P L D 1958 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This judgment will dispose of proceedings for professional misconduct against two Advocates of this Court, Mr. Ikram Ullah and Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. The proceed ings were consolidated because they arise out of the same facts. Evidence was recorded in the proceedings against Mr. Ikram Ullah and is, with the consent of the parties, to be evidence in the other case.

2. There were three connected criminal cases pending against Raju, Ahmad and another Ahmad in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala, which were being conducted on behalf of the accused by Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. On the 25th of April 1957, the accused intimated to the learned Additional District Magistrate their intention to move the High Court for transfer of these cases. The learned Additional District Magistrate ordered them to execute the usual bond and allowed them time up to the 29th of April for making an application. On the 29th of April, Riaz Husain, who is the clerk of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti and who held powers of attorney from the accused came to Lahore and engaged Mr. Ikram Ullah, who had previously been practising at Gujranwala and is now practising at Lahore, for filing the three transfer applications in the above‑mentioned three cases. The applications were filed the same day, but without any affidavit, as required by section 526, Criminal Procedure Code. The Deputy Registrar of this Court directed on the same day that the applications be returned, to be refiled within a week, and the name of Mr, Ikram Ullah was put on the same day on 'the notice board under the heading "returns". His name con tinued to be shown on the notice board on every succeeding day till the 27th of June 1957, when the Assistant to the Deputy Registrar's Reader put up a note, that despite the fact that the 'name of the counsel was being daily put on the notice board, he had not turned up to receive back the applications. When this note was put up before the Deputy Registrar, he addressed an enquiry to the Additional District Magistrate as to whether the cases had been stayed. A reply was received on the 15th of July 1957, to the effect that the cases had been stayed on account of certificates issued by Mr. Ikram Ullah dated the 29th of April 1957 to the effect that he had filed transfer applications in all the three cases in the High Court, and that this stay had come to an end on the 1st of July 1957, when Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti,' counsel for the accused, had stated at the bar, that the transfer applications had been dismissed by the High Court. The Deputy Registrar brought this matter to the notice of the Vacation Judge pointing out that in a previous case also Mr. Ikram Ullah had filed incomplete transfer applications and that already proceedings for professional misconduct had been initiated against him in that case. The Vacation Judge ordered that Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, who had made a statement at the bar that the applications had been dismissed, should be called upon to state whether in fact they had been dismissed and whether he could produce any order to that effect. Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti stated in reply that Mr. Ikram Ullah had met him by chance at Gujranwala and had told him that the transfer applications had been dismissed in the High Court and that it was on the basis of this information that he had made the statement with respect to the dismissal of the applications. On receipt of the reply of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, Mr. Ikram Ullah was called upon to explain as to why he did not take appropriate steps in the transfer applications and as to why he had informed Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti that the applica tions had been dismissed. Mr. Ikram Ullah stated in his explana tion that he had been engaged as a counsel on behalf of the accused for filing three transfer applications by a young man (whose name he did not mention) who gave him to understand that he was a munshi of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti ; and that he had filed those applications incomplete, i.e., without any affidavits, because no attested affidavits had been brought to him and 29th was the last date allowed by the trial Court for filing the applica tions. The munshi who had engaged him had promised to get the accused themselves over to Lahore or to send their affidavits soon, but no affidavit had been received. Mr. Ikram Ullah had sent verbal messages as well as postcards to the applicants through their counsel Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, but without any result. Nothing was stated in this reply as to why the applications had not been taken back from the office. As regards the allegation about the information given to Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti about the dismissal of transfer applications Mr. Ikram Ullah stated that he had not met Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti at all since the time he had been engaged by his munshi, except once about four months earlier when they had only exchanged greetings from a distance of 100 yards or so.

