the Prime Minister will be excluded. Article 183(1) provided for permanent seat of the Supreme Court at Islamabad. Under sub-Article (2) Chief Justice of Pakistan can declare other places after approval of the President for sitting of the Supreme Court which will exclude advice of the Prime Minister but in sub-Article (3) President is empowered to declare sitting of the Supreme Court at any such place until provision is made for establishment at Islamabad, advice of the Prime Minister will be attracted. Under Article 193 for appointment of a Judge of the High Court consultation is mentioned which will exclude advice of the Prime Minister. In Article 200(1) for transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another, consultation is required, so advice of the Prime Minister will be excluded. In Articles 200(3) and 203-C 'consultation' is not mentioned hence advice of the Prime Minister will be attracted. This argument that where process of consultation is provided and Prime Minister is riot mentioned by designation then in the process -advice of the Prime Minister is not attracted;. does not sound convincing because then only two Articles 177 and 193 would exclude the advice of the Prime Minister but in all other Articles relating to the appointment of Judges, advice would be included.
74. After considering the arguments advanced for and against the proposition on the point whether for making appointments of Judges under Articles 177 and 193, which are special provisions, advice of the Prime Minister i to the President under general provision of Article 48 is attracted or not, we are of the considered opinion that there is no apparent conflict ltt Articles 48 on one side and 177 and 193 on the other side, because Articles 177 and 193 are to be read in conjunction with Article 48(1) which is omni potent provision being special characteristic of Constitution of 1973 which envisages Parliamentary] Form of Government. If the Constitution-makers. intended even after promulgation of Eighth Amendment to exclude Article 48(1) from application to Articles 177 and 193, then they could have expressly mentioned in Articles 177 and 193 that the President while performing his functions under these Articles is allowed to act in his discretion excluding advice of the Prime Minister and would be deemed to be acting under Article 48(2). For such reasons we are of the view that there is no conflict as appointments under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are made in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Constitution always attracting and applying advice of the Prime Minister to the President.
75. The fifth point is whether President is bound by the advice of the Prime Minister in respect of appointments of Judges as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. On this point, Mr. Khairi, petitioner in C.P. 23/1996, submitted that the President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister in respect of appointments of Judges because in such appointments Article 48(2) will be attracted which gives President discretionary powers. Here, discretionary powers will be exercised by the President by implication because these provisions of the Constitution, namely, Articles 48, 177 and 193 are to be construed in such a way that Judiciary is made Independent. There are so many provisions in the Constitution to which Article 48 does not apply for the reason that President has to act subject to his satisfaction; such Articles are: 89., 232, 235 and so on.
76. In this respect, Mr. Shahid Hamid, counsel for the President, argued that President as Head of the State has responsibility as envisaged in. the Constitution and has to keep himself fully informed and the Constitution has empowered him under Article 56 to address either House or both Houses in the Joint Sitting on matters of public importance. He had sent message to both the Houses on the question of corruption, which is rampant in the country and is a matter of great national importance and suggested that law should be made on the subject which would apply to all including himself. Learned counsel then divided the powers of the President, mentioned in the Constitution, in seven categories. In the first category are Articles of the Constitution in which President is empowered to act in his discretion. In the second category are Articles in which words "in his discretion" are not mentioned. In the third category are Articles in which President is bound by the advice ("shall" and "may"). In the fourth category are Articles in which functions are to be performed by the President subject to Article 48(1). In the fifth category are Articles under which President is to exercise powers either on the advice of Prime Minister or independently, provided he is satisfied or forms the opinion that Constitutional basis exists for such exercise of that power. In the sixth category are Articles under which President is to exercise powers and discharge his duties with specified consultees. And in the seventh category there are Articles according to which Constitutional duty is to be performed by the President which is to be treated as sacred trust. According to the learned counsel so far appointments of Judges are concerned under Article 177 and 193 of the Constitution, President has to act in his discretion impliedly which would be covered by Article 48(2) of the Constitution for the reasons that sixth and seventh categories of powers will be attracted. According to sixth category President is to consult specified consultees and the whole methodology is provided in the Constitutional scheme of appointments without mentioning Prime Minister, hence advice of the Prime Minister is excluded. Category seven would also cover the case of appointments of Judges because here the President is performing Constitutional duties and he has to see that appointments are made strictly in accordance with the procedure which is laid down in the Constitution. 77 . In furtherance of his contentions, Mr Shahid Hamid further submitted . that in the original 1973 Constitution role of the President was insignificant and was -no more than that of a robot. Eighth Amendment inserted in the Constitution in 1985 has brought about radical changes and the President has been given very meaningful and effective role to play under the Constitution and has been freed from the advice of the Prime Minister in so many cases. He has also drawn our attention to Article 90(1) to show that after Eighth Amendment Executive Authority of the Federation is vested in the President and is to be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Previously, Article 90 before Eighth Amendment provided that Executive Authority of Federation was to be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government consisting of Prime Minister and Federal Ministers which shall act through the Prime Minister who shall be Chief Executive of the Federation. This proposition is dealt with in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment with observation that the amendment so made does not make much difference for the reason that Article 90 is to be read in conjunction with Article 48 of the Constitution and the language used in Article 90 by Eighth Amendment has been borrowed from Article 53 which is to be read in conjunction with Article 74 of the Indian Constitution. It may be mentioned here that Article 53 of the Indian Constitution in which same language is used as is now contained in Article 90 of our Constitution after Eighth Amendment and the language so used was there from the very beginning when the Constitution of India was promulgated in 1949. Indian Constitution contemplates parliamentary form of Government, so is the Constitution of this country even after the Eighth Amendment.
78. There is similarity in the provisions relating to appointments of Judges in - the Constitutions of India and Pakistan. In the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 268) it is held that President is obliged to act in accordance with advice of Council of Ministers circumscribed by the condition that advice given must be in accordance with Articles 124 and 217, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Likewise, in Pakistan this Court has also in the case of appointment of Judges reported as Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) has considered in great detail all the Articles relating to the judiciary and has held that in such appointments recommendation of Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of Pakistan are to be accepted and acted upon by the President/Executive in the absence of concrete and valid reasons to be recorded., We have interpreted the relevant provisions in the Constitution keeping in view the preamble, Article 2A, Islamic provisions in the Constitution and independence of judiciary and separation of judiciary from Executive as is contemplated under Article 175(3) of the Constitution. In the circumstances, to the performance of Constitutional duties, it is to be seen that provisions in the Constitution relating to the appointments of Judges are now to be construed in the light of the judgment which holds the field.
79. Mr. Hamid Khan, who represented Pakistan Bar Council, submitted before us that Eighth Amendment has not changed the complexion or basic character of the Constitution of 1973 which contemplates parliamentary form of Government beyond dispute or doubt. Eighth Amendment has at the most increased powers of the President to create balance between the powers of the Prime Minister and President in order to make the Constitution workable retaining the Parliamentary form of Government. He further submitted that Article 58 has been amended by the Eighth Amendment by giving power to the President to dissolve National Assembly in his discretion requiring holding of election within 90 days. In the meantime, in the sub-Article (5) of Article 48 provision is made for appointment of caretaker Cabinet. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, after dissolving the National Assembly and dismissing the Government of Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo appointed caretaker Minister without appointing the Prime Minister. This point came up for consideration in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 SC 166) end this Court held at page 215 of the report reproduced as under:-- "In this background the Constitution does not visualise a caretaker Cabinet without a Prime Minister. The absence of Prime Minister from a Caretaker Cabinet alters for the period under discussion the very character of the Constitution from a Parliamentary democracy to a Presidential system of Government. The Courts can neither countenance nor condone all this at this stage and in these proceedings. Such violations and breaches concern the very essential features of the Constitution. What are the legal consequences or individual acts done, or actions already taken and, suffered, we are leaving' it to be decided in individual cases, more appropriately brought before us." .
80. Mr Hamid Khan further submitted that in Parliamentary Democracy advice of Prime Minister is a must and binding even if it is not mentioned specifically. He has referred to Indian Constitution Article 74 before amendment in which it is mentioned that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advice the President. In the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another (AIR 1974 SC 2192) it is held that the President as well as the Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in Executive action and is not required by the Constitution to act personally without aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Where the Governor has any discretion, he acts on his own judgment. The Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The appointment as well as removal of members of the subordinate judicial service is an Executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. That is why any action by any servant, of the Union or State in regard to appointment or dismissal is brought against the Union or the State and not against the President or the Governor.
81. In the case of Shamsher Singh (supra) paragraph 148 at page 2228 of the report is very pertinent and is reproduced as under:
"In the light of the scheme of the Constitution we have already referred to, it is doubtful whether such an interpretation as to the personal satisfaction of the President is correct. We are of the view that the President means, for all practical purposes, the Minister or the Council of Ministers as the case may be, and his opinion, satisfaction or decision is Constitutionally secured when his Ministers arrive at such opinion, satisfaction or decision. The independence of the judiciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the deviation, is guarded by the relevant Article making consultation with the Chief Justice of India obligatory. In all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian Justice will and should be accepted by the Government of India and the Court will have an opportunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have entered into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India. In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order. In this view it is immaterial whether the President or the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally decides the issue. "
82. Mr. S.M. Zafar, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court submitted that Eighth Amendment is passed try the National Assembly under the shadow of Martial Law and notwithstanding the fact that Members of the National Assembly were elected on non-party basis, Constitution with Eighth Amendment included has become foundation of our national legal order. Constitution of each country is according to its own aspirations Quoting from Constitutional Interpretation by Philip Babbitt at page 12, he stated that Constitutional modalities are the ways in which legal provisions are characterized as true from Constitutional point of view. He named six such modalities. Firstly, the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution), Secondly, textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average contemporary man on the street), thirdly, structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); fourthly doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent), fifthly ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected to the Constitution), and sixthly, prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefit of a particular rule). It was submitted by the learned counsel that important modality is structural argument which means inferring from relations that Constitution creates inter sc to various structures with which Constitution is concerned, Articles 177 and 193 in our Constitution of 1973 which call for interpretation pertain to judicial structure requiring interpretation which would be applied to the whole structure. In such circumstances, there is no substance in the argument that in the appointments of Judges contemplated in our Constitution, since Prime Minister is not mentioned specifically, then role is completely excluded. Learned counsel then referred to various Articles of the Constitution under the Chapter of Judicature which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and need not be repeated.
83. Taking up textual argument, Mr. Zafar stated that Article 48(l) requires advice of - Cabinet or Prime Minister in respect of functions and actions as Article 48(1) is all embracing commenting upon the judgment in the Al-Jehad Trust case, learned counsel stated that Supreme Court of Pakistan in the said judgment has provided for independence of Judiciary which is fully secured. Chief Justice of Pakistan has assumed the role to see that no wrong appointment takes place in the judiciary, With regard to the advice of Prime Minister in respect of appointments of Judges, learned counsel submitted that this role is actuated by the fact, both political and social at the relevant time and the role to be played by the President in such appointments can be helpful and controlling providing careful balancing.
84. The upshot of what is stated above is that in respect of appointments of Judges as contemplated under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution advice of the Cabinet or Prime Minister under Article 48(1) is attracted which is further qualified by and subject to the ratio decidendi contained in the judgment of AI- Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) in which it is held that in the appointments of Judges, opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of High Court as to the fitness and suitability of a candidate for' judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons .to be recorded by the President/Executive. If President/Executive appoints a candidate found to be unfit and unsuitable for judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief justice of the High Court concerned, it will not be a proper exercise of power under the relevant Article of the Constitution.
85. The last point is very thought provoking and was raised in the Court during the hearing, which into the effect as to what will happen if the judgment of the Supreme Court in the- appointment of Judges case is not implemented. Learned counsel who had appeared in these matters made different .comments. Mr. S.M. Zafar as amicus curiae stated that in such a situation President will be justified to invoke Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution because it would amount to arising of situation in which Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, Under the four corners of the Constitution Article 189 provides specifically that any decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan. Article 190 envisages that all executive and judicial Authority throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. Article 204 empowers the Supreme Court to punish for contempt any person who-- (a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any order of the Court; (b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt: (c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Court; or '(d) does any other thing which; by law, constitutes contempt of the Court. 86 In the case of non-implementation of the judgment it will have to be found out as to who is responsible for not implementing it. Article 190 is a mandatory provision under which there is no alternative for the Executive but has to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Person identified as responsible for non- implementation of the judgment can be punished by the Supreme Court for contempt for disobedience of its judgment. Perusal of Articles 177 and 193 and other Articles which are relevant for the subject-matter of judiciary shows that Supreme Court has to correspond with the President for appointments as he is named specifically in the relevant Articles and all Executive actions are to be taken in his name. It is expected that President shall see to it that appointments of Judges in the superior Judiciary are made in strict accordance with the V Constitutional scheme contemplated in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution which are to be interpreted and read in conjunction with the judgment in Al- Jehad Trust case which is authoritative adjudicatory pronouncement in respect or interpretation of Articles in the Constitution relating to the judiciary. Time frame is also provided in the judgment within which appointments are to be finalised. If there is undue delay or impasse which shows that dilatory tactics are being adopted and sincere attempt is not being made to implement the judgment then it will become the Constitutional duty of the President to see that judgment of the Supreme Court is implemented and there is no violation or non compliance of Article 190 of the Constitutional which makes it mandatory for all Executive and Judicial Authority throughout Pakistan to act in aid of the Supreme Court. If all the Executive and Judicial Authorities in Pakistan are unable to come in aid of the Supreme Court and judgment is not implemented, then such situation would be open to be construed as impasse or deadlock and would amount to very unhappy situation reflecting failure of Constitutional machinery and one would be justified to say that a situation has arisen in which the Government of Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution as is contemplated under Article 58(2)(b).
87. For the facts and reasons stated above two Constitutional petitions 23/1996 and 54/1996 are 'disposed of in the terms stated above. Special Reference No.2 of 1996 filed by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution also stands disposed of in the terms stated above. Copy of the judgment may be sent to the President of Pakistan as opinion of the Supreme Court on the question framed and sent by him as contemplated under Article 186(2) of the Constitution. (Sd.) . SAJJAD ALI SHAH, C.J. (Sd.) FAZAL ELAHI KHAN, J. RAJA AFRASIAB KHAN, J.
With utmost respect and humality, I agree with the judgment having been rendered by the honourable Chief Justice. However, in view of the importance of the questions involved, I will add a note of my own. AJMAL MIA. J.-y this common opinion, t intend to dispose of the above two Constitution Petitions and the aforesaid Special Reference. Constitution Petition o.2of 1996 has been filed lay Al-Jehad Trust through Mr. Taib-ul-'hab Al-Khairi, which ways the petitioner in the case now town as 'Judges Case' reported in PD 1996 SC 321 (Al-.Tehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ui-Waahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, in the said petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:
Whereas Constitution Petition No.54 of 1996 has been filed by a practising Advocate, in which he has sought the following relief:
"In view of the above, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honourable Court may very graciously issue necessary direction for protection and enforcement of fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 4, 14 and 25 and pronounce that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has no power/authority under Article 48 of the Constitution of Pakistan to interfere, in any manner, in the matter of appointment of Judges of superior Courts. Any other relief to which the petitioner is found entitled may also graciously be granted." It may be observed that the President of Pakistan, in Special Reference No.2 of 1996, has sought the opinion of this Court under Article 186 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, on the following question:
"Whether or not the powers of the President to make appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) of the Constitution?" The memo. of the Reference has given the background which compelled the President to file the aforesaid Reference, namely, the then Prime Minister resisted the implementation of the judgment of this Court in the Judges Case (supra) in spite of best efforts on the part of the President.
2. In support of the above two Constitution Petitions, Messrs Habib-ul Wahab Al-Khairi, learned ASC and Raja Muhammad Akram. learned Sr. ASC have appeared. Whereas the President was represented in the aforementioned Reference by Mr. Shahid Hamid.
3. In response to the notices issued by the Court, Mr. Iqbal Haider had appeared as the Attorney-General and Mr. Abid Hasan Minto, learned Sr. ASC, appeared for the Federation up to 4-11-1996. However. after the dissolution of the National Assembly and the dismissal of the Government on 5-11-1996, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir had put in appearance as the Attorney-General and Mr. Abid Hasan Minto withdrew from the case on the instructions of the Caretaker Government. On an application of the former Prime Minister, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, she was impleaded in the above two Constitution Petitions in her personal capacity as respondent, No.3 by an order dated 23-11-1996, Mr. Iqbal Haider appeared on her behalf. Messrs Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, S.M. Zafar, Hamid Khan, Vice President of the Pakistan Bar Council on behalf of the Pakistan Bar Council, Muhammad Akram Sheikh, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, M.L. Shahani, Advocate-General Sindh, Mr. Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Additional Advocate-General Punjab, and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate General, N.-W.F.P., appeared as amicus curiae. The learned Additional Advocates-General, Punjab and N.-W.F.P. adopted the arguments of the learned Attorney-General, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir. In addition to the above learned counsel, we had also heard one Agha Muhammad Dilawar, who claimed to be the President of Pakistan Insaf Tehrik and Mr. Shahid Orakzai.
4. The basic question before the Court is the question on which the President has sought the opinion of this Court quoted hereinabove. Before touching upon the above question, we may dispose of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto when he was appearing for the Federation and Mr.Iqbal Haider- as to the maintainability of the aforesaid two Constitution Petitions. The thrust of their arguments was that, in order to attract the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, there are two pre conditions, namely, (i) that a question of public importance should be involved, and (ii) that such a question should be relatable to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part IL. According to them, the above two petitioners failed to demonstrate that any of their fundamental rights has been violated. In furtherance of the above submission, Mr. Abid Hasan Minto has referred to the case of Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan v. The Federation of Pakistan and others 1989 SCMR 22 and the case of Dr. Amanullah Khan and another v. Chairman, Medical Research Council and 3 others 1996 SCMR 1211. In the first case, a Bench of this Court comprising Full Court has held that invocation of jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 184(3) without alleging any infringement of fundamental rights is barred. Whereas in the second case, this Court declined a direct petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, in which the petitioner sought a prohibitory writ directing inter alia Pakistan Television Corporation from televising commercials of the cigarettes companies on the television, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that any of his fundamental rights was violated. On the other hand, Messrs Habib-ul-Wahab Al-Khairi and Raja Muhammad Akram have vehemently contended that the aforesaid Constitution petitions are in fact in continuation of the Constitution petition in the above Judges' Case and as the same was entertained, the present Constitution petitions are also competent. Reliance was placed by them on the following cases:
(i) Sharaf Faridi and 3 others v. The Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Prime Minister of Pakistan and another PLD 1989 Karachi 404; (ii) Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Karachi v. Sharaf Faridi and others PLD 1994 SC 105; (iii) S.P. Gupta case AIR 1982 SC 149; and . (iv) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268 They have also relied upon para. 18 of my opinion in the Judges' Case, which reads as follows:
"
18. At this juncture, I may point out the right to have access to justice through an independent Judiciary is a Fundamental Right as held in the case of Sharaf Faridi (supra) by Saleem Akhtar, J. In this regard, reference may be made to the following observation:
'The right of 'access to justice to all' is well-recognised inviolable right enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution. This right is equally found in the doctrine of 'due process of law'. The right of access to justice includes the right to be treated according to law, the right to have a fair and proper trial and a right to have an impartial Court or Tribunal. This conclusion finds support from the observation of Willoughby in Constitution of United States, Second Edition, Vol. II at page 1709 where the term 'due process of law' has been summarized. " The above view has been affirmed by this Court in the case of Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Azizullah Menton and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341. "
4. Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Sr. ASC, also supported the maintainability of the aforesaid Constitution petitions and referred to the case of I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041 and the case of Human Rights Cases 1993 SCMR 2001.
5. In Constitution Petition No.54 of 1996, only one relief has been prayed for relating to the question, as to whether Prime Minister's advice under Article 48(1) is necessary or not for the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. Whereas in Constitution Petition No.23 of 1996, a number of reliefs have been prayed for as is evident from the above-quoted para. from the memo. of the said petition. The same inter alia include the aforesaid question of applicability of Article 48(1). In addition to the above, inter alia under sub-para. of the afore quoted para. a declaration has been sought to the effect that the appointment of the present incumbent of the office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan cannot be challenged and that in future, the senior most Judge is entitled to be appointed has the Chief Justice.
6. I may observe that in the Constitution petition. relating to the Judges' Case, the petitioner had prayed that the then senior most Judge, Saad Saood Jan, J., who was then appointed as the Acting Chief Justice, should be appointed as the permanent Chief Justice. It may be observed that while the aforementioned Constitution petition was pending, the present incumbent of the office of the Chief Justice was appointed. The question, as to whether the senior most Judge had legitimate expectancy to be appointed as the Chief Justice in the absence of any concrete thing against him, was argued before the Bench which was hearing the Judges Case, to which I was a Member and so also the learned Chief Justice. I sought the assistance on the above question of the learned counsel who appeared in the aforesaid Constitution petition. My personal view was that since it was not directly involved, the question of appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan should also be decided as we were deciding the question vt appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Courts. .judges, of the Supreme -Court aid the. High Courts and other matters relating to the judicial appointments in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. However, the learned Chief Justice was of the contrary view. The above question was left open for the reasons mentioned in para. 53 of my opinion in the Judges' Case.
7. The above mentioned question was again raised by the Federation in the Review Petition filed against the judgment in the Judges' Case as well as in Special Reference No. l of 1996. The above Review Petition was withdrawn by the then Government for the reason, need not be repeated here. Whereas above Special Reference was withdrawn by the Caretaker Government on 23-11-1996. Thus the above relief prayed for in para. ( 7 ) has nexus with the Judges' Case on the parity of reasoning in the latter case, and it can be urged that the said relief falls within the ambit of Article ' 184(3) of the Constitution.
8. Mr. Shahid Hamid, learned counsel for the President, submitted that since the above question remained unattended, it should be decided by the Court. I enquired from him as to whether, it would be proper on my part to sit on the Bench and to hear the above question after the retirement of Saad Saood Jan J. His reply was that nobody knew that would happen in future, but in order to remove uncertainty and doubts, the aforesaid question should also be adjudicated upon for future. He also submitted that he was instructed by the President to make commitment that in future for the appointment of Chief Justice of Supreme Court, seniority rule would be followed as held by this Court in respect of the Chief Justices of the High Courts in the Judges' Case.
9. Mr. Iqbal Haider, with the permission of this Court, has placed on record a copy of an agreement which was entered into in 1989 between the then President of Pakistan, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, inter alia containing the agreed procedure as to the appointment of the Chief Justices and Judges of the superior Courts. The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is provided in Item No.4, which indicates that it was agreed that the senior most Judge would be given preference and that he would be superseded only in case there was anything adverse on record against him.
10. Since while pronouncing the above order on 4-12-1996, we have decided/expressed our view only on one question, the above matter need no further discussion. The question in issue is, as to whether the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution is necessary for the appointment of the Judges of the superior Courts. In my view, the above question is directly linked with the Judges' Case. The above matter was agitated before the Bench in the Judges' Case. It may be pertinent to reproduce paras. 66 to 68 froth the above judgment, which read as follows:
"
66. Before parting with the above discussion, I may observe that Mr.Sharifuddin Pirzada has contended that the appointment of Judges in the superior Courts by the President is not an act of the nature which needs advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48 of the Constitution. According to him, the relevant Articles of the Constitution confer power on the President to appoint the Judges of the superior Courts after consulting the consultees mentioned in the relevant Articles; which do not include the Prime Minister. His further submission was that since the special Articles provide specifically the consultees who are to be consulted, this will negate Article 48 of the Constitution and thus the Prime Minister's advice is not required. In support of his submission, he has referred to certain cases and other material. Mr. Khairi and Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned counsel for the newly added appellants Nos.3 to 7, had also submitted arguments in line with Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada's above arguments.
67. On the other hand, Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, learned Attorney General, and Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned counsel for the Federation, have submitted that the appointment of a Judge in a superior Court is an executive act and the Executive includes the President and the Prime Minister. According to them, it is not necessary to go into the above question.
68. Since the interpretation of various Articles given by this Court hereinabove will be binding on the Executive, as such it is not necessary to go into the above question in this case." The above question was left open in view of the statement of the then Attorney General, Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, and Mr. Eitzaz Ahsan, the learned counsel for the Federation, to the effect that the appointment of a Judge in a superior Court was an executive act and the Executive includes the President and the Prime Minister and, therefore, it was not necessary to go into the above question. I left the above question open after observing that since the interpretation of various Articles given by this Court would be binding on the executive and, as such, it was not necessary to go into the above question in that case. The scenario which emerged after the judgment in the Judges' Case was handed down, namely, the then Government resisted the implementation of the same which is also evident from the facts narrated in the memo. of Reference filed by the President. The above question has acquired importance and needs resolution.
11. I am, therefore, of the view that the above Constitution petitions are maintainable at least to the extent of deciding the above question for the reasons inter alia stated in the afore quoted para. 18 of my opinion from the Judges' Case. I may observe that some of the reliefs prayed for in Constitution Petition No.23 of 1996 were in fact also prayed for in the Judges' Case, but we refrained from dealing with the same as we were not inclined to grant the same. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the same can be repeated.
