1969 PLP 71 (PTD)
JOINT COMMITTEE OF ACTION, B GROUP MERCHANTS, BOMBAY Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY I.
| Citation | 1969 PLP 71 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Bombay (India) |
| Bench Members | Y. S. Tambe and V. S. Desai, JJ |
| Parties | JOINT COMMITTEE OF ACTION, B GROUP MERCHANTS, BOMBAY Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY I. |
| Primary Law | Business‑, STATEMENT OF CASE |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1969 PLP 71 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Business‑, STATEMENT OF CASE as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1969 PLP 71 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Bombay (India) bench comprising: Y. S. Tambe and V. S. Desai, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1969 PLP 71 (PTD) (JOINT COMMITTEE OF ACTION, B GROUP MERCHANTS, BOMBAY Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BOMBAY CITY I.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Headnotes / Summary
Cloth dealers‑Committee formed for temporary period to take quotas and distribute goods Profit derived from transaction‑Whether taxable Profit to be held in trust for benefit of dealers‑Effect‑Whether assessable under S. 41 Association‑Dissolution‑Notice issued and assessment made after dissolution‑Validity‑Reference‑Additional legal argument on point raised before and considered by Tribunal‑Income‑tax Act, 1922, Ss. 10, 41, 44 &
66. On the introduction of cloth control in 1945 cloth dealers in Bombay were divided into four groups. Group A comprised the wholesale dealers. Group B comprised semi‑wholesalers who bought from dealers of Group A and sold them to retailers. The retailers belonged to Group C. Commission agents for sales outside Bombay formed Group D. All these dealers belonged to one or other of three merchants' association. Certain direct dealings took puce between dealers of Groups A and C and the Group B dealers along with small quota- holders, in order to protect their interests, made representation to the Government and the three associations. Each of the three associations appointed sub‑committees to protect their interests, which together formed a joint committee and the Group B dealers appointed three of their members to be on the joint committee. The Group B dealers resolved that until such time as licences Nacre issued to all the Group B dealers and they were able to form an association, the Textile Controller should give quota permits in the name of the president of the joint committee who should hold the profit on such goods in a pool in trust for the Group B dealers and distribute it amongst such of them to whom licences might be issued. The joint committee put through only two transactions. It obtained a quota for 7,421 bales which it distributed to the Group B dealers without profit. It also obtained a quota for 1,844 bales but the Government directed that the goods should be distributed directly to the Group C dealers. In distributing the goods directly to the Group C dealers there A as a profit of Rs. 48,537 of which the joint committee distributed Rs. 35,285 to certain Group B dealers and Rs. 7,500 to charity, lost Rs. 1,398 on the failure of its banker and had on hand Rs. 4,
354. Thereafter, the joint committee ceased to function. Some years later the Income‑tax Officer issued a notice under section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, on the ex‑president of the joint committee and assessed the committee to income‑tax. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the assessment to the extent of the profit from the transactions and some additions. On a reference: Held, (i) that the proceedings initiated against the committee after its dissolution were not invalid; (ii) that as the joint committee was an entity which functioned on its own in the transactions, and the transactions carried out by the committee were trading transactions, the committee should be regarded as having carried on business and the profit from the transactions was therefore assessable to tax. The way in, which it appropriated or distributed the profit did not in any way affect its having carried on busi ness as a result of which the profit accrued. Nor did the fact that the committee did not intend to benefit itself in any way, but intended only to help the Group 13 dealers make any difference so far as the taxability of the income which it had earned was concerned; (iii) that the provisions of section 41 of the Indian Income‑tax Act had no application as there was no trust declared by a duly executed instrument in writing. The reso lution of the Group B dealers that the profit should be held in trust could not be regarded as an instrument in writing creating a trust within the meaning of section 41‑. An association which is dissolved is, by a fiction, deemed to continue after dissolution for the purpose of assessment under Chapter IV by reason of the provisions of section 44 of the Income‑tax Act. C. A. Abraham v. Income‑tax Officer, Kottayam (1961) 41 I T R 425 (S C) and Ramnivas Hanumanbax Somani v. S. Verkatwraman (1961) 43 I T R 152 fol. R. N. Bose v. Manindralal Goswami (1958) 33 I T R 435 ; Rajareddy Mallaram v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1960) 39 I T R 639 and Sumat Parshad v. Income‑tax Officer, A‑Ward, Bhatiada (1960) 40 I T R 692 not fol. Where no new facts are required to be investigated it is open to a party to put forward before the High Court on a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922, an additional legal argument in support of a point urged before the Tribunal and considered by it. Commissioner of Income tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (1961) 42 I T R 589 ref. By this application the assessee requires the Appellate Tribunal to state a case to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on certain questions of law which are said to arise out of the Tribunal's order in I. T. A. No. 11381 of 1957‑
58. In asmuch as, in our opinion, a question of law does arise out of the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, we hereby draw up a statement of the case agreed to by the parties and refer it to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under section 66(1) of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922.
2. On the introduction of cloth control in 1945, the cloth dealers in Bombay were divided into the following groups : A‑‑Wholesalers with quotas selling only in bales. B‑Semi‑wholesalers who sold by takas from bales received from A. C‑Retailers. D‑Commission agents for sales outside Bombay.
3. All the cloth dealers of the above four categories were Members of one or the other of the following three recognised associatins each of which accordingly had a mixed member ship . (i) The Bombay Piece goods Merchants Association ; (ii) The Bombay Country Fancy & Grey Piece goods Merchants Association ; and (iii) The Hindusthan Native Merchants Association.
4. As the B group dealers were adversely affected by the course of dealings that was at that time taking place direct between A and C groups aforesaid, on the advice of the Government, each of the aforesaid three associations, to protect the interests of their own B group members, elected seven of their own members from outside B group. This body co-opted three members who were B group dealers and members of one or the other of the aforesaid associations.
5. The above organisation of altogether 24 members framed its own rules, elected Wadilal Chaturbhuj as its President, opened up books of account and had letter‑heads printed describing themselves therein as shown below : "The Bombay Piece-goods Merchants Association.. The Bombay Country Fancy & Grey Piece-goods Associ ation. The Hindusthan Native Merchants Association. JOINT COMMITTEE OF ACTION." This organisation is hereinafter referred to as "Joint Committee ". A copy of the rules and regulations is annexed hereto as Annexure "A" and forms part of the case.