3. The case was then placed before a Division Bench 'and that Bench directed that charges be framed both against Mr. Ikram Ullah and Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. The amended charge sheet against Mr. Ikram Ullah reads as follows :‑ (i) That on 29th April 1957, you, Mr. Ikram Ullah, filed three transfer applications in the High Court in the following criminal cases :‑ (i) Raju son of Mughli, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of Kasseesey, Police Station, Jalalpur Bhattian, Tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala v. The State. (ii) Ahmad son of Bahlak, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of village Kasseesey, Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian, Tehsil Hafiz ahad, District Gujranwala v. The State. (iii) Ahmad son of Bahlak, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of village Kasseesey, Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian, Tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala v. The State. pending in the Court of Ch. Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala. (2) That you filed the applications for transfer without affidavits, as required by law, but you, at the same time, issued three certificates to the effect that the applications for transfer had been filed knowing that there were as yet no valid or proper applications before the High Court and knowing too that on account of your certificates the cases would be stayed as they would be on a valid and proper application. (3) That you were directed by the Office to take back the applications as they were defective but that you did not care to take them back nor did you take any steps to have the defects removed. (4) That the cases were in fact stayed on account of your certificates and with the knowledge that the cases had been stayed on your certificates and that they should not have remained stayed on account of applications which were defective and whose defects you had failed to remove, you took no appro priate steps to have the stays vacated and as a result of your conduct the cases remained stayed for a period of more than two months. (5) That you informed Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti a day or two before the 1st of July that the transfer applications had been dismissed which was not correct. (6) That in view of the above, you have been guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duties. The charge sheet against Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti reads as follows :‑ (1) That you, Rahmat Khan Bhatti, Advocate, Gujranwala, appeared for the accused in the following cases :‑ (i) Raju son of Mughli, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of Kasseesey, Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian, Tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala v. The State. (ii) Ahmad son of Bahlak, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of Kassesey, Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian, Tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala, v. The State. (iii) Ahmad son of Bahlak, caste Sheikh Muslim, resident of village Kasseesey, Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian Tehsil Hafizabad District Gujranwala, v. The State: pending in the Court of Ch. Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala. (2) That on the 25th of April 1957 you informed the trial Court. on behalf of your clients that you intended to move the High Court for the transfer of the cases from the Court of the said Magistrate. (3) That on 29th of April 1957, you produced chits before the said Magistrate purporting to be from Mr. Ikram Ullah Advocate High Court to show that the transfer applications had been filed in the High Court. (4) That again on 1st of July 1957, you appeared before the Magistrate and said that the transfer applications filed in the High Court had been dismissed. (5) That as a matter of fact the transfer applications filed in the High Court by Mr. Ikram Ullah had been marked back to him for making corrections therein and that Mr. Ikram Ullah did not care to receive back the same. (6) That on Ist of July 1957, you wrongly informed the Court that the applications in the High Court had been dismissed. (7) That by your acting in the manner indicated above the progress of cases was arrested in the Court of the trial Magis trate for a period of over three months. (8) That by acting in the manner in which you did you have been guilty of gross misrepresentation in the discharge of your duty and therefore committed professional misconduct and are therefore liable for proceedings in that behalf under the law. We had amended the charge against Mr. Ikram Ullah only to bring out clearly the case against him. In the reply which he had filed to the un‑amended charge, his explanation was on the same lines as the one which he had already tendered, with some additions and omissions. He stated that a person named Riaz Hussain, who gave him to understand that he was a munshi of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti and who held from the accused three powers‑of‑attorney, had brought to him three unattested affidavits in his own name. He had advised Riaz Husain not to file his own affidavits. Riaz Husain had told him that the parties would be penalised in the sum of Rs. 600 if the transfer applications were not filed on the 29th of April 1957, and he had, therefore, no alternative except to file the applications without the affidavits. While in the previous statement Mr. Ikram Ullah had said that the young man who engaged him had promised to bring the accused themselves to Lahore for making affidavits or to send their affidavits, it was alleged in this written statement that he had promised to come back soon with the affidavits of some relation of the applicants. It was explained in this written state ment that Mr. Ikram Ullah did not collect the applications as that would be of no avail because without affidavits the applications could not be completed. A plea was also taken that about two or three weeks after the filing of the applications Mr. Ikram Ullah "had to deal with a mental derangement base of a violent nature at his place" and was "so much upset that he had clean lost the memory of having some petitions for collection and refiling after completion of the same". Nothing was said in this statement as to any steps taken by Mr. Ikram Ullah for the purpose of securing affidavits to be filed in the transfer applications. He did not refer to any message or to any letter which may have been sent by him to any person. The reply filed to the amended charge also does not state that Mr. Ikram Ullah took any steps to secure affidavits. It simply says he was hoping that the affidavits would arrive. In this reply, however, some stress is laid on the plea that Mr. Ikram Ullah did not regard the filing of transfer applications without affidavits as improper.

4. The reply of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti to the charge is that Mr. Ikram Ullah had given him the information which he conveyed to the Court.

5. Mr. Badi‑uz‑Zaman, who appeared for the Advocate General, examined in support of his case Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, Mr. Saeed Ahmad, Reader to the Deputy Registrar, and Mr. Hidayat Ullah Shaida, Assistant to the Deputy Registrar's Reader. He also relied on the records produced. Mr. Ikram Ullah made his own statement and examined a number of witnesses in support of the allegation that he had in fact been making efforts to secure affidavits.

