P L D 2003 Karachi 127 (PLP)

(2)??????? Where a victim has more than one Wali, any one of them may waive this right of Qisas: Provided that the Wali who does not waive the right of Qisas shall be entitled to his share of Diyat. (3)??????? Where there are more than one victim, the waiver of the right of Qisas by the Wali of one victim shall not affect the right of Qisas of the Wali of the other victim. (4)??????? Where there are more than one offenders, the waiver of the right of Qisas against one offender shall not affect the right of Qisas against the other offender.

310. Compounding of Qisas (Sulh) in Qatl‑e‑Amd.‑‑(1) In the case of Qatl‑i‑Amd and adult sane Wali may, at any time on accepting Badl?-i‑Sulh, compound his right of Qisas: Provided that giving a female in marriage shall not be a valid Badl-?i‑Sulh. (2)??????? Where a Wali is a minor or an insane, the Wali of such minor or insane Wali may compound the right of Qisas on behalf of such minor or insane Wali: Provided that the value of Badl‑i‑Sulh shall not be less than the value of Diyat. (3)??????? Where the Government is the Wali, it may compound the right of Qisas: Provided that the value of Badl‑i‑Sulh shall not be less than the value of Diyat. (4)??????? Where the Badl‑i‑Sulh is not determined or is a property or a right the value of which cannot be determined in terms of money under Shafiah the right of Qisas shall be deemed to have been compounded and the offender shall be liable to Diyat. (5)??????? Badl‑i‑Sulh may be paid or given on demand or on a deferred as may be agreed upon between the offender and the Wali. Explanation.‑‑‑In this section Badl‑i‑Sulh means the mutually agreed compensation according to Shariah to be paid or given by the offender to a Wali in cash or in kind or in the form of movable and immovable property." A perusal of section 309 shows that it speaks of waiver (Afw) of the right of Qisas and section 310 speaks of compounding of the right of Qisas by accepting Badl‑i‑Sulh, while in section 338‑E, P.P.C. it is provided that subject to the provisions of Chapter XVI and section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. all offences under Chapter XVI, P.P.C. may be waived/compounding. A waiver or compounding of offences under Chapter XVI, P.P.C. is subject to the provisions contained in section 345, Cr.P.C., therefore, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions contained in section 345, Cr.P.C.: "S.345. Compounding offences.‑‑‑(1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Pakistan Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. (2)??????? The offences punishable under the sections of the Pakistan Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table: (3)??????? When any offence is compoundable under this section, the abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) may be compounded in like manner. (4)??????? When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf may with the permission of the Court compound such offence. (5)??????? When the accused has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court before which the appeal is to be heard. (5‑A)?? A High Court acting in the exercise of its power of revision under section 439 (and a Court of Session so acting under section 439‑A), may allow, any person to compound any offence which he is competent to compound under this section. (6)??????? The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. (7)??????? No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. " A perusal of section 345, Cr.P.C. also shows that it speaks of compounding of offences and not of mere punishment. A perusal of provisions contained in sections 309 and 310 shows that the waiver/compounding of the right of Qisas does not have the effect of acquittal of accused of the charge of Qatl‑i‑Amd but has the effect of conversion of punishment of Qisas to the payment of Diyat or Badl‑i‑Sulh. We are fortified it our views with the provisions contained in section 53 which teas been substituted by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (II of 1997), through which the provisions contained in sections 299 to 338, Chapter XVI were substituted. In section 299, P.P.C. Qisas, Diyat, Arsh, Daman and Tazir have been included in the kinds of punishments to which the offenders are liable under the Pakistan Penal Code. We would like to clarify that an adult sane "Wali" has a right to waive the right of Qisas and to retain his right of receiving Diyat or may waive the right of Qisas as well as Diyat, which is a compensation/substitute for the waiver, of right of Qisas. Thus if a "Wa?:" of deceased/victim waives the right of Qisas as well as compensation i.e. Diyat, the offender is to be acquitted of the charge. However, if the "Wali" has merely waived the right of Qisas then the offender is liable to be convicted for Qatl‑i‑Amd or as the case may be and is liable to the sentence of paying compensation by way, of Diyat or payment of Badl‑i‑Sulh. The reason being that Qisas and Diyat are two distinct punishments and are not the same kind of punishment. For this reason Qisas and Diyat are separately and distinctly mentioned in section 53, P.P.C. which enumerates different kinds of punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of P.P.C., Qisas and Diyat have been defined separately in section 299, P.P.C. as follows: "S.299(k). 