12. Before dealing with the above question, I - may take up another preliminary submission of Mr. Iqbal Haider, namely, that since the above mutual agreement entered into between the then President and the then Prime Minister contained a detailed agreed procedure as to the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the superior Courts and as a Bench of this Court comprising Full Court, on the basis of the above agreement, disposed of Civil Appeal No.486 of 1989 on 10-12-1989 through the judgment in the case of Federal Government of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate and others 1990 SCMR 189, there does not exist any doubt or dispute as to the mode of appointment of the Judges of the superior Courts and, therefore, the above Constitution petitions and the Special Reference are not warranted. In order to appreciate the above contention, it may be pertinent to point out that a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of M.D. Tahir v. Federal Government and 12 others 1989 CLC 1369, while dismissing a Constitution petition in limine, held that the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution was not necessary for the appointment of Judges in the superior Courts for the following reasons:
"5.- As regards the absence of the advice of the Prime Minister similar argument was advanced before a Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 Lah. 725 but according to the majority view interference in the matter, in exercise of discretionary powers under Article 199 of the Constitution was not called for. After hearing the petitioner we are not persuaded otherwise. In any case the Prime Minister does not find mention in, Article 193, amongst the person, after consultation with whom the President is required to appoint the Judges. It is Article 48(1) which ordains that in exercise of his functions the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Bur Article 193 specifically deals with the appointments of the High Court Judges and it is well-settled, that where if, a statute there are two provisions, one of which is of specific character and the other general one, then the specific provision ought to be applied unfettered by the general one. This principle has also been exhaustively discussed iii Government of Punjab v. Naila Begum PLD 1957 Lah. 336 to which one of us (Lone, J.) was a party." The above matter was brought before this Court by the Federation in the form of above appeal, which was disposed of by consent as under:
"The learned Deputy Attorney-General on instructions from the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Provincial Coordination, states that the Federal Government will be satisfied if para. 5 of the impugned order dated 21st December, 1988, of the Lahore High Court is excised and this appeal be disposed of accordingly. The offending portion in para. 5 is as follows: In any case the Prime Minister does not find mention in Article 193, amongst the persons, after consultation with whom the President is required to appoint the Judges. It is Article 48(1) which ordains that in exercise of his functions the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. But Article 193 specifically deals with the appointments of the High Court Judges and it is well-settled that where in a Statute there are two provisions, one of which is of specific character and the other general one, then the specific provision ought to be applied unfettered by the general one. This principle has also been exhaustively discussed in Government of Punjab v. Naila Begum PLD 1987 Lah. 336 to which one of us (Lone, J). was a party. Against which exception was taken by the Federal Government on the -ground that the required notice under Order 27-A, Rule 1, was not given to the Attorney-General before determining the Constitutional question. Learned counsel' for the respondent No.2. Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada stated that he had no objection to the disposal of the appeal in the above manner as it seemed to him to be a realistic and a practical approach. Respondent No.l, however, objected to the disposal of the appeal on this short ground, but as he had not filed arty appeal against the order, it became final as against him. As such we do not find any substance in his contention. Accordingly, the offending portion-be-excised but the judgment in all other respects stands. There will be no order as to costs. " It may be pertinent to mention that two of the learned Judges, namely, Abdul Kadir Shaikh and Zaffar Hussain Mirza, JJ. appended their short notes to the effect that the Court should have decided the above Constitutional question as it was the Constitutional duty of the Court to interpret the Constitution, but, at the same time, they agreed to the above consent order as the other learned Judges were agreeable to the same.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, who appeared as amicus curiae, has submitted that the above consent order recorded by this Court in the case of M.D. Tahir (supra) cannot be treated as a decree or a judgment of the Court and, secondly, the above agreement was not brought on record and, therefore, cannot be referred to. To reinforce the above submission, he has cited the case of Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others, Appellants v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs. and legal representatives, and others, Respondents AIR 1967 SC 591 relevant at page 595 and the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Appellant v. Gurnam Kaur, Respondent AIR 1989 SC 38 relevant at page
42. In the first case, it was held that a money decree passed on a compromise is not a decision of the Court and; therefore, it does not constitute res judicata as to create estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In the second case, it was concluded that a direction given by the Supreme Court of India to the Municipal Corporation to construct stalls for pavement squatters by consent is not a decision to be followed as a precedent by a High Court in a subsequent case.
14. The aforesaid mutual agreement contained a detailed procedure as to the guiding principles for exercise of Presidential Constitutional functions and the procedure as to the appointment of Judges of the High Courts, Chief Justices of the High Courts, Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. which reads as follows:
"Mutually Agreed Guiding Principles for exercise of President's Constitutional functions: (1) Discretion.- -The President should normally and a6 far as possible exercise his discretion after taking the Prime Minister into confidence by prior information. (2) Where word President simpliciter is used the President shall accept the advice of the Prime Minister subject to requirement for re consideration. The reconsidered advice should be tendered by the Prime Minister-normally and as far as possible accommodating the views of the President. (3) Where advice of the Prime Minister is incorporated in the Article itself then it is the advice which shall be accepted by the President without requirement of reconsideration. (4) Consultation, satisfaction, opinion, thinks fit, considers. Subject to detailed examination of the individual Articles of the Constitution, in principle decision will be based on consultations and as mutually agreed in one or more than one meetings. The Prime Minister will tender advice to the President reflecting the consensus/agreement reached which will be approved by the President accordingly. Appointment of the high Courts: (1) On his own initiative or on receipt of information from the Law and Justice Division verbal or written a panel of three names against each vacancy is forwarded by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court to the Governor of the Province. Copy of this communication is sent to the Federal Law Secretary. (2) From the Governor the file goes to the Chief Minister of the Province. The Chief Minister through office file makes recommendations or his comments on each nominee of the Chief Justice to the Governor. (3) The Governor sends a D.O. Letter to the Federal. Law Secretary containing his opinion on each nominee in the Chief Justice's panel based on the recommendations/comments of the Chief Minister. (4) Copies of the D.O. Letters of the Provincial Chief Justice and the Governor are sent by the Federal Law Secretary to the Chief Justice of Pakistan for his comments. (5) Based on the recommendations/comments/opinions of the Provincial Chief Justice, Governor of the Province and the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the Law and Justice Division submits a summary to the Prime Minister together with recommendations of Chief Justice and Governors. The Law and Justice Minister approves the submission of the Summary. (6) On receipt of the Summary, the Prime Minister calls for report from the DI.B. and DG ISI. .. (7) After completion of the above formalities, the Prime Minister and the President hold consultations in the light of recommendations, comments, opinions and Intelligence Reports etc. (8) Based on such consultations and as agreed in one or in more than one meetings the' Prime Minister tenders advice on the Summary to the President reflecting the agreement reached which is approved accordingly. ITEM-1I APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF A HIGH COURT (1) Chief Justice of Pakistan sends his recommendation to the Federal Law Secretary. (2) Law and Justice Division obtains the views of the Governor of the concerned Province. Views of the Governor, based on the opinion of the Chief Minister of the Province; are communicated to the Law and Justice Division. (3) In the matter of appointment of the Chief Justice of a High Court, due weight is given to the recommendation of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. (4) Preference is given to the senior most puisne Judge of the High Court for appointment as Chief Justice. (5) The senior most Judge would be superseded only in case there is anything adverse on record against him. In that case consultation would be held between the President and the Prime Minister in order to determine the question of super session. If it is agreed that on the basis of record the super session of most senior Judge is justified then the next most senior of the Judges of High Court will be appointed Chief Justice. ITEM-III APPOINTMENT OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT (1) On the request of the Law and Justice Division or on his own initiative, the Chief Justice of Pakistan sends a panel to the Federal Law Secretary to fill available vacancies. (2) On the basis of the recommendations of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, a Summary (Submission authorised by the Law and Justice Minister) is submitted by the. Law and Justice Division to the Prime Minister. (3) Based on such consultations and as agreed in one or in more, than one meetings the Prime Minister tenders advice on the Summary to the President reflecting the agreement reached which is approved accordingly. (4) Following has been the consistent practice so far in the appointment of Supreme Court Judges:
(i) On recommendation of the Chief Justice of Pakistan Supreme Court Judges have been appointed from amongst the nominees of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. (iij Nominees were .fudges of the High Court. (iii) Representation of the various High Courts was kept in view. (5) Above practice would continue to be followed in future also, ITEM-IV APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF PAKISTAN (1) On occurrence of a vacancy of Chief Justice of Pakistan a Summary is submitted by the Law and Justice Division to the Prime Minister. Submission of the Summary is authorised by the Law and Justice Minister. (2) Preference is given to the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court for appointment as Chief Justice. The senior most Judge would be superseded only in case there is anything adverse on record against him (3) Decision in principle would be made in the light of item 2 of Mutual Arrangements."
15. Tire above-quoted ' mutually agreed guiding principles indicates that modalities for the exercise of Constitutional functions by the President and as to the appointments of the Chief Justices and the Judges of the superior Court were mutually agreed to between the then President and the then Prime Minister which was founded on participator consultative process and consensus-oriented. If the above mutually agreed agreement would have been adhered to by tree former Prime Minister, there aright not have been any occasion for rendering judgment by this Court in the Judges Case or for the President to have made the above Reference. The above document spells out a coordinated working modality based on mutual confidence and understanding between the two high functionaries of the State, which is a must for the good governance and prosperity of the country. However, we cannot hold that in view of the above agreement, it is not necessary to answer the above Reference or to adjudicate upon the above question in the aforesaid two Constitution petitions. Mr. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada's submission that the above consent order in disposing of the above appeal by this Court in the case of Federation v. M.D. Tahir (supra) cannot be treated as a judgment, seems to be correct. Secondly, it is also true that since the above agreement was not brought even on the record of this Court in the aforesaid appeal, it cannot be contended that the above appeal was disposed of on the basis of the above agreement. Thirdly, the Court is under Constitutional duty to interpret the Constitutional provisions as held in the case of Union of India v. Sankalchand AIR 1977 SC 2328. In this view of the matter, Mr.Iqbal Haider's above submission is devoid of any force. However, it is for the President and the Prime Minister in power to consider, as to whether the above agreement can form a sound basis for carrying out their respective Constitutional functions.
16. I may now revert to the above question. (a) The learned counsel in support of the contention that the Prime Minister's advice under Article 48(1) of the Constitution is not required for the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts have inter alia contended as under:
(i) That under the original Constitution the President was only titular and practically had no functions to perform but the amendments made by the Eighth Amendment in the Constitution have brought about a balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister, though the Constitution remained a Parliamentary _Form; (ii) That it is-not correct to urge that under Article 48 of the Constitution, the President can act without accepting the Prime Minister's advice only in respect of those Articles which expressly confer discretion on him; (iii) That the ' appointments of Judges in the superior Courts cannot be equated with any other Constitutional appointments, but it is a Constitutional duty in . the form of a sacred trust and hence Article 48(1) of the Constitution has no application; (iv) That Article 48 of the Constitution is a general Article and whereas Articles 177 and 193 of the same are special Articles providing special procedure for the appointments of the Judges in the superior Courts and, therefore, the latter Articles shall exclude the applicability of the former Article; (v) That the conclusions recorded by this Court contained in para. 7(i), (v) and (vii) in the Judges' Case PLD 1996 SC 367 require recording of reasons by the President which cannot be done if it is held that the Prime Minister's advice is binding; (vi) That the view that the Prime Minister's advice is not required under Article 48(1) of, the Constitution is in accord with the objects of Independence and Separation of Judiciary enshrined in the Constitution; (vii) That since India has adopted the Westminster Type of Parliamentary form, Articles relating to appointment of Judges of the Indian Constitution and the case-law thereon cannot be pressed into service in Pakistan as the Westminster Type of Parliamentary form has not been accepted in Pakistan. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada's line of argument was somewhat different. According to him, in order to eliminate any political consideration and to ensure Independence of Judiciary, the Framers of the Constitution deliberately excluded the Prime Minister from Articles 177 and 193 and, therefore, Article 48(1) has no application to the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts. (b) The learned counsel, who canvassed at the Bar the opposite point of view broadly had urged as follows:
(i) That since Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution have not been amended by the Eighth Amendment, they would continue to operate as they were prior to the above amendments in the Constitution; (ii) That the President can act without or against the Prime Minister's advice in respect of the Articles of the Constitution relating to the appointments of Constitutional offices which expressly confer discretion on him; (iii) That all appointments under the Constitution involve duty in the nature of sacred trust and, therefore, appointments of Judges in the superior Courts cannot be distinguished on that account; (iv) That the rule that a special provision will exclude a general provision of a statute is not attracted in the present case; (v) That since in fact the Prime Minister is the consultor for the purpose of Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, he or she, as the case :nay be, will record reasons in terms of para. 7(i), (v) and (vii) of the judgment in the Judges' Case; (vi) That since prior and after the enforcement of 1956 Constitution during the period of the Parliamentary Form of Government in Pakistan the appointments of the Judges in the superior Courts have been made on the basis of the Prime Minister's advice, the same cannot be deviated as a Constitutional convention has come into existence; (vii) That since even under the Rules of Business, 1973, framed under the Constitution of 1973 and as amended upto date, the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts are required to be made on the advice of the Prime Minister, it cannot be urged that the same is not required under Article 48(1) of the Constitution; (viii) That the factum that there exists a Constitutional convention/practice since the adoption of the Parliamentary Form of Government in Pakistan to appoint Judges in the superior Courts on the basis of the Prime Minister's advice negates the contention that the Framers of 1956 or 1973 Constitutions intended to exclude the Prime Minister's advice in case of appointment of Judges in the superior Courts; (ix) That if we were to examine the question whether the Prime Minister's advice is necessary under Articles 177 and 193 thereof by pressing into service six modalities of Constitutional interpretation, it becomes evident that the same is required.
17. I may take up the above first contention mentioned in para. 16(a). In .order to appreciate what amendments have been made through the Eighth Amendment in the Constitution as to create balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister, it may be pertinent to refer to the English translation of the political plan announced by the then President, General M. Ziaul Haq, on 12-8-1983 at the seventh session of the Majlis-e-Shoora, relied upon by Mr. Hamid Khan, in which he has dilated upon the political history of Pakistan and the factum that a number of Constitutions had been framed since the .creation of Pakistan and the reasons for their failure. It may be instructive to reproduce the relevant portion of the above speech which runs into more than 20 printed pages, which reads as follows:
"After deliberating on this issue and after exchanging views with my colleagues I have reached the conclusion that we have three alternatives before us at the moment: One; to restore the 1973 Constitution as it is; Two; to abrogate the Constitution; frame a new Constitution and seek its endorsement by the people; and Three; to promulgate the 1973 Constitution with necessary amendments. If we were to, adopt the first alternative it would mean that the country would periodically face the same crises as it did in 1977, which meant that, on the one side, we would have a despotic Prime Minister and, on the other, a helpless and ineffective President so that the country would be at the mercy of a dictator. This would also mean that we had learnt no lesson from our past. To adopt this course, therefore, would not be in the national interest. Another important point to note is that in its pristine form the 1973 Constitution had "Islam" in it only to the extent . of its preamble while in its text it is rarely mentioned. This to my mind runs counter to the aspirations of the nation. The second alternative, too, was not, in our view, in the national interest because to adopt such a course would mean plugging the country and the nation into a situation of uncertainty and to throw Pakistan's Constitutional life back into the same position that obtained at the time of its birth. Had that been my intention I would not have kept it in abeyance for all these six years. I would have abrogated it a long time ago. So after due deliberation and consultations we have decided to adopt the third course because we consider it to be in the national interest. There are in this Constitution certain settled issues and it would be inappropriate to reopen them. Apart from this there is a consensus among all sections of the country on its restoration with certain amendments. It would not be inappropriate to point out here that this view is also shared by this House: and I and my colleagues greatly value this point. However, amendments of two kinds must be made in this Constitution as has been demanded by sensible people belonging to every school of thought. One aspect of the amendment relates to a suitable alteration that needs to be made in the respective powers of the President and Prime Minister: and the other to bring the Constitution in harmony with the Islamic principles. I shall perhaps not be able to go into the details of the amendments contemplated, but in deference to the principle of consultation I will definitely seek your advice as well as the advice of the people. I deem it necessary to identify the main points of the amendments contemplated. In the first place the Objectives Resolution which has been included in the preamble of the Constitution should find its place in the main text. Secondly, the guiding principles that have been framed for us must necessarily be incorporated in the Constitution in some form or the other. We believe that these guiding principles, in their original form, must form part of the Constitution. These are the barest minimum amendments that must be made in the 1973 Constitution so that apart from reflecting the Islamic aspirations of the people it may protect the country from future crises. After a dispassionate consideration of all these matters we have taken certain basic decisions, which are:
(1) The 1973 Constitution be restored but a balance be brought about between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister and the Constitution harmonised with Islamic principles. In adopting these amendments due consideration will be given, apart from other proposals, to the opinion of the Members of the Majlis-e-Shoora and the recommendations of the Ansari Commission. (2) There has been a lot of controversy with regard to the role of the Armed Forces. I would like to end this controversy too. The Armed Forces will have no new Constitutional role, the present accepted position in this matter will be maintained. (3) Elections will be held on the basis of adult suffrage. (4) The Prime Minister will be appointed by the President. But the person appointed must in the president s view command majority support in the National Assembly. The Prime Minister, within two months of assumption of office, will be required to obtain a vote of confidence from the National Assembly (5) When the President feels that a need has arisen for seeking a fresh mandate for the electorate, he can dissolve the National Assembly. But in such an event fresh elections will have to be held within 75 days. (6) . The President will have the powers to return for reconsideration to the Assembly and the House a bill which has already been passed. (7) The President will be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He will appoint the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services and determine the terms and conditions of their appointments. (8) The appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and members of the Commission will also be made by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. (9) The Provincial Governors will also be appointed by the President. (10) Additionally, a National Security Council will be established. The Government of the day will not be able to declare an emergency without the advice of the Council. The composition and duties of the National Security Council be announced later. (11) In order to improve the economic conditions of the country the private sector will be encouraged and protected."
18. The above-quoted extract from the above speech indicates that the then President, General M. Ziaul Haq, wanted to make minimum amendments on certain matters including in respect of certain appointments. After the above disclosure of the political plan by the then President, the elections for National Assembly and Provincial Assembles were held on 25-2-1985 and 28-2-1985 respectively. After few days from the above elections. Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985 (President's Order No, 14 of 1985), hereinafter referred to as the R.C.O., was issued and gazetted on 2-3-1985 containing a number of amendments in the 1973 Constitution. Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo was appointed as the Prime Minister of Pakistan by the then President-i,, terms of amended clause (2) of Article 90 of the constitution. He formed a political party in the National Assembly. The R.C.CJ, was placed before the National Assembly for adopting the same. However, it seems, that there was a bargain between the then President and the party in power inasmuch as a number of amendments in the Constitution incorporated by the R.C.O. were dropped/modified and the R.C.O. in tire, amended form was unacted as Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act XVIII of 1985) gazetted or, 1 i-11-1985, hereinafter referred to as the Eighth Amendment. The Martial Law was lifted on 31-12-1985. In other words, the Eighth Amendment facilitated the lifting of the Martial Law within six or seven weeks from the date of its enactment. In my view, it is not necessary to refer to all the amendment . I intend to refer only those amendments which have some bearing on the controversy in issue. The above relevant amendments are as follows:
(i) The original Article 46 reads as follows:
"Original Article 46.--The Prime Minister shall keep the President informed on matters of internal and foreign policy and on all legislative proposals the Federal Government intends to bring before Parliament." The R.C.O. substituted the same, which was adopted through the Eighth Amendment without any modification. The above substituted Article 46 provides as under:
. "R.C.O.. Article 46.--It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister-- (a) to communicate to the President all decisions of the Cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation; (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation as the President may call for; and (c) if the President so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Cabinet any matter on which a decision has been taken by the Prime Minister or a Minister but which has not been considered by the Cabinet." (ii) Original Article 48 reads as under:-- . "Original Article 48.--(1) In the performance of his functions, the President shall act on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding on him. (2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered to the President by the Prime Minister shall not be inquired into in any Court. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any rules made under Article 99, the orders of the President shall require for their validity the counter signature of the Prime Minister." . The above Article was substituted by the R.C.O. as follows:-- "R.C.O. Article 48.--(1) In the exercise of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, or appropriate Minister: Provided that the President may require the Cabinet to reconsider or consider such advice, as the case may be, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration or consideration. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the President shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do so. (3) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter in respect of which the President is by the Constitution empowered to act in his discretion, the decision of the President in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the President shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. (4) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered to the President by the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, a Minister or Minister of State shall not be inquired into in, or by, any Court, tribunal or other authority. (5) Where the President dissolves the National Assembly, he shall, in his discretion,
(a) appoint a date, not later than one hundred days from the date of the dissolution, for the holding of a general election to the Assembly; and (b) appoint a Caretaker Cabinet. (6) If, at any time, the President, in his discretion, or on the advice of the Prime Minister, considers that it is desirable that any matter of national importance should be referred to a referendum, the President may cause the matter to be referred to a referendum in the form of a question that is capable of being answered either by "Yes" or "No". (7) An Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) may lay down the procedure for the holding of a referendum and the compiling and consolidation of the result of a referendum. " The above Article was modified by the Eighth Amendment inasmuch as above clause (3) was omitted. (iii) Original Article 50 of the Constitution reads as follows:
"Original Article 50.--There shall be a Parliament consisting of two Houses to be known as the National Assembly and the Senate. " The same was substituted by the R.C.O. as under:-- "R.C.O. Article 50.--There shall be a Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan consisting of the President and two Houses to/be known respectively as the National Assembly and the Senate. " The same was adopted by the Eighth Amendment: (iv) Original Article 56 provided as follows:-- " original Article 56.--The President may address either House or both Houses assembled together and may for that purpose require the attendance of the members." The same was substituted by the R.C.O. as under:-- "R.C.O., Article 56.--(1) The President may address either House or both Houses assembled together and may for that purpose require the attendance of the members. (2) The President may send massages to either House, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or otherwise, and a House to which any message is so sent shall with all convenient despatch consider any matter required by the message to be taken into consideration. (3) At the commencement of each session of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), the President shall address both Houses assembled together and inform the Majlis-e-shoora (Parliament) of the causes of its summons. (4) Provision shall be made in the rules for regulating the procedure of a House and the conduct of its business for the allotment of time for discussion of the matter referred to in the address of the President. " The Eighth Amendment adopted the same with modification that in clause (3) the words, "after each general election" were added. (v) Original Article ~t3 reads as follows:-- "Original Article 58.--The President shall dissolve the National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister; and the National Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved, at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime Minister has so advised. Explanation.- -Reference in this Article to 'Prime Minister' shall not be construed to include reference to a Prime Minister against whom a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been moved in the National Assembly but has not been voted upon or against whom such a resolution has been passed or who is continuing in office after his resignation or after the dissolution of the National Assembly or a Federal Minister performing the functions of Prime Minister under clause (1) or clause (3) of Article 95." The same was substituted by the R.C.O. as under:
"R.C.O., Article 58.--(1) The President shall dissolve the- National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister; and the National Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime Minister has so advised. Explanation.--Reference in this Article to "Prime Minister" shall not be construed to include reference to a Prime Minister against whom a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been moved in the National Assembly but has not beets voted upon or against whom such a resolution has 'been passed or who is continuing in office after his resignation or after the dissolution of the National Assembly (2) The President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion, - an appeal to the electorate is necessary." The Eighth Amendment re-substituted the above Article by providing as under:-- . "58.--(1) The President shall dissolve the National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister; and the National Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime Minister has so advised. Explanation.--Reference in this Article to 'Prime Minister' shall not be construed to include reference; to a Prime Minister against whom a (notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been given) in the National Assembly but has not been voted upon or against whom such a resolution has been passed or who is continuing in office after his resignation or after the dissolution of the National Assembly. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion,-- (a) a vote of no-confidence having been passed against the Prime Minister, no other member of the National Assembly is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, as ascertained in a session of the National Assembly summoned for the purpose; or (b) a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried onP accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.." (vi) The original Article 75 reads as follows:-- "Original Article 75.--(1) The President shall assent to a Bill within seven days after it has been presented to him for assent under Article 70, Article 71 or Article 73 and if the President fails to do so he shall be deemed to have assented to the Bill at the expiration of the said period. (2) When the President has assented or is deemed to have assented to a Bill, it shall become law and be called an Act of Parliament. (3) - No Act of Parliament, and no provision in any such Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation, previous sanction or consent required by the Constitution was not given if that Act was assented to or deemed to have been assented to in accordance with the Constitution. " The same was substituted by the R.C.O. as under:-- "R.C.O., Article 75.--(1) When a Bill is presented to the President for, assent, the President shall, within, forty-five days,-- (a) assent to the Bill; or (b) in the case of a Bill other than a Money Bill, return the Bill to Majlis-e Shoora (Parliament) with a message requesting that the Bill, or any specified provision thereof, be considered and that any amendment specified in the message be considered. ' (2) When the President has returned a Bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), it shall be reconsidered by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in joint sitting and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment, by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), by the votes of the majority of the local membership of the two Houses, it shall be again presented to the President and the President shall assent thereto. (3) When the President has assented to a Bill, it shall become law and be called an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). (4) No Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), and no provision in any such ' Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation, previous sanction or consent required by the Constitution was not given if that Act was assented to in accordance with the Constitution. " The Eighth Amendment adopted the above. substituted Article 75 with the modification in clause (2), namely, that the words "the President shall assent thereto" which appeared as the last words in the aforesaid sub-clause, were substituted by the words "the President shall not withhold assent therefrom". (vii) Original Article 90 provided as under:-- "Original Article 90.--(1) Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers, which shall act through the Prime Minister who shall be the chief executive of the Federation. (2) In the performance of his functions under the Constitution, the Prime Minister may act either directly or through the Federal Ministers. (3) The Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly:" The R.C.O. substituted the same as follows:-- "The executive authority of the Federation shall vest in .the President and shall be exercised by him, either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. " Whereas the Eighth Amendment resubstituted as under:-- "90.-(l) The executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him, either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. (2) Nothing contained in clause (1) shall-- (a) be deemed to transfer to the President any functions conferred by any existing law on the Government of any Province or other authority: or (b) prevent the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) from conferring by law functions on authorities other than the President. " (viii) Original Article 91 of the Constitution provided as follows:-- "Original Article 91.--(1) The National Assembly shall meet on the thirtieth day following the day on which a general election to the Assembly is held, unless sooner summoned by the President. (2) After the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the National Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect without debate one of its Muslim members to be the Prime Minister. (3) The Prime Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the National Assembly: Provided that, if no member secures such majority in the first poll, a second poll shall be held between the members who secure the two highest numbers of votes in the first poll and the member who secures a majority of votes of the members present and voting shall be declared to have been elected as Prime Minister Provided further that, if the number of votes secured by two or more members securing the highest number of votes is equal, further poll shall be held between them until one of them secures a majority of votes of the members present and voting. (4) The member elected under clause (3) shall be called upon by the President to assume the office of Prime Minister and he shall, before entering upon the office, make before the President oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule." The R.C.O. substituted the same as under:-- (1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. (2)' The President shall in his discretion appoint from amongst the members of the National Assembly a Prime Minister who, in-his opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of the majority, of the members of the National Assembly. (3) The person appointed under clause (2) shall; before entering upon the office, make before the President oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule and shall within a period of sixty days thereof obtain a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. (4) The Cabinet, together with the Ministers of State, shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly. (5) The Prime Minister, shall, hold office during the pleasure of the President, but the President shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the .confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. (6) The Prime Minister may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office. (7) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the National Assembly shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister and shall not before the dissolution of that Assembly be again appointed a Minister unless he is elected a member of that Assembly: Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a Minister who is a member of the Senate. (8) Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed as disqualifying the Prime Minister or any other Minister or a Minister of State for continuing in office during any period during which the National Assembly stands dissolved, or as preventing the appointment of any person as Prime Minister or other Minister or as Minister of State during any such period. " It may be observed that under the Eighth Amendment, a new clause (2A) was added and clause (5) was amended. The same read as follows:--, "91.--(1). .. . .. ... ... .... .. ... ... ... ... .. (2).. ... .... ... ........ ... ... ........ . (2A). Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), after the twentieth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety, the President shall invite the member of the National Assembly to be the Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, as ascertained in a session of the Assembly summoned for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. . (3) ......................................... (4) .................................. (5) The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President, but the President shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, in which case he shall summon the National Assembly and require the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the Assembly. (6) . (7) (8) . The remaining clauses of the above Article were incorporated through the Eighth Amendment without any modification. (ix) Original Article 93 of the Constitution reads as follows:-- "Original Article 93.--(1) The Prime Minister shall continue to hold office until his successor enters upon the office of Prime Minister. (2) Nothing in Article 91 or Article 92 shall be construed to disqualify the Prime Minister or a Federal Minister or a Minister of State from continuing in office during the period the National Assembly stands dissolved." The R.C.O., substituted the same as under:-- "R.C.O., Article 93.--(1) The President may, on the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint not more than five Advisers, on such terms and conditions as he may determine. (2) The provisions of Article 57 shall also apply to an Adviser. " It may be noticed that no amendment was made in the above Article by the Eighth Amendment and the same was adopted. (x) Original Article 99 of the Constitution reads as under:-- "Original Article 99.