6. The statement of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti is to the effect that Mr. Ikram Ullah had met him a day or two before the 1st of July in Gujranwala and on his inquiry had told him that the transfer applications had been dismissed by the High Court. It is on the basis of this information that he had made the statement at the bar on the 1st of July 1957. Saeed Ahmad, Deputy Registrar's Reader deposed to the fact that the applications had been filed and had been ordered to be returned, because they were not accompanied by affidavits, to be refiled along with affidavits. Mr. Hidayat Ullah Shaida, Assistant to the Reader to the Deputy Registrar, stated that a direction was given by the Deputy Registrar for return of these applications and the name of Mr. Ikram Ullah was continuously being put up on the notice board till the 27th of June 1957 under the head "returns". Not only this, he had also personally contacted Mr. Ikram Ullah four or five times and had asked him to take back the, petitions and every time Mr. Ikram Ullah had told, him that he would come, but actually he never turned up. The Deputy Registrar of the High Court and the Superintendent of the General Branch were also examined in order to prove the loss of the notices which were being put up from the 29th of April to the 27th of June 1957 calling upon Mr. Jkram Ullah to take back the transfer appli cations. Mr. Ikram Ullah, when examined on his own behalf, stated that Riaz Husain, whom he knew as the Clerk of Mr: Rahmat Khan, had come to him on the 29th of April 1957, and had engaged him for filing three transfer applications. With respect to this statement he was confronted with his earlier statements which ware to the effect that he did not know the person who engaged him at all. Mr. Ikram Ullah attributed this inconsistency to bad drafting. He went on to say that Riaz Husain had brought to him three powers‑of‑attorney and three unattested affidavits of his own. As it was stated in those affidavits that Riaz Husain was a relation. of the accused which fact Mr. Ikram Ullah personally knew was not‑ true, he advised Riaz Husain, in his own interest, not to file those affidavits. Accepting his advice Riaz Husain took back the affidavits, but insisted that the transfer applications should be filed on the same day as the next day was the date of hearing in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate. He, therefore, filed the applications without affidavits. He could not say whether he filed the transfer applications with the unattested affidavits or without them. He had given three chits to Riaz Husain to the effect that the transfer applications had been filed on the 29th of April 1957. When the Deputy Registrar directed the return of the transfer applications, he waited for about two weeks hoping that affidavits would arrive and then started sending verbal messages and postcards to Riaz Husain. These postcards were addressed to Riaz Husain care of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. He knew that the transfer applications were incomplete, but he did not take them back from the Court because he thought it mattered little whether he took them back or allowed them to remain in the office of the High Court until he received the affidavits. He never received any reply to his messages and postcards. Then he had serious trouble in his own home and completely forgot about the transfer applications and took no further steps in the matter. He never informed Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti that the applications had been dismissed.

7. The first witness produced by Mr. Ikram Ullah is Qazi Muhammad Khalid, a Pleader of Gujranwala, who states that he had been working as a junior of Mr. Ikram Ullah when he was practising at Gujranwala. He used to see Mr. Ikram Ullah off' and on and by chance when in May 1957 he was in Lahore in connection with the operation of his eye, he met Mr. Ikram Ullah who gave him a message for Riaz Husain that he should send affidavits for the transfer applications. He did not meet Riaz Husain and did not deliver the message to him. Mr. Ikram Ullah had never after this enquired from him as to whether lie had delivered the message or not, although he continued visiting Mr. Ikram Ullah at Lahore. Mr. Khalid admitted that he had done his last case at Gujranwala as a lawyer in April 1956, but he added that he was getting his licence renewed, The next witness produced was Mirza Nasir Ahmad Beg, Advocate, Gujranwala. A question was put to him as to whether he had been asked by Mr. Ikram Ullah to carry any message in connection with any case and he said that he did not remember. He was then asked as to whether any message was given to him for Munshi Riaz Husain and he gave the same reply. The third witness is Maulvi Ghulam Husain. Secretary of the G. T. Bus, Gujranwala. He too was asked as to whether he had been given any message by Mr. Ikram Ullah to be delivered to Riaz Husain. He said he did not remember. The last witness produced in sup port of the plea that Mr. Ikram Ullah was sending messages is Feroze Din, who was the clerk of Mr. Ikram Ullah up to November 1957, when Mr. Ikram Ullah became a Claims Officer. Feroze Din stated that he was 4 retired Head Constable and had begun working as a lawyer's clerk with Mr. Ikrarn Ullah while he was at Gujranwala and had later been engaged by him in Lahore in May 1956 and remained with him up to November 1957. In his presence Riaz Husain had brought three unattested affidavits and three powers‑of‑attorney. Mr. Ikram Ullah had told Riaz Husain that his statement in the affidavit that he was a relative of the accused was incorrect to the knowledge of Mr. Ikrarn Ullah and that he should not file the affidavits which were against a Court. Riaz Husain promised that he would bring within 4 or 5 days a relative of the accused to make the affidavits, but the applications had to be filed without affidavits as time allowed for filing them was expiring. Mr. Ikrarn Ullah wrote a letter to Riaz Husain and he too wrote a letter to Riaz Husain at the instance of Mr. Ikram Ullah. About 17 or 18 days after the applications had been filed, when he was going to his own village, which is at a distance of 7 or 8 miles from Gujranwala, Mr. Ikram Ullah gave him a message for Riaz Husain to the effect that he should either come himself or send the affidavits of some relative of the accused. Mr. Ikram Ullah had given similar messages to Mirza Nasir, Mr. Muhammad Khalid and Maulvi Ghulam Husain Butt, all of whom were personally known to him. The witness admitted that he was only doing the work of Mr. Ikram Ullah relating to refugees' claim and was not concerned with the other work of Mr. Ikram Ullah at all. He was not getting munshiana of that work.