6. The B group dealers in Bombay at that time num bered
261. A meeting of this group was convened by the above joint committee on June 7, 1945, when a resolutions was passed agreeing that till they were all licensed and able to form themselves into a united body, the Provincial Textile Controller should issue the permits to take deliveries from A group dealers in the name of the president of the joint committee aforesaid. It also directed that the president shall pool the profit from the distribution and keep it in his control pending eventual distribution to each B group dealer after his licensing.
7. Pursuant to the above resolution, the Provincial Textile Controller issued permits for 7,421 bales to the president of the joint committee who duly took deliveries from about June 27, 1945, and distributed the goods to all the B group dealers at actual cost without loading any profit. The B group dealers paid for such deliveries to the A group through the Joint Committee who recorded both the receipts and payments in its own books. The B group member, recorded these as purchases in their own books as also the profit on their later sale at the margin allowed to them under the regulations. Sixty‑nine of this had made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500 on their allotments.
8. On the enforcement of rationing thereafter, the Gov ernment routed a further quantity of 1,844 bales to the joint committee ordering them to be distributed directly to the C group dealers from whom the price was to be collected. After the joint committee paid the purchase price to the A group wholesalers, it was left with a profit of Rs. 48,537.
9. Outside both the above two sets of transactions there were no more. Both of them were also over and complete before March 31, 1946.
10. The joint committee appropriated and distributed the above profit as follows : Rs. 1,398 Lost on failure of the Exchange Bank. 35,285 To the 69 B group dealers who had made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500 as aforesaid. 7,500 To charity. 46,183 The balance of Rs. 4,354 remained with it as cash on hand.
11. The joint committee ceased its functions thereafter and all the B group dealers formed themselves into an association. This association ratified the above profit appropri ation and took over the cash on hand aforesaid.
12. The Income‑tax Officer issued a notice under section 34 on January 24, 1955, on Wadilal Chaturbhuj as ex‑President of the Association of persons further describing the assessee as follows "The Joint Committee of Action, B Group Merchants of M.J.C. Market, in front of Market, Bombay. (Present address c/o Mr. Wadilal Chaturbhuj, Krishan Chowk, M.J.C. Marker, Bombay)." In due course he completed the assessment on a total income of fits. 1,65,250.
13. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the above assessment raising the following as the main grounds therein : "That the Income‑tax Officer was wrong in Serving a notice under section 34 on the Joint Committee of Action and framing the assessment on it, since the J.C.A. was only an executive body appointed by the three cloth associations to help the Government in the distribution of cloth. The Income‑tax Officer could neither make an assessment on the B group merchants association, which was a mutual concern." As an alternative contention, it asked for a reduction of the quantum on the basis of the book‑results. The legality of the application of section 34 was not challenged in this appeal.
14. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the above contention in the following words reproduced from his order : "It is said that after distribution of a part of the profit to the 69 B group members mentioned above, it was decided that the balance of the undistributed profits should be distributed equally between all the 261 B group members. Later on, however, a resolution was passed by the J.C.A. that the balance should be paid to charity and after the J.C.A. went out of action, the B group merchants association confirmed the resolutions passed by the J.C.A. From the above, it will be clear that the J.C.A is not an association of B group dealers which consists of 261 members but a distinct body consisting of 24 members of which only three are B group dealers. The J.C.A. is, therefore, not a mutual benefit society, since its members are neither contributory nor participators. It would be incorrect to say that the J.C.A. was formed under the orders of the Government since it was the B group dealers who were aggrieved and in order to redress this grievance, the Government agreed to recognize them and in fact issued licences to then, and asked then; to form them selves into an association and nominate a chairman or group leader. The fact that instead the 13 group dealers arranges to have 24 members elected through the three cloth association to form the J.C.A, would not prove that the J.C.A. was formed under orders of the Government. That the Government issued cloth to the J.C.A. on the request of the B group dealers with instructions regarding the manner of the distribu tion would also make no difference. The question is as to who carried on this business. The B group dealers did not carry on this business and did not distribute the 1,814 bales for earning profit thereon. It is, therefore, immaterial whether the B group dealers are a mutual benefit society or not. The three cloth associations also did not carry on this business. It was the J.C.A. which distributed the bales and earned the profit. According to the resolution dated June 7, 1945, of the B group merchants association, the J.C.A. was to hold such profit in a pool in trust for the B class dealers and distribute the same amongst such of them to whom licences may be issued. The J.C.A. decided to distribute a part of the profits to only such of the members who did not earn a minimum profit of Rs.1,500 and distribute the balance equally among the 261 B group dealers. Subsequently, it decided to give the balance away to charity, since there was disagreement between the B group dealers regarding the method of dis tribution. This was in contravention to the resolution dated June 7, 1945, of the B group dealers. Although the B group merchants association subsequently ratified this decision of the J.C.A. after it had gone out of action in order to resolve the difference amongst its members, yet it would not justify the inference that this was their initial resolution. It would thus appear that the J.C.A. was acting on its own authority regardless of the resolutions of the B group dealers. There was no interference from the three cloth associations either. This could have been done only if the J.C.A. carried on the business on its own and not as employees or agents of the B group dealers or the three cloth associations. The argu ment that the profit really belonged to the B group dealers and the J.C A. was only their executive or representative is futile. The entire profit did not go to the 261 B group dealers but only a part of it went to 69 dealers and the balance to charity. The J.C.A. was thus conducting a business and was not a mutual benefit society. Under section 10, a person who carries on business is liable to tax. As to who made the investments and on whose behalf the business was carried on is irrelevant. In this case, the J.C.A. had a right to carry on the business and had framed its own rules for the purpose and distributed the profits according to its own decisions. The B group merchants had no hand whatsoever in the business or the distribution of profits and did not even issue any instructions to the J.C.A. That the B group dea lers had provided the capital in the expectation of a return in the form of share in the profits would be irrelevant, since, as soon as income is earned, tax is attracted and the revenue is not concerned with its subsequent application. Although the Income‑tax Officer now says, he has assessed B group dealers through the J.C.A. yet in fact he had assessed the J.C.A. and fixed the liability on it. If the Income‑tax Officer's intention was to assess the B group dealers, he would have fixed the liability on them. As Such, I hold that the Income‑tax Officer was perfectly justified in taking action under section 34 and assessing the J.C.A. which had a right to carry on and ac tually carried on the business : Saifuddin Alimohamed v. Com missioner of Income‑tax (1954) 25 I T R 237."
15. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the quantum nevertheless to Rs. 49,786 after some routine addi tions to the book profit of Rs. 48,537 aforesaid. This amount is not in dispute.
16. An appeal to the Tribunal followed thereafter in which it was contended and argued as follows : "(a) The assessment is bad in law as the assessee is incorrectly described ; the joint committee of action is not the B group merchants as described but of the three associations referred to earlier in his order. (b) The profit, if any, belongs only to the aforesaid three associations and not to the joint committee which functioned only on their behalf and not for any separate assessable entity apart from them. (c) The organisation was brought about for a non‑trading purpose, only to help the Government in its scheme of distri bution ; as a matter of fact, 7,421 bales received had been distributed among B group merchants at cost only ; it was a mere accident and not on account of any volition on its part that there was a profit of Rs. 48,537 left on its hands, which was the mere result of a Government order ; such profit is not assessable for any of the following alternative reasons : (i) Just a windfall. (ii) There has been no trading in the strict sense of the term with any outsiders ; the activities were confined exclu sively among the members of the B and C groups who were all members of one or the other of "the three aforesaid organisations, whose creature the joint committee was.
17. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding as follows : (a) The joint committee was an organisation having an identity distinct and separate from the three associations aforesaid which had brought it into being. (b) The aforesaid transactions amounted to business. (c) The joint committee carried on such business through its president as its chief executive officer. (d) There was a profit of Rs. 48,537 which had arisen to the joint committee from such business carried on by it during, the year ended March 31, 1946, the previous year for assessment year 1946‑47, from perhaps conditions which could suggest a windfall, but such windfall had arisen only in the course of such business. (e) There was also no mutuality principle that called for consideration as the contributors of the profit were the C group retailers and the participators, B group dealers. The full reasoning and conclusions of the Tribunal are to be found in paragraphs 6 to 10 of its order extracted and annexed hereunto as Annexure "B" and forms part of the case.
18. From out of the aforesaid facts the only question of law that arises is : "Whether there are materials for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 49,786 is assessable in the hands of the assessee under section 10, no part of which is exempt under section 4(3)(vii) ?"
19. Shri Mulla appearing for the assessee says that the following questions of law should be raised : (1) Whether the notice under section 34 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, addressed to the members of the joint com mittee of action, B group merchants association and served on the ex‑President of the Joint Committee of action is invalid on the ground that there is no such assessable entity. (2) Whether the assessment made on "the joint committee of action B group merchants" is valid. (3) Whether the amount of Rs. 48,537 is liable to tax under the Indian Income‑tax Act. (4) If the answer to question No. 3 above is in the affirmative, whether the said amount is the income of the "joint committee of action" or of (1) toe Bombay piecegoods Merchants Association, (2) the Bombay Country Fancy and Grey Piecegoods Merchants Association and (3) the Hindusthan Native Merchants Association. In our opinion, the question of law framed by us in paragraph 18 above covers all the above four questions. R. J. Kolah with Dastur for the Assessee. G. N. Joshi with R. J. Joshi for the Commissioner. JUDGMENT V. S. DESAI, J.‑The question referred to us on this re ference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income‑tax Act relates to the order of assessment on the assessee for the assessment year 1946‑
47. The assessee in the case is described as the joint committee of action B group merchants, Bombay. This association came to be formed sometime on or about 1st June 1945, in the following circumstances : On the intro duction of cloth control in the year 1945, the cloth dealers in Bombay were divided into four groups, vie. (!) group A comprised of wholesalers who obtained their quotas for selling cloth only in bales, (2) group B who were semi‑wholesalers who received bales from A group dealers and sold cloth by whole takas to the retailers, (3) group C was comprised of the retailers, and (4) group D of commission agents for sales outside Bombay. There were three associations of the cloth dealers, vie. (1) The Bombay Piece-goods Merchants Association ; (2) The Bombay Country Fancy & Grey Piece-goods Merchants Association ; and (3) The Hindusthan Native Merchants As sociation ; and all the cloth dealers comprised in the four groups mentioned above belonged to one or the other of these three associations. The classification of the cloth dealers in the groups A, B and C was normally intended for the cloth to proceed from the wholesalers to the semi‑wholesalers and then from the semi‑wholesalers to the retailers, i.e. from A group dealers to the B group dealers and then from B group dealers to the C group dealers. It appears, however, that direct dealings took place between A and C groups in certain cases without the goods passing through the B group. The B group dealers, therefore, whose interests were prejudiced by these direct dealings between A and C groups, desired to have their interests protected. They sought the advice of the Government and were told that. it was necessary in the interests of each of the three groups that they should form their own separate associations. On the 7th May 1945, the small quota holders and semi‑wholesalers held a meeting and resolved that a representation should be made to the Government that the goods kept for Government approved shops or for C group dealers for Bombay zone should also pass through the semi‑wholesalers of Bombay. They sent letters to the various institutions and the authorities intimating to them their grievances and to their demands. On receipt of these intimations, the three associations, namely, the Bombay Piecegoods Merchants Association, the Bombay Country & Fancy Grey Piecegoods Merchants Association and the Hindusthan Native Merchants Association, considered the grievances of the B group dealers and decided to appoint sub‑committees to protect the interests of the small quota holders and B group dealers. Thus each of these three associations appointed sub committees consisting of seven of its members. The B group dealers thereafter held a meeting on 30th May 1945, at which they appointed three of their members to be on the joint committee to be formed of the sub‑committees appointed by the three associations. Thereafter, on the 1st June 1945, the members of the sub‑committees appointed by the three asso ciations as representing the three associations, formed the joint committee of action of the three associations, and also took on the said joint committee of action the three members of the sub‑committee appointed by the B group dealers. The joint committee of action appointed three of its members as their secretaries, and authorised one of them, namely, Wadilal Chaturbhuj, to act as the president of the joint committee of action until the appointment of the president was made in due course and further resolved that the expenses incurred by the joint committee of action should be borne by the three associations equally. On the 7th June 1945, the B group dealers at a general meeting decided that they should combine themselves into one group and take delivery of the goods in one group and issue supplies in accordance with the permits issued by the office of the Provincial Textile Controller and the group as well as B dealers individuals should keep a specific account of every piece of cloth received by them. They also decided that a request should be made to the Provincial Textile Controller to give them a reasonable margin to maintain their existence and further resolved that the Pro vincial Textile Controller should be requested that until such time as the licences were issued to all the B group dealers, quota permits may be given in the name of the President of the Joint Committee of action, and the President should hold the B group dealers profit on such goods in a pool in trust for the B group dealers, and distribute the same amongst such of them to whom the licences may be issued on applications received by the Provincial Textile Controller on or before the 31st March 1945. Thereafter, the joint committee of action of B group merchants, Bombay, which was thus formed (which will hereafter be referred to as the assessee), obtained from the Provincial Taxtile Controller, a quota of 7,421 bales of which it took deliveries from about 27th June 1915, and distributed the said goods amongst all the B group dealers .at actual cost without loading any profit. The price of these bales was produced by the B group dealers and it was paid to the A group dealers through the assessee, who recorded both the receipts and payments in its own books. The B group dealers themselves who got the bales in this distribution recorded as the purchases in their own books and also the profits which they later on made on selling them to the C group dealers. The total number of B group dealers was 261 ; 69 out of these 261 made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500, on the allotments which they had obtained in the distribution of the 7,421 bales through the assessee. Sometime thereafter, the assessee obtained a. further quota of 1,844 bales from the Government. But when this quota was allotted, Government directed that it should be distributed directly to the C group dealers without distributing them to the B group dealers. The assessee accordingly distributed these goods directly amongst the C group dealers and also received payments in respect thereof from the C group dealers directly. In this transaction of 1,844 bales, there was a profit of Rs. 48,
