2017 PLP 34 (YLRN)

SHAHNAWAZ TARIQ, J.

By this common judgment, I intend to dispose of Civil Revision Application No.255 of 1991 filed by the applicant S.K. Shah v. Jamaluddin and others, and Civil Revision Application No.280 of 1991, preferred by the applicant Liaquat Ali v. Jamaluddin and others, whereby the applicants have impugned the consolidated judgment and decree dated 30.09.1991, passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Karachi Central, and Civil Appeals Nos.08 of 1990 and 75 of 1990, filed by the applicants were dismissed.

2. The relevant facts narrated in the above revision applications are that the respondent No.1, Jamaluddin filed suit bearing New No.2535 of 1985 (old No.570 of 1979) for recovery of possession and mesne profits against the respondents, Liaquat Ali and 2 others in the Court of learned II Senior Civil Judge, Karachi Central, and sought the following reliefs:-- "(a) Defendants to give possession of the milk shop to the plaintiff which they had withheld under a conspiracy as trespasser. (b) Defendants to pay the mesne profits to the plaintiff amounting to Rs.1800/ - due till the end of January 1979 and future till ejected at the rate of Rs.10/ - per day. (c) The defendants Nos.1 to 3 be restrained from using the forged documents against the plaintiff to cloud the title of the plaintiff, and/or dispose of the property by sale or otherwise. (d) The defendants Nos.1 to 3 be permanently restrained from disposing of the milk shop and/or the plot No.III-G-12/37, Nazimabad under forged documents, by declaring that the plaintiff is the only lawful owner of the said plot."

3. The applicant S.K. Shah also filed suit bearing New No.2534 of 1985 (old No. 1178 of 1979) against the respondents, Jamaluddin and Muhammad Salim, for declaration, possession and permanent injunction in the Court of learned II Senior Civil Judge, Karachi Central, and sought the following reliefs:-- (a) Declaration that the plaintiff is lawful owner of the property plot No.III-G-12/ 37, Nazimabad, Karachi, and General Power of Attorney dated 30.04.1966 and sale deed dated 26.07.1978 executed by the defendants are forged ab-initio documents and of no legal consequence and not binding on the plaintiff. (b) Permanent injunction be granted restraining the defendants, their men, agents, servants and persons acting under them from using the power of attorney dated 30.04.1966 and sale deed dated 26.07.78 for disposing off the property plot bearing No. III-G-12/ 37 Nazimabad, Karachi in any manner whatsoever, and restraining the defendants from parting with the inside portion of the said property to any one in any manner whatsoever till they are not evicted under this suit. c) A decree be passed directing the defendants to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the inside portion of the said property to the plaintiff which is illegally occupied by the defendant.

4. The applicant S.K. Shah in his Suit No.2534 of 1985, has stated that he is the lawful owner of plot No.III.G.12/37, Nazimabad, Karachi, which was leased out by KDA in his favour through registered deed in the year 1965. Allegedly, the applicant S.K. Shah with his own funds constructed two rooms and let out one room as a shop to one Liaquat Ali. It is worth mentioning that Liaquat Ali is the applicant in Revision Application No.280 of 1991. In the year 1967, the applicant authorized one Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui to look after the property, collect the rent from the tenants and pay the dues and taxes to the concerned departments, which he continued till 1975. On 15.01.1979, the respondent No.1 sent a notice to his tenant Liaquat Ali that by virtue of sale deed registered on 26.07.1978, he had purchased the property from the applicant through the respondent No.2, who acted as attorney for the applicant and demanded the possession of the said rented shop. Liaquat Ali replied the notice and denied the claims of the respondent No.1. On 06.01.1979, the applicant appointed his tenant Liaquat Ali as attorney in respect of subject property.

5. It was further averred that the respondents on the basis of a forged general power of attorney dated 30.04.1966, got the sale deed registered on 26.07.1978, regarding the property in favour of the respondent No.1, therefore, the forged and void documents were not binding upon him. It was further asserted that on 27.02.1979, the respondents along with few persons broke the lock of the inside portion of the said property and got illegal possession thereof. The applicant through a notice dated 05.03.1979, demanded the possession of the property but the respondent No.1 refused to handover the same and claimed himself to be the owner of the property along with its tenants.

