1989S18 (PLP)

USMAN ALI SHAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal was granted to the appellants in all the appeals against a single judgment dated 25‑11‑1978 of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Circuit, Bahawalpur, passed in W.P.Nos. 2882/75, 72/76, 42/77, 43/77, 44/77, 45/77 and 46/77, filed by the appellant in all the matters, against the common judgment of the respondent No.1, dated 4‑11‑1975 upholding the order of the Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court who set ' aside the orders of dismissal of the aggrieved respondents in all the seven matters, reinstating them in service with all back benefits, was dismissed by the impugned judgment. The facts of the case briefly stated are that respondents Nos.3 to 7 in C.A.No.544/80, namely, Farid Ahmad, Muhammad Ajmal, Abdul Shakoor, Nazir Ahmad and Muhammad Sadiq, in C. A. No. 545/80, namely, Mushtaq Abmad, Javed Akhtar, Muhammad Sadiq, Hafiz Ahmad and Muhammad Afsar and in C.A.Nos. 546 to 550/80, only respondent No.3 in each appeal, namely, Abdul Aziz, Islamuddin, Ilahi Bakhsh, Liaquat Ali and Mubarrak Ali, respectively, were employed in Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari, Bahawalpur, originally an Enterprise of Cooperative Board. They were charge‑sheeted on the charges, of misconduct, slow‑down and instigating the workers of the Karkhana for strikes. On the basis of the said charges they were departmentally proceeded against and resultantly dismissed from their services by the respondent No.1 on different dates. All the said respondents challenged their dismissal from service before the Court of the Presiding Officer Junior Labour Courts, through separate applications under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, praying for their reinstatement in service with past benefits. The appellant herein filed written statements in each of these cases. The learned Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court, respondent No.2 herein, after a number of adjournments concluded that the action of the appellant ' against the aggrieved respondents is violative of the existing Labour Laws, declared the action of the appellant as illegal and ordered re‑instatement of the above said respondents with past benefits. Aggrieved by the said order of the Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court, the appellant filed appeals in each case before the Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Multan, respondent No.1 herein, under section 36‑D of the National Industrial Relations Ordinance XLVIII of 1978. The learned appellate Court vide his common judgment dated 4‑11‑1975 dismissed all the appeals on merit as well as being time‑barred, because the appeals were filed beyond 15 days which was 'the time limitation for such appeals. The explanation given by 'the appellant for such delay was not found satisfactory by the appellate Court. Further aggrieved by the said judgment of the appellate Court, the appellant filed Writ Petitions in each case as mentioned in the heading of this appeal, in the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Circuit, Bahawalpur. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard these Writ Petitions dismissed the same by a single Judgment dated 25‑11‑1978 with the following observations:‑ "In the circumstances I hold that the Cooperative Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari, is nothing but an "Industry" or "Industrial Establishment" within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing orders) Ordinance 1968 and consequently workmen of this concern i.e. Cooperative Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari are workmen/workers working in an industry and or commercial establishment are entitled to avail the protections afforded and remedies, available under the labour laws. In other words employees of the present Cooperative concern are as such workers/workmen as workers/workmen employed in any other industry or industrial and/or commercial establishment. The view I have taken is in consonance with the decision taken by this Court in K.C. Old Principal, Chairman Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others (P L D 1976 Lah.1097). In answer to a querry the Project Director of this concern disclosed that the factory manufactures agricultural implements and that last year such implements worth Rs.33‑68 lacks were manufactured in the establishment. He also added that their implements were sold mostly in the open market although some of these were also given to the Government. In view of thee above discussion I hold that the Petitioner's concern is an "industry" and that the respondents are "workers" or "workmen" within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, , 1969 and West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance. 1968 and that the Junior Labour Court as well as the Appellate Labour Court were competent to adjudicate upon the controversy. The Writ Petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs". After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal a of the judgments of the learned High Court in writ petitions as well .as those of the respondents Nos.1 and 2, we have come to conclusion that there is no merit in these appeals which deserve dismissal I straightway. The record of the case will show that the appellant is s the Project Director, Karkhana Alaat‑e‑Zari, Bahawaipui , originally y an Enterprise of the Cooperative Board. On dissolution of the said Board, an Administrator was appointed under section 4 of the West Pakistan Cooperative Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966. The