537. These were the only two transactions which were carried out by the assessee. They were completed before the 31st March 1946. It appears that, thereafter, the joint committee of action, i.e., the assessee association, ceased to function, since the B group dealers formed a regular association of their own. Now, so far as the profit of Rs. 48,537 was concerned the assessee appropriated and distributed ii as follows : Rs. 1,398 Lost on failure of the Exchange Bank: Rs. 35,285 To the 69 B group dealers who had made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500 as aforesaid. Rs. 7,500 To charity. These items totalled Rs. 44,183, leaving a balance of Rs. 4,354 as cash in hand with the assessee. After the associa tion of the B group dealers was formed, it took over the, cash on hand with the assessee, and also ratified the appropriation and distribution of profits made by the assessee, and the assessee ceased to function as an association. On the 24th January, 1955, the Income‑tax Officer issued a notice under section 34 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, on Wadilal Chaturbhuj as ex‑president of the association described as "the Joint Committee of Action, B Group Merchants, of M. J. C. Market, in front of Market, Bombay (present address c/o Mr. Wadilal Chaturbhuj, Krishna Chowk, M. J. C. Market Bombay." In the assessment proceedings, which were initiated on the said notice, the Income‑tax Officer assessed the assessee on a total income of Rs. 1,65,
250. This assessment was reduced to Rs. 49,786 by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the appeal to the Tribunal, the decision and order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was confirmed. In the appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee's contentions were, firstly, that the assessment was bad in law, as the assessee was incorrectly described ; secondly, the profits, if any, did not belong to the assessee but to the three associations which had formed the joint committee of action, and for which and on whose behalf it was functioning, and was not a separate assessable entity apart from them thirdly, the assessee organization was brought into existence for a non‑trading purpose, which was only to help the Government in the scheme of distribution. It was not functioning for carrying on any business or for earning profits, and the profit which was left on its hands was the mere result of a Government order and not profit from business, and was, therefore, not assessable either because it was in the nature of a windfall or because it was not the result of a trading activity in the strict sense of the term. All these contentions were negatived by the Tribunal. Thereafter, at the instance of the assessee, the following question was drawn up by the Tribunal and referred to this Court under section 66(1) of the Act : "Whether there are materials for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 49,786 is assessable in the hands of the assessee under section 10, no part of which is exempt under section 4(3) (vii)?" Mr. Kolah, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, has raised two main contentions before us on this reference. His first contention is that the present assessment which has been initiated and made on the association after its dissolution is invalid and bad in law. His second contention is that, even assuming that assessment could be made on the assessee, the association had not carried on any business and had no business income which was assessable to tax. In addition to these main contentions, his further argument was that even if it were held that the assessee. had carried on a business. such business was carried on by it not for itself, but for and on behalf of the B group dealers as their trustees or agent, and the income which it has received is the income held by it in the capacity of a trustee for the B group dealers, and; consequently, such income can be brought to tax only under the provisions and in the manner laid down in section 41 of the Indian Income‑tax Act. Since the present assessment has not been made in the manner provided by section 41, it cannot be allowed to stand. Now, with regard to the, first contention raised by Mr. Kolah, Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the revenue, has raised an objection in the nature of a preliminary objection that the contention cannot be allowed to be raised since it has not been, raised before the Tribunal and does not arise out of its order. Mr. Joshi points out that the only ground urged before the Tribunal, so far as the invalidity of the proceedings initiated under section 34 is concerned, was that the notice was issued to an entity which did not exist as described therein. The basis of the contention was that the association described in the said notice was "the Joint com mittee of Action, B Group Merchants, of M.J.C. Market, in front of Market, Bombay," while the assessee was not the joint committee of action of B group merchants, but of the three other distinctly different associations. Mr. Joshi, therefore, has urged that the present contention sought to be raised by Mr. Kolah that the assessment is invalid since it has been made on the association after it has been dissolved is anew contention which has, been sought to be urged for the first time in this reference. According to him, even, though the contention may be one of law, the question of law' which is not raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it will not be a question of law arising out of its order as held by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. ((1961) 42 I T R 589). In our opinion, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Joshi cannot be sustained. It is true that a new question of law not raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it will not be a question arising out of its order, so as to be capable of being agitated on a reference under action 66(1). But the contention which Mr. Kolah is raising before us is, in our opinion, not a new question of law, but an additional legal argument available to him in support of the point which he had urged before the Tribunal and had been considered by the Tribunal, namely, that the assessment made on, the assessee is not valid in law. More over; no new facts are required to be investigated in order to entertain the legal contention which Mr. Kolah wants to raise. It is undisputed on the record that the assessee association had ceased to function and had been dissolved long before the notice under section 34 was issued by the income‑tax Officer. On merits, however, we are of the opinion that the contention raised by Mr. Kolah cannot be accepted. In support of the submission which he has made, Mr. Kolah has relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in R. N. Bose v. Manindra Lal Goswami ((1958) 33 I T R 435), another of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Rajareddy Mallaram v. Commissioner of Income‑tax ((1960) 39 I T R 636) and the third of the Punjab High Court in Sumat Parshad v. Income‑tax Officer, A‑Ward, Bhatinda ((1960) 40 I T R 692). These cases indeed support the view for which he is contending. The Calcutta High Court held in R. N. Bose v. Manindra Lal Goswami that after the dissolution of the firm, whether it be a registered firm or an unregistered firm, an assessment to income‑tax of its pre‑dissolution income can only be made on the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of its dissolution jointly and sever ally and cannot be made on the firm. This view has been followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajareddy. Mallaram v. Commissioner of Income‑tax and also by the Punjab High Court in Sumat Parshad v. Income‑tax Officer, A‑Ward, Bhatinda However, in C. A. Abraham v. Income- tax Officer, Kottayam ((1961) 41 I T R 425), where the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of section 44 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, it took the view that the expression "all the provisions of Chapter IV shall so far as may be apply to such assessment" had not a restricted content, and it stated in terms that all the provisions of Chapter IV shall apply, so far as may be; to assessment of firms which have discontinued their business. After considering the language of section 44 in the context of the other provisions of Chapter IV, it observed : "In effect, the Legislature has enacted by section 44 that the assessment proceedings may be commenced and continued against a firm of which business is discontinued as if discontinuance has not taken place. It is enacted mani festly with a view to ensure continuity in the application of the machinery provided for assessment and imposition of tax liability notwithstanding discontinuance of the business of firms. By a fiction, the firm is deemed to continue after disconti nuance for the purpose of assessment under Chapter IV." Section 44 is a provision dealing with firms which have discontinued their business and association which have been dissolved. The case before the Supreme Court was of a firm which had discontinued its business. But the observations will equally apply to on association which is dissolved. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court, to which we have referred, it must be held that an association which is dissolved is, by a fiction, deemed to continue after dissolution for the purpose of assessment under Chapter IV by reason of the provisions of section 44 of the Income‑tax Act. Following this decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court has taken the view in Ramniwas Hanumanbux Somani v. S. Venkararaman, Income‑tax Officer, C‑III Ward, Bombay ((1961) 43 I T R 152) that it is open to the Income‑tax Officer to issue a notice under section 34 to the firm, though it stood dissolved at the time of the issue of the notice. Mr. Kolah has argued that since the main question before the Supreme Court in C. A. Abrahim v. Income‑tax Officer, Kottayam was whether the expression "assessment" in section 44 included the liability for imposition of penalty, we should regard the observations which have been referred to relating to the interpretation of section 44 as observations casually made by their Lordships. We are afraid we cannot agree with Mr. Kolah. It is no doubt true that the main question before the Supreme Court was whether the expression "assessment" included the liability for imposition of penalty. The penalty proceedings, however, in that case were started against the firm after it had discontinued its business, and if assessment proceedings could not be initiated against the firm after its dissolution, the penalty proceedings could equally not be initiated even if they were to be regarded as being included within the concept of "assessment". The Supreme Court held in. that case that the penalty proceedings were included in the expression "assessment" and, therefore, were validly initiated. We could not take it that the ground of invalidity of the penalty proceedings, even if they were taken to be included in the concept of the expression "assessment", was not present in the mind of the Supreme Court if such a ground of invalidity really existed. In our opinion, therefore, in view of the Supreme Court decision in C. A. Abraham v. Income tax Officer, Kottyam, to which we have referred. we must hold that the proceedings initiated in the present case against the firm were not invalid. Coming now to the second contention urged by Mr. Kolah, his argument is that the assessee association was not a firm for carrying on any business, nor was it carrying on any business and earning profits. It was a firm only to help the B group dealers and remove their difficulties until such time as they were able to form themselves into a regular association through which the entire quota allotted to the B group could be properly distributed amongst them. Now, at the time when the assessee association was formed, there was no regular association of the B group dealers ; and, in the absence of such a regular association, the quota which was in fact to be allotted to the B group dealers was not being received fully by them, since there used to be some transactions directly between the A group dealers and C group dealers. The B group dealers were advised by the Government that it would be in their interest if they formed a regular associa tion, because if such an association was formed, the quota meant for the B group dealers could be distributed through such associa tion and properly received by the B group dealers. The formation of a regular association of the B group dealers was likely to take time. It was, therefore, necessary to make such arrangement for the interim period whereby the interests of the B group dealers until a regular association was formed would be properly protected. It was in these circumstances that with the co operation of the three main associations of the cloth dealers, to one or other of which the B group dealers also belonged, that the assessee association was formed. This association was to receive from the Government the quota meant for B group dealers and to distribute it amongst the B group dealers. The association when it received its first allotment of 7,421 bales, which were meant for distribution amongst B group dealers, distributed it accordingly. The next allotment, however, to the association was accompanied by directions that the distribution should be made directly to the C group dealers. In other words, these bales could not be distributed amongst the B group dealers first, and thereafter, through B group dealers to the C group dealers. The assessee association dealt with the goods received under the second allotment according to the directions which resulted in a profit to the association. Mr. Kolah says that this profit could not be treated as the profit of the association from its business. It was the profit of the B group dealers to be distributed amongst them, just as the quota which was received by the B group dealers was to be distributed amongst them. Neither in the transaction of the distribution of the goods, nor in holding the profit which had accidentally occurred as a result of Government directions, was the association doing any business. In our opinion, it is difficult to accept this contention. The association when it was formed was no doubt formed for the purpose of helping the B group dealers, but it was still an entity which was functioning on its own in the transactions and the dealings which it was carrying on. It bad maintained its . own account books and letter‑heads. When it was allotted the first quota it took delivery of it after paying its price and distributed it amongst B group dealers after recovering the price from them though it did not charge them any profit. When the second quota was received it was sold by it, though according to the directions of the Government, to the C group dealers, making profit in this transaction. The transactions could not be anything but transactions in the nature of trading transactions. It may keep the profit which it had earned for itself or may choose to distribute that profit amongst others, leaving nothing to itself. The way in which it appropriated or distributed the profit would not in any way affect its having carried on business as a result of which the profit has accrued. Instead of forming this joint committee of action, if the B group dealers had formed a regular association, and the association had carried on dealings which the joint committee of action has carried on and had distributed profits obtained by it by such dealing amongst the various members of the association who had formed the association, it would still have carried on business itself and the profits earned by it would have been assessable as in the hands of an assessable entity. We cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Kolah's submission that the assessee association should be regarded as not having carried on any business or indulged in business and earned profits. The next submission of Mr. Kolah is that the profit, if earned by the association, was profit which was held by it in trust for the B group dealers and so far as the assess ment of this profit is concerned, the provisions of section 41 of the Act had to be followed. In our opinion, the provisions of section 41 have, in the first place, no appli cation to the present case at all. That section requires a trustee appointed under a trust declared by a duly executed instrument in writing. There is no such instrument in the present case. Mr. Kolah says that there is a resolution of the general meeting of the B group dealers under which the assessee association is required to hold profit which it makes in a pool in trust for the B group dealers and distribute the same amongst such of them as would be lincensed by the Collector, This resolution may no doubt give directions for the distribution of profits, but we do not think that it can be regarded as an instrument in writing creating a trust within the meaning of section
41. The assessee association no doubt did not intend to benefit itself in any way and its intention was only to help B group dealers until a proper association was formed, That, however, would make no difference so far as the taxability of the income which it has earned from the business which it has carried on is concerned. Whether for their own benefit or not; it cannot be denied that the transactions entered into by the assessee were business transactions. It cannot also be denied that profit has accrued to the association as a result of those transactions, although the association has not kept the profit for itself but has distributed it either amongst B group dealers or spent it in charity. In our opinion, therefore, the further contention which has been raised by Mr. Kolah also fails. In the result, our answer to the question which has been referred to us is in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Question answered in the affirmative.