'Qisas' means punishment by causing similar hurt at the same part of the body of the convict as he has caused to the victim or by causing his death if he has committed Qati‑i‑Amd in exercise of the right of the victim or a Wali.". "S.299(e). ' Diyat' means the compensation specified in section 323 payable to the heirs of the victim;" It would be appropriate to reproduce section 323 P.P.C. in which value of Diyat is given which reads as follows: "S.323. Value of Diyat.‑‑‑(1) The Court shall, subject to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and keeping in view of the financial position of the convict and the heirs of the victim fix the value of Diyat which shall not be less than the value of thirty thousand six hundred and thirty grams of silver. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), the Federal Government shall, by notification in the official Gazette declare the value of silver on the first day of July each year." Reverting back to the provisions contained in sections 338‑E, P.P.C. and 345, Cr.P.C., we find that the effect of waiver or compounding of the offence is provided in the sections. In proviso to subsection (1) 338‑E, P.P.C, it is contained that where wherein an offence has been waived or compounded, the Court may in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, acquit or award Tazir to the offender according to the nature of the offence. Thus the first effect of the compounding/waiver of offence by the "Wali" of the deceased/victim in case of Qatl and by the victim himself, in the case of causing hurt, would be the acquittal of the offender. However, the Court may award Tazir to the offender according to the nature of offence. We will (sic) available with Court presently likewise it is provided in subsection (6) of section 345, Cr.P.C. that the composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of accused with whom the offence has been compounded. It is established principle of interpretation of statutes, that when different words and expressions are used by the Legislature, in same section or different sections of the same statute, then such different words and expressions shall connote different meanings and convey different intentions of the Legislature. Adhering to this principle of interpretation of statutes, we are of the considered opinion that whenever there is waiver of right of Qisas either in which by the "Wali" of deceased or by the victim himself, as the case may be, they still retain the right to receive Diyat or Sulh‑i‑Badl and the offender shall be convicted accordingly for the offence committed and shall be liable to pay, Diyat or Sulh‑i‑Badl as the case may be. However, if the "Wali" or victim waives the right of Qisas without any compensation, it would be a case of acquittal of the accused subject to the discretion available with the Court to award punishment by way of Tazir under the provisions of section 311, P.P.C. read with section 338‑E(i), P.P.C. A perusal of the above provisions of law leads to the logical conclusion that when an offence is waived or compounded, then no punishment can be awarded except under the. proviso to section 338‑E(i), P.P.C. and section 311, P.P.C. which empower the Court to award punishment by way of Tazir notwithstanding the waiver or compounding of offence and the Court has to exercise its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and nature of offence as well as keeping in view the principle of Fasad‑fil‑Arz. At this stage it would be appropriate to reproduce section 311, P.P.C. which reads as follows: "

311. Ta'zir after waiver or compounding of right of Qisas in Oatl?i‑Amd. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 309 or section 310 where all the Walis do not waived or compounded the right of Qisas or keeping in view the principle of Fasad‑fil‑Arz the Court may, in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, punish an offender against whom the right of Qisas has been waived or compounded with imprisonment of either description for a term which extended to fourteen years at Ta'zir.' Explanation.‑‑For the purpose of this section, the expression Fasad-fil‑Arz shall include the past conduct of the offender as being a previous convict, habitual or professional criminal and the brutal manner in which the offence is committed." The result of above discussion is that when the offence is waived or compounded and the Court is accepting the compounding/waiver of the offence, then the convicted person is/are to be acquitted, until and unless, the Court is of the view that punishment is to be awarded by way of Tazir. In the absence of an order awarding Tazir, the accused persons are to be acquitted and the expression acquittal means a declaration that a person is found not guilty of the offence and means the process of freeing or being freed from a charge especially by a judgment of not guilty. Once the accused is acquitted of the charge then there can be no punishment. Since in this case, we are not persuaded to impose any punishment by way of Tazir, therefore, the only option left with this Court would be to acquit the appellants/convicts. At this juncture we would like to refer to another objection of Mr.Ali Azhar Tunio, learned Assistant A.‑G to the effect that the offence under section 302, P.P.C. is compoundable, while the offence under section