8. With respect to that part of the charge against Mr. Ikram Ullah which relates to the giving of wrong information to Mr. Rahmat Khan, let us say at once that we cannot hold it to be proved. There does not appear to us to be any reason why Mr. Ikram Ullah should make a false statement with respect to the applications to Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti who was the counsel conducting the cases of the accused.; Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti knew that the applications had been filed. The applications had been filed through his own clerk who had come to Lahore presum ably with his permission for filing those applications because the clerk was in Lahore during Court hours and Mr. Rahmat Khan would also know that the applications had been filed incomplete. Both Mr. Ikram Ullah and Mr. Rahmat Khan were, therefore, well aware of the position of these applications and there was no motive for Mr. Rahmat Ullah to make an untrue statement.

8. At the same time, although we exonerate Mr. Ikrarn Ullah of this charge, we cannot find the charge against Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti to have been proved in spite of the fact that the charges are in the alternative so that one of the two must be guilty. While it is improbable that Mr. Ikram Ullah gave this information to Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, there is only the word of Mr. Ikram Ullah against the word of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti and Mr. Ikram Ullah, not being a disinterested witness and being a person who has to save his own skin, we do not regard it safe to act on his testimony. We would give Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti also a benefit of doubt and hold that the charge against him is not proved.

9. Now we enter upon an examination of the record to determine the facts relevant to the remaining portion of the charge against Mr. Ikram Ullah. We will commence with a consideration of what happened when he was engaged by Riaz Husain. Riaz Husain had brought three powers‑of‑attorney from the accused and had asked Mr. Ikram Ullah to file three transfer applications. Mr. Ikram Ullah now says he had brought unattested affidavits with him. He had not said so in his reply to the letter of the Deputy Registrar and we are not prepared to accept, after a consideration of the circumstances that unattested affidavits had been brought by Riaz Husain. If they were brought there was no good reason why they should not be filed. The explanation of Mr. Ikram Ullah for not filing them is that they contained an untrue statement to the effect that Riaz Husain was a relative of the accused. But this is hardly a reason for not filing the affidavits at all. Either this part of the statement could be deleted or new affidavits could be typed out in which this statement was omitted. Really we do not see how the statement as to relationship could be there in the affidavit at all for this has nothing to do with any ground of transfer. But, in any case, when the deponent was here, there was no obstacle in the way of the filing of the affidavits. When confronted with this while in the witness box Mr. Ikram Ullah gave a new explanation. He said the affidavits, inasmuch as they stated that there was bad blood between Haroon Rashid and the accused, were false to his knowledge and, therefore, he did not allow Riaz Husain to make these affidavits. This reply is typical of the attitude of Mr. Ikram Ullah whose only consideration in making a statement is its expediency without regard to its relation to facts, though it must be stated in extenuation that he is not gifted with a high degree of intelligence and gains little advantage by this attitude. As already observed, in all the statement that Mr. Ikram Ullah has filed in the High Court he has represented that he was unacquain ted with Riaz Husain. In the witness‑box this was admitted to be untrue and, in order to explain why h did not allow Riaz Husain to file the affidavits, he went to the extent of saying that he had personal knowledge about, Riaz Husain not being a relative of the accused. Confronted with the inadequacy of this explanation, he came forward with another, namely, that he knew the statement in the affidavit with respect to Haroon‑ur‑Rashid being: an enemy of the accused to be false and, therefore, he dissuaded Riaz Husain who .was a young man from making such a statement. But his answer to the very next question made it clear that this statement vas untrue and that Haroon‑Rashid and the accused belonged to opposite parties. He admitted that Haroon Rashid and Mr. Rahmat Khah Bhatti belong to opposite factions and that the fait that the accused has engaged Mr. Bhatti would mean that they belonged to the group of Mr. Bhatti. Let us state here too that if in fact Mr. Ikram Ullah had filed transfer applications which contained a ground of transfer nature to his own knowledge, that would not do him any credit, and would by itself be a ground for taking disciplinary action, but we are not inclined to accept that in fact he knew that ground to be false. We have little doubt that he is now giving a false explanation.

