1980 PLP 152 (PTD)

(r) `plantation' means any land used for growing all or any of the following, namely, tea, coffee, rubber, cinchona or cardamom;" Section 3 is the charging section and it directs that "agricultural income tax at the rate or rates specified in Part I of the Schedule to this Act shall be charged for each financial year commencing from 1st April 1955 in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Act, on the total agricultural income of the previous year of every person." Section 4 describes what is "total agricultural income". Section 5 is concerned with the computation of agricultural income and directs the deduction of various items. We are concerned with two sub‑clauses and they are set out below: "5. (e) any expenditure incurred in the previous year (not being to the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation; . (k) any interest paid in the previous year on any amount borrowed and actually spent on the plantation from which the agricultural income is derived : ‑ Provided that the need for borrowing was genuine having due regard to the assets of the assessee at the time: Provided further that the interest allowed under this clause shall be limited .to six percent on an amount equivalent to twenty‑five per cent. Of the agricultural income from the plantation in that year." The learned counsel for the State contends that interest paid by the assessee is not deductible under section 5(e) of the Act on the three grounds first it is in the nature of capital expenditure; secondly, it is a personal expense of the assessee; and thirdly, it is not laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation. Before adverting to the above grounds, it will be noticed that section 5(e) is word for word a reproduction of section 10(2)(xv) of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, and as this Court and the High Courts have on various occasions considered the said clause, these decisions would be relevant for deciding the present case, which arises under the Act. Is the payment of the said interest in the nature of capital expenditure or not. Chetty urges that the assessee had bought the plantation with borrowed money and that was undoubtedly capital expenditure. He says that it follows logically from this that interest paid on the amount spent on the purchase of the plantation must also be capital expenditure. He invited our attention to a number of cases with which we will shortly deal. In order to determine whether an expenditure is revenue or capital expenditure, certain broad principles have to be borne in mind. This Court formulated these principles in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1955) 1 S C R 972 in the following words: ‑ "(1) Outlay is deemed to be capital when it is made for the initiation of a business, for extension of a business, or for a substantial replace ment of equipment: vide Lord Sands in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Granite City Steamship Company (1927) 13 Tax Cas. 1 and City of Landon Contract Corporation v. Styles (1887) 2 Tax Cas. 239. (2) Expenditure may be treated as properly attributable to capital when it is made not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade; vide Viscount Cave L. C., in Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. (1925) 10 Tax Cas.