149. P.P.C. is not compoundable. Although in Second Schedule to Cr.P.C. it is contained that the offence under section 149, P.P.C. is not compoundable but we are persuaded to agree with the views of Mr. Muhammad Bachal Tunio, learned A.A.‑G. and Mr.Ali Nawaz Ghanghro Advocate, the learned amicus curiae, that offence under section 149, P.P.C. is by way of constructive liability and when the main offence is allowed to be compounded and the persons who have taken specific. part in the commission of offence are allowed to compound, then the persons who are convicted on account of being merely members of unlawful assembly are also entitled to the concession of compromise/compounding/waiver, otherwise it would not be in consonance with the principles of justice, in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. It is provided in section 338‑F, P.P.C. that in the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter XVI, P.P.C. and interpretation of matters ancillary or akin thereto, the Court shall be guided by the Injunctions of Islam and laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. The above points came for adjudication before this Court and the Honourable Supreme Court in several cases. We would like to refer few judgments in this regard. In the case of Moula Bux v. State 1992 MLD 1590, a learned Single Judge of this Court after referring to the provisions contained in sections 300, 305, 306, 309, 310 and 311, P.P.C. as well as subsections (5), (6), (7) of section 345, Cr.P.C. observed that the composition of an offence shall have the effect of acquittal of an accused with whom the offence has been compounded. It was further observed that father and mother of deceased respectively were "Wali" of the deceased and they have pardoned the offender/appellant without fear or favour, and have waived their right to claim compensation from the appellant and therefore, the compromise was accepted and the appellant was acquitted. We are in respectful agreement with the above view taken by the learned Single Judge. However, we are not persuaded to agree with the following observation/finding of the learned Single Judge: "While taking wholesome view of the above amendment both in Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, a substantive law and in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 a procedural law it is obvious that the provisions of section 311, P.P.C. will be attracted only when the Court has declined the permission 0, compounding of the offence under section 345, Cr.P.C." We will dilate on this aspect presently. However at this stage we will reproduce the observation made by the learned Single Judge in respect of the amendment trade in the Criminal Law which still holds good: "

15. The changes brought about by the above law, though fundamental and substantial. but difficult to understand. The Islamic system or dispensation of justice is distinct, independent and capable of producing remarkable result. It is a living and efficient system based primarily on revealed knowledge and is in accordance with human nature. It must, however he sifted by eminent religious scholars jurists and social reformers before it is enacted as law of land. Else, in a haste and enthusiasm, we may not only create further confusion in the already confused state which our legal system has fallen during the last four decades. but in the process tray also provide further grounds for the people to become disillusioned and disenchanted against the cherished ideal of an Islamic society." The second judgement is in the case of Usman v. The State 1992 PCr.LJ 1960. In this case another learned Single Judge of this Court was while hearing an appeal against the order of Additional Sessions Judge who granted permission to compound and accepted the compromise under section 345, Cr.P.C. in respect of an offence punishable under section 302/34, P.P.C. but convicted the appellants under section 311, P.P.C. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that after granting permission to compromise the learned trial Court committed an illegality by convicting the appellants under the provisions of section

311. P.P.C. Learned Single Judge held as follows: "I may also observe that the learned trial Curt has misread the provisions of section

311. P.P.C. and after having, allowed the compromise application, the trial Judge had no other opinion but to accept the compromise. In this regard, I may refer to section 311, P.P.C. which is applicable in those cases where there is no compromise regarding the case as. a whole and only right of Qisas is waived under section 309, P.P.C. or if there is compounding of right of Qisas under section 310, P.P.C. then only the discretion provided under section

