P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

MASUD AHMAD, J.--‑This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant, Ali Ehsan, against the Federation of Pakistan, in which he claimed a sum of rupees one lakh and twenty thousand, as damages and compensation, on account of the loss suffered by him, as a result of an accident alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the respondent's servants. The facts, briefly stated, are as follows :‑ All Ehsan is a resident of village Nawan Lok, which is at a distance of about three miles from Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din. Ali Ehsan, accompanied by his cousin, Inayat Ullah P. W. left his village, for Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din, on the 21st June, 1954, at about 7‑30 or 8 p.m. Both of them had to go to Lahore by the evening train, which, in those days, used to leave the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din Railway Station, at about 10‑15 p.m. The sky was cloudly and a strong wind was blowing. By the time Ali Ehsan and Inayat Ullah had reached the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din town, the strong wind had turned into a severe dust‑storm, making visibility very poor. Between the town and the platform of the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din Railway Station, was a railway level crossing, which had gates around it. Normally, these gates were kept closed across the line, thus making available free ~f passage to the passengers from the town to the railway station, and vice versa and blocking the passage of any train, or engine, on the line. When these gates were opened, they were moved inside to block the passage between the town and the railway station and could be held, in this position, by catches provided at the gates, but if they were not so held they could leave the passage between the town and the railway station open to the passengers and could, at the same time, permit railway traffic on the railway line.

2. The appellant's case was that when he and his com panion, Inayat Ullah P. W., reached the level‑crossing the gates were found to be open and had no lights on them and that when they were passing through the gates towards the railway station, a railway wagon, which had been left unlocked and unchained on a railway line, which line had been left "un scotched", was set in motion by the dust‑storm, hit him, without previous warning, and carried him to a distance of about sixty feet and also injured his companion, Inayat Ullah P. W. As a result of collision with this wagon and of subsequent dragging by it the right elbow and the right leg of the appellant were crushed and he also received some other injuries. Immediately after being so hit, the appellant became unconscious. Inayat Ullah P. W. the companion of the appellant, and Nazar Muhammad and Jahan Khan P. Ws., who had come there, on hearing the appellant's cries, found‑ the latter lying injured on the railway track, at a distance of some sixty feet from the level‑crossing, took him out and removed him to the passengers' shed. From there he was taken to the. _Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din‑ Civil Dispensary and from that place to the Gujrat Civil Hospital. On the next morning he was taken from Gujrat to the Mayo Hospital, Lahore. As a result of these injuries gas gangerine set in the right leg of the appellant. He was, therefore, operated upon in the Mayo Hospital and his right leg was amputated. He remained in the hospital until the 13th August 1954, on which date he was discharged.

3. The respondent, the Federation of Pakistan, while admitting that the appellant was injured, as a result of an accident which took place near the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din Railway Station, pleaded that the appellant himself was responsible for the accident, because he was a trespasser and, on account of his own negligence, had met with this accident. It was pleaded further that the appellant did not cross the railway line at the level‑crossing, but he trespassed on the railway line. Some legal objections were also raised to the valuation and form of the suit, as well as to the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure served by the appellant before 'the suit was filed.

4. The trial Court framed the following issues :‑ (1) Whether the plaintiff crossed the Railway line at a level crossing ? (2) Whether the accident in question was the result of any negligence on the part of Railway Administration ? (2‑A) In case issue No. 1 is not proved and issue No. 2 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages and compensation claimed by him ? ' (3) Whether the plaint was not properly presented and with what effect ? (4) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule II (a) and (d), C. P. C. ? (5) Whether the defendant was served with a notice under section 80, C. P. C. ? (6) To what damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?

5. That first issue was found against the appellant and it was held that at the time of the accident the appellant was not crossing the railway line at the level‑crossing. The negligence on the part of Railway Administration was held to have been established and, therefore, issue No. 2 was found against the respondent. On issue No. 2‑A the finding was that as the appellant had failed to prove that he met with the accident at the level‑crossing and as his presence at the place where the accident took place was unlawful, he could not claim any damages, or compensation. This issue was, therefore, found against him. Issues Nos. 3 and 4 were found against the respondent and issue No. 5 in favour of the appellant. In view of the finding given on issue No. 2‑A, issue No. 6 was also found against the appellant. As a result of these findings the appellant's suit was dismissed. This appeal has been filed to challenge the decree and the judgment of the trial Court and it is prayed that the same may be reversed and the suit decreed, as prayed for.

