PLD 1965 Supreme Court 1 (PLP)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑This appeal, by the Province of East Pakistan, has been filed with the special leave of this Court against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus for setting aside the orders of forfeiture purported to have been made on the 18th February 1960, and the 20th January 1962, by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Dacca, under section 75‑A of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, forfeiting the lands and buildings situated on C. S. Plots Nos. 164, 165 and 181 under Khatian Nos. 14322 and 4676 of Mauza Shahr Dacca. These lands and buildings originally belonged to one Hemen dra Narayan Banerjee and his co‑sharers who were admittedly rent‑receivers and whose rent‑receiving interests had been acquired by the Government under the above‑mentioned Act. These lands were situated within the Municipal limits of the town of Dacca and formed part of premises No. 30‑Syed Awlad Hossain Lane. Hamendra Narayan Banerjee had a 1/3rd share therein which he purported to transfer to the respondent herein on the 12th of March 1958, by two registered deeds, the first of which was a deed of lease for 99 years and the second, which was executed at the same sitting and presented for registration simultaneously on the same date, was a deed conveying the residuary interests of the transferor in the said premises to the respondent. This residuary interest consisted of the right to receive the rent fixed under the deed of lease. This procedure of executing two documents, one of a lease for 99 years and the other of a conveyance of the rent‑receiving interest, was evidently adopted to get over the difficulty created by the Transfer of Property (Pakistan) Ordinance, 1947 (IV of 1947), which prohibited the registration of any deed of convey ance in respect of any property of the value of over Rs.100 unless it was accompanied by an income‑tax clearance certificate. This did not debar the registering authorities from registering deeds of lease. Hence the device adopted was to create a lease and then to convey the rent‑receiving interest at a value below Rs.100. In the present case, the consideration for the conveyance was fixed at Rs. 95 only. The premises in question were before their transfer to the respondent in the khas possession of the rent‑receiver, who after the above‑mentioned transfer delivered possession thereof to the respondent. But on the 5th of December 1959, the Circle Inspec tor, Government Estates, Dacca Sadat, called upon the respondent by a notice in writing to produce the documents by which he claimed to have acquired the 1/3rd share in the above premises. After this was done, the respondent was served with another notice on the 8th of February 1960, under the signature of the Additional Collector (Revenue), Dacca, calling upon him to show cause why the said premises should not be forfeited to Govern ment under the provisions of section 75‑A of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent showed cause in pursuance of the aforesaid notice and contended that the transaction entered into by him was in effect a sale and, as such, it was not hit by the provi sions of the said section 75‑A. The said contention was, how ever, not accepted and an order was made forfeiting the properties on the 18th of February 1960. The respondent's efforts to get redress by appeal to the Com missioner, Dacca Division, and by a further appeal before the Member, Board of Revenue, also having failed, an order was passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Dacca, on the 20th of January 1962, directing him to vacate the said lands and buildings within 7 days of the receipt of the notice falling which he was threatened to be evicted by police force. It was in these circumstances that he moved the High Court in its writ jurisdiction on the 12th of February 1962. Before the High Court also the respondent maintained that the transaction was a sale out and out and, as such, it was not hit by the provisions of section 75‑A of the Act. On the other hand, the Department maintained that since the transferor was admittedly a rent‑receiver whose rent‑receiving interests had been acquired under the Act, he had himself become a direct tenant under the Government in respect of the retainable khas lands and, as, such, he could not by reason of the provisions of section 75‑A of the Act sublet any portion of the premises in his khas possession after the issuance of the Notification under section 17 (3) of the Act on the 16th December 1955. Hence the creation of the lease on the 12th March 1958, amounted to a subletting in contravention of the above provisions, which rendered it null and void and made the land so sublet liable to forfeiture by the Government. The Government also relied on section 9 of the Act which prohibited the transference of any right or interest in any estate, taluk, tenure, holding or tenancy after the publication of a Notification under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Act either by sale, gift, mortgage or lease or any other contract or agreement for the transfer of any land in the khas possession of any rent receiver except with the previous permission of the prescribed authority. In the present case, since no such permission had been obtained, the lands were in any event liable to forfeiture. The High Court opined that even though it would, in ordinary circumstances, be inclined to hold "that the two documents put