10. The next question is whether Mr. Ikram Ullah has been sending messages verbally and in writing, as he now alleges, to Riaz Husain for the despatch of the affidavits. There is much on the record pointing to the contrary conclusion. According to Mr. Ikram Ullah Riaz Husain had told him that he was not keen about the transfer of the cases and the intention in filing the transfer applications was just to prevent the security from being forfeited. We are not taking any action against Mr. Ikram Ullali for his conduct in filing transfer applications when there was no intention to have the cases transferred, for that is not the charge against him. But this does show that Riaz Husain would not be keen to send the affidavits and the same would be the attitude of Mr. Ikram Ullah. His whole subsequent conduct shows he was not keen. The statements he has made with respect to his efforts to secure the affidavits are conflicting. In his reply to the letter of the Deputy Registrar Mr. Ikram Ullah had stated that Riaz Husain had promised to bring the accused themselves to Lahore or to send their affidavits soon. It appears that it was not present to the mind of Mr. Ikram Ullah at the time he made this statement that the applicants were all in jail. In his statement before us he says Riaz Husain had promised to bring some relations of the accused for the affidavits. In his reply to the Deputy Registrar's letter he did say that he had sent verbal messages and post‑cards, but he had stated that these were sent to the applicants through their counsel Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. Considering that in this reply he did not even mention the name of Riaz Husain and described him as an unknown young man who gave him to understand that he was the clerk of Mr. Rahmat Khan, the statement that he was writing to the applicants through their counsel, cannot possibly be inter preted to mean that he was writing to Riaz Husain. But in the witness box he states he was writing to Riaz Husain. When called upon to explain the discrepancy between this statement and that in the reply to the letter of the Deputy Registrar, he stated that the letters were being sent to Riaz Husain care of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. This effort at reconciliation is a failure, for as we have already explained the statement in the reply to the Deputy Registrar's letter is not capable of an interpretation that any letters were being sent to Riaz Husain care of Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti. The allegation there was that the applicants were being approached through their counsel. Of the witnesses whom Mr. Ikram Ullah produced in order to prove the verbal messages only two have supported him, i.e. Mr. Muhammad Khalid and his own munshi, who is a retired head constable. He did put in the witness box Mr. Nasir Ahmad Beg, Advocate, Gujranwala and Maulvi Ghulam Hussain, Secretary G. T. Bus, but they were not prepared to make an untrue statement in his favour. The state ments of Muhammad Khalid and Feroze Din do not impress us. Mr. Muhammad Khalid is obviously intimately connected with Mr. Ikram Ullah. The furniture of Mr. Ikram Ullah is lying in his house and he had been working as a junior of Mr. Ikram Ullah for two years. He had secured in February 1957 a certificate from Mr. Ikram Ullah that during the time he was working with him he had not an assessable income and on the strength of this certificate he had got an exemption from income tax. When asked to state whether he remembered .the date or the month of any other visit of his to Mr. Ikram Ullah, he gave a reply in the negative. He remembers the month of that particular visit only and that in spite of his bad memory for dates because he states he worked with Mr. Ikram Ullah in Gujranwala for two years during 1954 and 1955, while admittedly Mr. Ikram Ullah was not practising there in 1955 at all. He was asked whether he had been contacted before giving evidence by Mr. Ikram Ullah. He admitted that Mr. Ikram Ullah told him that he wanted him to give evidence with respect to the message he had given him for Riaz Husain in May 1957. He states that he never delivered this message and that Mr. Ikram Ullah also never afterwards questioned him as to whether the message was delivered. We may also mention another statement which Mr. Muhammad Khalid had made and which goes a long way in throwing doubt on his testimony. It is to be remembered that the visit of Mr. Ikram Ullah to Gujranwala about the first week of July has been a matter of serious contest between the parties, although we have disposed of this matter in a few words. The contention of Mr. Ikram Ullah is that he had just seen Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti from a distance, while Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti says Mr. Ikram Ullah had talked to him. When Mr. Muhammad Khalid was asked as to in which month of the year 1957 he had met Mr. Ikram Ullah for the last time in Gujranwala, he said he did not know, but he volunteered a statement that in July 1957 Mr. Ikram Ullah had gone to Gujranwala. Then he gave the details of that visit of his and in those details he contradicted Mr. Ikram Ullah. The statement of Feroze Din, the clerk of Mr. Ikram Ullah too is worthy of little credit. He admits that he had no concern whatever with any case of Mr. Ikram Ullah excepting the cases relating to refugees' claims. He was not getting munshiana except in such cases. He does not know whether those transfer applications were in fact dismissed or accepted. Accord ing to him messages had been delivered to Mirza Nasir Beg and Ghulam Husain, Secretary G. T. Bus in his presence, while neither of them remembers having received any such message. When asked to explain as to how he remembers the month in which Riaz Husain had come to Lahore for filing the applications he says it is by chance. He could not give the date of any other case of Mr. Ikram Ullah not connected with the claims. Out of the claims cases, the number of which was 500 or 600, he could give the dates of hearing of two claims only for remembering which he had special reasons. When questioned as to whether he had had a talk with Mr. Ikram Ullah as to the matter about which he was going to give evidence, he said Mr. Ikram Ullah had brought the summons to him personally and had told him that he had to appear as a witness in connection with the transfer applications in which he was engaged by Riaz Husain, but that he had no talk with him as to what were the facts in respect of which he was to make a statement because his wife was ill and there was no time for any talk. He contradicted Mr. Ikram Ullah by saying that Riaz Husain was insisting that the cases should be transferred and the transfer applications were not filed merely to save the money. He has deposed to have taken a message once only to Riaz Husain and does not say that he even had a talk with Mr. Rahmat Khan Bhatti, while according to the statement of Mr. Ikram Ullah in the witness box Faroze Din had spoken to Mr. Bhatti and Mr. Bhatti had promised to send the affidavits. When Mr. Bhatti was in the witness box no suggestion was made to him that he had ever received any message or made any promise to send affidavits. Feroze Din is not a Matriculate and under the rules could not have become a lawyer's clerk. When questioned as to this he said he did not at all know of the rule that no person could now be engaged as a lawyer's clerk unless he is a Matriculate.