(1) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Federal Government, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. (2) The Federal Government may regulate to allocation and transaction of . its business and may for the convenient transaction of that business delegate any of its functions to officers or authorities subordinate to it." The same was substituted by the R.C.O. as follows:-- "R.C.O.. Article 99.--(1) All executive actions of the Federal Government shall, be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. (2) The President shall by rules specify the manner in which orders and other instruments made and executed in his name shall be authenticated, and the validity of any order of instrument so authenticated shall not be questioned in any Court on the ground that it was not made or executed by the President. (3) The President shall also make rules for the allocation and transaction of the business of the Federal Government. " The same was adopted by the Eighth Amendment. (19)(i), I may highlight the above amendments brought about by the R.C.O.' and the Eighth Amendment in juxtaposition with the original versions of the Constitution as amended up to 5-7-1977. It may be pointed that .under original, Article 46 the Prime Minister was required to keep the President informed on matters of internal and foreign policy and all legislative proposals the Federal Government intended to bring before the Parliament. Whereas under the amended Article, the following duties have been imposed on the Prime Minister-- (a) to communicate to the President all decisions of the Cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation, (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and the proposals for legislative as the President may call for, and (c) if the President so requires to submit for consideration of the Cabinet any matter on which a decision has been taken by the Prime Minister but which has not been considered by the Cabinet. It may be pertinent to mention that above amended Article 46 in fact had been lifted from Pakistan Constitution, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 1996 Constitution), as Article 42 of the said Constitution was couched in the same language. Indian Constitution also contains Article 78 which is identical to the above-amended Article 46. (ii) It may further be pointed out that original Article 48 had three clauses. Whereas under the R.C.O. the above-substituted Article had six clauses. It may be mentioned that under the Eighth Amendment the above substituted Article has been retained with the modification that clause (2) thereof was omitted It may be observed that original clause (1) provided that in the performance of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice shall be binding upon him. Whereas under the substituted clause the words "and on" appearing after the words "the President shall act" and the words "and such advice shall be binding on him" have been deleted. At this juncture I may point out that it, was vehemently urged by Mr. Shahid Hamid and other counsel appearing in support of the, Constitution petitions that the above amendments have made significant difference as to its binding nature. I am not impressed by the above submission. Since under the substituted clause (1), by virtue of proviso to it, the President has been empowered to require the Cabinet to reconsider or consider the advice tendered under the above clause, the words "shall be binding on him" could not have been retained. The omission of the words "on and" are also of no significance. It will not be out of context to point out that in clause (7) of Article 37 of '1956 Constitution it was provided that, "(7) In the. exercise of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet on the appropriate Minister or Minister of State, as the case nay be, except in cases where he is empowered by the Constitution to act in his discretion, dud except as respects the exercise of his powers under clause (6; " It may further be highlighted that original Article 74 of the Indian Constitution provided that "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head to advise the President". It may be observed that by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1974, the words "who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice" were added. Then through the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, a proviso to the effect that "provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice either generally or otherwise and the President shall, act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration was added. The above substituted clause (1) is in line with clause (7) of Article 37 of 1956 Constitution and .Article 74 of the Indian Constitution. It may also be pointed out that Indian Supreme Court has held that even under unamended above Article 74 the advice of the Prime Minister was binding on the President. In this regard reference may be made to the following cases:
(i) Y.N.R. Rao v. Indirra Gandhi AIR 1971 SC 1002. (ii) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192. The original clause (2) of Article 48 provided that the question, whether any and if so what advice was tendered to the President by the Prime Minister shall not be inquired into in arty Court. The above clause in the amended from has been reproduced as clause (4) in the above substituted Article
48. In place of above clause (2) a new clause has been provided as clause (2) providing that "Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the President shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter of which he is empowered by the Constitution to so do". It may further be observed that under the R.C.O. the clause (3) of the above Article empowered the President to decide finally the question as to whether he had discretion in a particular matter. However, the latter clause was omitted by the Eighth Amendment as pointed out hereinabove. . It may again be observed that original clause (2) of Article 48 was substituted by the R.C.O. in the form of clause (4) and the Name was retained without any amendment by the Eighth Amendment. 'the effect of the amendment is that prior to the amendment, the question whether any and if so what advice was tendered to the President by the Prime Minister could not be inquired into in any Court. After the amendment the scope has been enlarged by adding two more forums after the words "any Court" the words "Tribunal and other authority". It may be pointed. out that original clause (3) of Article 48 which required countersignature of the Prime Minister on all orders made by the President for their validity was dropped by the R.C.O. and the same position was maintained under the Eighth Amendment. It may be mentioned that the newly-added 'clause (5) co Article 48 by the R.C.O. was retained by the Eighth Amendment With the modification that ire sub-clause "100 days" were substituted by '.`90" days. The above amended clause empowers the President in case the National Assembly is dissolved under Article 58(2) to take following actions in his discretion: (a) to appoint a date not later than 90 days from the date of the dissolution for the holding of a general election to the Assembly, (b) to appoint a Caretaker Cabinet which includes Prime Minister. It may further be observed that newly-added clause (6) to above Article is identical in the R.C.O. and thc Eighth Amendment. It has two parts, first part confers discretionary power on the President to refer any matter which lit; considers of national importance to a referendum in the form of a question that is capable of being answered either by "Yes" or "No". The second part empowers the Prince Minister to get any such question referred to a referendum through the President. (iii) It may be mentioned that original Article 50 ,provided that there shall be a Parliament consisting of two douses to be known as the National Assembly and the Senate. The above Article was amended and the same was retained by the Eighth Amendment. The effect of the amendment is that the word "Parliament" has been substituted by the word "Majlis-e-Shoora". The second amendment which may have some bearing on the issue under reference is to the effect that instead of the words "consisting of two Houses" the words "consisting of the President and two Houses" have been substituted. In other words, the President has become part of the Parliament though he is not a Member of the Parliament At this juncture it will not be out of context to point that Article 43 of 1956 Constitution was couched in the same language as the above-amended Article 50 with the exception that the word "National Assembly" was mentioned and not the word "Majlis-e-Shoora". It may further, be pointed out that the corresponding Article in the Indian Constitution, is Article 79 which is also worded in the same language. To put it differently under 1956 Constitution as well as under the Indian Constitution the President is a part of the Parliament. The above amendment apparently has been lifted from 1956 Constitution. " (iv) It may further be pointed out that-original Article 56 lead only one para. providing that the President may address either House or both the Houses assembled together and may for that purpose require the attendance of the members. The above para- has been numbered as clause (1) in the amended Article 56 and has been reproduced without any amendment. It may also be observed that three new clauses were added as clauses (2), (3) and (4) in the above Article 56 by the R.C.O., which were retained by the Eighth Amendment without any modification. Clause (2) confers power on the President to the effect that he may send messages to either House, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or otherwise. It further provides that a House to which any message is so sent shall with all convenient despatch consider any matter required by the message to be taken into consideration. Whereas clause (3) imposes obligation on the President to the effect that at the commencement of first Session after each general election to the National Assembly and at the commencement of first session each year to address both the Houses assembled together and inform the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of the causes of its summons. It may further be stated that above newly-added clause (4) provides that the provision shall be made in the rules for regulating the procedure of a House and the conduct of its business for .the allotment of time for discussion of the matters referred to in the address of the President. (v) It may be stated that the above-quoted original Article 58 had only one para. with an Explanation. The above para. provided that the "President shall dissolve the National Assembly" if so advised by the Prime Minister and the National Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, at the expiration of 48 hours after the Prime Minister has so advised shall stand dissolved. The Explanation appended to the above Article excluded for the purpose of above Article 58 a Prime Minister against whom a vote of no confidence had already been moved but not voted or who had resigned. In the substituted Article 58 under the R.C.O. original Article 58 was numbered as clause (1) with the Explanation. The clause itself was not amended but in the Explanation certain minor amendments were made as is evident from the above-quoted Explanation. The above clause (1) was retained under the Eighth Amendment. A new clause as clause (2) was added providing that "the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where in his opinion an appeal to the electorate is necessary". However, under the Eighth Amendment clause (2) was substituted providing conditions under which the President has discretion to dissolve the Assembly by incorporating sub-clauses (a) and (b) i.e. the President may dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion wherein his opinion-- (a) a vote of no confidence having been passed against a Prime Minister, no other member of the National Assembly is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution as ascertained in a Session of the National Assembly summoned for the purpose; or (b) situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary. To put it differently the unfettered and unbridled discretionary power which was conferred. on the President by clause (2) of Article 58 framed under the R.C.O. was circumscribed with the conditions contained in above clauses (a) and (b) by the Eighth Amendment. (vi) It may be noticed that the Original Article 75 provided that the President shall asset a Bill. within 7 days after it had been presented to him for assent under the relevant Article and if the President failed to do so, he shall be deemed to have, assented to the Bill at the expiration of the said period. Substituted clause (1) of Article 75 under the R.C.O. had been re -framed providing that President shall give his assent within 45 days or in case of a Bill other than a money Bill he might return the bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora with a message requesting that the Bill or any specified provision thereof be reconsidered and that any amendment specified in the message be reconsidered. It may further be observed that newly-added clause (2) by the R.C.O. laid down that upon the return of the Bill by the President, the same shall be reconsidered by Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in a joint sitting and if it was again passed with or without amendment by the Majlis-e-Shoora by vote of the majority of the total membership of the two Houses, it shall again be presented to the President who shall assent thereto. The above clause (2) was amended by the Eighth Amendment inasmuch as period of 45 days was substituted by 30 days and the last few words of the above clause were also substituted by the .words "the President shall not withhold assent therefrom." Original clause (2) of the above Article had been retained by the R.C.O. as well as by the Eighth Amendment, but was renumbered as clause (3). (vii) It may be stated that original Article 90 had two clauses, namely, clause (1) which provided that subject to the Constitution the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers which shall act through the Prime Minister, who shall be the Chief Executive. Whereas original clause (2) laid down that in the performance of his functions under the Constitution, the Prime Minister might act either directly or through the Federal Ministers. The above Article was substituted by the R.C.O. It had only one para. providing that the executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. It may further be observed that under the Eighth Amendment, the above para. was renumbered as clause (1) and a new clause as clause (2) was added providing that nothing contained in clause (1) shall-- (a) be deemed to transfer to the President any functions conferred by any existing law on the Government of any Province or other authority; or (b) prevent Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) from conferring by law function on authorities other than the President. It will not be out of context to mention that the above newly-added clause (1) through the Eighth Amendment providing that the executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President is lifted from clause (1) of Article 39 of 1956 Constitution, which corresponded to Article 53 of the Indian Constitution. (viii) It may be pointed out that as is evident from the above-quoted original Article 91 that it had three clauses and two provisos. Clause (1) provided that the National Assembly shall meet on the thirtieth day following the day on which a general election to the Assembly was held unless sooner summoned by the President. Whereas clause (2) provided that after the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the National Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect without debate one of his Muslim members to be the Prime Minister, It may further be observed that clause (3) laid down that the Prime Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the National Assembly. ft may further be stated that the two Provisos appended to the above clause provided formula for resolving the situation where none of the members secured majority in the first poll or where the number of votes secured by two or more members securing the highest number of votes is equal. The above Article 91 was re-drafted and enacted under the R.C.O. inasmuch as it provided six clauses instead of three clauses. Clause (1) provided that there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. Whereas clause (2) provided that the President shall in his discretion appoint from amongst the members of the National Assembly a Prime Minister, in his opinion, who is most likely tit command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. It may further be observe that 'clause (3) laid down that the person appointed under clause (2) shall before entering upon the office make before the President oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule and shall within a period of 60 days obtain a vote of confidence from the National Assembly, Whereas clause (4) provided that the Cabinet together with the Ministers of State shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly. It may also be mentioned that clause (5) laid down that the Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President but the President shall not exercise his powers under the above clause unless he was satisfied that the Prime Minister did not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. Whereas clause (6) provided that the Prime Minister might by writing under his hand address to the President resign his office. It may be pointed out that under the Eighth Amendment, above amended Article 91 was retained with certain additions inasmuch as clauses (1), (2), (4) and (6) were lifted from the R.C.O. However, a new clause as clause (2A) was added after clause (2) providing that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) after the 20th day of March, 1990, the President shall invite a member of the National Assembly to be the Prime Minister who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly as ascertained in a Session of the Assembly summoned for the purpose to accordance with the provisions- of the Constitution. In other. words, the above. newly-added clause (2-A) has nullified the discretionary power of the President with effect from 30-3-1990 given under above clause (2) to the effect that he could appoint arty Muslim member of the National Assembly as the Prime. Minister who in his opinion was most likely to command the confidence of the majority. It may further be observed that in clause (3) under the Eighth Amendment after the words 'under clause (2)'', the words "or as the case may be invited under clause (2-)" were added. Whereas in clause (5) the words "in which case he shall summon the National Assembly and require the Prime Minister to obtain d vote of confidence from the Assembly" were added by the Eighth Amendment. (ix) It may be stated Thai the. original Article 93 postulated that the Prime Minister shall continue till his successor entered upon the office of the Prime Minister and that nothing curtained in Article 91 or Article 92 was to be construed as to disqualify the Prime Minister or a Federal Minister or a Minister of State from continuing in office during the period the Assembly stood dissolved. Whereas the above Article 93 was substituted by the R.C.O., which was retained under the Eighth Amendment, The above substituted Article relates to the appointment of Advisors not more than five by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. (x) It may be pointed out that Article 99 was substituted by the R.C.U. The same was retained under the Eighth Amendment. Clause (1) of original Article 99 provided that orders and other instruments made and executed in the mine of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Federal Government, whereas substituted clause (1) lays down that all executive actions shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. It may further be observed that clause (2) of above original Article empowered the Federal Government to regulate the allocation and transaction of its business and to delegate any of its functions to officers or authorities subordinate to it. It may be pointed out that the above subject is now covered by clause (3) of the above-substituted Article which lays down that "the President shall also make rules for the. allocation and transaction of the business of the Federal Government". Whereas clause (2) of the above-substituted Article provided that "the President shall by rules specify the manner in which orders made and executed in his name shall be authenticated... "
20. In addition to the above amendments which have been highlighted, I may observe that clause (3) of Article 41 was amended by the R.C.O. which amendment was retained under the Eighth Amendment. The effect of the above amendment was that for the election of the President, the electoral college was expanded inasmuch as besides the two Houses of the Parliament, members of the four Provincial Assemblies were included as the members of the electoral college. In addition to that, besides discretionary power conferred under above Articles 48(5), (6), 58(2) and 92 discussed hereinabove the President was given discretionary power under Article 105(4) and in respect of the appointments under Articles 213, 242(1-A) and 243(2) the detail of which given hereinbelow inter alia in para. 22.
21. A resume of 'the above amendments indicate that under the original 1973 Constitution, the President as rightly pointed out by Mr. Shahid Harnidz learned counsel for the President, formal orders which he could make, the counter signature of the Prime Minister was required by virtue of clause (3) of Article 48 in order to make the saint valid. However, the amendments have changed the position of the President inasmuch as he has become part of the Parliament by virtue of amended Article
50. Besides the right to address to the Parliament, he had been given the power to send message to either of the Houses under clause (2) of Article
56. Additionally under clause (1) of Article 75 the President instead of assenting to a Bill other than a money Bill, can return the same to the Majlis-e Shoora (Parliament) with a message requesting that the said Bill or any specified provision thereof be reconsidered and any amendment specified in the message be considered. The executive authority of the Federation is vested in the President on account of amended Article 90(1). It may further be observed that Article imposes duty on the Prime Minister and creates right in favour of the President in respect of the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) & (c) already highlighted hereinabove in para. 19(i ) , Whereas under the proviso to clause (1) of Article 48, the President has been empowered to ask the Cabinet or the Prime Minister to reconsider the advice tendered under above clause. It may further be stated that under clauses (2) and (3) of Article 99, the President is to participate in the framing of the rules providing for the manner in which the orders and other instruments made and executed are to be authenticated and rules relating to allocation and transaction of business of the Federal Government. `
22. The cumulative effect of the above amendments seems to be that the President is no longer a titular head but by virtue of the various amendments, he can actively take interest and participate in the working of the Legislature and the Executive. He did not enjoy any discretionary power under the unamended Constitution. After the above amendments in the Constitution he has been given j express discretionary power in the following matters which he can exercise without or against the Prime Minister's advice under Article 48(1) of the Constitution
(i) to appoint a date for election under Article 48(5)(a); (ii) to appoint a Caretaker Cabinet after dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of the Cabinet under Article 58()(b), (iii) to refer a matter of national importance for referendum under Article 48(6); (iv) to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(a) when c onfidence vote has been passed against Prime Minister and the President is of the view that no other Muslim member is likely to command the confidence of the majority; (v) to dissolve the National Assembly if the two conditions contained in sub-clause (b) of Article 58 are fulfilled; (vi) to accord approval to the Government under Article 105(1)(4) of the Constitution for (a) appointment of the Chief Minister; (b) dismissal of a Cabinet which has not the confidence of the Provincial Assembly; (c) dissolution of the Provincial Assembly when an appeal to the electorate is necessary; (vii)' to appoint tire Chief Election Commissioner under Article 21:3(1); (viii)to appoint the Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission under Article 242(1-A); (ix) to appoint Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee Army, Naval and Air Staff under Article 243(2-C) Mr. Shahid Hamid has invited our attention to . the following observations which I made in my opinion in the case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif PLD 1993 SC 473: "In my view, the cumulative effect of the various provisions of the Constitution relating to the President is that the President enjoys the . right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn as remarked by Bagehot about the British Crown. In order to discharge his above Constitutional duties, he is expected to be vigilant and to keep his eyes and ears open. The documents produced by the Federation demonstrate that the President has attended to the above Constitutional duties by highlighting the various deficiencies and the need of improvement in the working of the Government. " He has also - invited our attention to paras. 8 and 9 from the opinion of Rustam S. Sidhwa J. at pages 683 and 684 of Kh. Ahmed Tariq's case PLD 1992 SC 640, in which Sidhwa, J. has succinctly described the position of the President and has pointed out that after the amendments the basic character of the Constitution is now a mix:
"A few words may be stated about the position of the President. The President, as the Head of the State, represents the unity of the Republic. He is thus placed above the party. He is the benign moderator and the symbol of the impartial ,, dignity of the State. He is entitled to certain communications and information, which is the duty of the Prime Minister to furnish, with power to submit for the consideration of the Cabinet any matter on which a decision may have been taken but which has not been considered by the Cabinet. He can call upon the Cabinet to reconsider any advice tendered or consider such advice. He has power to act in his discretion in respect of any matter it,, respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do so, with entitlement to decide 'whether he is so empowered. He has power to refer any matter of national importance to a referendum. He has power to send messages to either house for their consideration. He has the right to address both Houses assembled together at the commencement of each Session of Parliament. He has the power to dissolve the National Assembly if, in his opinion, a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. He has the power inter alia to appoint the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three Chiefs of the Army Staff, Naval Staff and Air Force Staff. He is at the apex, as the executive authority of the Federation, which is vested in him, is exercised by him directly or through officers subordinate to him. He is to be aided and advised in the exercise of his functions by the Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head. In the exercise of his functions, he has to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet ox the Prime Minister; except in cases where he is obliged to act in his discretion. The President is therefore no less powerful than the Prime Minister. The basic character of the Constitution is now a mix. It is not Presidential; it was never meant to be. It is not totally Parliamentary; as it was intended." The above-quoted observations seem to depict the correct nature of the Constitution and the position of the President, which emerged on account of the above highlighted amendments. However, since Articles 177 and 193 relating to the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts were not amended, the question arises, as to whether the above amendments in other Articles have in any way affected the operation of the above two Articles.
23. I may take up the question, as to whether Article 48(l) is attracted in case of appointments of Judges of the superior Courts. In this regard, I may mention that the learned counsel were at variance about the scope of clauses (1) and (2) of the above Article. According to Mr. Wahab-ul-Khairi, appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts fall under clause (2) of Article 48 which, according to him, covers the acts/orders passed by the President in exercise of his express or implied discretionary power. Whereas according .to Raja Muhammad Akram, clause (1) of Article 48 is applicable to all the functions which President performs under the Constitution except in the following three categories:
. (i) the action taken or order passed under Articles with expressly provide which that the President has discretion, (ii) where the language of the Articles is such that clause (1) of Article 48 is inapplicable, (iii) where the functions to be performed by the President under the relevant Articles are of the nature which by necessary intendment exclude advice under Article 48(l) of the Constitution. , Whereas Mr. Shahid Hamid, learned counsel for the President, has categorised the various Articles of the Constitution into seven categories in the context of Article 48, namely: (i) Articles of the Constitution in which it is specified that the President can act in his discretion in exercise of powers conferred by such Articles, -tinder this category, he has mentioned Articles 48(2), 48(5), 48(6), 8(2)(a), 58(22)(b), 105(3) read with 105(4). 203-C read with 2,03-A. 213, 242(1-A) and 243(2-C)3 (ii) Articles of the Constitution in which the words "in his discretion" are not mentioned but on the reading of which it is evident that the duty imposed and/or the right/power conferred is to be discharged/exercised by the President independently ,of the advice of the Cabinet/Prime Minister or where the President is either absolute or qualified discretion. The above category has been sub-divided by hurt into two sub-categories. In the first sub-category, he has specified Articles 29, 42, 56(3) read with 50, 70(3), 73(1) read with 75, 75(2), 91(2_A)> 99(21, 99(3), 160(1), 160(4), 171, 1 30, 228(6), 2321;'7) and
239. Whereas under the second sub-category, he has included Articles 44(2), 44(3), 45, 46(a), 46(b), 46(c), 47(7), 48(1), 56(1) read with 50, 56(2), 75(1)(b), 87(3), 91(8) read with 48(5), 91(5), 94, 100(2), 101(3) read with 101(1), 101(5) read with 101(1), 104 read with 101(1) and 160, 112(2), 162, 182, 183, 200(3), 208, 209(6) read with 209(5), 221 and 268(2). (iii) Articles of the Constitution in terms of which the President is bound to . exercise his functions in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or as the case may be of the Prime Minister and Articles in terms of which if the President acts he must do so in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet/Prime Minister. This category has also been bifurcated by him into two sub-categories under the captions "shall" and "may". Under the first sub-category he has specified Articles 48(1), 46(6), 58(1), 92(1), 92(3); whereas under the second sub-category, he has included Article 93 only. (iv) Articles of the Constitution in terms of which the exercise of functions to be performed by the President are (or appeared to be) subject to the provision of Article 48(1). In this category he has mentioned Articles 51(6), 54(1), 66(3)(b), 79, 91(1), 100(1), 145(1), 153(1), 153(2), 156(1), 160(2) read with 160(3), 160(6), 160(7), 168(1), 168(3), 168(6), 169, 176, 228(2), 228(4), 229, 233(2), 235(3), 235(2), 247(4), 247(5), 252(1), 258, 259(2). (v) Articles of the Constitution in terms of which the President is to exercise the powers conferred on him on the advice of the Prime Minister or as the case may be independently of such advice provided he is satisfied and/or considered and/or forms the opinion that a Constitutional basis exists for the exercise of that power. In this category, he has mentioned Articles 89(1), 186(1), 209(5), 229 read with 89(1), 232(1), 234(1), 235(1) and 247(6). (vi) Articles of the Constitution in terms of which the President .is to exercise powers and/or to discharge duties after consulting with the specified Constitutional consultees. In this regard, he has included Articles 72(2), 101(1), 160(1), 200(1) and 218(2). (vii) Articles of the Constitution in terms of- which a Constitutional duty in the form of a sacred trust has been imposed on the President which is to be discharged by him through participatory consultative process: in the case of the Supreme Court in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and in the case of the High Courts, in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Governors of the Provinces and the Chief Justices of the .High Courts. Under this category he has specified Articles 177, 181, 193 and
197. According to Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, learned Attorney-General, the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts fall under clause (2) of Article 48 and, therefore, Prime Minister's advice is not required. The same argument was adopted by the learned Additional Advocates-General, Punjab and N.-W. F. P. Whereas the learned Advocate-General Sindh, Mr. M.L. Shahani, besides adopting the arguments of the learned Attorney-General, has submitted that Article 48 provides for three situations, namely, (1) executive functions which are covered by Article 48(1), Constitutional functions of the President which are covered by Article 48(2) and political functions which are covered by. Article 48(6). ' On the other hand Messrs Iqbal Haider and Hamid Khan have submitted that there are two categories under Article 48(1) and (2). According to them, the President is required to act on the advice of the Prime Minister in all the matters except those matters in respect of which he has been given discretion expressly by the relevant Articles of the Constitution.
24. The learned counsel have taken us through the various Articles of the Constitution particularly Mr. Shahid Hamid had analytically dealt with each and every Article mentioned by him in the above seven categories referred to hereinabove. In my view, it is not necessary to deal with each and every Article and to record .a finding that action under a particular Article to be taken by the President requires Prime Minister's advice or not as it will be beyond the scope of the controversy before us. However, I may refer to some of the relevant Articles in support of the conclusions which I intend to record. Broadly speaking, in my view, prima facie the various Articles of the Constitution can be divided into following five categories for the purpose of application of Article 48(1) and (2):
(i) The Articles under which actions are to be taken in accordance with the advice tendered by the Cabinet or Prime Minister; (ii) The Articles under which the Prime Minister's advice is required but it will be binding if it is in accordance with the law declared by the Apex Court; (iii) The Articles which specifically provide for Prime Minister's advice or consultation independent of clause (1) of Article 48, to which Articles. aforesaid Article 48(1) would not be attracted to; (iv) The Articles under which the President has been given discretionary power, and, therefore, he can act without the advice of the Prime Minister by virtue of clause (2) of Article 48; (v) That the nature of the functions/duties/rights provided in certain Articles is such which exclude the application of Article 48(1).