together would amount to a sale", it found difficulty in doing so in the present case, as the transaction in question was, according to it, effected in such a manner that it created two "separate relationships", one of a lessor and lessee and the other of a transferor and transferee of the residuary interest. So far as the first relationship was concerned, namely that of lessor and lessee, it was in the view of the High Court hit by the provisions of section 9 of the Act and was, therefore, under subsection (2) of the said section null and void and legally unenforceable. Hence the second relationship was also of no effect, for, the first transac tion having fallen through there was no residuum left to transfer. The contention of the Government that section 75‑A of the Act also applied to the transaction in question did not, however, find favour with the High Court. According to it, there was a con flict between the provisions of sections 9 and 75‑A of the Act and this conflict could only be resolved by holding that since section 9 was a specific provision dealing precisely with the case under consideration, the provisions of section 75‑A, which were of general application, did not apply, particularly, since the specific provisions applicable were more favourable to the subject. They gave a right to the transferee to apply to the Government for the grant of the lease to him directly and merely penalised the rent‑receiver by depriving him of the compensation due in respect of such property. The views expressed in an earlier decision by another Division Bench of the same High Court in the case of Alhaj Kutubuddin Ahmed v. Abu Jafar Haidwanuddin Ahmad (P L D 1963 Dacca 304 )wherein the provi sions of section 75‑A of the Act were examined and held in more or less similar circumstances to apply to such transfers, were held to be obiter, as the consideration of the said question was not necessary for the decision of the case. Leave was granted in this case to consider Miellier there was a conflict between these two decisions of two Division Benches of the same High Court and whether the provisions of section 9 and' section 75‑A had been rightly construed and applied in the fact! and circumstances of the present case. . Since both the Benches of the High Court have taken the view that there exists a conflict between the provisions of sections 9 and 75‑A of the Act, it is necessary. to examine the provisions of the said sections. Section 9, as it originally stood read as follows :‑ 9 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, on and from the date of publica tion of a notification under subsection (1) of section 3, no rent receiver specified in such notification shall, except with the previous permission of a prescribed authority, transfer his rights and interests in any estate, taluk tenure, holding or tenancy, to which such notification relates, by private sale, 'gift, will. mortgage. lease or any contract or agreement, or ,transfer any land in his khas possession by any such means Provided that any such rent‑receiver shall be entitled to transfer, by private sale or mortgage only, agricultural land 11 his khas possession not exceeding ten standard bighas in lie aggregate, without any such permission. (2) Any transfer made in contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be null and void " The East Pakistan State Acquisition and Tenancy (Amendnt) Ordinance No. XXVII of 1961 amended these provisions and made certain additions thereto. After such amendment the section read as follows ' ‑ "9 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being m force, on and from the date of publication of a notification under subsection (1) of section 3, no rent‑receiver specified in such notification shall, except as provided in subsection (IA), transfer his rights and interests. in any estate taluk, tenure holding or tenancy to which such notification relates, by private sale, gift, will, mortgage, lease or any contract or agreement, or transfer any land in his khas possession by any such means without the previous permission of a prescribed authority. (IA) The rent‑receiver referred to in subsection (1) shall be entitled to transfer, by private sale or mortgage only, agricul tural land or non‑agricultural land of the classes retainable under subsection (2) of section 20, in his khas possession, not exceeding ten standard bighas in the aggregate in either case without such permission, subject to such private sale or mort gage not contravening the provisions of any other law for the time being in force Provided that in the case of agricultural khas land, in calcu lating the permissible quantity of ten standard bighas, any land transferred between the 1 th December 1948, and the date of publication of the notification under subsection (1) of section 3 shall also be taken into account. (2) Any transfer made in contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be null and void and the land so trans ferred shall be forfeited to the Provincial Government. (3) Nothing contained in the foregoing subsection shall render void any transfer which, prior to the coming into force of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy, (Fourth Amendment) Ordinance, 1961, was not in contravention of any law for the time being in force and was legal and valid." The provisions that were added were as follows :‑ "9‑A Any rent‑receiver may, within six months from the coming into force of this provision, by an affidavit declare before a Revenue Officer authorised