6. The finding of the trial Court on the first issue was very seriously challenged before us, but after hearing the parties counsel and after having through the record very carefully, we have come to the conclusion that that finding is substantially correct and that the appellant had failed to prove that the accident took place when he was crossing the railway line at the level‑crossing. In his evidence, as P. W. 2, the appellant had deposed that the wagon struck him when he was crossing the railway line at the level‑crossing. When a specific quesition was put to him by the Court as to how he was dragged by tile wagon, he replied that as, on being struck by the wagon, he became unconscious he could not say whether he remained lying there, or was dragged to some distance by the railway wagon. His companion, Inayat Ullah (P. W. 1), who was the only person present at the time of the accident, however, stated that the wagon, after striking the appellant, dragged him to a distance of 15 to 20 yards, from where he was removed after wards. Nazar Muhammad (P. W. 5) and Jahan Khan (P. W. 6), who claimed to have come to the scene of the accident immediately afterwards, found the appellant lying under the wagon, with no part of his body attached to it. Mirza Hameed Husain, a Surgeon of the Mayo Hospital, Lahore (P. W. 9) the first doctor who had examined the appellant thoroughly, found some injuries on the back of his head, a few abrasions on his body, besides fractures of the right leg and the right elbow. If the appellant bad been dragged by the railway wagon, to a distance of about 60 feet, with his face downwards, his chest and the rest of the front part of his body would have been badly lacerated, and if he was dragged, with his face upwards, his back would have been so lacerated. Moreover, if any such dragging had taken place, some part of his body must have been found attached to the wagon when he was taken out by Inayat Ullah, Nazar Muhammad and Jahan Khan. All these witnesses deposed clearly that when they found the appellant underneath the wagon he was lying on the track and no part of his body was touching the wagon. Further, though a pool of blood was found at a distance of some 59 feet from the level‑crossing (the place from where the appellant was removed) no blood was alleged to have been seen at any other place in between the level‑crossing and the place where that pool of blood was found. Doctor Zaheer‑ud‑Din Ahmad (D. W. 2) who was examined as an expert witness, expressed the opinion that the injuries found on the person of the appellant could not have been caused by being dragged by a railway wagon. He added, that the crushing of the bones could have been caused by a wheel passing over that part of the body. Doctor Mirza Hameed Husain (P. W. 9), on the other hand, expressed the opinion that no wheel could have passed over any part of the body of the plaintiff, because, in that case, that part of his body would have been completely severed from the rest. We are unable to accept the opinion of Dr. Zaheer‑ud‑Din (D. W: 2) on this point, because if a wheel of the wagon had passed over any part of the appellant's body, besides injuring the right elbow and the right thigh, injuries would also have been caused to the rest of he body and, in that case, the probability, as stated by Dr. Mirza Hameed Husain, was that one, or both the limbs of the appellant would have been severed from the rest of the body.

7. Though in this state of evidence we cannot come to a definite conclusion how the accident actually took place, which part of the appellant's body first came into contact with the railway wagon and in what position he was at that time, we feel almost certain that the appellant could not have been dragged to distance of about 60 feet or so, by the railway wagon, after he was hit by it. In any case, in our opinion, the appellant had failed to prove that the accident took place at the level crossing and that after he was hit by the wagon, he was dragged, from there, to a distance of about 60 feet, or so, to the place from where he was taken out afterwards. The finding of the trial Court on this issue, therefore, is correct.