311. P.P.C. becomes available. It may be noted that the compounding of Qisas and compounding of offence are two separate terms. Compounding of offence is provided by section 345, Cr.P.C. while compounding of Qisas is under section 310, P.P.C. In the present case the compromise was not in respect of compounding of Qisas, but it was in respect of compounding of offence and since the learned trial Judge had granted the permission and also accepted the compromise, therefore, the only option left with the trial Court was to pass the necessary orders under section 345(6). Cr.P.C. and acquit the accused. Since the compromise between the parties has already taken place the permission to compromise has already been granted by the trial Court and the compromise application has also been allowed by the trial Court as observed in the judgment at page 11, therefore, the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants are hereby set aside, and, as an effect of the compromise both the appellants are acquitted under section 345, subsection (6), Cr.P.C." We agree with the observation of learned Single Judge in the above judgment that the compounding of Qisas and compounding of offence are two separate terms and that compounding of offence is provided by section 345, Cr.P.C. while compounding of Qisas is under section 310, P.P.C. We further agree with the learned Single Judge that in the cited case the compromise was in respect of compounding of offence. However, we do not agree with the observation that: "The learned trial Judge had granted the permission and also accepted the compromise, therefore, the only option left with the trial Court was to pass the necessary orders under section 345(6). Cr..P.C. and acquit the accused," We will advert to the proposition of law subsequently. Now we will refer to few judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in which complete answer is provided to the contention raised by learned Assistant A.‑G. In the case of Sarwar Khan v. The State 1994 PSC [Crl.] 212, the heirs of the deceased had forgiven the offender in the name of Almighty Allah and therefore, by recourse to the provisions contained in section 309, P.P.C. read with compromise the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charge. In the case of Muhammad Ishaq alias Kali v. The State, 1994 PSC (Crl). 213 the appellant was convicted under section 302 P.P.C, and sentenced to death. During pendency of appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court the father, mother and brother of deceased admitted the receipt of Badl‑i‑Sulh and entered into compromise and stated that they have forgiven the appellant. The Honourable Supreme Court accepted the compromise and set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the appellant of the charge. In the case of Muhammad Rafiq v. The State (1994 PSC (Crl. ) 231), the parties entered into compromise during pendency of appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court. The deceased was unmarried at the time of his death and his father and mother appeared before the Honourable Supreme Court and affirmed that a. compromise had in fact taken place. In the said case compromise vas restricted to the charge under section 302/34, P.P.C. and no compromise was effected between the parties for the offence under section 304/34. P.P.C. The father and mother of the deceased acknowledged the receiving of compensation from the appellant. The conviction of appellant on the charge under section 302 read with section 34, P.P.C, was set aside and they were acquitted of the said charge. However, since no compromise had taken place for the conviction of offence under section 307 read with section 34, P.P.C. for making murderous assault upon a person other than deceased, therefore, it was directed that the order of acquittal from the charge under section 302 read with section 34, P.P.C. shall not affect, the petitioner's conviction in respect of the offence under section 307 read with section 34, P.P.C. We would like to observe that in the present case all the heirs of deceased Bashir Ahmed and all the heirs of deceased Lutuf Ali have compromised with the three appellants named above, in respect of all offences committed by the three appellants and therefore, the second part of the judgment is not attracted in this case. In the case of Aijaz Ahmed alias Aijaz Hussain v. The State 1994 PSC (Crl.) 405, the convict/petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment and tine. Application for composition of offence was made before the Honourable Supreme Court in review petition. The Honourable Supreme Court after conducting the enquiry about the compromise entered into and being satisfied with genuineness of compromise. observed that the deceased had left his mother and father as heirs and they had compounded the offence with the convict. Thus after allowing the application for composition of offence the order under review was set aside and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge. This judgment provides complete answer to the objection raised by Mr. Ali Azhar Tunio, learned Assistant A.