6. The respondents vehemently denied the averments of the plaint and stated that the applicant being the owner of subject property had appointed the respondent No.2, Muhammad Saleem as his lawful attorney vide irrevocable general power of attorney dated 30.04.1966, and since then he has been looking after the said property. The respondent No.2 was carrying the business of selling milk in one shop and employed said Liaquat Ali as his salesman for Rs.30/- per day. In the year 1978, the respondent No.1, Jamaluddin purchased said plot from the applicant through the respondent No.2 being his lawful attorney under a registered sale deed dated 26.07.1978, and was put in possession of the same. The respondent No.2 raised entire construction on the said plot with his own expenses.

7. It is further averred that in pursuance of sale deed, the KDA issued a letter of mutation in the name of respondent No.1 vide letter dated 12.08.1978. The respondent No.1 served a notice dated 06.01.1979, upon Liaquat Ali to handover the possession of the shop but he refused to deliver the possession and replied that he was tenant of the applicant and was paying rent to one Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui.

8. The learned trial Court consolidated both the above suits and Suit No.2534 of 1985 filed by the applicant S.K. Shah was treated as leading suit. Following consolidated issues were framed by the trial Court:- "i) Whether the plaintiff is the lawful owner of the plot/property No. III-G / 12-37, Nazimabad, Karachi? ii) Whether the General power of attorney dated 30.04.1966 is a forged document if so what is its legal effect? iii) Whether the sale deed dated 26.07.1978 executed by the Defendant No. 02 in favour of Defendant No. 1 is a void ab-initio document and not binding on the plaintiff? iv) Whether the construction on the property in question made by the plaintiff or defendant No. 2? v) Whether the existing/ tenants of the property in question are the tenants of the plaintiff or the defendant No.1? vi) Whether Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui acted as authorized person of the plaintiff and managed the property on his behalf? vii) Whether the plaintiff appointed Liaquat Ali as his attorney in respect of the property in question under a valid power of attorney if so what is its legal effect? viii) Whether the defendants on 27.02.1979, illegally forcibly took possession of the inside portion of the property in question, if so whether the plaintiff is entitled for its possession? ix) Whether Liaquat Ali is tenant of the plaintiff or is servant of the defendant No. 02? x) Whether Din Muhammad was running the business Jinnah Cotton independently or with the partnership of Defendant No. 02? xi) Whether any partnership deed was executed between Din Muhammad and Defendant No. 02 in respect of the business of cotton Ginning? xii) Whether Din Muhammad had constructed the said shop with his own funds? xiii) Whether the Defendant No. 1 is entitled to the possession and mesne profit of the shop in question of Liaquat Ali and Din Muhammad? xiv) What reliefs are the parties entitled?"

9. The applicant examined himself as Ex.5 and produced original allotment order, possession certificate, copy of the registered lease executed, sale agreement executed by the applicant in favour of Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui, clearance certificate, form B from Income Tax Department, KDA receipts for Rs.38.18, Rs.65 and Rs.55/-, power of attorney in favour of Liaquat Ali, notice published in Newspaper daily Mashriq by the applicant through his counsel to the respondent No.1 dated 05.03.1979, another notice dated 21.03.1979, mutual agreement, irrevocable general power of attorney, receipt of payment for Rs.10.37 and copy of lease as Ex.5/ 1 to 5/10 respectively. The applicant examined tenant Liaquat Ali as Ex.6 who produced rent receipt, certificate issued by Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui, copy of notice dated 16.01.1979 and notice dated 28.01.1979 as Ex.6/1 to 6/5 respectively. The applicant also examined Iqbal Ahmed as Ex.7, who produced the general power of attorney as Ex.8/ 1 executed by him in favour of Mohammad Arfeen of dated 14.10.1978. He also produced the receipt of Rs.24/-, notice from KMC, application to the KESC, a letter from Controller of Billing dated 22.07.1978, another application to the Controller of Billing KESC dated 21.09.1978, six receipts of betterment taxes and other copy of challan of Rs.54/-, special power of attorney executed by him in favour of Mohammad Saleem, the defendant No. 02 executed on 27.07.1967, copy of telegram, notice from advocate Abrar Hassan of dated 22.08.1967, another notice of dated 07.08.1967, 27.07.1967, 06.01.1979 and acknowledgement receipt as Ex.8/21 to 8/24 so also notice to Zahiruddin advocate on 21.01.1979 as Ex.8/25 and bill from KMC amounting to Rs.432/- as Ex.8/1 to 8/26. The respondent Kamaluddin examined himself as Ex.9 he has produced the copy of order of Civil Revision No. 12/88 and order passed on 09.01.1989. The respondent No.1 examined himself as Ex.10 and they also examined one Mohammad Sharif and the respondent No.2 Mohammad Saleem examined himself as Ex.12. He has also produced lease deed dated 26.07.1978 in respect of the suit property.