25. In order to determine the scope of the first category referred hereinabove in para. 24, it may be pertinent to refer again clause (1) of Article 48 without the proviso which provides that "in the exercise of his functions, the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister". It is evident that in the exercise of his functions the President is required to act on the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. The key-words used are "in the exercise of his functions". The learned counsel who have appeared in the above matters were at variance as to the meaning of the above word "function". According to M/s. Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi, Raja Muhammad Akram and Shahid Hamid the word 'function' employed in the above clause does not cover the act of appointments of the Judges in the superior Courts as the same in their view it is neither a function nor an executive act but it is an act in discharge of a sacred trust. Reliance was placed by them on sub- para. (vii) of para. 22 of my opinion in the Judges' Case. (Al-Jehad Trust) PLD 1996 page 324 at page 428, wherein I have made the following observations:
"(vii) that the power to appoint inter alia Judges is a sacred trust, the same should be exercised in utmost good faith. Any extraneous consideration other than the merits is a great sin entailing severe punishment." It may be noticed that in the above observation I have employed the words "the power to appoint inter alia Judges is a sacred trust". The use of the word 'inter alia' implies that among others the act of appointments of Judges is "a sacred trust. In other words, the other appointments of the State functionaries are equally sacred trust. The above inference was drawn by me on the basis of an Hadith (Rawiat) attributed to Hazrat Abu Bakr (Razi Allah Anho) reproduced from the publication of the Magazine title (a publication of Islamic University, Islamabad). The Rawiat speaks of all State appointments. The same seems-to be in consonance with the concept of State in Islam, which is enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution, which has now become part of the Constitution by virtue of Article 2A, namely, that the sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust". In this regard it may be pertinent to refer to the two judgments of this Court relied upon by Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi namely:
(i)Miss Asma Jilani v. The Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139 at page 182) wherein Hamooduf Rehman, C.J. has made very pertinent observation as to the concept of sovereignty in relation to a State in Islam and the status of the State functionaries as trustee. The. above observations read as follows:
Say, ' O Allah, Lord of Sovereignty. Thou gives sovereignty to whosoever Thou pleasest; and Thou takest away sovereignty from whomsoever Thou pleasest. Thou exaltest whomsoever Thou pleasest and Thou absest whomsoever Thou pleasest. Pt: 3, Ch.3, A1 ' Imran, Ay. 27). The basic concept underlying this unalterable principle of sovereignty is that the entire body politic becomes a trustee for the discharge of sovereign functions. Since in 'a complex society every citizen cannot personally participate in the performance of the trust, the body politic appoints State functionaries to discharge these functions on its behalf and for its benefit, and has the right to remove the functionary so appointed by it if he goes against the law of the legal sovereign, or commits any other breach of trust or fails to discharge his obligations under a trust. The functional Head of the State is chosen by the community and has to be assisted by a Council which must hold its meetings in public view and remain accountable to public. It. is under this system that the Government becomes a Government of laws and not of men, .for, no one is above the law. It is this that led Von Hammer, a renowned oriental list, to remark that under the Islamic system "the law rules through the utterance of justice, and the power of the Governor carries out the utterance of it." Hakim Khan and 3 others v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 595 at page 719 wherein Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, J. as his lordship then was, has dilated upon the above aspect as follows:
"This submission undoubtedly has force. In an Islamic polity all the three limbs of the State namely Executive, Legislature and Judiciary can exercise the delegated functions of the divine sovereignty within their respective spheres and the reference in the Holy Qur'an to the obedience of is equally applicable to the members of the judiciary. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that Maulana Maududi in his work entitled Tafheemul Qur'an observes; the original is in Urdu and the English rendering thereof below i-R somewhat as under:
"The concept of ' Oolilamr' comprises of persons who are in charge of the collective affairs of the Muslims. They may be Ulema offering guidance on religious matters, or the political leaders, the civil servants running the administration or Judges deciding disputes in Courts etc..." Interpreting the sane verse Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi in Tadabbar-i Qur'an observed: "Since at the time of Revelation of this verse there was no question of any State or caliphate, the expression ' Oolilamr' referred to in that context to the prominent leaders of the Muslims in various fields." This shows that the judiciary too can exercise the delegated divine sovereignty. Keeping in view the above Islamic concept of sovereignty, as enunciated inter alia in the above-cited cases, the appointment of Judges of the superior Courts cannot be distinguished from the appointments of other Constitutional functionaries under the Constitution on account of the above reason which is attracted in case of all the appointments under the Constitution. Raja Muhammad Akram and Mr. Shahid Hamid have also referred to the case of Subhesh Sharma v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 631 in which while dealing with the term 'consultation' employed in Articles 124, 214 and 217 of the Indian Constitution, it has been observed that:
"The Constitutional values cannot be whittled down by calling the appointment of Judges as an executive act. The appointment is rather the result of collective, Constitutional process. It is a participatory Constitutional function. It is, perhaps, inappropriate to refer to any 'power' or 'right' to appoint Judges. It is essentially a discharge of a Constitutional trust of which certain Constitutional functionaries are collectively repositories. " The above observations are to be read in the context in which they have been made. It has not been held by the Indian Supreme Court in the above case that the appointments of Judges is not an executive act but what has been emphasized is that the same is not an act, of a single State functionary. But it is a participatory collective Constitutional functions. In the Judges' Case (supra) in para. 78 at page 403 Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD ,1996 SC 324, it has been observed by the learned Chief Justice that-- "now there is no dispute about the fact that appointment of a Judge as contemplated in the Constitution is an executive action for the reason that a final order is passed in the name of the President." Whereas at page 488 of the above I have observed that: "I am inclined to hold that the act of appointment of a Chief Justice or a Judge in the superior Courts is an executive act. No doubt this power is vested in the Executive under the relevant Articles of the Constitution, but the question is, as to how this power is to be exercised. " In view of the above judgment of this Court, it cannot be contended that the appointments of the Judges is not an executive act. I may mention that in order to understand the scope of clause (1) of Article 148, it is imperative to understand the meaning of the word 'function' as the efforts were made by some of the learned counsel to distinguish the same from 'duties' and 'powers'. The word 'function' has been defined as under in the following Dictionaries:
(i) Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Vo1.2: "Functions.--(1) Irish Free State Agreement Act, 1922 ' 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c.4): see Great Southern & Western Railway Co. of Ireland v. R. 1925 A.C.754. (2) The Stat. Def. of "functions": is usually; 'Functions' include powers and duties, "See, for example, local Government Act, 1929 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 17, s.134; Town and Country Planning Act. 1947 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c.51, s.119 (1); National Assistance Act, 1948 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.29, s.64(1); Iron and Steel Act, 1949 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c.72, s.59(1); but see River Roads Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6, c. 32), s.36(1)." (ii) Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1991: "Function. Derived from Latin 'functus', the past participle of the verb ' fungor' which means to perform, executc, administer The nature and proper action of anything, activity appropriate to any business or profession. Resenblum v Anglitn. D.C. Cal. 43 F.Supp. 889, 892. office; duty; fulfilment of a definite end or set of ends by the correct adjustment of means. The occupation of an office. By the performance of its duties, the officer is said to fill his function. The proper activities or duties of municipality. Bean v. City of Knoxville, Tenn. 448m 175 S.W. 2d 954, 955. ... (iii) Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, Second Edition, Ballentine "Function (fungk'shon). Whatever a person is employed or appointed to do; the duty of an office or officer. See judicial functions; ministerial Functions; quasi judicial functions". ... (iv) New Webster's Dictionary Deluxe Encyclopaedic Edition. "Function, fungk'shan n. Fr. Fonction, L. functio, L. Fungor, functus, to perform, to execute. The normal or proper activity of a person, institution, or thing; the specific duties of a person, asp. in a professional or an official capacity, as: The function of a Judge is to administer justice. A formal or elaborate social occasion; math. The association of a particular quantity from one set with each quantity from another set, such that no change can be made in the former without producing a corresponding change in the latter; gram. the role of . a linguistic form in a grammatical construction.-v.i. To perform usual or specified activity; to serve in a particular capacity.-function. less, a." (v) Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition: "Function fung(k)' shen n. the doing of -a thing: performance obs.: Activity ohs: an activity appropriate to any person or thing: duty peculiar to any office: faculty, exercise of faculty: the peculiar office of anything: a profession obs.: a solemn service: a ceremony: a social gathering: in math., a variable so connected with another that for any value of the one 'there is a corresponding value for the other: a correspondence between two sets of variables such that each member of one set can be related to one particular member of the other set: an event, etc. dependent on some other factor or factors: the technical term in physiology for the vital activity of an organ, tissue, or cell: the part played by a linguistic form in a construction, or by a form or form class in constructions in general linguistics. -v.i. to perform a function: to act: to operate: to work." A perusal of the above Dictionaries meaning of the word 'functions' indicate that the same has very wide connotation. It encompasses not only executive functions but also judicial functions. The word "Function" is derived from Latin word, "Functus". It inter alia connotes the normal or proper activity of a person, institution, or the specific duties of a person especially in a profession or official capacity, or duty peculiar to any office. It includes "powers": and duties. Since the meaning of the word "function" includes Executive functions, I may refer to the celebrated treatise, namely, Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edition relied upon by Mr.S.M. Zafar in which in para 814 the Author has brought out succinctly distinction between the legislative, executive and judicial functions as follows:
"The executive.--Although the legislative, executive and judicial functions are formally distinct, it is not the case that executive functions are exclusively performed by the executive, or that the executive does not engage in functions which would normally be described as legislative or judicial in character. Executive functions are incapable of comprehensive definition, for they are merely the residue of functions of Government after legislative and judicial functions have been taken away." From the above-quoted extract, it is evident that executive functions are incapable of comprehensive definition but they can be described as residue of functions of Government after legislative and judicial functions have been taken out. In other words, executive functions are very wide in their import and scope. I am, therefore, of the view that the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 and/or under any other Articles cannot be excluded from the ambit of functions referred to in clause (1) of Article 48 on the above ground urged by the above learned counsel. 26. 1 may refer to the above second category i.e. the Articles under which tilt Prime Minister's advice is required, but it will he binding on the President if it is in accordance with the law declared by the Apex Court. In this regard, it is pertinent to. point out that Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution specify the consultees to whom the President is supposed to consult. I may mention that at this stage,' it is not necessary to examine the question as to whether the President is the consultor or the Prime Minister/Cabinet. This aspect I intend to deal with at a later stage. In the Judges' Case (supra) PLD 1996 SC page 324 the majority has held that the interpretation of various Articles relating to the superior judiciary given by this Court in the said case will be binding on the executive which includes the President, and the Prime Minister. I have already quoted hereinabove paras. 66, 68 and 69 of my opinion in which the above issue has been dealt with. In the Judges' Case we have inter alia held as under:
(i) The words "after consultation" employed inter alia in Articles 177 and 193 ..of the Constitution connote that the consultation should be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. The opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of a High court as to the fitness and suitability of a candidate for Judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the President/Executive. (ii) That if the President/Executive appoints a candidate found to 'tic; unfit and unsuitable for Judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, it will not be a proper exercise of power under the relevant Article of the Constitution. Since the interpretation of the various Articles by this Court becomes part of the Constitution and as it becomes the law, it is incumbent on all Executive and Judicial Authorities throughout Pakistan to act in aid of the Supreme Court by virtue of Article
190. An advice under clause(1) of Article 48 of the Constitution, therefore, cannot be in violation of the law as declared by this Court. In other words, if the advice tendered by the Prime Minister in respect of appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts is in accordance with the judgment of this Court in the Judges' Case, it will be binding on the President. But if the advice is contrary to the above judgment, the President has several options which inter alia include the following:-- (i) The President may agree with the reasons recorded .by the Prime Minister for not accepting the recommendations of the Chief Justice or the Chief Justices. In that event the above reasons will be justiciable as held by this Court in the Judges' Case. (ii) The President may refer back the matter to the Prime Minister for reconsideration under the proviso to clause (1) of Article. 48. (iii) The President may refer the matter for consideration of the Cabinet under clause (c) of Article 46 of the Constitution. (iv) The President may convene a meeting and may invite the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of High Court concerned for resolving the issue by participatory consultative process, consensus-oriented. Mr. Justice (Retd.) Muhammad Shahabuddin, former Chief Justice of Pakistan, in his Book under the title 'Recollections and Reflections' quoted by me in para. 46 at page 483 in my opinion in the Judges' Case has referred to the above practice. (v) The President may make a reference to this Court under Article 186 for soliciting opinion. However, it was urged by Mr. Iqbal Haider that the President is bound to accept the Prime Minister's advice even if it is violative of the Constitutions and the judgment in the Judges' Case. Reliance was placed by him on the following observations from the treatise titled, "Constitution of India" by Dr. Durga Das Basu Sixth Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol.E, 1981 Publication, page 273 which read as follows:
"One of the arguments of the protagonists of President's powers was that the President being bound by his oath under Article 60, page 234, ante, to 'protect and defend the Constitution' was entitled to reject a particular advice tendered by his Council of Ministers which, in his opinion, was likely to undermine the Constitution'. This argument would no longer be available after the 1976 amendment of Article 74(1), because the Constitution now expressly requires him to act in accordance with such advice'. If the Ministers give him an unconstitutional advice, the Ministers shall be answerable to the House of the People, under Article 75(3). But, if the President rejects a Ministerial advice, he would himself be liable to the charge of violating the Constitution and answerable to Parliament in impeachment. He cannot reject such advice, but may ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider it under the proviso inserted in 1978 p.272, ante." I am unable to subscribe to the above broad proposition of law to the effect that the President is bound to act, on the Prime Minister's advice even when it is in violation of the certain provisions of the Constitution and the judgment' of the Apex Court. I am inclined to hold that if there is no ambiguity as to the law declared by the Apex Court, the President cannot in breach of such law act upon the advice of the Prime Minister as it will not only be violative of the judgment of the Apex Court but would also be in breach of the oath of office. The view which I am inclined to take, was also found favour with the Indian Supreme Court. J.S. Verma, J. in para 482 of his opinion who spoke for himself and also on behalf of his four learned brethren, namely, Yogeshwar Dayal, G.N.Ray, A.S. Anand and S.P. Bharucha, JJ. in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC page 268, relevant at page 432 while dealing with the corresponding Article i.e. Article 74 of the Indian Constitution observed as follows:
"If it were to be held that. notwithstanding the requirement of Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of mandatory consultation with the, Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of the High Court, the Council of Ministers has the unfettered- discretion to give contrary advice, ignoring the views of the Chief Justice of India, arid the President is bound by Article 74(1) to act in accordance with that advice, then Constitutional purpose of introducing the mandatory requirement of consultation in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) would be frustrated. It is for this reason, that in the matter of appointments of Judges of the superior judiciary, the interaction and harmonisation of Article 74(1) with Articles 124(2) and 21 t (1) has to be borne in mind, to serve the Constitutional purpose In short, in the matter of appointments of Judges of the superior judiciary, the Constitutional requirement is, that to President is to ac; to accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers as provided in Article 74(1); and the advice of the Council of Ministers is to be given iii accordance with Articles 124(2) and 217(t),, as construed by this Court. In this sphere, Article 74(1) is circumscribed by the requirement to Articles 124(2) and 217(1), wid all of them have to be read together. "
27. Adverting to the above third category mentioned by me in para. 24, (i.e. "'The Articles which specifically provide for the Prime Minister's advice or consultation independent of clause (1) of Article 48, to which Article, aforesaid Article 48(1) would not be attracted to"), it may be observed that clause (1) of Article 48 will not be applicable to the Articles of the Constitution which provide for specific role for the Prime Minister. In this regard reference may be made to some of the Articles as examples. It may be stated that under clause (1) of Article 92, the President is requested to appoint Federal Ministers and Ministers of State: on the advice of the Prime Minister Similarly under clause (1) of Article 93 the President is to appoint Advisers to the Prime Minister not more than five on the advice of the Prime Minister. Whereas under clause (1) of Article 101 the President has been empowered to appoint a Governor for each of the Province after consultation with the Prime Minister. Since Articles 92(1) and 93(1) expressly provide that the President shall perform his functions under the same on the advice of the Prime Minister, second advice of the Prime Minister under clause (1) of Article 48 is not required. Furthermore, as under clause (1) of Article 101 the role of the Prime Minister is of a consultee, the same will exclude applicability of Article 48(1) of the Constitution on the principle that a special/specific provision shall exclude a general provision. 28. (a) I may now deal with the fourth category, namely, the Articles under which the President has been expressly given discretion to act. The detail of the Articles is given hereinabove in para. 22, therefore, need not to be repeated. The learned counsel for the petitioners and for -the President have vehemently contended that the above newly-added clause (2) has far-reaching effect as to the powers of the President, According to them this clause will not only include where the President has been expressly given discretion in the relevant Articles but will also include where an implied discretion can be inferred. On the contrary, it vas contended by the learned counsel opposing the above Constitution petitions that the above clause is applicable only to those matters in respect of which the relevant Articles of the Constitution have expressly provided discretion. To re-enforce ~ the above submission they have pointed out that under the original scheme of the Constitution, the President had not been given any express discretionary power. However, under the Eighth Amendment the President has been given express discretionary power in respect of the matters referred to hereinabove in para.
22. I am inclined to hold that since above new clause of Article 48(2) providing that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) the President shall act at his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do so, was added simultaneously with the amendments made in the relevant Articles providing that the president shall act at-his discretion in respect of the matters covered by the said Articles, clause (2) of Article 48 is relatable to those Articles only. The same does not include any Article of the Constitution, if any, relating to an 'implied power or discretion. it will not be out of context to point out that tinder the original subsection (1) of section 9 of the Government of India Act; 1935, it was provided that "There shall be a Council of Ministers not exceeding 10 to number to aid and advice the Governor-General in the exercise of his functions except so far as be has by or under this Act required to exercise his functions or any of theta in his discretion", in the above Act the Governor-General was given discretionary power under the following sections: "Ss.9-(1)(2)(3)-10-(5), 11-(1) 12-(h), 14-(1)(2), 15(4), 17(3)(5), 19(2), 20(1)(2), 22(3), 26(e)(f), 31(1)(3), 32(1), 33(3)(e)(4), 38(1)(a)(c)(d)(2)(3), 40(2), 43(1)(5), 44(1)(5), 45(1)()), 50(1)(2)(3), 51(5), 52(1)(g), 54(1)(2), 57(1)(3), 58(a)(b), 59(3)(5), 62(2), 63(1)(2), 65(3), 69(1)(e)(r), 74(2), 75, 76(1), 78(4), 84(1)(a)(c)(d)(2), 86(2), 88(1)(b), 89(1)(5), 90(1)(5), 92(2)(3). 93(1)())(5), 94(3), 95(1)(2)(3), 102(1), 104(2), 107(2), 108(1)(b)(c)(2)(b)(c)(d)(i), 110(ii), 111(3), 119(1), 123(3), 125(2), 126(4)(5), 128(2), 129(4)(5), 132(b), 138(2)(ii); 141(1), 152(1), 153, 163(4), 166(3), 167(2)(c), 170(1)(2), 175(1), 182(1)(2), 183(2)(4), 187(1)(3), 189(1), 195(3), 196(1)(2)(b)(8), 199, 202, 206(3), 213(1), 214(1), 222(1)(2)(3), 226(2), 242(4)()), 244(2)(4), 246(1), 251()), 265(1)(2)(3)(c), 266(3), 267()), 270(1), 271(1), 278(6), 286(2), 295(1), 299(3), 305(1)(2), 308(1), 313(3)(c)(4)(d) and 314(1)." It may further be observed that subsection (2) of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided that except in so far as other provision is made by or in accordance with law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under subsection (1) of above section 8, each of the new Dominions and all the Provinces and other parts thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935, subject to omissions and modifications which may be made. After the creation of Pakistan the Governor-General's above discretionary powers were curtailed in a number of matters. The above Act was substituted by 1956 Constitution, which was framed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and which came into effect on 23-3-1956. Clause (7) of Article 37 of the same already referred to hereinabove provided treat the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or appropriate Minister or Minister of State as the case may be except to case,. where he was empowered by the Constitution to act in his discretion and in respect of the exercise of his powers under clause (6) which provided that the Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President but the President shall not exercise the powers under this clause unless he was satisfied that the Prime Minister did not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. It may further be mentioned that under 1956 Constitution the President had discretionary power in the following matters besides above clause (6) of Article 37:
(i) to appoint a Muslim person as the Prime Minister among the members of the National Assembly, who in his opinion, was likely to command confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly (Article 37(3)). (ii) to constitute Election Commission (Article 137(4): (iii) to constitute a Delimitation Commission for the National and Provincial Assembles (Article 142(3): (iv) to appoint the Chairman and other members of the Public Service Commission in his discretion (Article 186). Since 1972 Interim Constitution of Pakistan was of Presidential Form, all the powers were vested in the President. However, on account of the pressure of UDF (United Democratic Front) and the public, 1973- Constitution adopted Parliamentary Form of Government. In the above Constitution, the President was not given any discretionary power. Even for his formal orders as pointed out hereinabove it was provided under clause (3) of Article 48 that save as otherwise provided in any rules made under Article 89, the orders of the President shall require for their validity, the countersignature of the Prime Minister. It may be mentioned that concept of countersignature was not a new concept introduced through the above clause in Pakistan. Article 38 of the Fourth French Republic Constitution of 1946 provided that every act of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by the President of the Council of Ministers and by a Minister. Similarly in Germany under the West German Constitution, 1949 read with the rules framed thereunder, it has been provided that all official acts of the President require the countersigning of a Minister save certain specified ones. The above view which I am inclined to take is supported by the above legislative/Constitutional history and is in line with the intention of the author of the above amendments, namely, then President General Muhammad Ziaul Haq manifested by him in his aforesaid address on 12-8-1983 to the Majlis-e-Shoora, namely that he wanted to make minimum amendments in the Constitution. for incorporating Islamic provisions and to have discretionary power to dissolve the National Assembly and to make .appointments of certain Constitutional functionaries, it may be stated that Articles 177 and 193 relating to the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts remained in the original form unamended. (b) -I may also deal with another argument of the learned counsel. It was urged by M/s. Shahid Hamid, Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi, Raja Muhammad Akram that the Articles of the Constitution which postulate "satisfaction of the President, are covered by implied discretionary power under clause (2) of ,Article 48 as the "satisfaction can be subjective and not objective". On the other hand, it was urged by the learned counsel opposing the above petitions that it is not open to this Court to read the words 'implied discretion' in clause (2) of Article
48. It was further urged by them that since the President is required to act on the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet by virtue of clause (1) of Article 48, the satisfaction, referred to in the relevant Articles, is of that the Cabinet or the Prime Minister and not of the President. It may be observed that the above controversy also cropped up in India. In the case of Bk. Sardari Lal, Appellant v. Union of India and others Respondents AIR 1971 SC- 1547, the question arose, whether under clause (c) of proviso of clause (2) of Article 311, which requires satisfaction of the President or the Governor as the case may be for dispensing with a regular inquiry in respect of misconduct of a civil servant, the same should be personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor or could it be of the Minister concerned or the officer concerned under the relevant rules. The answer was returned by a Bench comprising the learned Chief Justice and four companion Judges to the effect that it was the personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor as the case may be by reversing earlier view taken by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Moti Ram Deka etc. v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railways AIR 1964 SC 600 and the case of Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana AIR 1964 SC 648: The above question was again agitated before the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh v-. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192. A Bench comprising the learned Chief Justice and six companion Judges reviewed the case-law and overruled Bk. Sardari Lal's case (supra) AIR 1971 SC 1547. It may be pertinent to reproduce paras. 30 and 40 from the opinion of A.N. Ray, C.J. and para. 141 from the opinion of K. Iyer, J. which read as follows:-- "
30. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by making rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India or the Government of State respectively or by allocation among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance with Articles 77(3) and 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, as. for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2), proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the Constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules for the more convenient transactions of the business of the Government and the allocation of business among the Ministers of the said business. The rules of business and the allocation among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the decision of any Minister or officer under the rules of business made under these two Articles viz. Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of the State is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively.
40. The Rules of Business in the Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills case (1967) 2 SCR 406 - AIR 1967 SC 1145 '(supra) indicated that the business of the Government was to be transacted in various departments specified in the Schedules. Land and Land Revenue was allocated as the business of the Department of the Minister with that 'portfolio. The Minister-in charge had power to make standing order regarding disposal of cases. This Court held that the decision of any Minister or officer under Rules of Business is a decision of the President or the Governor respectively. The Governor means, the Governor aided and advised by the Ministers. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Although the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor actually it is carried on by Ministers under Rules of Business made under Article 166(3). The allocation of business of the Government is the decision of the President or the Governor on the aid and advice of Ministers.