155. If what is got rid of by a lump sum payment is an annual business expense chargeable against revenue the lump sum payment should equally be regarded as a business expense, but if the lump sum payment brings in a capital asset, then that puts the business on another footing altogether. Thus if labour saving machinery was acquired, the cost of such acquisition cannot be deducted out of profits by claiming that it relieves the annual labour bill, the business has acquired a new asset, that is, machinery. The expression `enduring benefit' or `of a permanent character' were introduced to make it clear that the asset or the right acquired must have enough durability to justify its being treated as a capital asset. (3) Whether for the purpose of expenditure, any capital was withdrawn, or, in other words, whether the object of incurring the expenditure was to employ what was taken in as capital of the business. Again, it is to be seen whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its circulating capital. Fixed capital is what the owner turns to profit by keeping it in his own possession. Circulating or floating capital is what he makes profit of by parting with it or letting it change masters. Circulating capital which is turned over and in the process of being turned over yields profit or loss: Fixed capital, on the other hand, is not involved directly in that process and remains unaffected by it." This Court further held that one has got to apply these criteria, one after the other from the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure 'incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter event only it would be a deductible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922." It we apply these principles to the facts of this case, the answer seems clear that the payment of interest is revenue expenditure. No new asset is acquired with it; no enduring benefit is obtained. Expenditure incurred was part of circulating or floating capital of the assessee. In ordinary commercial practice payment of interest would not be termed as capital expenditure. The cases relied on by Mr. Chetty do not bear on the precise problem. We may, however, notice them in brief: In S. Kuppuswami v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1954) 25 I T R 349, the assessee was held to have acquired the goodwill by paying a certain share of profits. This was held to be capital expenditure. In Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Siddareddy Venkatasubba Reddy (1949) 17 I T R 15 the assessees had under certain agreements obtained mining rights in different plots of land for periods varying from five to nine years, and claimed deduction of the amounts paid by them under the said agreements. The High Court held the money expended for the acquisition of mining rights be capital expenditure. In European Investment Trust Co. Ltd. v. Jackson (1932) 18 Tax Cas. 1 the Court Appeal was concerned with the interpretation of the Rules applicable Cases I and II of Schedule D of the Income‑tax Act, 1918 (8 and 9 Geo. V, c. 40). In the English Act there are a series of Prohibitions; among other things prohibited to be deducted are any capital withdraw from or any sum employed or intended to be employed as capital in such trade, profession or employment or vocation, and any annual interest or any annuity or annual payment payable out of profits. The English cases like the European Investment Trust Co. case are distinguishable because in England there exited the prohibitions enumerated above. There are no such prohibitions in the Act with which we are concerned. But apart from these prohibitions, Lord Herschell observed in Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Styles (1892) 3 Tax Cas. 185 as follows:‑ "I think the fourth rule was primarily designed to meet such a case as that in which a trader had contracted to make an annual payment out of his profits; as, for example when he had agreed to make such a payment to a former partner or to a person who had made a loan on the terms of receiving such a payment. But for the rule it might plausibly have been contended that in such a case, a trade was only to return as his profits what remained after making such payment (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, we hold that there is no force in the contention that the payment of interest was capital expenditure within section 5(e) of the Act. The next point, namely, that the payment of interest was personal expense is equally without substance, we are unable to appreciate that any expense to discharge a personal obligation becomes a personal expense within section 5(e). Personal expenses would include expenses on the person of the assessee or to satisfy his personal needs such as clothes, food, etc., or purposes not related to the business for which the deduction is claimed. The third ground raised by Mr. Chetty needs careful scrutiny. Court, after reviewing English and Indian cases, summarised this position in Commissioner of .income‑tax v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. (1964) 53 I T R 140 (S C), as follows: The aforesaid discussion leads to the following result: The expression 'for the purpose of the business' is wider in scope than the expression `for the purpose of earning profits'. Its range is wide; it may take in not only the day to day running of a business but also the rationalization of its administration and modernization of its machi nery; it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation coercive process or assertion of hostile title; it may also compre hend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a precondition to commence or for the carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on, of a business. However wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it. The purpose shall be for the purpose of the business, that is to say, the expenditure incurred shall be for the carrying on of the business and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business. It cannot include sums spent by the assessee as agent of a third party, whether the origin of the agency is voluntary or statutory; in that event, he pays the amount on behalf of another and for a purpose unconnected with the business." Before deciding the question, it is necessary to mention three other decisions of this Court. In Eastern Investment Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1951) S C R 594 this Court held that interest on debentures issued by an investment Company was to be allowed as business expenditure under section 12(2) of the Indian Income‑tar. Act. It observed that this being an investment Company, if it borrowed and utilised the same for its investments on which it earned income, the interest paid by it on the loans will clearly be a permissible deduction under section 12(2) of the Act. Earlier, it had observed that Scottish North American Trust v. Farmer (1911) 5 Tax Cas. 693 was a somewhat similar case. In Dharamvir Dhir v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1961) 3 S C R 359 this Court held that a payment of 11/16 of the net profits of the assessee's business was an expenditure Wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business as the assessee had arranged financing of the business on the best terms that he could manage. In Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Jagannath Kissonlal (1961) 41 I T R 360, this Court upheld the claim of the assessee to deduct the amount it had to pay tire bank on a joint promissory note. . The only case cited by Mr. Chetty, which has some resemblance to the present case is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Metro Theatre, Bombay Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1946) 14 I T R

638. But this case is distinguish able, for the 'interest claimed to be deducted, and which was disallowed, was in respect of the amount borrowed for acquiring land on 999 years lease, on which a cinema was subsequently built. There was no immediate connection between the interest paid and the cinema business. As Kania, d., as he then was, put it, "if the interest was not paid, the result would be not necessarily the stoppage of the business of showing cinema films, but the assessee will not acquire the lease of this property". Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it seems to us that it is impossible to describe the character of the assessee as the owner of the plantation and as a person working the plantation. The assessee had bought the plantation for working it as a plantation, i.e., for growing tea, coffee and rubber. The payment of interest on the amount borrowed for the purchase of the plantation when the whole transaction of purchase and the working of the plantation is viewed as an integrated whole, is so closely related to the plantation that the expenditure can be said to be laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that what the Act purports to tax is agricultural income and not agricultural receipts. From the agricultural receipts must be deducted all expenses which in ordinary commercial account ing must be debited against the receipts. There is nothing in the Act which prohibits such expenses from being deducted. No farmer would treat interest paid on capital borrowed for the purchase of the plantation as anything but expenses, and as long as the deductions he claims, apart from any statutory prohibition, can be fairly said to lead to the determination of the true net agricultural income, these must be allowed under the Act. In principle, we do not see any distinction between interest paid on capital borrowed for the acquisition of a plantation and interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of existing plantations: both are for the purposes of the plantation. In the result, we agree with the High Court that the deduction claimed by the assessee fell within the scope of section 5(e) of the Act, and that the whole of Rs.22,628‑9‑8 and not merely Rs. 1,570‑10‑7 should have been deducted from his assessable income. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.