by the Collector in this behalf, all the agricultural khas lands transferred by him since the 14th December, 1948, and all the non‑agricultural khas lands of the classes retainable under subsection (2) of section 20 transferred by him since the date of publication of the, earliest notification under subsection (1) of section 3 acquiring any of his interests, and if the Revenue Officer, after making such enquiries as may be necessary is satisfied about the truth of the declaration, he shall make an order declaring the transfer of only such quantity of laud as do not exceed the permissible ten standard bighas, under subsection (1A) of section 9 as valid and shall also specify the land to the extent of the quantity so declared valid Provided that such declaration shall not validate any transfer which is invalid under any other law for the time being in force. 9‑B (1) Any person, to whom a, rent‑receiver has prior to the coming into force of this provision, transferred for valuable consideration any land in contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 9 by misrepresenting that he was legally entitled to transfer the same and has thereby caused wrongful loss to him, may file a petition before a Revenue Officer autho rised by the Collector to entertain such petitions. (2) The petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the allegations of the petitioner. (3) Where the Revenue Officer is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out, he shall issue a notice upon the rent receiver to appear and either satisfy him that the allegations are not true or deposit the amount of the consideration in Court. (4) If the rent‑receiver appears and shows cause against the allegations, the Revenue Officer shall make such enquiries and take such evidence as he may consider necessary. (5) Where the rent‑receiver does not appear or appears but fails to satisfy the Revenue Officer that tile allegations are not true, and the Revenue Officer is satisfied that the petitioner has suffered wrongful loss on account of the alleged misrepresen tation of the rent‑receiver, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, order the repayment of the consideration money or such part there of as may seem to him to be fair and equitable to the petitioner through the Court. (6) Where the Revenue Officer is satisfied that the allegations are not true, he may award costs and compensation not exceeding twenty‑five per centum of the alleged consideration money to the rent‑receiver. (7) Where the rent‑receiver fails to carry out the order of the Revenue Officer made under subsection (5), the Revenue Officer may order forfeiture of the land to the Provincial Government and recommend to the Collector its transfer to the petitioner upon such terms as the Collector may consider fair and equitable, and may also order the forfeiture of any com pensation that may be due to the rent‑receiver under the Act not exceeding the amount of the consideration money for payment to the petitioner Provided that when no compensation is due or when the compensation due is insufficient, the petitioner may recover the consideration money or the difference between the consideration 'money and the amount forfeited, as the case may be, from the rent‑receiver through the Civil Court. (8) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Revenue Officer made under subsection (7) may, within one month from the date of the order, file an appeal to the Collector. (9) Where the Collector passes an order reversing or modify ing the order tile Revenue Officer any person aggrieved by the order of the Collector on appeal under subsection (8) may, within two month from the date of the order, file a second appeal to the Commissioner. (10) The Board of Revenue may, at any time, either on its own motion or an application by an aggrieved party, revise an order made by the Collector on appeal under subsection (8) when no appeal is provided for against such order of the Collector, and any order made by the Commissioner on second appeal under subsection (9). (11) No order passed under. this section by the Revenue officer or the Collector or the Commissioner of the Board of Revenue shall be called into question in any Civil Court by a suit or otherwise, 9‑C. No affidavit of declaration under section 9‑A or petition under section 9‑B shall be entertained unless the transfer has been made by a registered document, and unless such affidavit or petition is accompanied by such registered document or a certificate copy thereof ; and the petitioner shall not be permitted to claim any amount as consideration in excess of the amount mentioned in the document. 9‑D. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in any legal proceeding, the payment of rent to the Provincial Government by a transferee who has purchased the land transferred in contravention of the pro vision of subsection (l) of section 9 by a rcpt‑receiver shall be evidence of adverse possession against the rent‑receiver or any person claiming any right through him except the Provincial Government.'' Section 75‑A, which was inserted by the East Bengal State acquisition and (Amendment) Act, 1954 (XII of 1954), was in these terms :‑ "75‑A (1) On and from the date of publication of a notifica tion under subsection (3' of section 17 or under subsection (1) of section 31, no person shall sublet any land in his khas pos session in the area to whirl‑, such notification relates. (2) Any subletting made in contravention of subsection (1) shall