10. After hearing the arguments of counsel for both the parties, the learned trial Court vide consolidated judgment dated 21.11.1990, dismissed Suit No.2534 of 1985, filed by the applicant, and decreed Suit No. 2535 of 1985 filed by the respondent No.

1. The applicants preferred two separate Civil Appeals Nos.8 of 1990 and 75 of 1990, against the said consolidated judgment and decree, which were also dismissed vide the impugned judgment passed by the appellate Court.

11. Learned Counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant being employee of P.P.W.D remained posted till 1976 in Peshawar and visited the subject property in 1967 but other shops were not constructed till that time and he only let out the shop in question to Liaquat Ali as tenant. He contended that the statements of respondents show that the applicant was available at Karachi for the execution of power of attorney dated 30.04.1966, whereas the record of the department produced by Muhammad Zaman, Divisional Account Officer, P.P.W.D proved that the applicant was in Peshawar at the relevant time as such the question of execution of power of attorney in favour of the respondent No.2 does not arise.

12. Learned Counsel for the applicant further submitted that the respondents produced the photocopy of the power of attorney dated 30.04.1966, and besides that the applicants are still in possession of the said shop and title documents pertaining to the said property and without the delivery of possession, the sale transaction was incomplete, but both the Courts below failed to appreciate this fact of the case and also misapplied Article 95 of Qanun-e-Shahadat as the applicant had clearly denied the execution of said power of attorney. He further submitted that mutual agreement and irrevocable general power of attorney are forged documents which were not executed by the applicant, therefore, the respondents had fraudulently executed sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1, as such the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.1991, passed by the appellate Court are liable to be set-aside. He relied upon PLD 1996 Karachi 475, 1993 SCMR 1137, PLD 1989 SC 112, 1982 SCMR 673 and PLD 1983 Karachi 492.

13. Learned Counsel for the respondents at the very outset submitted that on 30.04.1966, the applicant executed mutual agreement and an irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the respondent No.2, and subsequently the sale deed was registered on 26.07.1978, in favour of respondent No.1 by the respondent No.2 and the original irrevocable general power of attorney was handedover to the Registrar at the time of registration of sale deed. He further contended that one Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui to whom the applicant had sold out the said plot also executed a special power of attorney in favour of the respondent No.2 to approach the KDA for mutation. He also submitted that all the required formalities were completed and a notice for invitation of objections was also published in newspaper but none came forward whereupon the shop in question was mutated in favour of the respondent No.1 by KDA.

14. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the applicant filed suit challenging irrevocable general power of attorney and sale deed registered in the name of the respondent No.1 being forged and unlawful but same was dismissed and even the civil appeals preferred by the applicants were also dismissed by the appellate Court. He further contended that the concurrent findings of the Courts below are based on valid material placed on record and instant revisions are not maintainable on question of facts unless misreading or non-reading of evidence is proved. He relied on the case of Shafi Muhammad and others v. Mst. Rasheeda Bibi, 1997 MLD 385, wherein it was observed as under:-- "The trial Court as well as Appellate Court below had already decided factual side of case and had given concurrent findings of facts. Ground agitated in revision before High Court were same which were urged by petitioners at length before Appellate Court below, but no legal flaw had been pointed out by Petitioners. Only legal points are to be discussion in revision and not the factual aspects of the case. Petitioners having failed to point out any illegality in judgments of Courts below, findings of fact could not be looked into by High Court in revision except glaring illegality which was not found in the case."