11. It is to be noted that according to the statement of Mr. Ikram Ullah he had never received any reply to any message sent by him either verbally or by post except that brought by his own clerk Feroze Din and he (Mr. Ikram Ullah) had never made any enquiry from any person to whom he delivered the message as to what the reply was. Mr. Ikram Ullah stated further that after some time when the affidavits were not received he became suspicious and thought there was something fishy in Riaz Husain not sending affidavits. In spite of this fact he never wrote any registered letter and never took any other step to secure the affidavits.

12. It seems clear on a consideration of the circumstances that the transfer applications were put in just to save the bonds and that in fact neither the parties nor Mr. Ikram Ullah had any intention of putting in any affidavits. The moment the applica tions were put in Mr. Ikram Ullah considered be had done all that he was required to do. Riaz Husain had admittedly made it clear to him that the object was the recovery of the money and not a transfer of the case. It is sufficient to look at the frivolous grounds of transfer stated in the application to come to the conclusion that the applications could not have been serious. Mr. Ikram Ullah admits he kept no brief and did not enter the cases in his diary. When his name was shown in the list of "returns" he took no notice of it and even when contacted by the Assistant to the Deputy Registrar's Reader he did not take back the applications. He did nothing at all further in the matter though according to him he had been taking the trouble of sending post cards and verbal messages and had begun feeling that the conduct of Riaz Husain and Mr. Bhatti was suspicious. Mr. Ikram Ullah feels the difficulty when questioned as to why he did not do anything at all after the affidavits were not received for a month or so and has taken refuge behind some vague words that there was some incident in his family on account of which he lost all memory of these transfer applications. His own clerk has admitted that continu ously after the 17th or 18th of June Mr. Ikram Ullah wad attending to 2 or 3 cases daily before Claims Officers. In fact it is not Mr. Ikram Ullah's own case that he was not attending to his cases in the Courts. There is no support at all for this altogether vague allegation to which, considering the tendency of Mr. Ikram Ullah to make expedient statements, we are not prepared to attach much importance. Mr. Ikram Ullah says the matter went out of his mind. It is strange that while he has been sending verbal messages and letters and had also been feeling that there was something suspicious in it, the matter at once went out of his mind. The inference is obvious that having once filed the applications he had washed his hands of the affair.

13. Mr. Ikram Ullah admits that the transfer applications were incomplete and could not be put up before a Judge. He admits too that the certificates he issued were to be produced in the trial Court and that the proceedings would be stayed in consequence. He had issued certificates to the effect that the applica tions had been filed, which should mean, in the absence of any qualification, that proper applications which could be heard by a Judge had been filed. He knew that if the fact of the applications being incomplete was mentioned in the certificates the Court could not stay the cases and may also take proceedings for forfeiture of the bond executed by the accused. Yet he suppressed this fact in the certificates. If the intention of Mr. Ikram Ullah at that time were that he would, in a short space of time, complete the appli cations and had he taken active steps soon after to have them completed, there would be some reasons for condoning the misleading statement, but, as it is, there does not appear to have been any intention of making up the defects. We are not prepared to accept that any step was in fact taken. Afterwards, he knew that the proceedings in the trial Court had, in all probability, been stayed. In fact he accepts that on his chits proceedings would be stayed. Yet, with that knowledge, he took no steps whatsoever to have the stays terminated. He knew that there were no applications whatsoever in the High Court on the basis of which the proceedings should remain stayed. He has no explanation to offer for this conduct except the vague allegation that he "had to deal with a derangement case of a violent nature at his place", which we, without hesitation, reject.

14. On these conclusions, is there good ground for taking disciplinary action against Mr. Ikram Ullah? Mr. Shaukat Ali, who appears for Mr. Ikram Ullah, says it is only a case of negli gence and puts forward the proposition, supported by some authorities, that negligence, however grave, cannot be the basis of disciplinary action against an Advocate.