141. Similarly, the President is entrusted with powers and duties covering a wide range by the Articles of the Constitution. Indeed, he is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Article 53(2), appoints Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and determines the latter's age when dispute arises, has; power to refer questions for the Advisory opinion of the Supreme Court (Article 143) and has power to hold that Government of a State cannot be carried in accordance with the Constitution (Article 356). The Auditor-General, the Attorney General, the Governors and the entire army of public servants hold office during the pleasure of the President. Bills cannot become law, even if passed by Parliament, without the assent of the President, recognising and de-recognising rulers of former native States of India is a power. vested in the President. The extraordinary powers of legislation by, Ordinances, dispensing with enquiries against public servants before dismissal declaration of emergency and imposition of President's rule by proclamation upon States, are vast powers of profound significance. Indeed, even the power of summoning and proroguing and dissolving the House of the People and returning Bills passed by the Parliament belongs to him. If only we expand the ratio of Sardarilal (1971) 3 SCR 461 = AIR 1971 SC 1547 and Jayantilal (1964) 5 SCR 294 - AIR 1964 SC 648 to every function which the various Articles of the Constitution confer on the President or the Governor, Parliamentary democracy will become a dope and national elections a numerical exercise in expensive futility. We will be compelled to hold that there are two parallel authorities exercising powers of governance of the country, as in the dyarchy days, except that white-hall is substituted by Rashtrapati Bhavan and Baj Bhawan. The Cabinet will shrink at Union and State levels in political and administrative authority and, Paving solemn regard to the gamut of his powers and responsibilities, the Head of State, will be a reincarnation of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, untroubled by even the British Parliament --a little taller in Power than the American President. Such a distortion by interpretation, it appears to us, would virtually amount to a subversion of the structure, substance and vitality of our Republic, particularly when we remember that Governors are but appointed functionaries and the President himself is elected on a limited indirect basis. As we have already indicated the overwhelming catena of authorities of this Court have established over the decades that the Cabinet form of Government and the Parliamentary system have been adopted in India and the contrary concept must be rejected as incredibly allergic to our political genius, Constitutional creed and culture." A perusal of the above-quoted paras. from the above two opinions indicates that the Indian Supreme Court while construing Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 wherein the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is required to be satisfied, has held that in view of the scheme of the Constitution, it is the satisfaction of the Council of the Ministers or the Minister concerned under the relevant rules. It has been also highlighted that under the various Articles of the Indian Constitution referred to in the above-quoted para.141 from A.N.Ray, C.J.'s opinion, the functions of appointments of various Constitutional functionaries including the appointments of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are vested with the President. But the said power is to be exercised with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, otherwise the Parliamentary democracy will become a dope and national elections a numerical exercise in expensive futility. It was contended by M/s. Raja Muhammad Akram, Shahid Hamid and Shahzad Jehangir (learned Attorney-General) that since India had adopted Westminster Type/British Parliamentary Form of Government, the judgments of the Courts of Indian's jurisdiction cannot be relied upon as in Pakistan we have not adopted above type of Parliamentary Government as sovereignty in Pakistan vests in Almighty Allah. In this regard, it may be pertinent to point out that in the case of Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan reported in PLD 1988 SC p.416 in which certain provisions of Political Party Act, 1962 inter alia relating to the restrictions on political parties were declared ultra vires Article 17(2) of the Constitution, Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. in his opinion at page 616 has held that "even otherwise, speaking broadly our Constitution is a Federal Constitution based on the model of Parliamentary Form of representative Government prevalent. in United Kingdom. It is also clear from the Objectives Resolution that principles of democracy as enunciated by Islam are to be fully observed. True and fair elections and the existence of political parties, is an essential adjunct of a functional democratic system of Government". It may further be observed that Shafiur Rahman, J. in the case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (supra) at page 603 with approval quoted the following observations from the judgment of this Court in the case of Mirza Tahir Beg v. Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others PLD 1976 SC 504: "Needless to say that the Speaker in a Parliamentary Form of Government holds an office of highest distinction and has the sole responsibility cast on him of maintaining the prestige and the dignity of the House and each and every member composing the House. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution has ordained that a resignation by a member is effective only when it is 'addressed' to the Speaker: it was not intended to tie an idle formality. To relinquish a Parliamentary seat by resignation is a grave and a solemn act. By and large our political institutions are fashioned on the pattern of those obtaining in England and it is a settled principle of parliamentary law in England that- a member of Parliament after he is duly chosen, cannot relinquish his seat by unilaterally resigning his membership. In order to evade this restriction a member who wishes to relinquish his seat, accepts office under the Crown which legally vacates his seat. This is enough to underline the gravity of the matter. (See May's Parliamentary Practice, 18th End., p.45)." Mr. Muhammad Afzal Lone, J. made the similar observations at page 757 in Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's case. However, I may observe that the simpliciter the fact that a country has British Parliamentary Form of Government will not be the determining factor, on the question, whether the President or the Prime Minister has power to appoint the Judges of the superior Courts but the determining factor will tae the language employed in the relevant Article-s of the Constitution . I may mention that in the Judges' Case Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan learned counsel for the Federation had referred the Constitutions of 71 countries to canvass at the Bar that the recommendations of the Chief Justices in respect of appointments of Judges are not binding. In that context, I observed as under in para. 42 of my opinion: "The question, as to whether the appointment of Judges is an executive act or not, will depend on the language employed in the relevant provisions of the Constitution in issue. I have already referred to hereinabove the factum that Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan has furnished photostat copies of the relevant Articles of the Constitutions of 71 countries, which inter alia indicate different modes of appointment of Judges, namely:-- ' (i) by election through the mode provided in the relevant Articles of the Constitution; (ii) by nomination by the head of the State but appointment with the consent of the legislative body; (iii) by the head of the Government on the advice of Judicial Commission/Judicial services Commission; (iv) by the head of the Government; and (v) by the head of the State in consultation with the heads of the Judiciary. Mr. Shahid Hamid has referred the Constitution of Malaysia whereas Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada has referred to the Constitution of Malaysia, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Bangladesh. He has also given synopsis of the Constitutions of Malta Barbados, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, and Tanzania. The parity of reasoning adopted in the above-quoted relevant portion of para. 42 of my opinion from Judges' Case will be equally applicable to the above Constitutions. M/s. Iqbal Haider and Hamid Khan have heavily relied upon the following observations made by the various learned Judges in Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's case in respect of powers/functions vis-a-vis the President and the Prime Minister: "Nasim Hasan Shah, J: Unfortunately, this belief that he enjoys some inherent or implied powers besides these specifically conferred on him under Articles 46, 48(6), 101, 242(1-A) and 243(2)(c) is a mistaken one. In a Constitution contained in a written document wherein the powers and duties of the various agencies established by it are formulated with precision, it is the wording of the Constitution itself that is enforced and applied and this wording can never be overridden or supplemented by extraneous principles or non-specified enabling powers not explicitly incorporated in the Constitution itself. In view of the express provisions of our written Constitution detailing with fullness, the powers and duties of the various agencies of the Government that it holds in balance there is no room of any residual or enabling powers inhering in any authority established by it besides those conferred upon it by specific words." Shafiur Rahman J.'s observations have already been quoted above in para.28(a). "Saad Saood Jan J: It seems difficult to support this contention. To begin with, personal feelings of the President and the Prime Minister towards each other do not enter into and are in fact inrrelevant so far as the conduct of the affairs of the Federation is concerned. Our Constitution clearly demarcates the spheres of activity of the President and the Prime Minister. Except in matters where the Constitution clearly expresses an intention to the contrary, the President has no option but to act on the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. This is exactly what Article 48(1) of the Constitution states. If he does not approve of the advice given to him all that he can ask is that the advice should be re considered by the Cabinet. But if the same advice is re-tendered to him he is under a duty to act in accordance therewith. I therefore do not see how the President can invoke his powers under Article 58(2) (b), ibid, to dissolve the National Assembly if his relations with the Prime Minister are on an edge." Aimal Mian J: But at the same time the Prime Minister's status is neither inferior nor is less important to that of the President. Except in the matters which are in the sole domain of the President, the President cannot act without the advice of the Prime Minister, whose advice is binding on him by virtue of Article 48(1) of the Constitution. The Prime Minister, in fact, runs the Government and formulates its policies in terms of the Constitution and is accountable to the Parliament. He represents the will of the people. Prior to the Eighth Amendment the Prime Minister was all in all, but after the above amendment, the position has changed considerably." Muhammad Afzal Lone, J: The compulsory nature of the principle of advice is quite obvious. The President is bound to act on the advice of Prime Minister/Cabinet, commending majority in the House, except where he has discretion or exercises prerogative such as under Article 94 and his satisfaction is secured (Articles 232, 234, 235); if such satistaction is borne out from the advice tendered to him by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. Compliance with Article 48(1) by the President is ensured by Articles 42 and
47. Under Article 42 he takes the oath to perform his functions faithfully in accordance with the Constitution and further to preserve, protect and .defend the same. If he misConducts or refuses to accept the advice, he can be impeached under Article 47 for violation of the Constitution." "Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, J: The result was that though the President had made an inroad, in the all supremacy of the Prime Minister, under Article 48, with the phrase, ' in his discretion' and avoided in certain matters his binding advice, yet he did not succeed in his attempt in respect of Article 58(2). Thus notwithstanding the words ' in his discretion, an action by the President, even under Article 58(2), lost exclusiveness and immunity and became justiciable." "Saleem Akhtar, J: In interpreting Article 58(2)(b) the Constitutional background is to be taken into consideration. The Constitution envisages parliamentary form of Government. Therefore, if any provision has been inserted in the Constitution afterwards infringing, or impinging on the democratic and parliamentary system, it is to be construed in a manner that spirit and form of parliamentary system is not distorted." "Saiduzzaman Siddiaui, J: On a careful examination of the above Articles of the Constitution it is quite clear that the President in discharge of his functions under the Constitution has to act on the advice of Prime Minister or the Cabinet, except in those cases where he is specifically authorised by the Constitution to act in his discretion. The discretionary powers of the President under the Constitution are limited to the extent of making a few appointments to the high Constitutional offices, besides his power to dissolve the National Assembly (Article 58(2)(a) and (b), to refer a matter of national importance to referendum (Article 48(6) and to fix a date for election within 90 days on dissolution of National Assembly and to appoint a Caretaker Cabinet (Article 48(5) ." It will not be out of context to point out that Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's case (supra) was decided by the then learned Chief Justice and the 10 companion Judges. Out of the above eleven (11) members Bench ten (10) of the learned Judges adopted above reasonings. It has been held that the President does not have any implied power by virtue of the Eighth Amendment but he has only those powers which have been specifically conferred on him. At the same time as I have already pointed out hereinabove that the President is no longer a titular. But he is entitled to participate actively.
29. I may take up the fifth category mentioned by me hereinabove in para.24 namely, "that the nature of the functions/duties/rights provided in the Articles is such which'excludes the application of Article 48(1). To illustrate above category, I may refer to a few Articles of the Constitution. It may be pointed out that under clause (c) of Article 46, the President may require the Prime Minister to submit for the consideration of the cabinet any matter on which a decision has been taken by the Prime Minister, whereas under proviso 1 to clause (1) of Article 48, the President may require the Cabinet or as the case may be, the Prime Minister to reconsider advice tendered under the above provision of the Constitution. It may further be pointed out that under clause (1) of Article 56 the President may address either House or both Houses whereas under clause (2) of the above Articles, the President may send message to either House, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or otherwise, and a House to which a message is so sent shall with all convenient despatch consider any matter required by the message to be taken into consideration. Similarly, under clause (2) of Article 75 the President has been empowered to return a Bill other than a Money Bill to Majlis-e-Shoora for reconsideration. It may be observed that the nature of functions mentioned in the above Articles, is such that clause (1) of Article 48 of the Constitution is inapplicable. The above Articles create right in favour of the President and corresponding duty on the part of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Parliament. For exercising the above rights it is inconceivable that the President should seek advice of the State functionaries against whom such rights are to be exercised in respect of the legislative and executive functions referred to hereinabove.
30. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to deal with another important aspect of the judgment in the Judges' Case. In this regard, it may be pertinent to quote sub-para. (iii) of para. 69 of the same at page 520 which reads as follows:-- "That the permanent vacancies accruing in the offices of Chief Justices and Judges normally should be filled in immediately not later than 30 days but a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reasons, should be filled in within 90 days on permanent basis. " A, perusal of the above-quoted sub-para. indicates that a time-frame has been specified for the appointments of the Judges against the permanent vacancies ie. within 30 days in normal circumstances and 90 days when a vacancy occurs due to death of an incumbent or for any other reason, before attaining the age of superannuation. The question arises what will happen if the Prime Minister's Secretariat does not forward the summary to the President within a reasonable period after having received the same. One view can be that it can be presumed that the Prime Minister does not have any objection or reservation to the recommendations made by the learned Chief Justices and, therefore, one can infer that the Prime Minister has tendered his/her advice in accordance with Article 48(1). The other possible view can be that an advice to be tendered under the Constitution cannot be presumed to have been impliedly tendered on account of an act or omission or inadvertence on the part of. the Prime Minister's Secretariat. I am inclined to prefer this view. The above view seems to be more in keeping the respect of the high office of the Prime Minister which it carries because he/she represents the will of the people. However, I may observe that delay can be averted by working out modalities in detail in respect of the process of appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts. Since the dates of retirement of the Judges are known to the quarters concerned, the process of appointments for filling in vacancies can be initiated much in advance. The period of 90 days for filling in vacancies which may occur on account of death or for any other reason seems to be reasonable and there should not be any difficulty in adhering to the above time-frame. Copies of the summary can also be submitted to the President's Secretariat simultaneously with the Prime Minister's Secretariat so that the President's Secretariat may follow up the above matter and may carry out the initial processing. .
31. M/s. Shahzad Jehangir, Sharifuddin Pirzada, Shahid Hamid, Habib-ul Wahab-ul-Khairi and Raja Muhammad Akram have urged that the Article 48 of the Constitution is a general Article, whereas Articles 177 and 193 of the same are special Articles providing a special procedure for the appointment of Judges in the superior Courts and, therefore, the latter Articles shall exclude the application of the former Article. Their precise submission was that since the consultees have been specified in the above two Articles who do not include the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister's participation stands excluded. On the other hand M/s. Iqbal Haider and Hamid Khan have contended that the above principle is not applicable to the present case. They pointed out that since under clause (1) of Article 48 the President is to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, it was not necessary to specify the role of the Prime Minister in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. According to them Article 48(1) is very much applicable. To re-enforce the above submission Mr. Shahid Ramid has referred Article 101 of the Constitution which provides that "there shall be a Governor for each Province, who shall be appointed by the President (after consultation with the Prime Minister)". According to him if the Framers of the Constitution wanted to include Prime Minister as a consultee in Articles, 177 and 193 of the Constitution, the same would have been provided. I may observe that under the R.C.O., it was provided that the President would appoint a Governor at his discretion. The above refrained Article 101 was not accepted by the then Prime Minister and the party in power while the Eighth Amendment was under consideration before the Parliament. A via media was found by substituting the word 'discretion' by the words "after consultation with the Prime Minister". Since the Prime Minister has been provided a specific role in the function of appointment of a Governor under Article 101, clause (1) of Article 48 stands excluded. However, this reason is not available while construing Articles 177 and 199 of the Constitution as the Prime Minister has not been assigned any role in the above Articles as clause (1) of Article 48 is to apply. If through the Eighth Amendment the Prime Minister would have been included as one of the consultees in. the above two Articles, the above parity of reasoning in respect of Article 101 would have been very much applicable. This was not done and; therefore, the original position which was obtaining prior to the Eighth Amendment continued to prevail. The above aspect I have dealt with hereinabove in para. 24 while dilating upon the third category of Articles of the Constitution. The above two Articles remained unamended during the Martial Law period and thereafter. They are in their original form. M/s. Sharifuddin and Shahid Hamid have heavily relied on the case of Union of India, Appellant v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, Respondent (AIR 1971 SC 1093) and the case of Anand Kumar v. Kattail Bhaskaran (1988) 2 Supreme Court Cases 50). In the above first case the Supreme Court of India while construing clause (3) of Article 270, which provides that "If any question arises as to the age of a Judge of a High Court, the question shall be decided. by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the decision of the President shall be final" held that since under the above Article, the President was to consult the Chief Justice of India before deciding the question as to the age of a Judge of a superior Court and as it was a judicial act, the Government was not involved in the resolution of the above question. The above view was affirmed by the Indian Supreme Court in the above subsequent case. In my view, the above cases have no application to the case in hand for simple reason, that the act of adjudication of age of a Judge was held to be a judicial act and not an executive act. The above reason cannot be pressed into service in the case in hand, as it cannot be held that the act of appointment of a Judge under Articles 177 and 193 is a judicial act. Raja Muhammad Akram, on the proposition that a special provision in a Statute/Constitution will exclude a general, had,cited three cases at the bar during the arguments, namely Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore v. .Wushtaq Ahmad Warraich (PhD 1985 SC 159), Neimat Ali Goraya and 7 others -. Jaffar Abbas, Inspector/Sergeant Traffic (1996 SCMR 826) and Mst.Imam Bibi v Allah Ditta (P1 .D 1989 SC 384). In the first two cases, it was held that Police Service Rules Being the Special Rules shall prevail over the General Service Rules. Whereas in the third case, this Court while construing the provisions of the Colonization ;)f Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912) also dilated inter alia on the legal maxim "generalia", specialibus non derogant, and quoted inter alia Maxwell (Eleventh Edition) on Interpretation of Statutes, ia. which'inter alia it was observed that a general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. However, in his list of cases, he has mentioned 67 cases on the above point. Whereas Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada has referred to the case of High Court of Australia namely, (i) Goodwin v. Philips (1909 in Commonwealth Law Reports Volume 7 page 1), (ii) the case reported under the title "In the matter of Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 162 of the' late Constitution 1956 PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 219, (iii) the case of The State v. Zia-ur-Rahman and others (PLD 1973 SC 49) and (iv) the case of J.K.C.S. & W. v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1170). In the above cases inter alia the above well-settled legal proposition that a special provision shall prevail over the general provision has been dilated upon. It may again be observed that the above jurisprudential principle of interpretation cannot be pressed into service in the instant case. On the other hand M/s. Iqbal Haider and Hamid Khan have vehemently urged that while construing a Constitutional provision an established Constitutional convention in respect thereof, if,any, is to be invoked in aid. According to theta throughout during the Parliamentary Form of Government in Pakistan under the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and 1956 and 1973 Constitutions, all the appointments of the Judges of the, superior Courts had been made on the advice .of the Prime Minister. This position has not been controverted though I asked Mr. Shahzad Jehangir learned Attorney-General to make a statement, as to whether any appointment of a Judge of a superior Court has been made in the past without the advice of the Prime Minister. He promised to furnish the requisite information but this was not done apparently for the reason that this is a well established convention that appointments of the Judges in the superior Courts have always been made on the basis of the advice of the Prime Minister during the Parliamentary Form of Government in Pakistan. In this regard reference may be made to Muhammad Munir a former Chief Justice of Pakistan's Book titled 'Highways and Bye-ways of Life' which was relied upon by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada in Judges' Case in which the learned former Chief Justice described his conversation with Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who was the Prime Minister of Pakistan for some time as under:- "I have said that Mr. Suhrawardy was assertive and conscious of the powers he enjoyed. I am tempted to mention here an incident of the appointment of a Judge of the East Pakistan High Court. A new Judge had to be appointed to that Court. I had recommended a Muslim Lawyer (he was, though I am not sure Mr.Saim who became the President of Bangladesh after Mujib's assassination). Mr. Suhrawardy however, appointed a Hindu, Nandi by name, without consulting me. Nandi was the ablest member of the Bar; but his loyalty to, and citizenship of Pakistan were doubtful. His family lived in Calcutta and he sent all the money he earned in East Pakistan to his home in Calcutta. He came to Dacca only when he had to argue a case there and accepted briefs for Dacca in his Calcutta office. At a dinner at Dacca when I was sitting next to Suhrawardy I told him that I was waiting for an appeal from Nandi's judgment. Why so, he asked me. I told him that his appointment having been made without consulting me, it was void and I would hold, whenever an occasion arose, that his judgment for that reason was void. Suhrawardy folded his hands before me and said Guruji don't do this please, I can send the pap,rs to you for a retrospective approval. " The above conversation lends support to the fact that even under 1956 Constitution Judges of the superior Courts were appointed on the basis of the Prime Minister's advice, which was required under Article 37(1) of the above Constitution. It may be .observed that even if we were to hold that the above Constitutional provision was not mandatory, it cannot be denied that there exists a well-established convention to the effect that appointments of Judges of the superior Courts have always been made on the basis of the Prime Minister's advice In the Judges' Case. in my opinion, I have opined in para. 29 (page 441) as to the effect of a well-established Constitutional convention as follows:> "Para.
29. I am inclined to hold that the distinction which was brought out by A.V. Dicey in 1885 between laws and conventions as to the enforcibility and non-enforcibility by the Courts is no longer holding the field. With the passage of time, the other eminent Jurists have not adhered to the above distinction. They have emphasised.the importance -of the Constitutional conventions for proper operating/functioning of the Constitutions. Jennings has put it very beautifully by explaining that the Constitutional conventions provide 'flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make the legal Constitution work; they keep in touch with the growth of ideas' . The above view has been reiterated by the other Professors/Jurists of international repute. Even the President of Indian Constituent Assembly. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while introducing a bill for the adoption of Indian Constitution in 1950, pointed out in his speech that 'many things which cannot be written in a Constitution are done by conventions. Let me hope that we shall show those capacities and develop those conventions'. The Indian Supreme Court, after reviewing the treatises on Constitutional law and the caselaw in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (supra) has held that there is no distinction between the "Constitutional law" and an established 'Constitutional convention' and both are binding in the field of their operation. I am also of the view that the Courts, whilc construing a Constitutional provision, can press into service an established Constitutional convention in order to understand the import and the working of the same, if it is not contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. It is also evident that under Islamic jurisprudence, the conventions which were not contrary to Holy Qur' an and Sunnah, were recognised from the very inception and they were given binding effect. In this view of the matter, it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant conventions, if any, while construing various Constitutional provisions relating to the Judiciary. " We can, therefore, press into service the above well-established Constitutional convention while construing the above Articles 177 and 193 of Q the Constitution.
32. Syed Iqbal Haider has also relied upon Rule 15-A of the Rules of Business, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), which have been framed under the Constitution, which reads as follows:- "15-A. Reference to the President.--(:) Notwithstanding the provisions made in these rules where in terms of any provision of the Constitution any function is to be performed or any orders have to be issued by the President or his specific approval is required, the Division concerned shall incorporate in paragraph to this effect in the summary entitled as 'Summary for the Prime Minister'. The Prime Minister shall, tender his advice and submit the case to the President. After the President has seen and approved the case, it shall be returned to the Prime Minister. The cases to which this sub-rule applies are enumerated in Schedule V-B. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions made in these rules, where in terms of any provisions of the Constitution any function is to be performed or any orders have to be issued by the President in his discretion, the Division concerned shall submit the case to the President through the Prime Minister including a self-contained, concise and objective summary entitled as 'Summary for the President stating the relevant facts and points for decision prepared on the same lines as prescribed in these rules for a Summary for the Cabinet, except that only one copy will be required which may not be printed. This procedure will not, however, be applicable where the case is initiated by the President himself and decided in consultation with the Prime Minister. The cases to which this sub-rule applies are enumerated in the Schedule VI. (3) The cases and papers referred to in Schedule VII shall be submitted to the President for his information". A perusal of the above-quoted clause (1) of above rule read with Schedule V-B indicates that Items 31, 32 and 33 of the above Schedule deal with the appointments of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court, High Courts and the Federal Shariat Court. The above clause (1) of the above rules- demonstrates that Articles in question relating to the appointments of Judges in the superior Courts have always been understood and construed as the function which the President performs on the Prime Minister's advice. The above rule is a legal instrument and, therefore, in the absence of any inconsistency with any Constitutional provision, the same is to be followed as held by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh (supra), relevant para. from the opinion of Ray, C.J. I have quoted hereinabove in para. 28(b). It may further be observed that even the functions which are to be performed by 1the President in his discretion ander the relevant Articles of the Constitution aie routed through the Prime Minister as is evident from above clause (2) of the above rule read with Schedule VI, this is so as rightly pointed out by Mr. Shahid Hamid to have cordial working relationship between the two high functionaries of the State.
33. It will not be out of context to deal with the submission of Mr. S.M.Zafar, namely, that if we were to test the above question with reference to six modalities of Constitutional interpretation, namely: (i) Historical arguments. (ii) Textual arguments. (iii) Structural arguments. (iv) Doctrinal arguments. (v) Ethical (ideological arguments). (vi) Prudential arguments. it will become evident that the Prime Minister's advice is necessary for the appointments of Judges under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. He while dealing with structural arguments pointed out that the contention that in the Articles in which consultees other than the Prime Minister/Cabinet are mentioned, the same would exclude the application of Article 48(1) of the Constitution does not stand to the test of soundness for the reason that in as many as 12 Articles, relating to the judiciary no consultee is mentioned and, therefore, it must follow that in respect of the same Prime Minister's advice will be necessary under Article 48(1). To re-enforce the above submission, he has referred to Article 176 (relating to the Constitution of the Supreme Court), Article 177(1) (pertaining to appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan), Article 180 (relating to the appointment of Acting Chief Justice of Pakistan), Article 182(a) and (b) pertaining to the appointment of ad hoc Judges in the Supreme Court), Article 183(3) (relating to the seat of Supreme Court of Pakistan), Article 196 (pertaining to the appointment of Acting Chief Justice in a High Court), Article 200(1) (relating to transfer of a High Court's Judge to another High Court), Article 200(3) (requiring a High Court's Judge to attend sittings of another High Court temporarily), Article 203(c)(2) (pertaining to the appointment of Chief Justice of Federal Shariat Court) and Article 203(c)(4) (relating to the appointments of Judges in the Federal Shariat Court). In none of the above Articles any consultee is mentioned. Mr. S.M.Zaffar's above submission seems to have force as it does not stand to reason that in respect of two Articles relating to judiciary Prime Minister's advice is not necessary under Article 48(1) whereas in respect of about 12 Articles, Prime Minister's advice is required for the reason that no special consultees are mentioned therein. The above scenario does not fit in with the structural arguments. Mr. S.M. Zafar has referred to the Book titled "Constitutional Interpretation" by Bobbitt Philip in which the above six rules of interpretation have been effectively dealt with.
34. I may refer to the submission of the learned counsel that the view that the Prime Minister's advice is not required, is in accord with the objects of independence and separation of judiciary, enshrined in the Constitution, whereas Mr. S.M. Zafar has pointed out that under Article 90 of the Constitution executive authority vests in the President or in any case he is also a part of the executive, the above contention is not tenable. However, M/s. Shahzad Jehangir, Shahid Hamid, Habib-ul-Wahab-ul Khairi, Raja Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Akram Sheikh have emphasised that the President being the head of the State and being the symbol of unity, does not belong to any political party, whereas the Prime Minister in a Parliamentary Form of Government represents a political party and, therefore, if we were to hold that the Prime Minister's advice is not required by the President for the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193, it will contribute towards the independence of judiciary as generally Prime Minister is subject to political constraints/pressures. His/her advice, therefore, may be, motivated on account of political consideration. Mr. Muhammad Akram Shaikh, the President of the Supreme Court of Pakistan Bar had highlighted the factum that the former Prime Minister resisted the- implementation of the judgment of this Court in the Judges' Case inasmuch as she acted in violation of the same by extending the period of service of Rana Bhagwan Das of the Sindh High Court and Javed Nawaz Khan Gandapur of Peshawar High Court though the learned Chief Justices had not recommended any extension. He also referred to the Beijing Declaration to which a number of Chief Justices of the various countries including the learned Chief Justice of Pakistan were parties and in which it has been exphasised that the independence of judiciary should be ensured. There is no doubt that a Prime Minister may be motivated to tender a particular advice in case of appointment of a Judge of a superior Court inter alia for political consideration. Whereas a President is generally not involved in the party politics, and, therefore, there is less possibility of the President being motivated for any political consideration. However, the above fact alone will not justify to place a construction on Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution contrary to the scheme of the Constitution which is founded on a Parliamentary Form of Democracy though under the Eighth Amendment, certain functions have been vested within the sole domain of the President by specifically authorising him to perform those functions in his discretion. The detail of which is already discussed hereinabove ir. nara. 22.
35. I may now take up Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada's submission that in order to eliminate political considerations and to ensure independence of judiciary, the Framers of the Constitution deliberately excluded the Prime Minister's advice under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. In support of his above Justice of Pakistan, two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court and two most senior Chief Justices of the High Courts. The above provision was adopted in 1973 Constitution in the form of Article
209. In other words, status quo obtaining in the Interim Constitution as to the removal of the Judges of the superior Courts was maintained in 1973 Constitution. It will not be out of context to quote from the above memoires the following passage on the question of appointments of the Judges in the superior Courts. "Judicature: You propose that the President should, in his discretion, appoint the Chief Justice of Pakistan. Allow me to point out that, under the Constitution, it is the Prime Minister and not the President who is responsible to Parliament, and thus the President at all times acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. Here again, while you profess the desire to follow the Westminster pattern, you.confuse the issue. In the United Kingdom, for example, all the high judicial officers are in fact appointed by the Prime Minister. The Lord Chancellor, the head of the Judiciary, is not only appointed by the Prime Minister but is a senior member of the Cabinet. He, and in some cases the Home Secretary, Appoints the Judges of the High Court and lesser Judges." The above-quoted passage indicates that the then President did not intend to dispense with the requirement of the Prime Minister's advice in respect of the above appointments. The above contention also stands negated by the fact that since .the framing of 1973 Constitution, the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts have always been made on the basis of the advice of the Prime Minister.