15. Learned Counsel for the respondents also submitted that applicant has failed to rebut the lawful authenticity of the power of attorney and only emphasized on the statement of official witness of concerned department, who only produced account of earned leave and deposed that as per record of the department, applicant was available on duty at Peshawar on 30.04.1966, but during his cross-examination, admitted that he could not say whether applicant was on casual leave on 30.04.1966, and was present at Karachi. He contended that the said official witness also stated that applicant was retired on 2.02.1976, and died on 23.05.1982, but during the said period he did not move any application for production of such record before the Court. The said witness also deposed that usually casual leaves are granted for one week and annual leave are different in nature, and record produced by him in court did not relate to account of causal leaves. Learned Counsel further submitted that no relevant record of casual leave or daily Muster Roll of the applicant was produced in the trial Court, therefore, the statement of official witness should be considered as whole and not in piece meal.

16. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the tenant Liaquat Ali admitted that he engaged the counsel in suit and then went to Sahiwal where the applicant executed power of attorney and he was well aware about the registration of sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1, therefore, being the tenant he had no legal status to defend the cases by paying fees to advocates and bear the expenses of the Court. He placed his reliance on PLD 1975 Lahore 1205.

17. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the applicant had sold out the said property thrice, therefore, he remained away and did not initiate any proceedings against the alleged tenants, and Liaquat Ali deposed that Deen Muhammad is in possession of the shop as its owner. He also contended that power of attorney is not required to be registered under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, as said Power was attested by the Notary Public on 30.04.1966, which is also protected under provision of Article 95 of Qanun-e-Shahadat. He also submitted that the applicant has not filed suit for the cancellation of the said power of attorney, registered sale deed and mutation. He contended that the applicant had not challenged the statement of the attesting witness pertaining to the execution of power of attorney, its attestation by the Notary Public and payment of Rs.25000/-. He also contended that the applicant had also not challenged the statement of witness Kamaluddin that original title documents were deposited in Court in a murder case as surety. He submitted that the judgment and decree dated 30.09.1991, passed by the appellate Court are proper and in accordance with law, and the revision applications are liable to be dismissed.

18. The perusal of the available record and consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties has emanated that the respondent No.1 allegedly purchased the shop in question from the applicant through respondent No.2, being the attorney of applicant, on the strength of irrevocable general power of attorney executed on 30.04.1966. Simultaneously, a mutual agreement was executed between the applicant and the respondent No.2, whereby the respondent No.2 took the responsibility of the loan of Rs.50,000/- taken by the applicant from one Abdul Wahab. Subsequently, the respondent No.2 executed the registered sale deed on 26.07.1978, in favour of the respondent No.

1. Thereafter the applicant again sold the said property to one Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui vide sale agreement dated 25.04.1967, and receipt of advance amount was executed at Karachi and delivered him the possession of the said plot in the capacity of its owner. Said Iqbal Farooqui inducted Ishaque, Salahuddin, Butt and Deen Muhammad as tenants and Deen Muhammad constructed 2 shops with the consent of Iqbal Farooqui from his own expenses and they were paying rent to him. The applicant admitted that he had not constructed the shops which are in possession of the tenants. Applicant's tenant Liaquat Ali has also admitted that the above referred tenants were tenants of the said Iqbal Farooqui. Liaquat Ali further admitted that Deen Muhammad is in possession of his shop as its owner which was constructed by him at the instance of said Iqbal Farooqui.

19. It is also important to mention that the applicant deposed that he revoked the sale agreement executed in favour of said Iqbal Farooqui after three months but no notice was issued in this regard, and he permitted said Iqbal Farooqui to look after and manage the said property. Amazingly, as per admission of the applicant, he never demanded any account or rent being received by said Iqbal Farooqui from tenants. It is also strange that said Iqbal Farooqui permitted the tenants to construct the shops by themselves while they were paying rent to him and even the applicant Liaquat Ali was also paying rent to him and produced rent receipt issued by Iqbal Farooqui. Furthermore, after registration of the sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1, said Iqbal Farooqui also executed a special power of attorney in favour of the respondent No.2 to appear before KDA for mutation. It is also essential to mention that despite having the knowledge of those facts, the applicant never objected to the above mentioned activities. The conduct and continuous silence of the applicant prima facie established that the sale agreement executed between the applicant and Iqbal Farooqui was not revoked by the applicant as it was mandatory that when a written sale agreement and receipt for the advance amount were executed, the revocation of the sale agreement must also be in written form either by way of issuance of notice to the buyer or execution of such revocation deed, as such the verbal revocation had no legal foundation particularly when the said Iqbal Farooqui had continued his authority as owner of the said property.