8. On the second issue, as stated above, the trial Court found that the accident was caused as a result of negligence on the part of the Railway Administration. That finding of fact was not seriously challenged before us, nor could this be done, because the evidence on the record clearly established that if the employees of the Railway Administration had not been so grossly negligent this accident could not have happened. Admittedly, the appellant was injured by a moving railway wagon which was not being shunted by any engine. The night of the occurrence was, admittedly, dark and a strong wind, which afterwards turned into a severe dust‑storm, was blowing. As alleged by the appellant, this railway wagon must have moved as a result of the strong wind, or the dust‑storm. It could not have moved if it had been properly secured and chained, if the line on which it was standing had been blocked by a "scotch block" or even if the gates at the level‑crossing, which normally are kept closed across the line, had not been kept open. For proof of these matters the appellant relied on his own statement and that of his cousin, Inayat Ullah P. W., on the admissions made by Muhammad Akram (D. W. 3), formerly Station Master at the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din Railway Station, and on the report (Exh. P. W. 10/2) of Sh. Muhammad Afzal, Traffic Inspector (P. W. 11), who made an enquiry into the matter immediately after the accident. Muhammad Akram (D. W. 3) admitted that the wagon, which was the cause of this accident, started moving as a result of a strong dust‑storm, which started at 10‑2 p.m. when he was not on duty. He also admitted that the "scotch block" on the railway line on which this wagon was standing was off the line "at that time." Sh. Muhammad Afzal (P. W. 11), who was not an eye‑witness, but who started an enquiry into the cause of this accident on the 8th July 1954, in his report (Exh. P. W. 10/2), found as follows :‑‑ "(a) The blown‑away vehicle had not been safely chained although storm was throughout the day, (b) the scotch‑block was not kept acroses the line ; and (c) the level‑crossings were open". In the opinion of this witness if any one of these three devices, as required by the rules, had been employed the accident could have been avoided. As a result of these findings, he came to the conclusion that Muhammad Akram, Station Master, and Muhammad Masood, Assistant Station Master were respon sible for :‑ "(a) not securing the last vehicle at the Malikwal end of the goods platform line with a safety chain although strong wind was blowing during their duty hours, thus violating S. R. 148/4, (b) not putting the scotch‑block across the line (i.e., in its normal position during their duty hours), thus violating S. R. 152/2, and (c) not‑closing, during their duty hours, the gates of the C class level behind the station building thereby violating para. 18/B of the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din yard working rules." He also found that Muhammad Sardar Khan was responsible for not closing the gates of the level‑crossing after shunting by R‑57 Up, which had left the Mandi Baha‑ud‑Din Railway Station at 4‑40 on the 21st June 1954. These findings of fact are not based on the personal knowledge of the witness and if they had stood alone these findings could not be considered to be sufficient proof of the existence of these facts, but as most of these facts were also admitted by Muhammad Akram, Station Master, the same must be taken to have been proved. Moreover, if any one of the three precautions mentioned in the report of this officer had been taken by the employees of the Railway Administration, the railway wagon in question could not have moved on the railway line and, after crossing the level‑crossing, could not have caused injuries to the appellant at a distance of some 60 feet from that place. Agreeing with the trial Court, therefore, we hold that not only were the employees of the respondent negligent in the discharge of their duties, but that this accident was a direct result of their negligence.

9. Issue No. 2‑A was disposed of by the trial Court in a short paragraph of six lines, which runs as follows :‑ "The plaintiff has failed to prove that he met the accident at the level‑crossing. His entry at any other place was un lawful and it is not disputed that such entry disentitles the victim of an accident to claim damages or compensation even if the other part has contributed to the happening of the accident: The issue is consequently decided against the plaintiff". In the grounds of appeal this finding of the trial Court was not specifically challenged, but during the hearing of this appeal, with our permission, the learned counsel for the appellant addressed us arguments on this part of the finding of the trial Court, to `t which the learned counsel for the other party was allowed to reply. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that it was wrong on the part of the trial Court to remark that it was "not disputed" that if the appellant was a trespasser and his entry into the railway premises was unlawful, he was not entitled to claim any damages, even though the accident took place as a direct result of the negligence on the part of the respondent's employees. As a proposition of law, we think, these observations of the trial Court are not correct. At least, we have not been shown any authority in which it has been held that under no circumstances can a trespasser recover damages from the occupier of a property if the occupier, or his agents or employees cause him any injury.

10. As a general rule, we think, the occupier of a property owes no duty to a. trespasser, but there might be cases where a trespasser, who is injured on account of wilful default, or gross negligence on the part of the occupier of the property, or his agents or employees is entitled to claim damages from the occupier of such property. This point is not free from difficulty and as no direct authority covering it was cited at the bar, we considered it necessary to carefully examine ourselves a few important cases on this subject.