15. The present proceedings are under Clause 8 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, which is appli cable to the West Pakistan High Court by virtue of Clause 9 of the High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order promul gated by the Governor‑General by virtue of his powers under section 7 of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act. Under Clause 8 of the Letters Patent an Advocate can be suspended or removed from practice for reasonable cause. It has been urged before us that although Clause 8 mentions only reasonable cause, the grounds for disciplinary action under this clause cannot be different from those under section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, which speaks of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had, in A, a Pleader v. The Judges of High Court, Madras (A I R 1930 P C 144), laid down that section 13 would be a good guide for determining the cases under the Letters Patent. We ourselves do not see any reason why there should be different standards of conduct in proceedings under different provisions applicable to legal practitioners and we would be prepared to take into consideration cases decided under the Legal Practitioners Act. But we are not prepared to accept that negligence howsoever gross can never be the foundation of disciplinary proceedings. The word `negligence' may be used either to mean just inattention, want of due diligence or lack of proper care in the performance of a duty, or it may be used to denote an omission to perform a duty; though it is true that the line of distinction between the two kinds of cases may sometimes be very thin. We are prepared to concede that in its first mentioned sense negligence simpliciter could not be a ground for proceedings for professional misconduct. But even such negligence, if persisted in, may disclose an attitude not only of lack of due care but of callous indifference towards duty and that will render the petitioner liable to disciplinary action. If an Advocate were so negligent that in one month he got thirty cases dismissed in default of appearance and the client complained to the High Court, would the High Court tell them that they are power less to take action and that such a person had an inviolable right to continue to practise. As their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan said in Ch. Sardar Ali Advocate v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan (P I. D 1950 S C.(Pak.) 274), what is needed for founding disciplinary proceedings is something evil or something gross. It need. Not necessarily be evil if it is gross, though it can be urged that when negligence shows gross proportions, it is akin to evil.

16. As regards the second sense of the word `negligence', it would be impossible for any person to contend that failure to perform a duty, howsoever gross, can never be a foundation for disciplinary action. So to hold would be tantamount to granting legal practitioners a licence to act in complete disregard of their duties. We do not think any Advocate, with any sense of duty, would ever put forward such a proposition. The proposition is opposed to reason and as will appear later cannot be supported by authority. Whether a failure to perform a duty will be sufficient for taking disciplinary action will depend upon the nature of the duty and the attendant circumstances.

17. To revert to the present case, we do not accede to the contention that this is a case of negligence only. So far as the issue of certificates is concerned, Mr. Ikram Ullah knew that the applications were incomplete, but did not say so. He was conscious that if he stated in the certificates that the applications were incomplete the purpose of his clients would not be served. He was deliberately suppressing the truth and with improper motive. This is certainly not mere negligence.

18. As regards the subsequent conduct of Mr. Ikram Ullah, he knew that the cases had been stayed on account of his improper certificates. He knew too that there was no valid application before the High Court on account of which the cases should remain stayed, yet he took no steps at all to have the stays terminated. It was the duty of Mr. Ikram Ullah, whose incorrect certificates were responsible for the stays, to take some 'steps for the purpose of putting an end to the stays, and his omission to do so is a culpable disregard of duty and discloses an attitude of acquiescence in something that was improper.