20. The prime issue in present controversy is orbiting around the execution of the irrevocable power of attorney which is the most dynamic document. In this regard, the learned Counsel for applicant has emphasized that the official witness Muhammad Zaman produced official record showing that the applicant had not obtained annual leave from his department during the relevant time, therefore, he was on duty at Peshawar. However, the official witness in his cross-examination had frankly admitted that he could not say that whether applicant was on casual leave on 30.04.1966, and was present at Karachi. The official witness also admitted that the leave account produced by him in the Court was the account of annual leave, which is quite different from the account of causal leave. He further admitted that usually casual leave at a stretch is granted for one week. In present state of affairs the uncertain statement of the official witness cannot be treated as gospel truth that the applicant was on duty on 30.04.1966, and was available at Peshawar, as it was open for the applicant to obtain one week casual leave for the execution of irrevocable general power of attorney. The wisdom and purpose of cross-examination is to check the credibility and truthfulness of the facts deposed by a witness and the statement made in examination in chief be filtered through the process of cross-examination, as such the applicant cannot take any benefit from the said produced incomplete official record.

21. To strengthen their claim, the respondents examined one attesting witness of the execution of irrevocable power of attorney namely Muhammad Shareef who testified and completely supported the execution of the irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of Respondent No.2 by applicant on 30.04.1966, and Rs.25000/- were paid as sale transaction. It is also pertinent to mention that in cross-examination the counsel for the applicant had not confronted the statement of the said witness by putting questions regarding the execution of said power of attorney, signatures of attesting witnesses, its attestation by the Notary Public Munawar Ali Khan and the payment of sale transaction worth Rs.25000/- to shatter the testimonial of the said witness which remained unchallenged and unshaken. The omission of not challenging the above referred essential aspects of the execution of said power of attorney, prima facie, established that the said document was executed by the parties and in this scenario its authenticity cannot be questioned nor refused. Consequently, mere denial of the signature of the applicant on the power of attorney without producing any strong supporting evidence could not be considered as genuine. It is well settled that the party denying the factum of execution of any document is bound to prove its claim by adducing oral or documentary cogent evidence and its mere denial of signature would not be sufficient to disbelieve and discard the execution of said document which otherwise was supported by any of the attesting witnesses or attesting authority. In present case the applicant has also failed to adduce any evidence or examine the second attesting witness before the Court to invalidate the assertions of the respondents and attesting witness Muhammad Shareef.

22. It is also essential to mention that said Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui executed special power of attorney on 27.07.1967, in favour of the respondent No.2, regarding the subject property to appear before KDA for the completion of the mutation in respect of subject property and to collect documents on behalf of the executant. The said special power of attorney was attested by the Notary Public Masud Hassan Khan Sari (retired DC and Ist Class Magistrate) and all the pre-requisite formalities were also complied with before the Sub-Register and a notice was also published in the newspaper inviting the objections to the mutation of subject property by the KDA in favour of the respondent No.1 but no one came forward at the time of execution of said mutation.

23. The prime iota of evidence is the statement of the applicant that despite the oral cancellation of sale agreement of said Iqbal Farooqui on 05.01.1979, he was permitted to maintain his authority over the property and continue to manage and supervise the affairs of the tenants and he even permitted Deen Muhammad to construct 2 shops. The applicant had paid ground rent only and was unaware about the details of taxes and its payments. He also claimed that he constructed 2 rooms in 1965 and let out one room to Liaquat Ali, but was unaware about the cost of its construction and even had no detail of such accounts nor aware of the measurement of both the rooms. He lastly visited plot in 1972 and there were other tenants on the said plot namely Mohammad Ishaque, Salahuddin, Butt, Deen Mohammad and one other. He was also unaware of the tenants' date of occupation and the amount of rent being paid by them. He was unaware if Deen Mohammad was partner in business with the respondent No.2 from 1966 in disputed shop. He was also unaware of the fact that if the respondent No.2 is owner of shop in possession of Liaquat and if he was carrying business of Milk and Liaquat was working as his servant. He also had no knowledge if any notice was issued by K.M.C. to respondent No.2 for demolition of some portion of the shop of Deen Mohammad and the respondent No.2 demolished the same. The applicant denied that for the fourth time he sold the said plot to said Liaquat Ali. He admitted that no report was lodged before filing the suit when respondent No.2 occupied the inside portion of the property by force. Amazingly, the applicant admitted in cross-examination that he authorized Deen Mohammad from 1967 to 05.01.1979 to give the shop on rent, collect rent and look after the shops. He admitted that the shop in possession of Deen Mohammad was given to him by Iqbal Farooqui. He was unaware who had fixed electric meter and electric fittings etc. He was well aware that demands of taxes by Excise and Taxation Department were issued in the name of Iqbal Farooqui.