be null and void. (3) Nothing in subsections (1) and (2) shall apply to the subletting of any land purchased by a landlord in execution of a rent decree or surrender or abandoned under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Ac[, 1885, or the Sylhet Tenancy Act, 1936, when such land is sublet at a rent not more than the rent which was payable for such land by the outgoing tenant," This section was again amended in 1956 and after such amendment it read as follows: "75‑A (1) On and from the date of publication of a notifica tion under subsection (3) of section 17 or under subsection (1) of section 31, no person shall sublet any land in his khas possession in the area to which such notification relates. (2) Any subletting made in contravention of subsection (1) shall be null and void and the land so sublet shall be forfeited to the Provincial Government. (3) Any person may, at any time, apply to the provincial Government for the acquisition of any of his khas lands under subsection (2) of section 3 on payment of compensation at the rate prescribed for such land in section 39." The notification contemplated under section 17 (3) of the Act was a notification giving notice of the intention of Government to take up the preparation of new record‑of‑rights for the assess ment of compensation payable for the interests acquired under the Act. It will be observed from the provisions quoted above that under section 9, as it originally stood, there was no absolute bar but transference was permissible with the previous permission of a prescribed authority and even this permission was not necessary under the proviso to subsection (1) in respect of the transference of agricultural khas lands not exceeding ten standard bighas if made by private sale or mortgage. There was also no provision for the forfeiture of lands transferred in contravention of that section. The provision for forfeiture was incorporated in 1961. In this year transference was further liberalised. Thus a rent‑receiver could thereafter transfer by sale or mortgage non‑agricultural khas lands as well, if they were of the categories retainable under section 20(2) of the Act and not in excess of ten bighas, without taking the permission of any authority. Furthermore, elaborate provisions were also made which enabled relief being given to transferees against: invalid transfers by ex‑rent receivers, provided the transfer had been obtained in good faith and for valu able consideration. Right was also given to aggrieved persons to appeal from the orders of the Revenue Officers first to the Collector and then to the Board of Revenue. But these provisions came into operation as soon as the notification of the proposed acquisi tion of any estate, taluk, tenure or holding or tenancy was made by the Government under section 3 (1) of the Act. On the other hand, section 75‑A, which was incorporated in 1954, came into operation only when a notification giving notice of the intention to undertake the preparation : ~ the records of‑rights under section 17(3) or of the compensation assessment roll under section 31 (1) had been given and it placed a complete embargo only on the subletting of any land in the khas possession of any rent‑receiver within the area or areas spec: led in the noti fication and subletting, if made in contravention of the said section, was made null and void. The land so sublet was also to stand forfeited to the Provincial Government after the amendments made to the said section in 1956. The intention of this section appears to be that since after the acquisition of the interests of rent receivers, rent‑receivers were themselves to retain certain classes of retainable khas lands as tenants directly under the Government, they should not be allowed to create further sub‑tenancies under them. This was in keeping with the scheme of the Acquisition Act, which was that after the acquisition of all rent‑receiving interests any one who held land within the Province of East Pakistan should hold it as a tenant or raiyat directly under the Government and not under any one else as an intermediary. "Sub‑letting" has, of course, not been defined under the Act but under section 2(31) of the Act words used in the first IV Parts of the Act (within which section 75‑A occurs) and not defined therein are to be given the same meaning as they bear in the Bengal Tenancy Act or the Sylhet Tenancy Act. "Subletting" under the latter Acts connotes the creation of a subordinate tenancy or under‑raiyati, under which the sub‑leas would but for a special contract be liable to pay rent for that land to a person other than the Provincial Government. Section 75‑A was intended to prevent this eventuality and this intention is made further manifest by the provisions of sub section (3) thereof which provide that if any person holding land in his khas possession does not wish to retain the same in his khas he may apply to the Provincial Government for the acquisi tion thereof on payment of compensation at the prescribed rate. Even under the general law relating to transfer of property a sub‑lease or under‑lease connotes the transference of only a part of the original lessee's interest whereas the transference of the whole of the interest in the lease by the transfer amounts to an assignment of the lease‑hold interest. Thus an assurance, even though purporting to be an under‑lease, would amount to an assignment of the term if it comprised the whole term. This distinction is not without importance, for, different jural