11. Before, however, we refer to those cases, .it would be useful to reproduce certain observations made by a learned author (Vaz) in his book, Negligence Founded on Rights.(1925 Edition). Some of these observations are the view of the author himself and some others are based on the view expressed in certain reported cases. This is what the learned author says at pages 162 and 163 of his book :‑ " A duty implying as it does a moral concept, a notion prevails that an owner of premises is not liable for injuries caused to a trespasser unless they be intentionally caused ; and qua duty it must be admitted that a duty towards a trespasser is a contradiction in terms. Prima facie, and taken by itself, the term trespasser is exclusive of any right to claim protection in his trespass. But if that duty is an obligation to avoid a conflict of rights, there is nothing repugnant in‑ the law affirming that obligation even towards a trespasser. A trespasser is a wrong‑doer arid the law gives a remedy to the party wronged ; but to allow the latter to exercise his rights without control is, to revert to the times when the law had not begun to regulate the conflict. 'The main reason, however, for the notion of the absence of a duty towards a trespasser will be found to lie in the fact that as regards such person it is difficult to presume that the owner of property had the consciousness of his presence, and therefore of the likelihood of injuring him. The occupier is entitled to presume that no one will trespass on his property and thereby do a wrong. On this presumption he is entitled to act. If in the exercise of a right an injury is caused, the absence of consciousness exempts him from liability for negligence. In the words of Bowen, L. J. "In the case of premises that contain an element of danger a duty arises as soon as there is a probability that people will go upon them".

12. In the earliest of these cases reported as The Directors & Co., of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Company v. Judith Slattery (1878 III Appeal Cases 1155), it was held that "where notices have been put up by a railway company forbidding persons to cross the line at a particular point, but these notices have been continually disregarded by the public,, and the company's servants have not interfered to enforce their observance, the company cannot, in the case of an injury occurring to anyone crossing the line at that point, set up the existence of the notices by way of answer to an action for damages for such injury".

13. In the case reported as Thomas v. Quartermaine ((1887) 18 Q B D 685 pp. 694, 695), one of the learned Judges, while dealing with the subject, made the following observations :‑ The common law imposes on the occupier of premises no abstract obligation at all as to the state in which he is to keep them‑‑provided that he carries on no unlawful business and is guilty of no nuisance. In the case of premises that contain an element of danger, a duty arises as soon as there is a probability that people will go upon them ; but it is a duty only, towards such people as actually do go. It is not a duty in the air, but a duty towards particular people. The occupier is bound to use all reasonable care to prevent such persons from being hurt. It is obvious that this duty must vary according to the character of the danger, and the circumstances under which the premises are to be visited. 1t differs in the case of hidden dangers, and in the case of dangers that are palpable and visible; it may vary according to the age and comprehension of the visitor ; in the case of bare licensees, and of those who come on the premises on the occupier's business and at his invitation. The only obligation on the occupier is to take such precautions as are reasonable in each instance to prevent mischief . . . . . . ."

14. In Norman v. Great Western Railway Company (1), one of the learned Judges, while dealing with the same subject, observed as follows :‑ " The liability of a person upon whose land another comes towards the latter in respect of not exposing him to danger may be stated in an ascending scale. The liability is lowest towards a trespasser. If a trespasser chooses to come upon another person's land, in which the latter has dug a hole and covered it with brushwood for the purpose of catching an animal, or for some such purpose, the trespasser, if he falls into the hole, cannot complain. He had no right to be there, and if he is injured he must bear the consequences. The next is the case of a licensee. He is allowed to come on the premises and he must take them as they are, but the occupier must not expose him to a hidden peril. If the occupier knows of a danger upon the premises he must warn the licensee ; he owes a duty to the licensee not to lay a trap for him. Next in the ascending scale is the invitee. * * * * * * The duty of the invitor towards the invitee is to use reasonable care to prevent damage from, unusual danger which he knows or ought to know. If the danger is not such that he ought to know of it, his liability does not extend to it".

15. Next in order of dates is the case reported as Mercer v. South Easter and Chatham Railway Companies' Managing Committee (2). In this case it was found that the practice of the railway company was to keep the wicket gate always locked if a train was approaching and only to have it unlocked when no train was approaching. On the occasion in question, owing to the neglect of the signalman, the gate was unlocked at a time when a train was approaching. It was held that by leaving the gate unlocked the defendant company gave an invitation to the plaintiff to cross the line and as he had not failed to use ordinary and reasonable care, he was entitled to recover damages for the injury caused.