19. That a failure to perform a duty will attract disciplinary action will be amply clear from a perusal of decided cases. In the matter of Krishaswami Aiyar (I L R 35 Mad. 543), printing chargers paid by a client for an appeal had not been deposited by an Advocate. The clerks of the Advocate had been fraudulently representing to the client in the correspondence that was being carried on, that the appeal was progressing and would be fixed for hearing. The appeal was actually dismissed for failure to deposit printing charges, but the clerks told the client that the appeal had been heard and dismissed. The Advocate did nothing in the matter till the client came and put in an application for restoration. That application was again dismissed for default of appearance because the Advocate reached the Court a few minutes late. In the proceedings for professional misconduct based on these facts the Advocate was acquitted of personal fraud. But he was still held guilty of professional misconduct by their Lordships of the Privy Council and the reasons will appear from the following passage :‑ "The main issue in this case is, what was the conduct, relative to the Court, relative to the client, and relative to his own professional position. which this vakil perpetrated on or about the 26th January ? Their Lordships while not interfering, as stated with his acquittance of direct and personal fraud, do not see their way to acquit him of conduct in the management of the appeal and of his client's affairs which caused the procedure of the Court to be the very opposite of what all such procedure should be, namely, first responsible, secondly orderly, and thirdly, pure. In all these respects there has been a violation of the proprieties which attach to legal procedure." Here there was only a failure to perform a duty. We would reproduce also a passage from the judgment of the Madras High Court in that case wherein the learned Judges explained what was the gravamen of the charge against the Advocate. The learned‑Judges said :‑ "In this state of things, the onus was heavy on 'the vakil to explain the true state of affairs to the Court and to his client. So far as the Court is concerned, he does nothing. His failure to be in Court when the case was called on may have been accidental. But one would have thought in a case where a grave injustice had been done to his client by a mistake in his office of which the vakil was personally‑ aware, he would have been specially careful to attend and explain how things stood. It was a duty which he owed to the Court. It was a duty which he owed to his client, who had suffered a serious injustice. It was a duty which he owed to himself since the mistake might well give rise to questions involving personal honesty of the vakil or his clerks. There may be an explanation of the vakil's failure to appear. It seems to us there can be no satisfactory explanation of his conduct in not bringing the matter before the Court at the very earliest opportunity. In our opinion, the gravamen of the charge is not that the vakil failed to appear when the case was called on (this, as we have said, may have been an accident) but that having failed to appear, and the appeal having been dismissed, he did not give a full explanation to the Court at the earliest opportunity. His excuse that he was under the impression that he could not mention the facts till the same Bench sat again seems to us to be idle." In Muni Reddi and another v. K. Venkata Row (I L R 37 Mad. 238), there was a failure to appear in a Sessions Court. The Advocate had denied that he had been engaged to appear in the Sessions Court and had taken up the plea that his engagement was confined to the commitment proceedings. An argument was offered on his behalf that there was, on account of his non‑appearance, at the most a neglect and neglect was insufficient for disciplinary action. Sundara Ayyar, J. thus dealt with this argument :‑ "It is argued for the pleader that even if all the facts are found against him they amount only to negligence and that the pleader cannot be punished for mere negligence not amounting to fraud. I am of opinion that what is proved amounts to something worse than negligence ; nor am I prepared to accept the contention that a pleader who is wilfully and grossly negligent in the discharge of his duties cannot be punished for his misconduct in the exercise of our disciplinary, powers. The pleader was not guilty of a mere omission to do his duty in this case. He repudiated the agreement into which he had entered with his client and he did so deliberately and without justification. I cannot say that this amounts to anything less than fraudulent conduct on his part. "A passage in Cordery on Solicitors, page 180, was referred to on behalf of the pleader, I do not think that that passage lays down anything more than that it is not all negligence which would furnish a cause of action to a client that would be punished by the Court. Certainly that is so. Far instance a pleader may not have acted with sufficient diligence in the discharge of his duties. He may not have instructed himself in the facts or the law of a case as he should. He may have acted contrary to the client's instructions in some particular matters, or he may have acted without instructions. In such cases the Court would generally be content with leaving the client to his remedy in an action for damages. But negligence may‑also be so gross and amount to such a violation of the duties of a pleader as an officer of the Court and to the litigant and as `a member of a responsible and honourable profession as to require that the Court should punish him in the exercise of its powers over its officers." In the matter of an Attorney (A I R 1955 Cal. 113) the question as to whether negligence, could support a charge of misconduct was discussed at some length. The facts were that a solicitor had filed a warrant of attorney on behalf of some convict‑appellants which contained no qualification that he was not bound to brief counsel and arrange for representation of the appellants unless funds were placed at his disposal. He failed to brief an Advocate because he had not been provided with funds and left for Bombay to attend to other professional engagements without putting his assistant in a position to arrange for representation of the appellants. In proceedings for professional misconduct it was urged that this was a case of negligence and that negligence could not constitute professional misconduct. Relying upon Myers v. Elmam (1940 A C 282), and other cases, the proposition was rejected and it was held too that failure to appear was not a case of negligence, but a disregard of professional obligations.

20. In Myers v. Elman (AIR 1940 A C 282), Lord Wright had defined professional misconduct as "conduct which involves a failure on the part of solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realise his duty to promote in his own sphere the cause of justice."

21. In Emperor v. Jodh Singh (A I R 1923 Lah. 211), a pleader when filing an application for bail had not brought it to the notice of the Court that an earlier application for bail had been dismissed. It was held that his failure to do so was professional misconduct within the provisions of section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act.

22. Learned counsel for Mr. Ikram Ullah has cited in re An Advocate (A I R 1935 Cal. 484), In re Gondikota Satyanarayanamurthy Pantulu Garue, Pleader, Chicacole (A I R 1938 Mad. 965) and Emperor v. Bhubaneswar Nag (A I R 1925 Cal. 146), for the proposition that mere negligence howsoever gross cannot be a ground for disciplinary action. We have little doubt that negli gence as used in these judgments only means want of due diligence and not one of these cases can be interpreted as laying down the proposition that disregard of professional duty can amount to nothing but negligence and can never be the basis of proceedings for professional misconduct.

23. We find Mr. Ikram Ullah guilty of professional mis conduct. His offence is such as would call for a deterrent punishment in view of the fact that it has become customary with learned counsel to file transfer applications which are not intended to be pressed and are filed only for saving bond and for getting an adjournment and learned counsel at the same time issue certificates to the effect that applications have been filed with the result that proceedings in the trial Courts remain pending for long periods, although there is no proper application before the High Court at all. However, as this is the first case of its kind we do not propose to take strong action. We would only suspend Mr. Ikram Ullah for a, period of two months. Mr. Ikram Ullah is now a Claims Officer and the effect of our order would be that when he applies for recommencing his practice, he will remain suspended for a period of two months. Mr. Ikram Ullah will also pay the costs of these proceedings. A. H. Order of suspension passed.