relationships arise from each. The assignee of a lease stands in the place of the original lessee and becomes a tenant of the original landlord. A privity of estate also arises between the original landlord and the assignee who becomes liable to perform the covenants in the lease or such of them as run with the land A sub‑lessee on the other hand is liable only to the sub‑lessor, he cannot sue or be sued by the original landlord. In view of the wide distinction between the legal consequences flowing from each of the above‑mentioned transactions, it is necessary that the word "sub‑letting" should be given its exact legal connotation particularly in a statute which not only makes "sub letting" unlawful but also penalizes the person subletting by for feiting the lands so sublet as under section 75‑A of the Act. "Sub letting" in this section should therefore, be construed strictly and unless the transaction sought to be invalidated comes strict within the ambit of sub‑letting in this strict sense, it should not be brought within the mischief of this section. In this view or the matter it is necessary now to determine as to what was the true nature of the transaction entered into in the present case. Before entering upon this investigation, however, it will be convenient, at this stage, to complete the examination of the provisions of the Act relevant for purposes of this appeal‑ Section 9, as already pointed out, does not place any complete embargo on transfers of khan lands but merely restricts the moue of transfer, for, all that is necessary under this section is that the prior permission of the prescribed authority should be obtained for certain kinds of transfer. The intention of this section, which was in the nature of an ad‑interim provision, was clearly to prevent further complications before the preparation of the record of‑rights or the compensation assessment roll was undertaken. But even so, this section at no stage prevented the transfer by sale or mortgage of either agricultural or non‑agricultural khas lands of the classes retainable under subsection (2) of section 207 of the Act if the land so transferred, did not exceed the standard bighas. This intention has now been made abundantly clear by the total repeal of the provisions of sections 9 to 9‑D by the Last Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy (Amendment) Act (Act No. VI of 1964) after the record of rights and compensation assessment rolls had been prepared. Between 1954 when sec tion 75‑A came to be incorporated and 1964 when sections 9 to 9‑D were totally repealed it is suggested that there was a conflict between the provisions of these sections so far as leases were concerned, for, after the incorporation of section 75‑A which was not given retrospective effect, subletting became totally prohibited on and after the date of publication of the notification under sub section (3) of section 17 and subsection (1) section

31. After the incorporation of section 75‑A permission could no longer granted by the prescribed authority under section 9 for transference by lease. It is for this reason that the view was taken in the case of Alhaj Kutubuddin Ahmed v. Abu Jaffar Haidwanuddin Ahmed that section 9, so far as it concerns demises of khas lands of rent‑receivers, should be deemed to have been repealed in an area which was covered by any notification under section 17 (3) or section 31 (1) of the Act, so far so that even if the contract for lease was made before section 75‑A came into operation, it would still be void and, therefore, incapable of being specifically performed after the coming into force of section 75‑A. In that case what was sought was the specific performance of an agreement to case a khas land of a rent‑receiver executed on the 12th November 1955, before the publication of the notification under section 17 (3) of the Act on the 16th December 1955. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing this relief after the creation of leases had become totally prohibited but its view that in these circumstances the contract would be void and un lawful cannot be supported. Nor can it be accepted that sections 9 to 9‑D of the Act stood pro‑tanto repealed from the 16th December 1955. Section 75‑A, though it came into force on the 30th August 1954, was made operative only from the date of the notification under section 17(3) or section 31(11 and, as such, it bad no retrospective operation and did not invalidate leases created before such date. The provisions of sections 9 to 9‑DI would still continue to govern such cases. We arc unable to accept that the provisions of these sections could not stand together, for, all that happened after the publication of the noti fication under section 17(3) was that the authority prescribed under section 9 could no longer permit a transfer by lease. The other view expressed in the judgment under appeal that even the case of a lease created after the 16th December 1955, as in the present case, the provisions of sections 9‑A to 9‑B should have been resorted to for effecting a forfeiture of the leased land cannot also be accepted as sound. This would render the pro visions of subsection (2) of section 75‑A wholly nugatory. If the authority prescribed under section 9 has no power to grant permission to transfer by lease after the date of the relevant notification, he obviously has also no power to grant any relief against such forfeiture in the case of leases created after such date. Reverting now to the investigation of the true