16. Next is the case reported as Jones v. Great Western Railway. Co. (3). In this it was held that in Euch an action the plaintiff has not only to prove negligence on the part of the defendant but also that that negligence was the real, or direct cause of the accident.

17. Some Indian Authorities on the subject of contributory negligence were cited at the Bar, but we propose making a reference P a few of them only. In Jahangir Muncherji Lali v. The Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Co. (37 Bom. 575), at page 587, the following statement of law, on this subject, taken from Halsbury s Laws of England, Volume XXI, was cuoted with approval :‑‑ "In an action for injuries arising from negligence it is a defence if the defendant proves that the plaintiff, by some negligence on his own part, directly 'contributed to the injury in the sense that it formed a material part of the effective cause thereof. When this is proved, the plaintiff's negligence is said to be contributory . . . . . . In order that a plea of contributory negligence may be successful, it must be shown either that there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to the accident and that the defendant could not, by using ordinary care, have avoided the accident, or that, notwithstanding the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff could, by exercising ordinary care, have avoided the accident. Where, therefore, the defendant is negligent and the plaintiff is alleged to have been guilty of contributory negligence, the test to be applied is whether the defendant's negligence was the real, direct and effective cause of misfortune".

18. In the case reported as J. D. Haywood v. F. M. Huggins (A I R 1937 Sind 118) it was held that any one who has, by his own negligence, contributed to the injuries of which he complains, cannot maintain an action against another in respect of it, for he will be considered to be the author of his own wrong. In a case of the Calcutta High Court reported as J. W. Nunn v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. (A I R 1930 Cal. 603), it was held that when a collision is brought about by negligence on the part of both the vehicles, or the vehicle and the person coming into collision, if nevertheless one of the two parties could by using due care and diligence, have avoided the accident, then the negligence of the other, even if he contributed in a sence to the accident, did not necessarily disentitle him to succeed. It was observed that in such a case the real question was who was the last act of negligence that brought about the accident". Almost similar views have been expressed in a latter case of the Madras High Court, reported as The Madras and Southern Maratha Railway Co. Ltd. v. Jayammal (A I R 1925 Mad. 304), and in it was observed further that the theory of contributory negligence is not a special or separate branch of the law and that it is, a different aspect of the sole question requiring decision in such an action namely, what was the proximate, or effective, cause of the accident. It was held that if in spite of the negligence, or as it is called, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the defendant could even then, by exercise of ordinary care, have avoided it accident the plaintiff was entitled to recover not because that he was not negligent but only because the negligence that proximately caused the injury was the negligence not of the plaintiff but that of the defendant.

19. The question of liability of a railway company to a trespasser was dealt with in a case of the Bombay High Court reported as Ismail Haji Naja Mafat v. B. B. & C. I. Railway (1911 Appeal Cases 361) It was held, in this case, that the company will be liable to a trespasser only if the railway servant acts in wilful disregard of his safety. It was observed that, in many cases, it was of great importance to determine whether the person who was on the land of another: was a licensee or a trespasser and that, generally speaking, the occupier of the land owes no duty to a trespasser. Further on, the following observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Grand Trunk Railway oj' Canada v. Barnett (1911 Appeal Cases 361) were quoted with approval: "The railway. company, was undoubtedly, under a duty to the plaintiff trot wilfully to injure him.; they were not entitled, unnecessarily and knowingly to increase the normal risk by deliberately placing unexpected dangers in his way, but to say that they were liable to a trespasser for the negligence of their servants is to place them under a duty to him of the same character as that which they undertake to those whom they carry for reward ".

20. A careful perusal of the authorities cited above reveals that the following principles are almost well established :‑ (1) If an action is based on the allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant, it is not only necessary ford the plaintiff to prove that the defendant, or his agents or servants were negligent, but also to show that their negligence, was the real, or proximate, cause of the accident. (2) Mere negligence on the part of the plaintiff would not disentitle him to damages for the injury caused, unless it cant also be held that his negligence was the direct or proximate cause of injury and that the same could have been avoided if hey had taken due precautions. (3) The case of a trespasser stands on a different footing from that of an invitee, or a licensee and generally speaking, the occupier of a property is under no duty to him, but if he is injured as a result of wilful negligence on the part of the occupier, or his agents or servants, he would be entitled to recover.