36. Before concluding I may deal with the question; as to whether the President or the Prime Minister is the consultor under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. In practice the process for an appointment of a Judge in a superior Court is initiated in a High Court by its Chief Justice and in case of the Supreme Court by its Chief Justice. After that it is processed in case of a High Court by the Governor and the Chief Minister concerned. Then it is sent to the Ministry of Law and Justice, which seeks opinion of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan. After that a summary is forwarded to the Prime Minister, who records his/her advice. Finally the matter is placed before the President for order. In case of the Supreme Court the above procedure is followed with the modification that the Provincial functionaries are not involved and that Ministry of Law and Justice does not forward the matter to Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan as the latter sends the recommendation to the above Ministry. Since the President is to pass a final order after considering the Prime Minister's advice and the recommendations of the consultees mentioned in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, he is the consultor in terms of the Constitution. The fact that the Prime Minister is to give advice under Article 48(1) of the Constitution to the President militates against the view that the Prime Minister is the consultor.
37. The upshot of the above discussions is that my answer to the above question framed in the above President's reference is that for appointments of Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. Article 48(1) relating to Prime Minister's advice is attracted and the President shall act inn accordance with the same provided it is in accordance with judgment in the case of ' Al-Jehad Trust. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC
324. The above two petitions also stand disposed of in terms of the above answer. (Sd.) AJMAL MIAN. J. SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--This judgment will dispose of .the abovementioned two Constitutional Petitions Nos.23 of 1996 and 54 of 1996 filed by AI-Jehad Trust,and Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate, respectively under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Constitution.' only) and Reference No.2 of 1996 filed by the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter to be called as 'the Reference' only) under Article 186 of the Constitution. The principal question agitated in all these cases relateq to the interpretation and scope of Article 48(1) of the Constitution with reference to Articles 177 and 193.
2. I will first take up the Reference. The question of law of public importance referred by the President to this Court for opinion is formulated in the Reference as follows:-- "Whether or not the powers of the President to make appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) of the Constitution?" Before expressing any opinion on the above referred legal question, I think it appropriate to state briefly the background leading to the filing of the Reference before this Court. This Court in the case of Al-Hehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324, popularly known as the Judges' Case, interpreted various provisions of the Constitution relating to appointments, transfer and other related matters concerning the Judges of Superior Courts and laid down with precision, the parameters within which the executive/President was required to act while dealing with these matters. The decision in Judges' Case was announced on 20th March, 1996 and in implementation of this decision, the executive/President was required to take several steps within the time frame indicated in the judgment. According to facts mentioned in the functions the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. - In this matter, the following points need consideration:-- (i) the appointments to the Constitutional Offices forming part of the judicial organ of the State, would appear to be a sacred Constitutional duty and not the exercise of an executive function; (ii) the appointments of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are to be made by the President after consultation with named Constitutional consultees. It appears prima facie that the power to make these appointments after such consultation is within the ambit and scope ,)f Article 48(2).of the Constitution- (iii) As events since the announcement of the Supreme Court Judgement in the Al-Jehad Trust case have shown, the prime Constitutional objective of securing the independence of the judiciary requires that the President should be the effective appointing authority for Judges forming part of the Judicial organ of the State, in accordance with the judgment given in that case. " At this stage, it appears necessary to mention another important fact. The reference before this Court was filed by the President through a private counsel Mr. Shahid Hamid, Advocate, instead of Attorney-General of Pakistan. The then Attorney-General, Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, challenged the maintainability of the Reference on the ground that it was tiled without the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution which was necessary. Mr. Iqbal Haider, who succeeded Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil as Attorney-General of Pakistan during the pendency of the Reference, however, made a statement before this Court on 21-10-1996 that he would not object to the maintainability of the Reference as the Cabinet accorded ex post facto approval to the filing of the Reference before this Court. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the :hen Attorney-General also placed on re-rd the decision of the Cabinet which was to the following effect:- "The Cabinet has given ex post facto approval to Reference No.2 of 1996, filed by the President before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, without prejudice to the Cabinet position that such a reference cannot be filed without the advice of the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister cannot advise the President without the approval of the Cabinet. However, the Cabinet has given ex post facto approval so that the Court could move on to the question raised in the reference."
4. In view of the above stated position, in my opinion, it is not necessary to go into the question of maintainability of the Reference. I may also mention here that the facts stated in the reference were not controverted on behalf of Federal Government and in view of the position taken by the then learned Attorney-General of Pakistan, Mr. Iqbal Haider, on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet regarding maintainability of Reference, the facts mentioned therein shall be deemed to have been admitted.
5. We have heard Mr. Shahid Hamid for the President, Mr. Habib Wahabul Khairi for Al-Jetiad Trust, Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram for Zafar lqbal Chaudhry, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, Attorney-General for Federation, Mr. VI.L. Shaham, Advocate-General Sindh. Mr. Shabbar Raza, Additional Advocate-General Puniab, Mr. Shah Jehan fusutzai, Additional Advocate General, N.-W.F.P., Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, President of Supreme Court Bar Association on Court notice and Mr. Iqbal Haider for the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Besides hearing the abovementioned learned counsel for the parties, we also heard Mr. Agha Dilawar Khan and Mr. Shahid Orakzai, the two gentlemen who claimed to be interested in the controversy as a member of the public. In the end, the two learned amicus curiae, Mr. S.S. Pirzada and Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates of Supreme Court, appointed by the Court and Mr. Hamid Khan, Advocate, Vice-Chairman, Pakistan Bar Council as a representative of the Bar Council placed their views before us with regard to the controversy arising in these cases.
6. Mr. Shahid Hamid, the learned counsel for the President took us through almost all the Articles of the Constitution whereunder the President exercises some powers under the Constitution and contended that in discharge of, these powers sometimes the President performs Constitutional functions while in other cases he fulfils Constitutional obligations and duties imposed on him by the Constitution and the oath he took under the Constitution. Elaborating his contention, the learned counsel argued that the functions and duties of the President can be classified under seven different categories. According to learned counsel the first category comprises of those acts which the President is specifically authorised under the Constitution to perform in his discretion. In respect of acts falling under this category, according to Mr. Shahid Hamid, neither the advice of Prime Minister nor of the Cabinet is necessary. The second category according to learned counsel, relates to those acts of the President under the Constitution which though not specifically described in the relevant Articles as falling within his discretion but on account of the nature of the duty, or function to he Performed by the President, they necessarily fall in the category of acts which the President may perform either in his absolute or qualified discretion. The 3rd category, according to learned counsel, embraces rhose functions of the President which he performs in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. The fourth category, according to learned counsel, also relates to acts and functions of the President, performance whereof, from the language of the relevant Articles of Constitution, appears to be subject to Article 48(1) of the Constitution. The fifth category, according to. learned counsel, relates to the acts which the President performs under the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet but in the performance of these acts, the President must satisfy himself or form an opinion that a Constitutional basis exists for exercise of power by him. The sixth category, according to Mr. Shahid Hamid, relates to acts which the President performs under the Constitution after consultation with specified Constitutional consultees. The last and the seventh category, according to Mr. Shahid Hamid, the learned counsel for the President, relates to acts of the President which he performs under the Constitution as a sacred duty and trust through consultation and participatory process under Articles 177, 181, 193 and 197 of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel, the duty performed by the President under Articles 177, 181, 193 and 197 of the Constitution cannot be held to be subject to the advice of Prime Minister or the Cabinet as envisaged by Article 48(1) ibid. It is contended that such an interpretation runs contrary to the concept of independence of judiciary and its separation from executive which is the driving spirit of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the President accordingly, contended that in order to preserve, the independent character of judiciary and to keep the institution of judiciary free from political influences, it is necessary that power of appointment of Judges in the superior judiciary is exercised by the President who has no political agenda to execute after his induction in the high office of Presidency and is more representative in nature as compared to the Prime Minister, and he represents the unity of the Federation, according to Constitutional provisions. Mr. Wahabul Khairi and Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Petitions Nos.23 and 54 of 1996 supported the contention of Mr. Shahid Hamid.
7. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the learned counsel for the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, contested the above contentions and vehemently argued that by interpreting Articles 177, 181, 193 and 197 of the Constitution in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the President and the two petitioners, we will change the basic character of the Constitution which is based on parliamentary system of Government on the pattern of Westminster style, to a Presidential form of Government. It is contended by Mr. Iqbal Haider, that in the form of Government based on parliamentary system, the Prime Minister is the Chief Executive of the Government and is answerable for all his acts to the Parliament. The learned counsel contended that the President, who is indirectly elected under the Constitution and is neither answerable to the Parliament nor to anyone else, cannot be vested with the power to appoint holders of such high offices under the Constitution to the exclusion of, the Prime Minister who is directly elected by the people. Mr. Iqbal Haider went on to argue that in spite of inroads made on the powers of Prime Minister through Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, by vesting some discretionary powers on the President, the basic character of the Constitution continues to be parliamentary democracy on the model of Westminster as held by this Court in the case of Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646 and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC
473. According to learned (counsel, so long the features of the Constitution which envisaged the parliamentary system of Government are retained, the Prime Minister cannot be deprived of his role as the Chief Executive and head of the Government and, therefore, the President while making appointments in higher echelon of judiciary will be bound by the advice of the Prime Minister or Cabinet tendered under Article 48(1) of the Constitution. Replying to the argument that in Articles 177, 181, 193 and 198, the Prime Minister does not figure anywhere, Mr. IqbW Haider forcefully argued that in our Constitutional scheme wherever the satisfaction or opinion of President is mentioned it refers to the satisfaction and opinion of Prime Minister and Cabinet, as in performance of all such functions the President is to act on the advice of Prime Minister or the Cabinet as provided in Article 48(1) ibid. In support of his argument, Mr. Iqbal Haider relied on the observations of Indian Supreme Court in the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192, wherein the Indian Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Article 74(1) of Indian Constitution made the following observations:-- . "
148. In the light of the scheme of the Constitution we have already referred to, it is doubtful whether such an interpretation as to the personal satisfaction of the President is correct. We are of the view that the President means,, for all practical purposes, the Minister or the Council of Ministers as the case may be, and his opinion, satisfaction or decision is Constitutionally secured when his Ministers arrive at such opinion, satisfaction or decision." Mr. Iqbal Haider further contended that in spite of amendments of several Articles of Constitution through Constitutional (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, no attempt was made to amend Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution which are retained in their original form till today and as such there exists no justification for construing or interpreting these articles in a manner which would suggest a departure from the previous construction of these provisions.
8. Mr. Iqbal Haider also. contended that a similar controversy had arisen in 1989 when Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was holding the office of President and Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister, but the controversy was resolved through a mutually agreed farmula which was sanctioned by this Court as is evident from the judgment reported as Federal Government of Pakistan v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate 1990 SCMR
189. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the. learned counsel, relying on the order of this Court in M.D. Tahir, Advocate's case supra, contended that on the face of existence of this agreed formula between the two highest functionaries of the Constitution which also bore the seal of this Court, the issue regarding exercise of power by the President to the exclusion of Prime Minister cannot be reopened and reagitated. Mr. Iqbal Haider further contended that in any case, after the decision of this Court in the Judges' Case, this controversy is no more a live issue.
9. Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, the learned Attorney-General on behalf of Federal Government contended that the position of the President under the Constitution as originally enacted, was undoubtedly that of a mere figure head but after amendment of the Constitution through Constitutional (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be called as the Eighth Amendment) he acquired effective role under the Constitution. The learned Attorney-General referred to various Articles of the Constitution whereunder the President is now empowered to act in his discretion without the advice of the President. The learned Attorney-General argued that prior to the Eighth Amendment, under Article 90 of the Constitution the Prime Minister was the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Federal Government consisted of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers but this position was radically changed after the Eighth Amendment as under the newly substituted Article 90 in the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation now vests with the President which he exercises either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. The learned Attorney-General contended that in matters of day to day functioning of the Government, the President acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, in the performance of a duty imposed upon the President under the Constitution, the President is not bound by the advice of the Prime Minister. According to learned Attorney-General the exercise of power under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution by the President is a Constitutional duty which is to be performed strictly in accordance with the provisions of these Articles and therefore, Article 48(1) of the Constitution is not attracted in such situation. The learned Attorney-General further contended that keeping in view the provisions of Article 175(3) of the Constitution which contemplates complete separation of judiciary from the executive and the concept of independence of judiciary enshrined in Article 2A of the Constitution, it is necessary that power to appoint Judges of the superior Courts is exercised by the President who is not a political personality under the Constitution and represents the unity of Federation.
10. The learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, Mr. Shabbar Raza, Mr. M.L. Shahani, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh and Mr. Shah Jehan Yousafzai, Additional Advocate-General of N.-W.F.P. adopted the arguments of learned Attorney-General.
11. Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, the learned President of Supreme Court Bar Association contended that appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts do not fall within the functions of the Government so as to attract the provisions of advice contained in Article 48(1) of the Constitution. The learned counsel contended that the power to appoint Judges of the superior Courts under the Constitution does not belong to political arena and therefore, its exercise by the President, who does not belong to any political party, will keep the institution of judiciary away from political influences. The learned counsel further contended that the past experience shows that the exercise of this power by the President under the advice of the Prime Minister had led to the politicising of the judiciary and, therefore, to preserve the independent character of judiciary, it is necessary that the power to appoint Judges of superior Courts is exercised by the President without the advice of Prime Minister.
12. Mr. S.S. Pirzada, the learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and amicus curiae, in his usual lucid and persuasive style took us through the conventions followed by the. British Rulers of the Sub-continent in pre independence period in making appointments to the higher judiciary, the historical background of Constitution making in India and Pakistan in post independence period with special reference to the Constitutional provisions relating to the appointments of Judges in superior judiciary, and the latest trend in the United Kingdom reflected in the report of the Committee of the House o1 Commons submitted on 5-6-1996 favouring exclusion of the role of Prime Minister in the process of appointment of Judges of superior Courts. Mr. Pirzada contended that the conventions followed by the British Rulers in the Sub-continent in pre-independence period in the appointment of Judges o1 superior Courts provide a safe guide for interpretation of the provisions of out Constitution relating to the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts. Mr. Pirzada pointed out that the conventions in this behalf set by the Britishes were continued to be followed in India in post-independence period up to 4-11-1947 which were drastically changed thereafter but at the end of the day the Indian Supreme Court had to rule in the case of S.C. Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268, that in the matter of appointment of Judges of the superior judiciary the President though acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers but such advice must be in accordance with the provisions of Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Indian Constitution as construed by the Indian Supreme Court in S.C. Advocates-on-Record's case, to keep the institution of judiciary independent and free from political influences. While referring to the historical background of Constitution-making in the newly created States of India and Pakistan in post-independence period, Mr. Pirzada referred to the report compiled by Rt. Honourable Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Rt. Honourable Mr. R. Jayakar, Honourable Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyanger and Kunwar Sir Jagdish Parashad, popularly known as "The Sapru Committee Report", and contended that this report contained valuable suggestions and recommendations concerning the future political Government, Legislature and the judiciary in the new Indian Republic. Mr. Pirzada contended though the recommendations contained in the Sapru's Committee Report regarding future judiciary of India were not accepted by the framers of Indian Constitution but in Pakistan the Constitution-makers substantially adopted Sapru Committee's Report while incorporating the provisions regarding appointment of Judges in the superior judiciary in the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. Mr. Pirzada contended that the main theme of Sapru Committee's Report regarding judicature was, its independent character and its separation from the executive. The learned amicus curiae specifically relied on the following passages from Sapru Committee's Report to highlight his point of view:-- "
259. In our recommendation No. 13 we first recommend that there shall be a Supreme Court for the Union and a High Court in each of the units. Then in the second clause we recommend that the strength of judges in each of these Courts at the inception of the Union as well as ,the salaries to be paid to them shall be fixed in the Constitution Act and no modification in either shall be made except on the recommendation of the High Court, the Government concerned and the Supreme Court, and with the sanction of the head of the State, provided, however, that the salary of no judge shall be varied to his disadvantage during his term of office. In sub-clause (3) we recommend:
"(a) The Chief Justice of India shall be appointed by the Head'of the State and the other Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (b) The Chief Justice of a High Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Head of the Unit and the Chief Justice of India. (c) Other Judges of a High Court shall be appointed by the Head of the State in consultation with the Head of the Unit, the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and the Chief Justice of India.
261. Our main object in making these recommendations is to secure the absolute independence of the High Court and to put them above party polities or influences. . Without some such safeguards, it is not impossible that a Provincial Government may under political pressure affect prejudicially the strength of the High Court within its jurisdiction or the salary of its Judges. If it is urged that the High Court and the Government, concerned will be more or less interested parties in the matter, the intervention of the Supreme Court and of the Head of the State would rule out all possibility of the exercise of political or party influences. The imposition of .these conditions, may, on a superficial view, seem to be inconsistent with the theoretical autonomy of the Provinces, but, in our opinion, the independence of the High Court and of the judiciary generally is of supreme importance for the satisfactory working of the Constitution and nothing can be more detrimental to the well being of a Province or calculated to undermine public confidence than the possibility of executive interference with the strength and independence of the highest Tribunal of the Province. " 13, Replying the argument of Mr. Iqbal Haider, the learned counsel for the former Prime Minister, that under the Parliamentary system of Government, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet is answerable to the Parliament for all his acts, and therefore, the advice of Prime Minister is necessary in the appointment of Judges, Mr. Pirzada stated that mere fact that the Prime Minister is answerable for all his acts in a parliamentary -form of Government to the Parliament, is no ground to vest the Prime Minister with the power of appointment of the Judges of the superior judiciary. The learned amicus curiae contended that exercise of a particular power by the Prime Minister or the President under the Constitution, is not a factor which alone determines whether the system of Government is Parliamentary or Presidential in form. Mr. Pirzada referred the provisions relating to appointment of the Judges of the superior Courts under tile Constitutions of Malaysia, Republic of Singapore and Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh and several other. countries to demonstrate that though the system of Government in vogue in these countries is parliamentary democracy but the power is exercised in different manner by the President or the Prime Minister under these Constitutions.
14. Mr. S.S. Pirzada.contended that after inclusion of Article 2A in the Constitution the concept of independence of judiciary which was already guaranteed under the Constitution, has acquired a greater predominance and to give effect to this predominant will of Constitution, it is necessary to interpret Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution in a manner which secures the independence of judiciary and its separation from the executive fully. Mr. Pirzada contended that Article 48(1) of the Constitution is a provision of general application which cannot control the provision relating to appointment of Judges contained in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution which is a self-contained special provision. Mr. Pirzada argued that while appointing Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, the President exercises his power in performance of his Constitutional duty after consulting the consultees mentioned in the provision and in discharge of this duty he is not bound by the advice of Prime Minister. In support of his contention that where a statute contains general provisions as well as special provisions, the general provisions stand displaced to the extent of applicability of the special provisions. Mr. Pirzada relied on the following cases:
(1) State v. Ziaur Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49. (2) J.K.C. S&W Mills v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170.
15. Mr. Hamid Khan, the learned Vice-Chairman, Pakistan Bar Council, presented views of the apex body of the lawyers on the controversies involved in the above cases. The learned counsel contended that the Constitution as originally framed in 1973 contemplated a parliamentary system of Government but the provisions contained therein concentrated all the executive powers of the Government in, the hands of Prime Minister who was the Chief Executive of the Federation and Head of the Federal Government. The President under the Constitution of 1973 enjoyed no powers at all and acted merely as a figure head and acted only on the advice of the Prime Minister. Through the 8th Amendment, Mr. Hamid Khan contended, some discretionary powers were conferred on the President which he could exercise without advice of the Prime Minister, but the role of Prime Minister continued to remain predominant under the Constitution. Apart from the powers which the President was authorised to exercise under the Constitution, after the 8th Amendment, in his discretion, in all other matters the President could only act on the advice of the Prime Minister. The learned counsel, accordingly, contended that in spite of changes introduced in the Constitution through 8th Amendment, the spirit of the Constitution continued to remain Parliamentary and Federal in character. Mr. Hamid Khan contended that the changes introduced in the Constitution of 1973 through the 8th Amendment, brought the Constitution nearer in spirit to the Constitution of 1956. To support his contention that in spite of amendment made in the Constitution through 8th Amendment, the spirit of the Constitution remained parliamentary in character, the learned counsel referred to the observations made by the learned Judges `in the case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan (supra). On the basis of his above submissions, Mr. Hamid Khan argued that the appointment of Judges in the superior judiciary being an executive act, could only be made by the President under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution on the advice of Prime Minister.
16. Mr. S.M. Zafar the other amicus curiae in the cases, was the last learned counsel to address the Court in the sequence. Mr. S.M. Zafar contended that the Courts while interpreting the Constitution are guided by six principles namely, (a) the historical argument, (b) the textual argument, (c) the structural argument, (d) the doctrinal argument, (e) ethical argument or ideological argument and (f) the prudential argument. Explaining his above formulations the learned amicus curiae contended that the historical argument requires discovery of the original intention of the framers of the Constitution. The structural argument applies when the Constitution has different structural scheme within it. In such a case, the interpretation adopted should not mutilate or destroy the structural scheme of the Constitution. While applying the textual argument, the learned amicus contended, the Court determines whether the interpretation of the particular text of the Constitution holds good for the rest of the Constitution also. The doctrinal argument notices the existing interpretation by the Courts and jurists of the particular or similar Constitutional provisions. The ethical argument finds its roots in the ethos of nations which are engrained in some high principles or grund norm. The prudential argument according to learned amicus, proceeds on that interpretation which creates balance between various provisions of the Constitution.
17. The learned amicus contended that interpretation of Articles 48, 177 and 193 of the Constitution keeping in view aforementioned principles, suggests that there was no change in the original intention behind Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution in spite of textual amendment in Article 48 ibid, through the 8th Amendment. The learned amicus contended that Article 48 in its amended form continued to be applicable to the provisions of Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution and no such inconsistency existed between Article 48 on the one hand and Articles 177 and 193 on the other hand so that the two cannot stand together. The learned amicus, contended that if Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are interpreted on the basis that the consultees are specifically mentioned in these Articles, therefore, Article 48(1) is inapplicable, it will lead to the application of two different principles of interpretation to the provisions within the same structure of the Constitution as there are several Articles in Part VII of the Constitution relating to judicature wherein the consultees are not mentioned, meaning thereby that Article 48(1) will be attracted in these cases. The learned amicus further contended that the fact that 8th Amendment introduced no changes in language of Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution goes to show that the framers of the Constitution intended no change in the scheme of these Articles. The learned amicus argued that by interpreting the provisions of Articles 177 and 193 subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) ibid, the independence of judiciary is neither affected nor curtailed especially after the pronouncement of this Court in the case of AI-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) which has curtailed the executive discretion and has set the parameters within which the executive has to act in relation to the appointments in the superior judiciary. 1.8. Before considering the above contentions I would. like to dispose of one of the contentions raised by Mr. Iqbal Haider that after the decision of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. M.D. Tahir, Advocate, and subsequent decision in the case of Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan the controversy raised in the presidential reference and in the two petitions is no more a live issue on which a pronouncement of this Court is necessary.-
19. The decision in the case of M.D. Tahir, Advocate,, supra, relied by Mr. Iqbal Haider arose out of the judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in Writ Petition No.589 of 1989 filed by M.D. Tahir, Advocate to challenge the appointments of about 12 Judges of Lahore High Court which were made by the President without the advice of Prime Minister. The learned Judges of the High Court while dismissing the above writ petition summarily, held that the executive authority of the Prime Minister under Article 48 of the Constitution did not extend to the appointments of High Court Judges as Article 193 ibid makes no mention of the Prime Minister among the consultees. It was also held in that case by the learned Judges of Lahore High Court that the provisions relating to the appointment of Judges contained in Article 193 ibid laid down a special procedure and therefore, to, that extent the provisions of Article 48(1; which was general in nature did not apply. The Federation filed an appeal before this Court against the above decision of Lahore. High Court. It appears that during the pendency of the above appeal a comprmise was reached between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (who was the then President of Pakistan) and Mohtarama Benazir Bhutto (who was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan) and as a result of this compromise between the two high functionaries of the Constitution the Court allowed disposal of the appeal in terms of the following order:-- "The teamed Deputy Attorney-General on instructions from the Secretary, Ministry o Law, Justice and Provincial Coordination, states that the Federal Government will be satisfied i para.5 of the impugned order, dated 21st December, 1988, of the Lahore High Court is excised and this appeal be disposed of accordingly. The offending portion in para. 5 is as follows: In any case the Prime Minister does not find mention in Article 193, amongst the persons, after consultation with whom the .President is required to appoint the Judges. It is Article 48(1) which ordains that in exercise of his functions the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet or the Prime Minister. But Article 193 specifically deals with the appointments of the High Court Judges and it is well settled that where in a Statute there are two provisions, one of which is of specific character and the other general one, then the specific provision ought to be applied unfettered by the general one. This principle has also been exhaustively. discussed in the Government of Punjab v. Naila Begum PLD 1987 Lah. 336 to which one of us (Lone, J:) was a party'. Against which exception was taken by the Federal Government on the ground that the required notice under Order 27-A, Rule 1,- was not given to the Attorney-General before determining the Constitutional question. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 Mr. Sharif-ud-Din Pirzada stated that he had no objection to the disposal of the appeal in the above manner as it seemed to him to be a realistic and.practical approach, Respondent No. 1, however, objected to the disposal of the appeal on this short ground, but as he had not filed any appeal against the order, it became final as against him. As such we do not find any substance in his contention, Accordingly, the offending portion be excised, but the judgment in all other respects stands. There will be no order as to costs. " Two learned members of the Bench, (Abdul Kadir Shaikh and Zafar Hussain Mirza, JJ.), which decided the case of Federal Government. of Pakistan v. M.D. I Tahir, Advocate, supra, however, had reservations to the . disposal of the appeal in the manner cited above and they recorded their opinions as follows:-- "ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.
I feel that since it is the primary and sacred function of this Court to resolve all Constitutional controversies relating to the interpretation of the Constitution, the appeal should be heard and decided on the questions of law of fundamental public importance on which leave to appeal was granted, namely, interpretations of Constitution concerning ' the function of the Parliamentary Democracy in our country' so that an authoritative decision of this Court be rendered, for, if left for decision in the future, the consequences will be awkward, inconvenient and not conducive to proper administration of justice as these would subvert the legitimacy of the very appointments of the Judges themselves. If left undecided, these issues are also bound to cause confusion among the litigants in view of uncertainty with regard to the validity of the judgments and decisions rendered by the Judges whose appointments in the office as Judges would be simultaneously the subject-matter of litigation. perhaps in the same Courts. Such uncertainty would have also the consequent odium attached to stash a situation. Certain consequences are bound to be irrevocable, for example, already expired jail sentences passed under the judgments recorded by the Judges of the superior Courts whose appointments may be held to be illegal and without lawful autbority on the basis of the decision on the issues which are to be decided in this appeal.. ' However, since overwhelming majority of the Judges is of the view that the appeal should be disposed of in the terms of the statements made by the learned counsel for, the parties, I reluctantly agree to that mode of disposal, but at the same time cannot help recording this note. ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.