Project Director of the said Karkhana suspended the abovementioned respondents without giving them any advance notice but haphazardly charge‑sheeted them with similar kind of charges and finally dismissed them from their services. The learned Presiding officer Junior Labour Court declared this action on the part of the said respondents with. all back benefits within the stipulated period. All the abovementioned respondents were mainly charged for persuading the workers for slow down and to instigate them for launching strikes in the Karkhana. They were not served with proper charge‑sheets and no proper inquiry was held against them. They were neither given proper opportunities of being heard in person nor allowed to produce evidence in defiance against the allegations leveled against them and even no proper report of inquiry was placed on the record to justify their dismissal from service. The main thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the notification issued under the West Pakistan I Cooperative Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966 the Karkhan& Allat‑e‑Zari was declared as a project and not an industry and contends that employees of the Karkhana Allat‑e‑Zari, fall under the definition of "public servants" and as such the Industrial Relations Ordinance will not be applicable to them. He further urged that the public servants of the Agriculture Department are engaged in the "administration of the State" and as such they are excluded from the sphere of Industrial Relations Ordinance on the strength of subsection (3) of section I and the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour' Court is barred to redress their grievances. The learned counsel further argued that the Administrator has been appointed under section 4 of the Cooperative Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966 and the employees of the said Karkhani are now to be governed by statutory rules of service framed by the Punjab Government and the pro‑visions of Industrial Relations Ordinance will I not be applicable to the respondents in all the appeals. Subsection (3) of section 1 of the said Ordinance which the learned counsel for the appellants has made the basis of his contention is reproduced as under:‑‑ (3) It shall not apply to any person employed in the police or any of the Defense Services of Pakistan or any service or installations connected with or identical to the armed forces‑of Pakistan including an ordnance factory maintained by the Central Government or to any person employed in the Administration of State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Department." The question involved in these appeals is that to determine whether the respondents in these appeals are workers/workmen employed in the said Karkhana as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and it would be proper to examine it in the light of nature of their work performed by them at the said Karkhana of the appellants. The record of the case does not bear any Article or Memorandum of Association or any document which shows the object or purpose of the said establishment. The said Karkhana on its liquidation was purchased by the West Pakistan Cooperative Development Board which came into existence by West Pakistan Cooperative Development Board (Ordinance XIV), 1962. Thus the Board was empowered under section 7 of the said Ordinance to take over and manage the affairs of the Cooperative Societies as and when required to do so. The Board consists of its Chairman and not more than 10 other members. The appointment of the Chairman and only half of its members were to be made by the Government and the remaining members were to be appointed by the West Pakistan Cooperative Union. In 1966, when the above said Board was dissolved under the West Pakistan Cooperative Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966, the Government then appointed an Administrator for the purpose of running the affairs of this Cooperative Karkhana Allat‑e‑Zari. Section 9 of the aforesaid Act lays down that the Administrator and his other employees shall be deemed "public servants" within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that in accordance with provision of section 9 of the said Act the said respondents in these appeals are not "workers" or "workmen" but "public servants" and they are persons employed in the "administration of the State" within the meaning of section 1 subsection (3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and are therefore, immune from the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts/ laws. This contention on the part of the learned counsel for the appellants does not appeal to reason because the word "Administration of State" means persons employed by the State in connection with the activities of the State, in exercise of its political powers, including the action of legislative, judicial and executive wings. According to this definition, "public servant" would come within the category of persons employed in the administration of the State but that would not include the present respondents employed in the Cooperative Industrial Establishment, run by the Administrator who is appointed by the State. The said respondents are working in the Karkhana in the capacity of helpers, fitters, turners, blacksmiths, drill operators, storekeepers, supervisors, draftsmen and foremen. Most of them are skilled workers and it cannot be said that they are employed in the administration of State but they are "workers" or "workmen" within the meaning of labor laws. A similar question arose in a case referred