nature of the transaction entered into in the present case it must, with respect, pointed out at the very outset that the approach of the High Court to this aspect of the case was not correct. The reason given by the High Court for not accepting that the transaction evidenced by the two registered documents executed on the same date and presented for registration at the same time did not constitute one and the same transaction, does not appear to us to be sound. If, a transaction is entered into by more than one document, both the documents should, in our opinion, be read together and their combined affect considered. In the present case, the intention of the parties was clearly to effect an out and out transfer of all the right, title and interest of the transferor to the transferee. How this could be affected conveniently, whether by one document. or by more than one documents, was not very material. What had g to be ascertained upon a proper consideration of these two documents together was as to what was the intention of the parties. If the intention was to make a complete and out and out transfer, then the transaction was a sale not merely a lease, even though it may have been camouflaged as a lease for 99 years coupled a conveyance of the residuary rent‑receiving interest absolutely which together effected a transfer of the entire bundle of rights of the transferor in these lands. Since both the documents were registered documents, they complied with the requirements of other relevant laws as well. Recourse could not be had to the provisions of Ordinance No. IV of 1947 to invalidate these documents, for, both these documents were duly registered under the Registration Act. That this was the proper approach for the determination of the true legal effect of these two documents appears to have been accepted by this Court in an unreported decision in the case of Manir Ahmad v. S. Mani Kuntala Devi and another (P L D 1964 S C 861) decided on the 27th of March 1961. There too the transaction had been similarly entered into by a lease and a conveyance of the rent receiving interest but it was held that the two documents taken together in effect evidenced a single sale. The jural relationship sought to be created and .evidenced by the two documents, in the present case also was, we have no hesitation in holding, that of a transferor and transferee and not, as held by the High Court, first of a lessor and lessee and then of a transferor and transferee of the residuary interest. We have also had the advantage of examining the original documents by which the transaction in question was entered into and from them we find that the stamps for the documents were pur chased on the same date, namely the 1st of February 1958, that they were typed by the same typist on the same date, namely, the 12th of March 1958, and that they were presented for registration on the same date and executed before the same witnesses, as observed by the High Court, "simultaneously." In these circumstances, the intention of the parties to the documents was manifest and it was to create a single jural relationship, namely, that of transferor and transferee of the entire bundle of the rights, titles and interests of the transferor in the premises concerned. Such a transfer could, in our opinion, only be described as a sale and nothing else. In this view of the matter the transaction was clearly not affected by section 75‑A, for, it was in no sense of the term a sub‑letting, nor was it affected at any point of time by section 9, for, subsection (1‑A) of that section permitted the transfer by sale or mortgage of khas non‑agricultural lands of the class retainable under subsection (2) of section 20 provided that the land d1d not c exceed 10 standard bighas. The documents in the present case show that the land consisted of 1/3rd share in the total area of 4528 acre, which is equivalent to slightly less than half an acre, that is to say, roughly 1J bighas. The forfeiture was, therefore, clearly illegal and has rightly been ordered to be set aside by the High Court, although for different reasons. We do not propose to enter into an examination of these reasons again, as in our view, there is no real conflict between o the provisions of sections 75‑A and 9 to 9‑D of the Act and the two can well stand together. It remains now to consider only one other point raised on behalf of the Government by the learned Advocate‑General, namely, that since the amended provisions of section 9 (A) came into operation only in 1961 after the lease had been created and forfeiture effected in 1960, the provisions of that subsection would not be available to the respondent. This argument over looks the fact that the amendments made to section 9 in 1961 were expressly given retrospective effect and that even in 1961 the matter had not been concluded, as the appeal before the Commissioner was decided only on the 15th of December 1961, after the amendments had come into force and the second appeal was not decided by the Member, Board of Revenue, till the 12th of January 1962. On the filing of the appeal the entire matte became reopened and sub judice and had to be decided in accordance with the law then prevailing. For the reasons given above, we are of the view that this appeal must fail and we, accordingly, dismiss the same. But having regard to the fact that our reasons for holding the forfeiture to be illegal are different from those given by the High Court, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.