I am of the view that consistent with the rule of practice and the nature of the jurisdiction vesting in this Court under Constitution vide Article 185 of the Constitution, whereby it is the Constitutional duty of this Court to decide questions affecting the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly when such questions have been properly raised in this appeal, this Court should normally have determined the questions so raised. Also it has been authoritatively held that, consent of parties, or adjusting the controversy according to a consensus, cannot deter this Court from discharging its obligation, to express their final opinion and set at rest any misgivings with regard to the Constitutional issues. However, since the Federal Government who had raised the aforesaid questions is not willing to proceed further for reasons not disclosed to us and the majority of my brothers on the Bench agree that no further hearing of this matter be continued,. I would like to go alongwith the majority in the circumstances. I, therefore, agree that this appeal may be disposed of as done in the main order." It is, therefore, quite clear from the order passed by this Court in the case of M.D. Taktir, .supra, as well as reservations expressed by the two learned members of that Bench that no decision was given by this Court on the question of law arising before it. Disposal of a case as a result of compromise between the parties without adverting to the legal issues cannot be treated as enunciation of law by this Court within the meaning of Article 189 of the Constitution. Similarly, in the case of AI-Jehad Trust (supra) Mr. S.S. Pirzada, who was one of the amicus curiae did raise a contention that in matters of appointment of Judges of superior Courts, 'he advice of Prime Minister under Article 48(1) is not necessary. This contention was duly noted in the judgment of Ajmal Mian, 1 in paragraph 66 and was disposed of as follows:-- "
66. Before parting with the above discussion, I may observe that Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada has contended that the appointment of Judges in the superior Courts by the President is not an act of the nature which needs advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48 of the Constitution. According to him, the relevant Articles of the Constitution confer power on the President to appoint the Judges of the superior Courts after consulting ,the consultees mentioned in the relevant Articles, which ,do not include the Prime Minister. His further submission was that since the special Articles provide specifically the consultees who are to be consulted, this will negate Article 48 of the Constitution and thus the Prime Minister's advice is not required. In support of his submission, he has referred to certain cases and other material. Mr. Khairi and Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned counsel for the newly added appellants Nos.3 to 7, had also submitted arguments in line with Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada's above arguments.
67. On the other hand, Mr. Qazi Muhammad Jamil, learned Attorney General, and Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned counsel for the Federation, have submitted that the appointment of a Judge in a superior Court is an . executive act and the executive includes the President and the Prime Minister. According to them, it is not necessary to go into the above question.
68. Since the interpretation of various Articles given by this Court hereinabove will be binding on the executive, as such it is not necessary to go into the above question in this case." I
7. The above passage from the judgment of this `curt in l-Teha. Trust case clearly shows that this Court did not find it necessary to go into the question of applicability of Article 48(1) in that case. Therefore, the decision in the Al Jehad Trust case also did not amount to a decision of this Court on a question of law under Article 189 of the Constitution so as to bar 'a decision on the present controversy. ' . - , 1 am, therefore, of the view that neither the decision of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. M.D Tahir, Advocate, nor in the case of Al Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) come in the way of adjudication of the Presidential Reference or the two Constitutional petitions in so far they raise the question of interpretation of Articles 4$, 177 and 193 of the Constitution.
20. I now proceed to consider various contentions raised in the above cases. Mr. Shahid Hamid, the learned counsel for the President took us through almost all the Articles of the Constitution, whereundei: the President exercises some power. I, however, do not propose to undertake examination of all these Articles here as this exercise is not only unnecessary but also'beyond the scope of the present proceedings. I have already mentioned earlier all the contentions in' details raised in these cases. To summarise these contentions, Mr. Shahid Hatnid, Mr. Habib Wahab-ul-Khairi, Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, Mr. Shaikh Akram, the learned counsel in those cases supported the proposition chat the President white appointing the Judges of the superior Courts in exercise of his power under Articles 177 and 19~ of the Gonstitutsnn is neither hound by The advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution nor such an advice is necessary. The learned Attorney-General of Pakistan,, and respective Advocates-General and Additional Advocates-General of the Provinces of Sindh, Punjab and N.-W..F.P. also supported this proposition. One of the learned amicus in the case Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada also supported the above proposition. On the other hand Mr. Iqbal Haider, and Mr. Hamid Khan the two learned counsel expressed the views that the President in exercise of his powers under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution is bound by the advice of Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution, Mr. S.M. Zafar, the other learned amicus in these cases, supported this later view. 21. . It has-been vehemently argued in these cases that since the concept of Government under the Constitution is Federal and Parliamentary in nature, therefore, Prime Minister who is the Chief Executive of the Federation and Head of the Federal Cabinet is to have an effective role in all executive actions including the appointment of Judges of the superior Courts. It is also contended that by vesting the power of appointment of Judges to the President, the spirit of the Constitution would be changed from Parliamentary to Presidential form. The nature of the Constitution, whether it is Parliamentary or Presidential in character is determined by the scheme of a Constitution. In a Constitution which envisages a parliamentary system of Government, the parliament is considered supreme td all other organs of the State and the Cabinet consisting of Ministers and Prime Minister is responsible for running and managing the affairs of the Government. The concept of responsible Government or collective responsibility of Cabinet to the parliament is inherent in this system. So long these features are present in the Constitutional scheme, the system retains the characteristics of a parliamentary form, irrespective of the fact that some other powers under the Constitution are exercised by the Prime Minister. Mr. S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, the learned amicus drew our attention to various Constitutions enforced in the countries of the world, which though envisaged parliamentary system of Government but the distribution of powers between the Prime Minister as the Chief Executive and the President as head of the State are arranged in these Constitutions differently. Suffice it to say that the Courts while interpreting a written Constitution, will go by the wording of the documents and will not allow it to be influenced or overridden by any extraneous principles of other Constitution not explicitly incorporated in the scheme chosen by the Framers of the Constitution.
22. The first Article of the Constitution which requires consideration in these cases is Article
48. Through the 8th Amendment the original Article 48 ~-as substituted by a new Article in the Constitution. To correctly understand the scope of the stew Article 48 of the Constitution, in my humble opinion, it is necessary to -xamine its language and scheme in juxtaposition with the original Article
48. The two Articles are as follows-- ' Article 48 as it Article 48 after the 8th Amendment. originally stood in the Constitution of 1973. (1) In the performance of his (1) In the exercise of his functions, functions, the President shall act on the President shall act in accordance and in accordance with the advice of with the advice of the Cabinet or the the Prime Minister and such advice Prime Minister: shall be binding on him. Provided that the President may (2) The question whether any, and if require the Cabinet or, as the case so what advice was tendered to the may be, the Prime Minister to President by the Prime Minister reconsider such advice,either shall not be inquired into any Court. Generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance (3) Save as otherwise provided in with the advice tendered after such any rules made under Article 99, the reconsideration. orders of the President shall require for their validity the - (2) Notwithstanding anything counter signatureof the Prime contained in clause (1), the President Minister. " shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do. so and the validity of anything done by the President in his discretion shall not be called in question on any ground whatsoever. (4) The question whether any, and if so what. advice was tendered to the President by the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, a Minister or Minister of State shall not be inquired into in, or by, any Court, Tribunal or other authority. (5) Where the President dissolves the National Assembly, he shall, in his discretion,-- (a) appoint a date, not later than ninety days from the date of the dissolution, for the holding of a general election to the Assembly; and (b) appoint a care-taker Cabinet. (6) If, at any time, the President, in his discretion, or on the advice of the Prime Minister, considers that it is desirable that any matter of national importance should be referred to a r=eferendum, the President may cause the matter to be referred to a referendum in the form of a question that is capable of being answered either by "Yes" or "No". (7) An Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) may lay down the procedure for the holding of a referendum and the compiling and consolidation of the result of a referendum.
23. The learned counsel who supported the proposition that the advice of Prime Minister was neither necessary nor binding on the President while he exercises power under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution, laid much stress on the omission of the expre=sion "shall be binding on him" from sub-clause (1) of Article
48. This deliberax o.w..-.sion according to learned counsel not only changed the binding nature of the advice of the Prime Minister but it also reflected the real intention of the Constitution-makers which intended to alter the whole scheme behind Article 48, tilting the balance in. favour of the President. It is further contended that by substituting sub-clause (2) in Article 48 which provided that the President shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do so and the validity of any thing done by the President in his discretion shall not be called in question on any ground whatsoever, the Constitution-makers further made their intention explicit, that the President who was merely a figure head under the original Constitution of 1973, . is now an effective Constitutional functionary having a large Constitutional field available to him for exercise of power without the advice of Prime Minister. Sub-clause (2) of Article 48 ibid, according to the learned counsel, vested the President with power to act in his discretion wherever the provisions of the Constitution so permitted notwithstanding the fact that the provisions did not use or contain the expression "in his discretion". To reinforce the above argument, the learned counsel relied on the amendments made in Article 90 of the Constitution through the 8th Amendment. The amended Article 90 of-the Constitution states that the executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him, either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution.
24. The amendments referred to by the learned counsel in support of the proposition that these amendments transferred the executive authority of the Federation to the President from the Prime Minister does not appear to be correct. The omission of expression "shall be binding on him" from the original Article 48(1) of the Constitution in my opinion made not much difference, in so far the authority of Prime Minister as the head of the Cabinet and the Government was concerned. The omission of expression "shall be binding on him" from sub-clause (1) of Article 48 ibid, in my opinion was necessary to give full effect to the following proviso which was added to Article 48 ibid after sub clause (1):
"Provided that the President may require the Cabinet or, as the case may be, the Prime Minister to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tenderred after such reconsideration. " In my opinion by omission of the expression "shall be binding anhittx" from sub-clause (1) and insertion of the proviso after this sub-clause of Article 48, the only change in the scheme of this Article brought about was, that under the original Article 48, the advice once tendered by the Prime Minister was binding on the President but now the President is authorised to refer back the advice to Cabinet or Prime Minister as the case may be, for reconsideration. However, the advice received by President after such reconsideration binding under Article 48(1) of the Constitution. Similarly, sub-clause (2) of Article 1R vested the President with the power to act in his discretion wherever he is a authorised under the Constitution. The amended Article 48(1) of the Constitution is similar to Article 74(1) of the Indian Constitution. Similarly, the provisions of Article 48(2) are comparable in language to Article 37(7) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956. The language of amended Article 90 of the Constitution likewise is similar to Article 39 of the Constitution of 196 and Article 53 of the Indian Constitution.
25. From the above discussion, it is quite clear that the changes brought about the Article 48(1) and (2) and Article 90 of the Constitution through the 8th Amendment were neither unique nor extraordinary in character nor they were unknown in the Constitutional field. The Makers of the Constitution., therefore. were deemed to be aware of the scope of these amendments and the manner in which these amendments were interpreted. In my view, therefore, the powers of President under the Constitution remained confined only to the extent they were conferred on him specifically under the Constitution. I had the occasion to consider in some detail the effect of amendments of Articles 48, 90 and 91 of the Constitution on the powers of the President under the Constitution in the case relating to dissolution of National Assembly reported as Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v: President of Pakistan (supra), and as a reiteration of my views I reproduce the relevant passages which read as follows:- "On a careful examination of the above Articles of the Constitution it is quite clear that the President in discharge of his functions under the Constitution has to act on the advice of Prime Minister or the Cabinet, except in those cases where he is specifically authorised by the Constitution to act in his discretion. The discretionary powers of the President under the Constitution are limited to the extent of making a few appointments to the high Constitutional offices, besides his power to dissolve the National Assembly (Article 58(2)(a) and (b), to refer a matter of National importance to referendum (Article 48(6) and to fix a date for election within 90 days on dissolution of National Assembly and to appoint a Caretaker Cabinet (Article 48(5)). Besides, the above discretionary powers of the President under the Constitution, the Prime Minister is Constitutionally bound to communicate to the President all decisions of the Cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of Federation and proposal for Legislation (Article 46(a)). The President may also call for from the Prime Minister any information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and may also require for submission to the Cabinet for consideration any matter on which a decision has been taken by the Prime Minister or a Minister but not considered by the Cabinet (Article 46(h) and (c)). The President also has the right to address either House or both the Houses of Parliament (Article 5611)) besides his right to send messages to either House and the matter contained in such messages to be considered by the House (Article 56(2)). At the commencement of first sessions of National Assembly after general elections and at the commencement of first session of each year, the President has the right to address the joint session of the two Houses of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) (Article 56(3)). It is quite significant that under Article 91(4) of the Constitution, the Cabinet together with Ministers of State is collectively responsible to the National Assembly alone. It is also very important to note that although the Prime Minister holds the office at the pleasure of the President but this pleasure cannot be exercised by the President so ?ang as the prime Minister commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly and in order to ascertain whether the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, the President is obliged to Summon 3 session of National Assembly and ask the Prime Minister to seek a vote of confidence from the Assembly (Article 91(5)), From the, abase stated Constitutional position, there remains no room for any doubt rh?r the Prime Minister in running the affairs of the Government is neither answerable to President nor in that capacity he is subordinate to the President- In formulating the policies of his Government and running its affairs the Prime Minister under the. Constitution is answerable only to the National Assembly and the President has no Constitutional role in this behalf. The President in all such matters is bound by the advice of Prime Minister or the Cabinet. No doubt, President may require the Cabinet or the Prime Minister, as the case may be, to reconsider any advice tendered to him but the President is bound to act on the advice tendered after reconsideration. The President and the Prime Minister have defined roles under the Constitution which do not overlap. They exercise powers in their respective Constitutional domain unhindered and uninterrupted by each other. No doubt, Constitutionally it would be an ideal situation where both the President and the Prime Minister have identity of view on matters concerning the affairs of the Federation but ideals do not exist in reality as they are outcome of imagination. Therefore, difference in perception on the part of holders of these two top offices on any issue should not cause any stirring or alarm as in spite of different perceptions, persona( likes or dislikes the two can co-exist Constitutionally. It is important to note that while addressing an issue in discharge of their Constitutional obligation, both the President and Prime Minister are bound to act within the limitations imposed on them by the Constitution and their personal feelings, likes or dislikes cannot override the Constitutional mandate. We should also bear in mind that the method of election provided under the Constitution for these two top offices, also foresees a possibility that the holders of these two top posts may not belong to the same political party. Therefore, possibility of a play in the relationship between the holders of these two top posts cannot be ruled out. No doubt, the President as the symbol of the unity of Federation occupies a neutral position in the Constitution, and in that capacity he is entitled to highest respect and regard by all the functionaries of the State. But it is equally important that in order to protect and preserve the dignity of this high office and this neutral image under the Constitution the President must keep aloof from all political imbroglio, If the President is unable toward off the temptation to keep away from political game or he starts siding with one or the other political element in the Assembly, he is likely to lose his image as the neutral arbiter in national affairs and as a symbol of unity of Federation under the Constitution. In the latter event, his conduct may also came under criticism from those who may feel betrayed."
26. It is also argued before us that Article 48 contains provisions which are of general application while Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution lay dawn a special procedure for exercise of power by the president under the Constitution. On this premises, it is contended that the special provisions contained in Articles 177 and 193 would prevail aver the general provisions of Article 48f1). It is also contended that in order to protect and preserve the concept of independence of judiciary enshrined in Article 2-A, separation of judiciary from the executive contemplated under Article 175(3) of the Constitution and to guard against the political influences finding their way in the judiciary Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution be interpreted in a manner that the power to appoint Judges of the superior Courts is vested with the President without the advice of the Prime Minister. Such an interpretation, it is suggested, is more in consonance with the scheme of Constitution, the historical and legislative background and the conventions followed in this behalf. These solemn and weighty considerations may be relevant if there is difficulty in discovering the real intent of the Constitution-makers on account of ambiguity in the language of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution which we are called upon to interpret here present no such difficulty. It is an admitted position that through 8th Amendment while changes were introduced in various Articles of the Constitution, the Chapter relating to the judiciary and especially Articles 177 and 193, remained in their original form. The retention of the provisions of Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution in their original forms suggests that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to change the scheme and scope of these provisions. It is not disputed before us that from the time of enforcement of the Constitution of 1933, all appointments in the higher judiciary were made by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister (this however, does not include to the period when the country remained under Martial Law from July, 1977 to March 1985). Even after the incorporation of 8th Amendment in the Constitution, the appointments in the higher judiciary continued to be made by the head of the State on the advice of Prime Minister. Mr. Iqbal Haider, the learned counsel for the former Prime Minister drew our attention to the Rules of Business (hereinafter to be called as "the Rules' only) framed under the Constitution in exercise of the power derived under Articles 90 and 99 of the Constitution. The learned counsel referred to Rule 15-A(1) of the Rules and Items Nos.31, 32 and 33 of Schedule V-B under Rule 15-A(1) in support of his contentions that matters relating to appointments of Judges of Supreme Court, High Courts and the Federal Shariat Court, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justices of High Courts and Federal Shariat Court, were always considered matters falling within the scope of clause (1) of Rule 15-A of the Rules, where advice of the Prime Minister was necessary. The learned counsel contended that matters falling within the discretionary powers of President, where no advice of the Prime Minister was required, were covered by sub-clause (2) of Rule 15-A and details of these matters are mentioned in Schedule VI. Rule 15-A and Items 31, 32 and 33 of the Schedule V-B read as follows:
"15-A. Reference to the President.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions made in these rules, where in terms of any provision of the Constitution any function is to be performed or any orders have to be issued by the President or his specific approval is required, the Division concerned shall incorporate a paragraph to this effect in the summary entitled as "Summary for the Prime Minister". The Prime Minister shall tender his advice and submit the case to the President. After the President has seen and approved the case, it shall be returned to the Prime Minister. The cases to which this sub-rule applies are enumerated in Schedule V-B. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions made in these rules, where in terms of any provisions of the Constitution any function is to be performed or any orders have to be-issued by the President in his discretion, the Division concerned shall submit the case to the President through the Prime Minister including a self-contained, concise and objective summary entitled as "Summary for the President" stating the relevant facts and points for decision prepared on the same lines as prescribed in these rules for a Summary for the Cabinet, except that only one copy will be required which may not be printed. This procedure will not, however, be applicable where the case is initiated by the President himself and decided in consultation with the Prime Minister. The cases to which this sub-rule applies are enumerated in Schedule VI. (3) The cases and papers referred to in Schedule VII shall be submitted to the President for his information. " "SCHEDULE V-B Rule 15-A (1) List of cases requiring orders of, the President on the advice of the Prime............... Minsiter .. ... .... .... .... ... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... (a) Sitting of the Court at places other Article 183(2). than Islamabad. (b) Number of Judges, appointment of the Articles 177(1), Chief Justice, other Judges and their 179, 182, resignation, removal, allowances and 209(6). privileges.
32. High Courts: number of Judges, their Article 203-C" appointments., transfers, resignation, removal, allowances and privileges.
27. Rule 15-A was added in the Rules oni 4-8-1985, after. the Constitution was amended through the 8th Amendment. From reading of Rule 15-A(1) ibid, and Items Nos. 31, 32 and 33 of Schedule V-B it appears that summaries for the appointment of Judges of Supreme Court, High Courts, Federal Shariat Court, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justices of High ,Courts and Federal Shariat Court, are submitted to the President for approval after advice is tendered by the Prime Minister. Insertion of Rule IS-A in the Rules on 4-8-1985, supports the conclusion that the amendments in Articles 48 and 90 of the Constitution through the 8th Amendment did not affect the original .scheme of Constitution and advice of Prime Minister was necessary in exercise of power by.the President under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. While still on this point, I may attend to another argument raised in this behalf. It is argued that besides performing various functions under the Constitution on the advice of Prime Minister, the President in some cases acts under the command of the Constitution in discharge of his Constitutional duty and, therefore, in the latter cases the advice of Prime Minister is neither necessary nor binding on the President. On these premises, it is argued that the President while exercising powers under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution does not perform 'function' but acts in discharge of his Constitutional duty. Article 48(1) of the Constitution refers to the functions of the President. Article 48(2) similarly refers to the acts which the President performs in his discretion. Article 48 nowhere makes any reference, to the duties of the President under the Pakistan in his discretion proceeds from the realization that the Prime Minister who would be involved in serious political conflicts and important State litigation would not process the necessary objectivity. The President unaffected by those conflicts would be in a better position to make a .proper selection. United Democratic Front would not object to the Prime Minister and the Law Minister placing their views before the President prior to his making the selection. But it would be contrary to national interest to make this matter on which the Prime Minister's advice should bind the President. The independence of the judiciary is an agreed objective The UDF is glad that the improper interference with the independence of judiciary through a resolution of Parliament seeking removal of Judges has been dropped. When we suggested executive control over all judicial institutions vesting in the Supreme Court, we were not trying to interfere with Provincial autonomy. We were following the American and Turkish precedent. If the Government would like the High Courts to exercise this executive control over all Courts and Tribunals civil and criminal including special Courts within their jurisdiction, we will gladly fall in line. We, however, object to the executive Government having any kind of control over Courts as we know by experience that this seriously impairs the independence of judiciary. The Government party cannot be really serious in insisting that for every vacancy in the Supreme Court or the High Court, the Chief Justice of Pakistan should recommend three persons. There are not so many capable persons available for such recommendations. When we suggested that the Presiding Officer of the highest Administrative Court or Tribunal should be a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court, we were conscious that this could not apply to lower administrative Courts at the district or divisional level. The need for an appellate administrative Court in every Province cannot be under estimated, and the requirement that the Presiding Officer of the highest Special Court or Tribunal should be sitting or retired Judge needs no argument. Nevertheless, Mr. Bhutto has declined to accept this suggestion. " (The underlining in my own). The above extract from the rejoinder of UDF issued in reply to Memoir of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, dated 4-4=1973, clearly spells out two things. Firstly, the front did not object to the views of Prime Minister or. that of the Law Minister being placed before the President prior to the appointment and selection of Judges but that the advice of Prime Minister should not be binding on the President in this behalf. The UDF could not have taken this stand on 9-4-1973 if there was already an agreement between the UDF and Peoples' Party in the Assembly that the power to appoint the Judges of superior courts will be exercised by President. Secondly, the UDF in its reaction on 9-4-1973 expressed satisfaction on the dropping of provision in draft Constitution relating to removal of Judges through a resolution of Parliament, which had an obvious reference to the underlined statement at page 157 of the documents relied by Mr. Pirzada the learned amicus. It is not disputed before us that after the Constitution of 1973 was enforced all appointments of the Judges of superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution were made by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. This practice continued to be followed even after the Constitution was amended through the 8th Amendment, is fully borne out, from Rule 15-A and Schedule V-B of the Rules, framed under Articles 90 and 99 of the Constitution, which were inserted on 4-8-1985.
28. The preceding discussion leaves no room for any doubt that the advice of Prime Minister is necessary in the appointment of Judges of superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution by the President. The only other point which remains to be answered is, in what manner the advice is to be tendered by the Prime Minister in connection with the appointments of Judges of the Superior ~ Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution after the decision of this Court in Al-Jehad Trust case. The Indian Supreme Court in the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, supra, while holding that the President's satisfaction under the Indian Constitution meant the satisfaction of the Minister or Council of Ministers, emphasised the concept of independence of judiciary as follows:
"The independence of judiciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the deviation, is guarded by 'the relevant Article making consultation with the Chief Justice of India obligatory. In all conceivable cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian Justice will and should be accepted by the Government of India and the Court will have an opportunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have entered into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India. In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order. In this view it is immaterial whether the President or the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally decides the issue." Similar 'observations were made in the case of S.C. Advocates-on Record v. Union of India, supra, by the Indian Supreme Court, which were as follows:
"
482. If it were to be held that, notwithstanding the requirement of Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of the High Court, the Council of Ministers has the unfettered discretion to give contrary advice, ignoring the views of the Chief Justice of India, and the President is bound by Article 74(1) to act in accordance with that advice, then Constitutional purpose of introducing the mandatory requirement of consultation in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) would be frustrated. It is for this reason, that in the matter of appointments of Judges of the superior judiciary, the interpretation and harmonisation of Article 74(1) with Articles 124(2) and 217(1) has to be borne in mind, to serve the Constitutional purpose. In short, in the matter of appointments of Judges of the superior judiciary, the Constitutional requirement is, that the President is to act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers as provided in Article 74(1); and the advice of the Council of Ministers is to be given in accordance with Articles 124(2) and 217(I), as construed by this Court. In this sphere, Article 74(1) is circumscribed by the requirement of Articles 124 (2) and 217(1), and all of them have to be read together."
29. This Court in the ease of Al-Jehad Trust, supra, ruled that the opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of a High Court as to fitness and suitability of a candidate far judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the executive/President. It was further held in that case that appointment of a person found unfit and unsuitable far judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of High Court concerned, would riot be a proper exercise of power under the relevant Articles of the Constitution. This Court also fixed the time frame for filling the permanent vacancies occurring in the offices of Chief Justice and Judges not later than 30 days and for a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reason, within 90 days an permanent basis. The advice of the Prime Minister to be binding an the President must be in line with the abase ratio in the ease of AI-Jehad Trust. The Supreme Court of India in the case of S.C. Advocates-an-Record v. Union of India, supra, in order to ensure proper compliance of the judgment and to prevent undue delay in the process of appointment of Judges made the following observations.-_- "(12)Adherence to a time bound schedule would prevent any undue delay and avoid dilatory methods in the appointment process. On initiation of the proposal by the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court, as the case may be, failure of any other Constitutional functionary to express its opinion within the specified Period should be construed to mean the deemed agreement of that functionary with the recommendation, and the President is expected to make the appointment in accordance with the final. opinion of the Chief Justice of India. In such a situation, after expiry of the specified time within which all the Constitutional functionaries are to give their opinion, the Chief Justice of India is expected to request the President to-make the appointment without any further delay, the process of consultation being complete." 30. 1 am in respectful agreement with the above observations and inclined to hold that if the Prime Minister within the time frame fixed in the judgment of this Court in A1-Jehad Trust case fails to tender his advice, he or she shall be deemed to have agreed to the recommendations of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and that of the Chief Justice of Provincial High Court as the case malt be and the president may Proceed to make the final appointment on that basis. The question of eau referred by the president under Article 186 of the Constitution this Court far opinion, is answered as stated above.
31. The decision of President's Reference No.2 of 1996 completely covers the disposal of Constitution Petition No.54 of 1996 wherein in question of law agitated by the petitioner is identical to the legal proposition answered by us in the Reference. In so far Constitution Petition No. 23 of 1996 is concerned, in this petition besides the question of interpretation of Articles 48, 177 and 193 of the Constitution, which has been decided by this judgment, the petitioner has claimed several other reliefs which in my opinion do not arise at present and therefore, need not be decided in these proceedings. With these observations, Constitution Petition No.23 of 1996 also stands disposed of.