in 1975 P L C 361, Sind Road Transport Corporation v. District Manager, Karachi Omnibus Service. The Provincial Government in pursuance to section 70 of West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1965 set up Sind Road Transport Corporation for the purposes of operating road transport services in the Province. The Trade Union of workers of the Sind Road Transport Corporation submitted applications containing allegations that Corporation has failed to deduct the monthly subscription payable to the Union from the wages of the workmen and also an application making grievances against the Corporation to have not acceded to their charter of demands. The Union after serving the strike notice to the Corporation, initiated conciliation proceedings which failed. The case went to the Labour Court. The Corporation took the plea that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the application of the Union as the West Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1959 was applicable to all the transport workers and the said Act ousted the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine industrial dispute in respect of persons to whom it is applicable. The objection found favour with the Labour Court and held that the provisions of the Ordinance cannot be extended to road transport workmen. The Union preferred appeals against the order of the Labour Court and the learned Appellate Tribunal repelled the contention and held that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to decide the applications filed by the Union and directed it to do so. In a writ petition of the Corporation before the High Court Mr. Brohi the learned counsel argued that the Corporation is owned and controlled by the Provincial Government and its Chairman and Directors are the creature of Provincial Government and the Government is empowered under the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 to frame rules prescribing the powers and functions of the Corporation. He urged that the Corporation is deemed to be performing its statutory function of operating road transport services in the Province for and on behalf of the Provincial Government and hence it should be considered to be a limb or at least agent of the Government and all its employees should be considered as employed in the "administration of State". The Court after referring to the various definitions of administration of State dismissed the writ petition and held that though the Corporation may be performing function as an agent of or on behalf of the Provincial Government its employees are not persons "employed in the administration of the State" and hence are not excluded from the application of or the benefit provided under the Ordinance. This view was adopted in a case Mechanical Engineer v. S.M.D. Sukkur and others v. Andrew John and others PLD 1978 Kar.

503. The respondents Andrew John and others who were fitters‑ cum-mistris in the department of the Public Works Mechanical Division of Government of Sind, applied under section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969 requesting that they may be redesignated as mechanical mistris. Their application was allowed by the Labour Court and the order was challenged in appeal which was dismissed. The Mechanical Engineer Department filed writ petition before the Sind High Court at Karachi. It was contended that the Labour Court acted without jurisdiction in the matter as the respondents were persons serving in the Public Works Department and their pay and increments etc. . Were governed by the relevant rules. On the basis of section 1 subsection (3) of the Ordinance it was contended that the provisions of the Ordinance are attracted in, respect of persons employed in the "Administration of State". The High Court in the light of the judgment in case of Sind Road Transport Corporation, reported in 1975 P L C 361 held that the persons un‑connected with the actual performance of administrative or executive duties of the State and engaged in manual or menial work such as fitters, electrician, drivers and sweepers etc., cannot be considered as persons employed in the "administration of the State" and held that the case of‑the respondents was covered by the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The same view was also followed in a subsequent case Worker‑ Union v. Sind Government Press, Karachi 1980 PLC 244 in which the expression "persons employed in administration of State", has beet, interpreted in a limited and narrow sense. Workmen employed in respondent's Press being mere clog in vast and expanding machinery of State with no administrative functions much less any directional or. policy control, held, can not be: said to be employed in the "administration of State! Within the, meaning of section 1(3) of the Ordinance. Thus in the light of the above discussion, we are therefore, of the opinion that the learned Junior Labour Courts and the Appellate Labour Courts were competent to adjudicate upon these cases. Under the circumstances, it is therefore, clear that the findings recorded in the impugned judgments of the Courts below do not suffer from any error of law Thus re‑instatement of the aggrieved respondents in all these appeals, can not be possibly questioned. The result is that:- (a) Civil Appeals Nos. 544 and 545 of 1980 are dismissed with and (b) Civil Appeals 546 to 550 of 198(j are also dismissed with Costs, but as the eases from which they arise are still pending in the Labour Courts for decision on merit, the Labour Courts shall Proceed to decide, their, in accordance with law. A.A. /P. 78/S Appeals dismissed.