21. Keeping in mind the principles laid down above, the question which requires decision is whether, in the cir cumstances of this particular case, and bearing in mind the fact that the accident did not take place at the level crossing, but took place at a distance of about 60 feet from that place, when either the appellant was trying to cross the railway line, or he was sitting at that place for some purpose, the respondent can be held liable for the negligence of its employees which, without any doubt, was the direct cause of the injuries inflicted on the appellant. If the appellant had been injured while trying to cross the railway line' at a place other than the level‑crossing, when shunting operations were in progress, or some lawful act was being done by the respondent's employees, even though they,‑ had not taken due precautions for the safety of the persons who might be present on, or near the railway line, the appellant; in our opinion, would have had no case against the respondent on the ground that the respondent's employees, could not :be aware of his existence and were, , therefore, not expected to take arty pre cautions for his safety. The accident, however, took place on account of gross negligence on the Part of the respon dent's employees which negligence, in our opinion, amount to wilful default, in the sense that they deliberately ed to take the necessary precautions which, if taken, would have prevented such an accident taking place. If the wagon had been chained, or, if the scotch‑block had been placed across the line, or if the gates at the level‑crossing had been closed, the wagon in question could not have moved on the line and even tf it had moved, it could not have struck and injured the appellant. The failure on the part of the' respondent's employees to take any of these three precautions did, in our opinion, amount to wilful default on their part and hence the respondent should be held liable for the ensuing result. The mere fact that the accident did not take place at the level‑crossing, but at some distance from it should not, in our opinion, make any difference, so far as the respondent's liability is concerned, because the appellant would have been hit even if he had been crossing the line at the level‑crossing. On this view of the case, there fore, disagreeing with the trial Court, we decide issue No. 1‑A in the appellant's favour.

22. The findings on issues' Nos. 3 to 5 are not being challenged before us and, therefore; we; are not called upon to say anything concerning them. This leaves only issue No. 6 for decision. In view of the finding given on issue No. 2‑A, the trial Court did not give any clear finding on this issue. The appellant had claimed a sum of Rs. 1,20,000 as damages ; Rs. 20,000 on account of expenses required for his treatment and rest on account of the mental distress and physical pain suffered by him and for being handicapped in the prosecution of his studies. In his evidence in the Court he had stated that he will have to go to London for procuring an artificial leg, which would cost about Rs. 16,000, and that he had to spend about Rs. 5,000 on his treatment in the hospital. No documentary proof was furnished by him, in support of this claim for Rs. 5.000. Doctor Mirza Hameed Hussain‑(P. W. 9) had, however, deposed that only those medicines which were not available in the hospital were purchased by the appellant, at his own expense; while the rest were given to him free of cost. Shaukat Ali (P. W. 3), a clerk employed in the Mayo Hospital had deposed that no fees are charged for treatment in the hospital and that in the case of those patients whose monthly income is less than Rs. 250 even food is given to them free. In these circumstances, the appellant's allegations that he spent a sum of Rs. 5,000 on his treatment, in the hospital, cannot be accepted as correct. The rest of his claim for Rs. 1,00,000 appears to us to be very exorbitant. He deposed that at the time of the accident he was reading in the II year Class and that he had the intention of proceeding to England for higher studies, with a view to obtain a doctorate and for being called to the Bar. His school record does not appear to be very bright. He never obtained any scholarship and in the year 1951 passed the Matriculation Examination in the 3rd Division only. Though he had deposed that he did not fail in any class, he had not been able to pass the F. A. Examination within a period of four years. There can, however, be no doubt that having lost one of his legs the appellant continue to suffer from this handicap during the rest of his life and this might stand in the way of his prose cution of further studies. There can also be no doubt that he must have gone through considerable mental distress and physical pain, both immediately after the accident and during the course of his treatment in the hospital. Considering all these circumstances, we think, a decree for Rs. 20,000 would meet the ends of justice.

22. For reasons given above, we accept this appeal, set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and grant the appellant a decree for Rs. 20,000 with proportionate costs, against the respondent. A. H Appeal accepted.