‑G. that in case of imposition of tine the heirs of the victim "Wali" cannot be allowed to enter into compromise absolving the offender of the entire liability entitling him to the acquittal of the charge. In the case of Almar Shah v. The State, 1999 SCMR 2047, a compromise application was submitted before the Honourable Supreme Court, in which the appellants were convicted under sections 302/149 and 148, P.P.C. In the cited case, legal heirs of the deceased except the minor had entered into voluntary compromise with the accused by having pardoned him in the name of Allah. Accused had deposited the sum of Rs.100,000 as the share of minor, in the Diyat amount., and the compromise was accepted by the Honourable Supreme Court and the accused was acquitted of the charge. In the cited case appellant convicted was under section 302/149, P. P. C. and tine was also imposed and in default the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. On recovery, half of the tine was ordered to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased as compensation. The appellant was also convicted under section

148. P. P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs.1000 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. The objection of learned Assistant A.‑G. that the offence under section

302. P.P.C. is compoundable while the offence Under Section 149, P.P.C. is not compoundable and therefore. the compromise cannot be accepted in totality is fully met with this judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court. Now we would revert to the observations of two learned Single Judges in the case of Moula Bux (supra) and Usman (supra). In both these judgments learned Single Judges have observed that the provisions of section 311, Cr.P.C. shall he attracted when the permission for compounding has been declined. With due deference to the learned two Single Judges of this Court, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by them in the above judgments appears to be result of lack of assistance. The very heading or section 311 is "Tazir after waiver or compounding of right of Qisas in Qatl‑i‑Amd". The section starts with the non obstante clause which escaped the notice of the learned two Single .fudges. Secondly they have considered first part of section 311 only which says that where all the "Walis" do not waive or compound the right of Qisas the Court may in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case punish the offender against whom the right of Qisas has been waived or compounded. While the second part has been ignored which is to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in section 309 or 310 and keeping in view the principle of Fasad‑fil‑Arz. the Court may in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, punish an offender against whom the right of Oisas has been waved or compounded. The explanation to section 311 has also been Ignored which provides that for the purpose of section 311 the expression "Fasad‑fil‑Arz" shall include the past conduct of the offender as being previous convict, habitual or professional criminal and the brutal manner in which offence is committed. Thus notwithstanding the acceptance of the waiver or compounding of right of Qisas in Qatl‑i‑Amd by the "Wall" of deceased the Court has been conferred the discretion to punish the offender by way of Tazir for maintaining of the interest of law and order and :n the larger interest of the society. The first and foremost duty of every Government and particularly a Government in an Islamic State, as the pakistan is under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is to protect the life, liberty, property and honour of the citizens/people and to maintain law and order, Both the learned Single Judges have not adverted to the point that the waiver and compounding under sections 309 and 310 is confined to the right of Qisas only and Tazir is a punishment distinct from Qisas as specified in section 53, P.P.C. and defined in section 299(i) to mean punishment other than Qisas, Diyat, Arsh or Daman. Thus the effect of non obstante clause in section 311 is that in spite of acceptance of the waiver or E compounding of a right of Qisas, in Qatl on the part of the "Wali", the Court shall still hold the discretion to punish the offender by way of Tazir, keeping in view the principle of Fasad‑fil-Arz. This discretion of the Court is not controlled by the provisions contained in sections 309 and 310, P.P.C. but is, notwithstanding the provisions contained in the said sections. It appears hat the learned Single Judges further ignored the proviso to section 338‑E and section 338‑F, P.P.C. which very clearly provide that where an offence leas been waived or compounded, the Court tray in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, acquit or award Tazir to the offender according to the nature of the offence and that while interpreting and applying the provisions of Chapter XVI, and in respect of matters ancillary or akin thereto the Court shall be guided by the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. While applying and interpreting any provision of law in a statute, a very important principle of interpretation of statute