24. Applicant's witness Liaquat Ali has deposed that Deen Mohammad constructed the shop with his own expenses and is sole owner of the said shop. He deposed that he was well aware before getting the power of attorney that the said property was already sold by the respondent No.2 to the respondent No.

1. He also admitted that he engaged an advocate to contest the suit and then went to Punjab, where power of attorney was executed in his favour and after execution of the power of attorney he was not paying rent. He admitted that the respondent No.2 is still in possession of one room. He admitted that Ishaque, Salahuddin, Butt and Deen Mohammad are tenants in shops but they are not paying rent to anyone. He produced his rent receipt as Ex.6/2 issued to him by Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui. He denied that applicant sold the plot thrice.

25. In its all practical senses, the above discussed facts and circumstances have established that the said property was neither under the control and management of the applicant nor he exercised his authority as its owner since the year 1967. Consequently, in the scenario discussed supra, presumption can safely be drawn from the demeanor of the applicant that he had sold out the property to different persons at different instances and the applicant has not come to the Court with clean hands as such his statement does not seem to be credible and trustworthy.

26. It is an undeniable fact that the respondent No.2 subsisting the irrevocable power of attorney, had executed registered sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1 which was not revoked on the date of alleged sale transaction. Moreover, it is clearly mentioned in the irrevocable general power of attorney that the attorney is absolutely empowered to sell, mortgage and rent out the property on behalf of the applicant. Similarly, in mutual agreement dated 30.04.1966, it is also obviously mentioned that original documents of the property in question were deposited as surety in Court in a murder case.

27. It is duty of the Court to unravel the tangled skein of facts involved in a case to identify the material issues and consider all the necessary and relevant aspects of the controversy adjudicated between the parties to examine the root cause of the dispute so that the truth is unveiled for the administration of justice. The attitude and demeanor of the applicant as a whole should be scanned judiciously. It is important to mention that Iqbal Ahmed Farooqui had deposed that in the year 1973, he was dispossessed from the said plot by the respondent No.2, Muhammad Saleem but he neither made any complaint regarding his illegal dispossession nor issued any legal notice nor filed suit for the possession against the respondent No.2. Undoubtedly, the applicant and his attorney Liaquat Ali have concealed this very fact from the Courts by not mentioning in the plaint as well as deposing in their evidence that the respondent No.2 had taken over the possession of the plot in question in the year of 1973. In fact they falsely claimed that the possession of the shop in question was in their possession, while they admitted that the respondent No.2 had forcibly taken over the possession of one room and even then no suit for the restoration of the possession was ever filed. Considering the above peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant cannot defeat the factum of execution of the irrevocable general power of attorney in favour of the respondent No.2, on mere plea of denial in absence of the solid and plausible evidence.

28. Furthermore, the applicant has not filed suit for the cancellation of the registered sale deed and mutation executed in favour of the respondent No.1, and in absence of such mandatory relief, an effective and fruitful decree cannot be passed by the Court. Consequently, I am of the considered view that the applicant had executed the irrevocable general power of the attorney in favour of the respondent No.2. Moreover, the applicant has failed to point out any non-reading or misreading of the evidence adduced by the parties and any glaring illegality or material irregularity committed by the Courts below while passing the concurrent findings. It is well settled that the concurrent findings of Courts below based on oral and documentary evidence could not be interfered by High Court in revisional jurisdiction in absence of any error of jurisdiction.

29. From the above discussion, the concurrent findings of the courts below do not call for any interference, hence same stand maintained. Consequently, Civil Revision Applications Nos.255 of 1991 and 280 of 1991 stand dismissed with no order as to cost. MH/S-7/Sindh Revision dismissed.