Judgment & Decree
V. S. DESAI, J.‑The question referred to us on this re ference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income‑tax Act relates to the order of assessment on the assessee for the assessment year 1946‑
47. The assessee in the case is described as the joint committee of action B group merchants, Bombay. This association came to be formed sometime on or about 1st June 1945, in the following circumstances : On the intro duction of cloth control in the year 1945, the cloth dealers in Bombay were divided into four groups, vie. (!) group A comprised of wholesalers who obtained their quotas for selling cloth only in bales, (2) group B who were semi‑wholesalers who received bales from A group dealers and sold cloth by whole takas to the retailers, (3) group C was comprised of the retailers, and (4) group D of commission agents for sales outside Bombay. There were three associations of the cloth dealers, vie. (1) The Bombay Piece-goods Merchants Association ; (2) The Bombay Country Fancy & Grey Piece-goods Merchants Association ; and (3) The Hindusthan Native Merchants As sociation ; and all the cloth dealers comprised in the four groups mentioned above belonged to one or the other of these three associations. The classification of the cloth dealers in the groups A, B and C was normally intended for the cloth to proceed from the wholesalers to the semi‑wholesalers and then from the semi‑wholesalers to the retailers, i.e. from A group dealers to the B group dealers and then from B group dealers to the C group dealers. It appears, however, that direct dealings took place between A and C groups in certain cases without the goods passing through the B group. The B group dealers, therefore, whose interests were prejudiced by these direct dealings between A and C groups, desired to have their interests protected. They sought the advice of the Government and were told that. it was necessary in the interests of each of the three groups that they should form their own separate associations. On the 7th May 1945, the small quota holders and semi‑wholesalers held a meeting and resolved that a representation should be made to the Government that the goods kept for Government approved shops or for C group dealers for Bombay zone should also pass through the semi‑wholesalers of Bombay. They sent letters to the various institutions and the authorities intimating to them their grievances and to their demands. On receipt of these intimations, the three associations, namely, the Bombay Piecegoods Merchants Association, the Bombay Country & Fancy Grey Piecegoods Merchants Association and the Hindusthan Native Merchants Association, considered the grievances of the B group dealers and decided to appoint sub‑committees to protect the interests of the small quota holders and B group dealers. Thus each of these three associations appointed sub committees consisting of seven of its members. The B group dealers thereafter held a meeting on 30th May 1945, at which they appointed three of their members to be on the joint committee to be formed of the sub‑committees appointed by the three associations. Thereafter, on the 1st June 1945, the members of the sub‑committees appointed by the three asso ciations as representing the three associations, formed the joint committee of action of the three associations, and also took on the said joint committee of action the three members of the sub‑committee appointed by the B group dealers. The joint committee of action appointed three of its members as their secretaries, and authorised one of them, namely, Wadilal Chaturbhuj, to act as the president of the joint committee of action until the appointment of the president was made in due course and further resolved that the expenses incurred by the joint committee of action should be borne by the three associations equally. On the 7th June 1945, the B group dealers at a general meeting decided that they should combine themselves into one group and take delivery of the goods in one group and issue supplies in accordance with the permits issued by the office of the Provincial Textile Controller and the group as well as B dealers individuals should keep a specific account of every piece of cloth received by them. They also decided that a request should be made to the Provincial Textile Controller to give them a reasonable margin to maintain their existence and further resolved that the Pro vincial Textile Controller should be requested that until such time as the licences were issued to all the B group dealers, quota permits may be given in the name of the President of the Joint Committee of action, and the President should hold the B group dealers profit on such goods in a pool in trust for the B group dealers, and distribute the same amongst such of them to whom the licences may be issued on applications received by the Provincial Textile Controller on or before the 31st March 1945. Thereafter, the joint committee of action of B group merchants, Bombay, which was thus formed (which will hereafter be referred to as the assessee), obtained from the Provincial Taxtile Controller, a quota of 7,421 bales of which it took deliveries from about 27th June 1915, and distributed the said goods amongst all the B group dealers .at actual cost without loading any profit. The price of these bales was produced by the B group dealers and it was paid to the A group dealers through the assessee, who recorded both the receipts and payments in its own books. The B group dealers themselves who got the bales in this distribution recorded as the purchases in their own books and also the profits which they later on made on selling them to the C group dealers. The total number of B group dealers was 261 ; 69 out of these 261 made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500, on the allotments which they had obtained in the distribution of the 7,421 bales through the assessee. Sometime thereafter, the assessee obtained a. further quota of 1,844 bales from the Government. But when this quota was allotted, Government directed that it should be distributed directly to the C group dealers without distributing them to the B group dealers. The assessee accordingly distributed these goods directly amongst the C group dealers and also received payments in respect thereof from the C group dealers directly. In this transaction of 1,844 bales, there was a profit of Rs. 48,
537. These were the only two transactions which were carried out by the assessee. They were completed before the 31st March 1946. It appears that, thereafter, the joint committee of action, i.e., the assessee association, ceased to function, since the B group dealers formed a regular association of their own. Now, so far as the profit of Rs. 48,537 was concerned the assessee appropriated and distributed ii as follows : Rs. 1,398 Lost on failure of the Exchange Bank: Rs. 35,285 To the 69 B group dealers who had made a profit of less than Rs. 1,500 as aforesaid. Rs. 7,500 To charity. These items totalled Rs. 44,183, leaving a balance of Rs. 4,354 as cash in hand with the assessee. After the associa tion of the B group dealers was formed, it took over the, cash on hand with the assessee, and also ratified the appropriation and distribution of profits made by the assessee, and the assessee ceased to function as an association. On the 24th January, 1955, the Income‑tax Officer issued a notice under section 34 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, on Wadilal Chaturbhuj as ex‑president of the association described as "the Joint Committee of Action, B Group Merchants, of M. J. C. Market, in front of Market, Bombay (present address c/o Mr. Wadilal Chaturbhuj, Krishna Chowk, M. J. C. Market Bombay." In the assessment proceedings, which were initiated on the said notice, the Income‑tax Officer assessed the assessee on a total income of Rs. 1,65,