is. always required to be kept in view that no provision or section in the statute is to be read in isolation. All the provisions, of law are to be read in the totality of the scheme and in cohesion with each other, in order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and the purpose of. Yet another principle is also to be kept in view that no provision of law is to be interpreted in a manner which may render another provision of law a superfluous, redundant or nugatory. Even if some apparent discrepancy or contradiction appears in different provisions of a statute it is to be interpreted in a manner that the various provisions are reconciled and the intention/purpose of the law is achieved. Now if the view of learned Single judges in the two cases under consideration is accepted, that the Court can punish an offender by way of Tazir .if it refuses to accept the compromise/compounding only and not otherwise. Then the very non obstante clause in section 311, as well as the purpose of giving this discretion to the Court contained in section 311, P.P.C. shall be negated, and the very clear and unambiguous provision contained in proviso to subsection (i) of section 338‑E, P.P.C. shall be rendered superfluous and nugatory. As already observed this proviso clearly states that when an offence has been waived or compounded the Court may in its discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case acquit or award Tazir. to the offender according to the nature of the offence. It is very clearly stated that the discretion of the Court shall come into play after the offence has been waived or compounded and Court shall be empowered either to acquit the offender, while accepting the waiver or compounding of the Qisas and receiving of the right of Diyat or looking to the facts and circumstances of the case award Tazir to the offender according to the nature of the offence. The purpose of this provision has already been explained by us and we would not like to add anything else, except that it is important to keep in view that on account of waiver or compounding of offence, the punishment of Qisas and Diyat cannot be imposed but merely Tazir can be imposed which is a punishment other than Qisas and Diyat. Thus we are of the considered opinion that the view held in the two Single Bench Judges in the case of Moula Bux v. State, 1992 MLD 1590, and Usman v. The State, 1992 PCr.LJ 1960, do not contain the correct proposition of law pertaining to the discretion of the Court to award the conviction to an offender by way of Tazir even after acceptance of compromise. It is held that the Court even after accepting the waiver/compounding of the right of Qisas under sections 309/310, P.P.C. or after accepting waiver of compounding of offence under section 338‑E, P. P. C, read with section 345, Cr.P.C. can award Tazir by the recourse to the provisions contained in section 311, P.P.C. read with section 338‑E, P.P.C. The view held in the above two Single Bench judgments is hereby overruled. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that acceptance of the compromise would be in the better interest of parties as old enmity and bickering between them shall come to an end and shall be conducive to peaceful living all the parties, thereby saving the loss of lives in future. The permission to compromise sought in both the appeals is therefore, granted and compromise applications are accepted. Appellants/convicts Islam alias Leemo son of Menhal Aghani, Sikander Ali son of Islam alias Leemo Aghani and Ashique son of Ghulam Nabi Agham are acquitted. The conviction and sentence awarded to them is hereby set K aside. The Jail Appeal No.D‑39 of 1999 preferred at the instance of Ashique Aghani is allowed as above and stands disposed of. He is present in custody and is remanded back in custody to the Central Prison, Sukkur with direction to release him forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Appeal No.D‑33 of 1995 preferred at the instance of Hussain Bux son of Ali Gohar Aghani, Uris son of Ali Gohar Aghani, Islam alias Leemo soon of Meehal Aghani and Sikandar Ali son of Islam alias Leemo Aghani is partly allowed in terms of compromise. The appellants Islam alias Leemo son of Menhal Aghani and Sikander Ali son of Islam alias Leemo Aghani are present on bail and their bail bond stands discharged. Appeal at the instance of Hussain Bux son of Ali Gohar Aghani and Uris son of Ali Gohar Aghani shall remain pending and proceed in accordance with law and shall be decided on merits. The reference for the confirmation of death penalty in respect of Ashique son of Ghulam Nabi Aghani is not accepted, in view of compromise entered into between him and the legal heirs of both tile deceased/victims and consequent acquittal of appellant Ashique son of Ghulam Nabi Aghani. The reference pertaining to the confirmation of death sentence awarded to absconding accused/convict Ashraf shall be heard alongwith the appeal at the instance of Hussain Bux son of Ali Gohar Aghani and Uris son of Ali Gohar Aghani and shall be disposed of on merits. N.H.Q./H‑84/K?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Order accordingly.