32. Before concluding, I would like to record my appreciation for the valuable and able assistance rendered by the two learned amcius curiae, Mr. S.S. Pirzada and Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocates of this Court, in resolving the legal issue referred to this Court for opinion. I may also mention here that Mr. S.S~. Pirzada, in spite of his other professional engagement, regmlariy attended the proceedings of these cases and was available in the Court most of the time for assistance:-I also thank Mr. Hamid Khan, Advocate, the Vice-Chairman of Pakistan Bar Council and Mr. Akram Shaikh, Advocate, the President of Supreme Court Bar Association for placing before the Court the views of their respective associations. The above are the reasons in support of short order announced on 4-12-1996. (Sd. ) SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J RAJA AFRASIAB KHAN, J.-- On 21st of April 1996, Constitution Petition No.23 of 1996 (Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others) was directly filed in this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 with the following prayer:-- Constitution Petition No .54 of 1996 (Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry ,Advocate v Federation of Pakistan and others ) was instituted on 26th of august 1996 praying In view of the above , it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon ble Court may very graciously issue necessary direction for protection and enforcement of fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 4,14 and 25 and pronounce that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has no power/authority under Article 48 of the Constitution of Pakistan to interfere, in any manner, in the matter of appointment of Judges of superior Courts. . Any other relief to which the petitioner is found entitled may also graciously be granted." On 19-5-1996, Reference No. l of 1996 was filed by the Federal Government without obtaining the signatures of the President. Another Special Reference No.2 of 1996 was sent by the President on 21st of September, 1996 under Article 186 of the Constitution for securing the opinion of this Court on the question: "Whether or not the powers of the President to make appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution are subject to the provisions of Article 48(1) of the Constitution. " During the hearing of the aforesaid matters, Reference No. l of 1996 was not pressed by the learned counsel for the President and as such, it was dismissed as withdrawn on 23-1~1-1996. It is not necessary to state all the facts and the circumstances under which the aforementioned cases were filed inasmuch as they have fully been given by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in his leading judgment. I, respectfully agree with the judgment. However, in view of the great public importance of the question involved in these matters, I have decided to add a note of my own. The preamble of the Constitution which was later on made a substantive part of the Constitution as Article 2A, would demonstrate that our Constitution envisages the Parliamentary form of Government. In order to better understand the point, Article 2A is reproduced:-- "2A: Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan; Wherein the State shall exercise its ,powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people; Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives.. in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah; Wherein adequate provisions shall be made for the minorities to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures; Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed; Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes; Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded; So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity. " This Article has unequivocally stated that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority to be exercised by the People of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. It provides that the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people (underlining is mine).- A perusal of the Resolution shows that system of our Government is Parliamentary inasmuch as the powers and authority of the State shall be exercised by the chosen representatives of the people. The terms "people" includes the whole mass of persons living in Pakistan. At page 746 of Macmillan Dictionary, the leaning/illustration of "People" has been given in these words:-- "People.--1. persons, esp. when considered indefinitely or collectively: She's afraid of what people might say. This theater can seat 500 people. 2. body of persons comprising a nation, race, tribe, or community: the Israeli people, primitive peoples, the peoples of Asia. 3. body of persons considered as or comprising a distinct group: rich people, people of New England. 4. body of citizens of a State or other political unit: Congressmen are elected by the people. 5. body or mass of common persons as distinguished from person of some special group or class: the everyday language of the people. 6. persons in relation to a superior, as the subjects of a ruler: the King was loved by his people. 7. human tciugs as distinguished from animals: Distemper is not a disease affecting people 8. informal, one"s family; relatives, 9. the little (or good) people. leprechauns; fairies.-- v.t. ples,- pling. to fill with inhabitants; populate: the myriad of human beings who people the K earth. (Old French pueple body of persons, nation, the public, from Latin Populus). " This leaves no doubt to say that the people having been mentioned in the Article would represent the whole nation. The people will choose their representatives in a free, fair, unfettered and honest election to be held under Part VIII (Articles 213 to 226) of the Constitution. Article 218 provides:-- (1) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... (2) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .... (a) ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. (b) .. ..: ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. ` (3) It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted -honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against." (Underlining is mine). The elections have to be held strictly in accordance with law, justly, fairly and honestly. The people who are responsible to arrange/organize such elections, are bound under the Constitution and the law to be impartial, neutral and honest to the greatest possible extent in the discharge of their sacred duties. It has been emphasised by the Constitution that corrupt practices are to be guarded against This is indeed, a Herculean job to be done by the "Chief Election Commissioner'. It cannot be said; that he is subordinate to any Authority while doing his duties in holding free, fair and transparent elections which would, in turn, give birth to a body/institution of the nation called "Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoorah)". In its own rights, the Parliament shall be all powerful in the field of law-making within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. In such a set-up, Prime Minister has teen shown to be the leader tit the majority party in trio National Assembly. Likewise, he/she is the leader of a political party which has given a manifesto to the nation on the basis of which, such a leader has succeeded in the general elections defeating all his political opponents., In other words, 'he/she (prime Minister) will be the leader of the chosen representatives as has been mentioned in Article 2A. He will thus IV represent the will of the people. Needles to add that the chosen representative of the people shall fulfil all the qualifications having beets mentioned in Article 62 of the Constitution. In case, any one or some of them, is/are hit by any of the disqualifications under Article 63, he/they will be declared to have lost his/their membership or shall be disqualified from being elected as member of the Parliament by the competent Authority. The Prime Minister has also been held not to be subordinate or inferior to- the President in the landmark judgment of this Court reported as Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan etc. PLD 1993 SC
473. It is true that drastic changes have been made in the Constitution by means of Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the Eighth Amendment) under which specific powers have been given to the President. This is surely a scheme to create balance of powers between the President and the' Prime Minister. However, the fact remains that the basic structure namely Parliamentary form of Government was not touched by the Eighth Amendment. It remains the same as existed in the original Constitution. Under Article 48(1), the President is bound to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. The President may send 0 back the advice to the Prime Minister for reconsideration. Nevertheless, the 0 President shall act according to the advice after its reconsideration. Language of 0 clause (1) of Article 48 even after amendment does indicate that the powers of the Prime Minister have not been affected so substantially so as to conclude that the system has. been changed. The original system of Government remains in the field only with the change that some more powers were specifically given to the President to be exercised by him in his discretion to. meet an appropriate situation. Article 91 of the Constitution illustrates that there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. Provisions of Article 91 have further reiterated/confirmed the powers to be exercised by the Prime Minister to run the P affairs of the Federation in his/her own rights. This may be possible only where P there is Parliamentary form of Government. In the Presidential system of P Government, all the powers will vest in the' President. The Prime Minister, if any, in such a system, has surely a second role to play and that too; under the supervision and control of the President who is, in fact, the fountain head of all the State powers. This question was somewhat discussed to show that system prevailing in Pakistan is Parliamentary. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's case (supra) in support of this plea, may usefully be referred. In this judgment, Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah (as his Lordship then was) noted the following observations made by Zafar Hussain Mirza J. at page 766: "The expression 'political justice' is very significant and it has been placed in the category of Fundamental Rights. Political parties have become a subject-matter of a Fundamental Right in consonance with the said provisions in the Objectives Resolution. Even otherwise, speaking broadly, our Constitution is a Federal Constitution based on the model of Parliamentary form of representative Government prevalent in United Kingdom. It is also clear from the Objectives Resolution that principles of - democracy as enunciated by Islam are to be fully observed. True and fair elections and the existence of political parties, is an essential adjunct of a functional democratic system of Government." The view expressed by Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone at page 756 is:
"Our Constitution ordains a Parliamentary system of Government with collective ministerial responsibility to the Parliament." Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shah the then Hon'ble Chief Justice observed:
"Thus in the scheme of our Constitution, the guarantee ' to form a political party' must be deemed to comprise also the right by that political party to form the Government, wherever the said political party possesses the requisite majority in the Assembly. As was explained by Chief Justice Muhammad Haleem in the same judgment:
'Our Constitution is of the pattern of Parliamentary democracy with a Cabinet system based on party system as essentially it is composed of the representatives of a party which is in majority ...It is a party system that converts the results of a Parliamentary election into a Government'. " There can be no doubt about the proposition that in a pure Parliamentary system of Government, Chief Executive shall always be the Prime Minister. A question of law which has been sent to this Court to obtain its opinion is "whether or not K the President of Pakistan is bound by the advice of the Prime Minister rendered to him under Article 48(1) of the Constitution in respect of appointment of Judges". In the abovesaid background, it is not difficult to say that clause (1) of! Article 48 of the Constitution will apply in respect of appointment of Judges. In IF this connection, very exhaustive and elaborate arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the parties to support their views. Shortly, one submission of M/s. Habibul Wahabul Khairi, Raja Muhammad Akram and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada was that keeping .in view the nature of the controversy advice of the Prime Minister in regard to appointment of Judges is not necessary and the provisions of clause (1) of Article 48 of the Constitution will not be attracted. According to them, clause (2) of Article 48 shall apply. It is submitted that under Articles 177 and 193, Prime Minister has not been mentioned with a clear purpose in the list of consultees just to oust him/her in the matter of such appointments. This being the position, advice of the Prime Minister is not needed. In consequence, the President shall be competent to appoint the Judges of the superior Courts without the receipt of advice of the Prime Minister. Syed Iqbal Haider, learned counsel for the former Prime Minister, respondent No.3 has submitted that in the Parliamentary form of Government, the advice of the Prime Minister is necessary and shall bind the President in the discharge of his functions. According to him, the powers which have been given to the President after Eighth Amendment have been mentioned in various Articles of the Constitution but they do not affect the authority of the Prime Minister. Mr. S.M. Zafar has argued that Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution have not been amended and reading them alongwith clause (1) of Article 48 and also keeping in view the modality of interpretation of statutes the position which prevailed before the Eighth Amendment would apply obliging the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister in respect of appointment of Judges. He continues to argue that system of Government in Pakistan is Parliamentary under 1973 Constitution. In this scenario, decision/opinion of my brother Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J. is:
"This Court in the case of AI-Jehad Trust, supra, ruled that the opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of a High Court as to fitness and suitability of a candidate for judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the Executive/President. It was further held in that case that aappointment of a person found unfit and unsuitable for judaeshin by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of High Court concerned would not be a mover exercise of power under the relevant Articles of the Constitution. This Court also fixed the time frame for filling the permanent vacancies occurring in the offices of Chief Justice and Judges not later than 30 days and for a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reason, within 90 days on permanent basis. The advice of the Prime Minister to be binding on the President must be in line with the above ratio in the case of Al-Jehad Trust. The Supreme Court of India in the case of SC Advocates-on Record v. Union of India, supra, in order to ensure proper compliance of the judgment and to prevent undue delay in the process of appointment of Judges made the following observations:
"(12) Adherence to a time bound schedule would prevent any undue delay and avoid dilatory methods in the appointment process. On initiation. of the proposal by the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court as the case may be, failure. of any other Constitutional functionary to express its opinion within the specified period should be construed to mean the deemed agreement of that functionary with the recommendation, and the President is expected to make the aunointment in accordance with the final opinion of the Chief Justice of India. In such a situation, after expiry of the specified time within which all the Constitutional functionaries are to give their opinion, the Chief Justice of India is expected to request the President to make, the appointment without any further delay, the process; of consultation being complete. " I am in respectful agreement with the above observations and inclined to hold that if the Prime Minister within the time-frame fixed in the judgment of this Court in Al-Jehad Trust case fails to tender his advice, he or she shall be S deemed to have agreed to the recommendations of the Chief Justice of Pakistan S and that of the Chief Justice of Provincial High Court as the case may be, and S the President may proceed to make the final appointment on that basis. The question of law referred by the President under Article 186 of the Constitution to this Court for opinion, is answered as stated above." (Underlining is mine). An elaborate judgment/opinion has been given by Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian. Inter alia, it states:
, "Mr. S..M. Zafar's above submission seems to have been as it does not stand to reason that in respect of two Articles relating to judiciary ' Prime Minister's advice is not necessary under Article 48(1) whereas in respect of about 12 Articles, Prime Minister's advice is required for the reason that no special consultees are mentioned therein. The above scenario does not fit in with the structural arguments. Mr. S.M. Zafar has referred to the book titled 'Constitutional Interpretation' by Bobbitt Philip in which the above six rules of interpretation have been effectively dealt with. The above contention also stands negated by the fact that since the framing of 1973 Constitution, the appointments of the Judges of the superior Courts have always been made on the basis of the advice of the Prime Minister." -' The leading judgment rendered by Hon'ble Chief Justice has covered each and every point raised and argued by the learned counsel for the parties. His Lordship has given opinion on the controversy in a very lucid and masterly way in paras. 85 and 86 of his judgment which is:
"The last point is very thought-provoking and was raised in .Court during the hearing, which is to they effect as to what will happen if the judgment of the Supreme Court in the appointment of Judges' Case is not implemented. Learned counsel who had appeared in these matters made different comments. Mr. S.M. Zafar as amicus curiae stated that in such a situation President will be justified to invoke Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution because it would amount to arising of situation in which Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Under the four corners of the Constitution Article 189 provides specifically that any decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan. Article 190 envisaged that all Executive and Judicial Authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the, Supreme Court. Article 204 empowers the Supreme Court to punish for contempt any person who-- (a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any order of the Court; (b) Scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt; (c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter, pending before the Court; or (d) does any other thing which by law, constitutes contempt of the Court. In the case of non-implementation of the judgment it will have to be found out as to who is responsible for not implementing it. Article 190 is a mandatory provision under which there is no alternative for the Executive but has to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Person identified as responsible for in-implementation of the judgment can be punished by the Supreme Court for contempt for is obedience of its judgment. Perusal of Articles 177 and 193 and other Articles, which are relevant for the subject-matter of Judiciary shows that Supreme Court has to correspond with the President for appointments as he is named specifically in the relevant Articles and all Executive actions are to be taken in his name. It is expected that President shall see to it that appointments of Judges in the Superior Judiciary are made in strict accordance with the Constitutional scheme contemplated in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution which are to be interpreted and read in conjunction with the judgment in Al-Jehad Trust case which is authoritative adjudicatory pronouncement in respect of interpretation of Articles in the Constitution relating to the Judiciary. Time-frame is also provided in the judgment within which appointments are to be finalised. If there is undue delay or impasse which shows that dilatory tactics are being adopted and sincere attempt is not being made to implement the judgment, then it will become the Constitutional duty of the President to see that judgment of the Supreme Court is implemented and there is no violation or non-compliance of Article 190 of the Constitution which makes it mandatory for all Executive and Judicial Authorities throughout' Pakistan to act in aid of the Supreme Court. If all the Executive and Judicial Authorities in Pakistan are unable to come in aid of the Supreme Court and judgment is not implemented, then such situation would be open to be construed as impasse or deadlock and would amount to very unhappy situation reflecting failure of Constitutional machinery and one would be justified to say that a situation has arisen in which the Government of Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution as is contemplated under Article 58(2)(b)." I shall further support the above conclusions. If the judgment of this Court is not implemented intentionally, an answer to the question has been given under Article 204 of the Constitution. This shall clearly mean that the order/deciee of the Court has been disobeyed. The Constitutional command is that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall bind all Courts of the country. Article 190 of the Constitution has ordained that all Executive and Judicial Authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of Supreme Court of Pakistan. Learned Chief Justice has rightly held that provisions of Article 204 will be attracted in case of non-implementation of judgment of this Court. Under Article 5, obedience to the Constitution and law is the inviolable obligation of every' I citizen of Pakistan. Article 25 states that all the citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. In other words, no citizen howhighsoever he may be, can claim exemption/immunity from the application of law of the land. This being the position, every person in authority is bound to come in aid of Supreme Court in the implementation of its judgment whether or not such, a -person is called upon to do so. There should be no doubt/ambiguity about this proposition of law. In case of State v. Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 following observations were made:
"So far therefore, as this Court is concerned it has never claimed to be above the Constitution nor to have the right to strike down any provision of the Constitution. It has accepted the position that it is a creature of the Constitution; that it derives its powers and jurisdictions from the Constitution; and that it will even confine itself within the limits set by the Constitution which it has taken oath to protect and preserve but it does claim and has always claimed that it has the right to interpret the Constitution and to say as to what a particular provision of the Constitution means or does not mean even if that particular provision is a provision seeking to oust the 'jurisdiction of the Court. This is a right which it acquires not de hors the Constitution but by virtue of the fact that it is a superior Court set up by the Constitution itself. It is not necessary for this purpose to invoke any divine or super natural right but this Judicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It flows from the fact that it is a Constitutional Court and it can only be taken away by abolishing the Court itself. In saying this, however, I should make it clear that I am making a distinction between "judicial power" and "jurisdiction". In system where there is a trichotomy of sovereign powers, then ex necessitate rel from the very nature of things the judicial power must be vested in the judiciary. But what is this judicial power. "Judicial power" has been defined in the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. XVI, Paragraph 144, as follows:
'The judiciary or judicial department is an independent and equal coordinate branch of Government, and is that branch thereof which is intended to interpret, construe, and apply the law, or that department of Government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is, and its construction, so far as it is written law.' This power, it is said, is inherent in the judiciary by reason of the system of division of powers itself under which, as Chief Justice Marshal put it, 'the Legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law.' Thus the determination of what the existing law is in relation to something already done or happened is the function of the judiciary while the predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provisions is the function of the Legislature. It may well be asked at this stage as to what is meant by 'jurisdiction'? How does it differ from 'judicial powers'? Apart from setting up the organs the Constitution may well provide for a great many other things, such as, the subjects in respect of which that power 'nay be exercised and the manner of the exercise of that power. Thus it may provide that the Courts set up will exercise revisional or appellate powers or only act as a Court of a cessation or only decide Constitutional issues. It may demarcate the territories in which a particular Court shall function and over which its writs shall run. It may specify the persons in respect of whom the judicial power to hear and determine will be exercisable. These are all matters which are commonly comprised in what is called the jurisdiction of the Court. It expresses the concept of the particular or subject-matter over which the judicial power is to be exercised and the manner of its exercise. Jurisdiction is, therefore, a right to adjudicate concerning a particular subject-matter in a given case, as also the authority to exercise in a particular manner the judicial power vested in the Court. In exercising this power, the judiciary claims no supremacy over other organs of the Government but acts only as the administrator of the public will. Even when it declares a legislative measure unconstitutional and void, it does not do so, because, the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative power; but because the Constitution has vested it with the power to declare what the law is in the cases which come before it. It thus merely enforces the Constitution as a paramount law whenever a legislative enactment comes into conflict with it because, it is its duty to see that the Constitution prevails. It is only when the Legislature fails to keep within its own Constitutional limits, the Judiciary steps in to enforce compliance with the Constitution. This is no doubt a delicate task as pointed out in the case of Fazlul Quader Choudhary v. Shah Nawaz, which has to be performed with great circumspection out ii teas nevertheless w bt performed as a sacred Constitutional duty when other State functionaries disregard the limitations imposed upon them or claim to exercise owe? which the people have been careful. to withhold from them. On the other hand, it is equally important to remember that it is not the function of the judiciary to legislate or to question the wisdom of the Legislature in making a particular law if it has made it competently without .transgressing the limitations of the Constitution. Again if a law has been competently and validly made the judiciary. cannot accuse to enforce it even if the result of it to be to nullify its own decisions. The Legislature has also every right to change, amend or clarify the law if the judiciary has found that the language used by the Legislature conveys an intent different from that which was sought to be conveyed by it. The Legislature which establishes a particular Court may also, if it so desires, abolish it." (Underlining is mine). This Court, undoubtedly, decides cases involving interpretation of the Constitutional provisions in its capacity as administrator of the will of the people. This interpretation becomes a part and parcel of the Constitution and the law which, in turn, shall be obeyed/followed by all and padre ,in letter and spirit Side by side, it may also be noted that well-established conventions' and practices have always been treated as part of the Constitution provided they do not violate/contravene the provisions of a written Constitution. It was so held by this Court in Al-Jehad Trust's case (supra). The consistent practice in the past has been that the appointments in the superior Judiciary were made by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, deviation to the above convention had been made during the period when there existed Presidential form of Government in the country. Even after the introduction of Eighth Amendment, from 1985 onward, such appointments were made by the ?resident in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. It may, :n particular, be noted that this method continued to exist even during the lifetime of the person (Gen. Muhammad Ziaul Haq) who was responsible for the enactment of Eighth Amendment. On 9th of March 1987, a batch of six Judges was elevated on the explicit advice of the then Prime Minister. The then President, Gen. Muhammad Ziaul Haq did not object to the advice of the Prime Minister on the ground that he had the exclusive powers to make such appointments. It may be seen that under Articles 90 and 99, Rules of Business, 1973 were framed. These rules are still in force. The rules show beyond doubt that it is the Prime Minister who shall propose and recommend the names of the candidates for their appointment as Judges. Rule 15-A of the Rules of Business may be referred. The validity of these Rules had never been challenged by any person. Even in these marathon proceedings, none came out to challenge the vires of these rules referred to above. These rules, as such are an essential appratus/machinery to run the affairs of the country unless, it is shown that they are in contravention of the Constitution itself under which they have been framed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. It may not, however, be understood that these rules are equal to the Constitution status-wise. In these circumstances, I support the view of the Hon'ble Chief Justice that Article 204 of the Constitution will be attracted to take action against the Y person/persons who do not intend to implement the judgment of this Court. The Y Constitutional provisions on the subject have been interpreted in the case of Al Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC
324. A detailed procedure regarding the appointments of Judges has been mentioned in the case which is:
(i) The words "after consultation" employed inter alia in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution connote that the consultation should be effective, meaningful, purposive, consensus-oriented, leaving no room for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play. The opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of a High Court as to the fitness and suitability of a candidate for judgeship is entitled to be accepted in the absence of very sound reasons to be recorded by the President/Executive. (ii) That if the President/Executive appoints a candidate found to be unfit and unsuitable for judgeship by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, it will not be proper exercise of power under the relevant Article of the Constitution. (iii) That the permanent vacancies occurring in the offices of Chief Justice and Judges normally should be' filled in immediately not later than 30 days but a vacancy occurring before the due date on account of death or for any other reasons, should be filled in within 90 days on permanent basis. (iv) That no ad hoc Judge can be appointed in the Supreme Court while permanent vacancies exist. (v) That in view of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and established conventions/practice, the most senior Judge of a High Court has a legitimate expectancy to be considered for appointment as the Chief Justice and in the absence of any concrete and valid reasons to be recorded by the President/Executive, he is entitled to be appointed as such in the Court concerned. ` (vi) An Acting Chief. Justice is not a consultee as envisaged by the relevant Articles of Constitution and, therefore, mandatory Constitutional requirement of consultation is not fulfilled by consulting an Acting Chief Justice except in case the permanent Chief Justice concerned is unable to resume his functions within 90 days from the date of commencement of his sick leave because of his continuous sickness. (vii) That Additional .judges appointed in tile High, Court against permanent vacancies or if permanent vacancies occur while they are acting as Additional Judges, acquire legitimate expectancy and they are entitled to be considered for permanent appointment upon the expiry of their permanent appointment as Additional Judges and they are entitled to be ' appointed as such if they are recommended by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and the Chief Justice of Pakistan in the absence of strong valid reason/reasons to be recorded by the President/Executive. (viii) That an appointment of a sitting Chief Justice of a High Court or a Judge thereof in the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-C of the Constitution without his consent is .violative of Article 209, which guarantees the tenure of office. Since the former Article was incorporated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the latter Article was enacted by the Framers of the Constitution, the same shall prevail and, hence; such an appointment will be void. (ix) That transfer of a Judge of one High Court to another High Court can only be made in, the public interest and not as a punishment. (x) That the requirement of 10 years' practice under Article 193(2)(a) of the Constitution relates to the experience/practice at the Bar and not simpliciter the period of enrolment. (xi) That the simpliciter political affiliation of a candidate for judgeship the superior Courts may not be a disqualification provided the candidate is of an unimpeachable integrity, having sound knowledge in law and is recommended by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and the Chief Justice of Pakistan. (xii) That it is not desirable to. send a Supreme Court Judge as an Acting Chief Justice to a High Court in view of clear adverse observation of this Court in the case of Abrar Hassan v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1976 SC 315 at 342. ' (xiii) That since consultation for the appointment/confirmation of a Judge of a Superior Court by the President/Executive with consultees mentioned in the relevant Articles of the Constitution is mandatory any appointment/confirmation made without consulting any of the consultees as interpreted above would be violative of the Constitution and, therefore, would be invalid." This being the position, such recommendations/consultation cannot by any stretch of imagination be ignored and as such, shall have to be treated as final qua the aforesaid Judicial appointments. The Chief Justice of Pakistan, being the Head of the Judiciary has the right of primacy on the issue. There might be cases of fraud or misrepresentation wherein it could be shown that the candidates for judgeship were not entitled to be appointed for lack of qualifications. In that case, Chief Justice may review his earlier recommendations on the basis of documentary evidence disclosing fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud surely vitiates even the most solemn proceedings. On the contrary, opinion of the Chief Justice shall hold the field and has to be treated as the last word on the controversy. As stated above, the question about appointment of Judges has been decided in Al-Jehad Trust's case (supra) leaving no room for any doubt. This is the law of the land. The Judges in Superior Courts shall, therefore, be appointed strictly in accordance with this law. In this view of the matter,. the advice of the Prime Minister shall be accepted by the President provided it is in accordance with the rule laid down in case of Al-Jehad Trust (supra). From the above, the conclusions which may be drawn are:
' (i) On the basis of the preamble and the Objectives Resolution (Article 2A), the system of Government which. emerges therefrom is Parliamentary. (ii) The representatives of the people are to be chosen in free, fair, just and honest elections to be conducted by the Chief Election Commissioner vide Articles 213 to 226 of the Constitution. Prime Minister is the leader of the Parliamentary majority party in the National Assembly. He/she is the leader of the chosen representatives of the people having full powers to run the affairs of the Federation. (iii) Before the promulgation of Eighth Amendment, there was no dispute on the powers of the Prime Minister to give advice to the President for appointment of Judges. Such advice was binding on the President. (iv) After the enactment of Eighth Amendment, there is no substantial change in clause (1) of Article
48. Articles 177 and 193 of the (; Constitution were not amended. The position being the same, the advice C of the Prime Minister shall be of binding effect. (v) The President has been assigned some specific powers to be exercised by him in his discretion for which, in my view, there is no ambiguity in the Constitution. This may be seen. from close reading of the Constitution Eighth Amendment Act, 1985. The most important power which has been conferred on the President under the Eighth Amendment is the one to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution. (vi) It has been the established convention that the appointments of Judges were made by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. - On 4-12-1996, unanimously, following short order was passed:
. "For the reasons to be recorded later, we hold that for the appointments of Judges of the superior Courts under Articles 177 and 193, Article 48(1) of the Constitution is attracted and the President shall act in accordance with the same provided it is in accordance with the judgment in the case of Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC
324. The Reference and the two Constitutional petitions are disposed of in the above terms. " The above are my reasons in addition to the reasons advanced by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in his judgment with which I have already concurred. M.B.A./A-1431/S Petitions disposed of