250. This assessment was reduced to Rs. 49,786 by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the appeal to the Tribunal, the decision and order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was confirmed. In the appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee's contentions were, firstly, that the assessment was bad in law, as the assessee was incorrectly described ; secondly, the profits, if any, did not belong to the assessee but to the three associations which had formed the joint committee of action, and for which and on whose behalf it was functioning, and was not a separate assessable entity apart from them thirdly, the assessee organization was brought into existence for a non‑trading purpose, which was only to help the Government in the scheme of distribution. It was not functioning for carrying on any business or for earning profits, and the profit which was left on its hands was the mere result of a Government order and not profit from business, and was, therefore, not assessable either because it was in the nature of a windfall or because it was not the result of a trading activity in the strict sense of the term. All these contentions were negatived by the Tribunal. Thereafter, at the instance of the assessee, the following question was drawn up by the Tribunal and referred to this Court under section 66(1) of the Act : "Whether there are materials for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 49,786 is assessable in the hands of the assessee under section 10, no part of which is exempt under section 4(3) (vii)?" Mr. Kolah, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, has raised two main contentions before us on this reference. His first contention is that the present assessment which has been initiated and made on the association after its dissolution is invalid and bad in law. His second contention is that, even assuming that assessment could be made on the assessee, the association had not carried on any business and had no business income which was assessable to tax. In addition to these main contentions, his further argument was that even if it were held that the assessee. had carried on a business. such business was carried on by it not for itself, but for and on behalf of the B group dealers as their trustees or agent, and the income which it has received is the income held by it in the capacity of a trustee for the B group dealers, and; consequently, such income can be brought to tax only under the provisions and in the manner laid down in section 41 of the Indian Income‑tax Act. Since the present assessment has not been made in the manner provided by section 41, it cannot be allowed to stand. Now, with regard to the, first contention raised by Mr. Kolah, Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the revenue, has raised an objection in the nature of a preliminary objection that the contention cannot be allowed to be raised since it has not been, raised before the Tribunal and does not arise out of its order. Mr. Joshi points out that the only ground urged before the Tribunal, so far as the invalidity of the proceedings initiated under section 34 is concerned, was that the notice was issued to an entity which did not exist as described therein. The basis of the contention was that the association described in the said notice was "the Joint com mittee of Action, B Group Merchants, of M.J.C. Market, in front of Market, Bombay," while the assessee was not the joint committee of action of B group merchants, but of the three other distinctly different associations. Mr. Joshi, therefore, has urged that the present contention sought to be raised by Mr. Kolah that the assessment is invalid since it has been made on the association after it has been dissolved is anew contention which has, been sought to be urged for the first time in this reference. According to him, even, though the contention may be one of law, the question of law' which is not raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it will not be a question of law arising out of its order as held by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. ((1961) 42 I T R 589). In our opinion, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Joshi cannot be sustained. It is true that a new question of law not raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it will not be a question arising out of its order, so as to be capable of being agitated on a reference under action 66(1). But the contention which Mr. Kolah is raising before us is, in our opinion, not a new question of law, but an additional legal argument available to him in support of the point which he had urged before the Tribunal and had been considered by the Tribunal, namely, that the assessment made on, the assessee is not valid in law. More over; no new facts are required to be investigated in order to entertain the legal contention which Mr. Kolah wants to raise. It is undisputed on the record that the assessee association had ceased to function and had been dissolved long before the notice under section 34 was issued by the income‑tax Officer. On merits, however, we are of the opinion that the contention raised by Mr. Kolah cannot be accepted. In support of the submission which he has made, Mr. Kolah has relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in R. N. Bose v. Manindra Lal Goswami ((1958) 33 I T R 435), another of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Rajareddy Mallaram v. Commissioner of Income‑tax ((1960) 39 I T R 636) and the third of the Punjab High Court in Sumat Parshad v. Income‑tax Officer, A‑Ward, Bhatinda ((1960) 40 I T R 692). These cases indeed support the view for which he is contending. The Calcutta High Court held in R. N. Bose v. Manindra Lal Goswami that after the dissolution of the firm, whether it be a registered firm or an unregistered firm, an assessment to income‑tax of its pre‑dissolution income can only be made on the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of its dissolution jointly and sever ally and cannot be made on the firm. This view has been followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajareddy. Mallaram v. Commissioner of Income‑tax and also by the Punjab High Court in Sumat Parshad v. Income‑tax Officer, A‑Ward, Bhatinda However, in C. A. Abraham v. Income- tax Officer, Kottayam ((1961) 41 I T R 425), where the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of section 44 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, it took the view that the expression "all the provisions of Chapter IV shall so far as may be apply to such assessment" had not a restricted content, and it stated in terms that all the provisions of Chapter IV shall apply, so far as may be; to assessment of firms which have discontinued their business. After considering the language of section 44 in the context of the other provisions of Chapter IV, it observed : "In effect, the Legislature has enacted by section 44 that the assessment proceedings may be commenced and continued against a firm of which business is discontinued as if discontinuance has not taken place. It is enacted mani festly with a view to ensure continuity in the application of the machinery provided for assessment and imposition of tax liability notwithstanding discontinuance of the business of firms. By a fiction, the firm is deemed to continue after disconti nuance for the purpose of assessment under Chapter IV." Section 44 is a provision dealing with firms which have discontinued their business and association which have been dissolved. The case before the Supreme Court was of a firm which had discontinued its business. But the observations will equally apply to on association which is dissolved. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court, to which we have referred, it must be held that an association which is dissolved is, by a fiction, deemed to continue after dissolution for the purpose of assessment under Chapter IV by reason of the provisions of section 44 of the Income‑tax Act. Following this decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court has taken the view in Ramniwas Hanumanbux Somani v. S. Venkararaman, Income‑tax Officer, C‑III Ward, Bombay ((1961) 43 I T R 152) that it is open to the Income‑tax Officer to issue a notice under section 34 to the firm, though it stood dissolved at the time of the issue of the notice. Mr. Kolah has argued that since the main question before the Supreme Court in C. A. Abrahim v. Income‑tax Officer, Kottayam was whether the expression "assessment" in section 44 included the liability for imposition of penalty, we should regard the observations which have been referred to relating to the interpretation of section 44 as observations casually made by their Lordships. We are afraid we cannot agree with Mr. Kolah. It is no doubt true that the main question before the Supreme Court was whether the expression "assessment" included the liability for imposition of penalty. The penalty proceedings, however, in that case were started against the firm after it had discontinued its business, and if assessment proceedings could not be initiated against the firm after its dissolution, the penalty proceedings could equally not be initiated even if they were to be regarded as being included within the concept of "assessment". The Supreme Court held in. that case that the penalty proceedings were included in the expression "assessment" and, therefore, were validly initiated. We could not take it that the ground of invalidity of the penalty proceedings, even if they were taken to be included in the concept of the expression "assessment", was not present in the mind of the Supreme Court if such a ground of invalidity really existed. In our opinion, therefore, in view of the Supreme Court decision in C. A. Abraham v. Income tax Officer, Kottyam, to which we have referred. we must hold that the proceedings initiated in the present case against the firm were not invalid. Coming now to the second contention urged by Mr. Kolah, his argument is that the assessee association was not a firm for carrying on any business, nor was it carrying on any business and earning profits. It was a firm only to help the B group dealers and remove their difficulties until such time as they were able to form themselves into a regular association through which the entire quota allotted to the B group could be properly distributed amongst them. Now, at the time when the assessee association was formed, there was no regular association of the B group dealers ; and, in the absence of such a regular association, the quota which was in fact to be allotted to the B group dealers was not being received fully by them, since there used to be some transactions directly between the A group dealers and C group dealers. The B group dealers were advised by the Government that it would be in their interest if they formed a regular associa tion, because if such an association was formed, the quota meant for the B group dealers could be distributed through such associa tion and properly received by the B group dealers. The formation of a regular association of the B group dealers was likely to take time. It was, therefore, necessary to make such arrangement for the interim period whereby the interests of the B group dealers until a regular association was formed would be properly protected. It was in these circumstances that with the co operation of the three main associations of the cloth dealers, to one or other of which the B group dealers also belonged, that the assessee association was formed. This association was to receive from the Government the quota meant for B group dealers and to distribute it amongst the B group dealers. The association when it received its first allotment of 7,421 bales, which were meant for distribution amongst B group dealers, distributed it accordingly. The next allotment, however, to the association was accompanied by directions that the distribution should be made directly to the C group dealers. In other words, these bales could not be distributed amongst the B group dealers first, and thereafter, through B group dealers to the C group dealers. The assessee association dealt with the goods received under the second allotment according to the directions which resulted in a profit to the association. Mr. Kolah says that this profit could not be treated as the profit of the association from its business. It was the profit of the B group dealers to be distributed amongst them, just as the quota which was received by the B group dealers was to be distributed amongst them. Neither in the transaction of the distribution of the goods, nor in holding the profit which had accidentally occurred as a result of Government directions, was the association doing any business. In our opinion, it is difficult to accept this contention. The association when it was formed was no doubt formed for the purpose of helping the B group dealers, but it was still an entity which was functioning on its own in the transactions and the dealings which it was carrying on. It bad maintained its . own account books and letter‑heads. When it was allotted the first quota it took delivery of it after paying its price and distributed it amongst B group dealers after recovering the price from them though it did not charge them any profit. When the second quota was received it was sold by it, though according to the directions of the Government, to the C group dealers, making profit in this transaction. The transactions could not be anything but transactions in the nature of trading transactions. It may keep the profit which it had earned for itself or may choose to distribute that profit amongst others, leaving nothing to itself. The way in which it appropriated or distributed the profit would not in any way affect its having carried on business as a result of which the profit has accrued. Instead of forming this joint committee of action, if the B group dealers had formed a regular association, and the association had carried on dealings which the joint committee of action has carried on and had distributed profits obtained by it by such dealing amongst the various members of the association who had formed the association, it would still have carried on business itself and the profits earned by it would have been assessable as in the hands of an assessable entity. We cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Kolah's submission that the assessee association should be regarded as not having carried on any business or indulged in business and earned profits. The next submission of Mr. Kolah is that the profit, if earned by the association, was profit which was held by it in trust for the B group dealers and so far as the assess ment of this profit is concerned, the provisions of section 41 of the Act had to be followed. In our opinion, the provisions of section 41 have, in the first place, no appli cation to the present case at all. That section requires a trustee appointed under a trust declared by a duly executed instrument in writing. There is no such instrument in the present case. Mr. Kolah says that there is a resolution of the general meeting of the B group dealers under which the assessee association is required to hold profit which it makes in a pool in trust for the B group dealers and distribute the same amongst such of them as would be lincensed by the Collector, This resolution may no doubt give directions for the distribution of profits, but we do not think that it can be regarded as an instrument in writing creating a trust within the meaning of section
41. The assessee association no doubt did not intend to benefit itself in any way and its intention was only to help B group dealers until a proper association was formed, That, however, would make no difference so far as the taxability of the income which it has earned from the business which it has carried on is concerned. Whether for their own benefit or not; it cannot be denied that the transactions entered into by the assessee were business transactions. It cannot also be denied that profit has accrued to the association as a result of those transactions, although the association has not kept the profit for itself but has distributed it either amongst B group dealers or spent it in charity. In our opinion, therefore, the further contention which has been raised by Mr. Kolah also fails. In the result, our answer to the question which has been referred to us is in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Question answered in the affirmative.