of the agreement had taken place at Rawalpindi, and as the plaintiffs had received the reply to their notice at Rawalpindi, th (PLP)

7. There can be no doubt that, in view of clause (c) of section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court in whose jurisdiction cause of action, wholly or In part, arises, has jurisdiction to try the suit. Counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the finding before me, that the breach of the agreement had taken place at Rawalpindi. He has, however, urged that the breach of the agreement had given the option to the plaintiff to revoke the contract, and as the revocation had been completed at Karachi, therefore, the Karachi Courts alone have jurisdiction over the suit and not the Courts at Rawalpindi. In support of this proposition he has relied on Dhanraj Mills Limited Liability Co. v. Narsingh Prasad Boobna and others (A I R 1949 Pat. 270), where it has been held that the Court at the place of communication of renunciation of the contract can try a suit for breach of contract. In my opinion, no exception can be taken to the rule laid down in this ruling, but the question which really requires determination in the present case is whether the Court in whose jurisdiction the breach of contract had taken place and on the basis of which the contract had been revoked, has the jurisdiction to try the suit or not. The ruling referred to above does not throw any light on this question and, as such, is of no avail to the petitioner. As the breach of the agreement at Rawalpindi had given the right to the plaintiff to revoke the contract, I am of the opinion, that the cause of action did arise, in part at least if not wholly, at Rawalpindi, and, therefore, in view of clause (c) of section 20, C. P. C. the Court at Rawalpindi has jurisdiction to try this suit.

8. As regards the relief relating to the rendition of accounts, it appears that the objection now raised was not taken before the trial Court. There is noting in the agreement to indicate that the accounts had to be rendered at Karachi. As the defendant -petitioner had supervised the work at Rawalpindi in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and as the breach of the agree ment had taken place at Rawalpindi, prima facie it appears that he is liable to render accounts at Rawalpindi. The question whether he is liable at all to render accounts will be gone into by the trial Court If the necessity arose for it, but for the present, I see no reason to hold that the Court at Rawalpindi has no jurisdiction so far as this relief is concerned.

9. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in Civil Revision No. 249 of 1960, and I accordingly dismiss it with costs.

10. So far as Civil Revision No. 278 of 1960, is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Court has not passed any order on the application of the petitioner filed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. From the facts narrated above, it is quite clear that the decision of this appli cation was postponed till the decision relating to the question of jurisdiction. After the decision on that question was given by the Court on the 30th of June 1960, it appears that the counsel for the parties asked for some time to propose the name of the arbitrator. The object of the application under section 34 was that the proceedings in the suit should be stayed and it transpires from the various orders passed by the Court thereafter that no further proceedings were in fact taken in the suit. It is, however, true that no order staying the proceedings has been passed by the Court on the application under section 34 of the Arbi tration Act.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the counsel for the petitioner appearing before the Court below had no authority to agree to refer the suit to arbitration. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate is the counsel for the petitioner before the Court below and the power‑of‑attorney is in the following terms:‑ "I, S. M. Qasim, partner of defendant company, do hereby nominate and appoint Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate to appear, act and plead on my behalf as an Advocate in this matter with power to receive payments from all the Courts." Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Ahmad v. Sardara and others (A I R 1929 Lah. 171), where Tek Chand J., held that a pleader engaged to act or plead in a suit does not possess the power to refer it to arbitration without the express authority from the client, but later the learned Judge himself relied on the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sourendra Nath Mitra and others v. Tarubala Dasi (A I R 1930 P C 158), Amir Shah and others v. Abdul Aziz and another (A I R 1932 Lah. 373), and observed as follows: ‑ "As stated above, the plaintiffs, including Mst. Rahmat Bibi and Mst. Mehraj Begum, had engaged Lala Panna Mal, Advocate, to file the plaint and prosecute the suit on their behalf, and in the vakalatnama had specifically given him authority to refer the dispute to arbitration. It is clear that even if specific authority to refer the suit to arbitration had not been con ferred on the Advocate by the vakalatnama he still had the power to do so under the recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi." In the Privy Council ruling, their Lordships have dealt with this question at some length and have held as follows: ‑ "They are of opinion that Mr. Sircar, as an Advocate of the High Court, had, when briefed on behalf of the defendant in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Hoogly, the implied authority of his client to settle the suit. Their Lordships have already said that he must be treated as though briefed on the trial of the suit. Their Lordships regard the power to compromise a suit as inherent in the position of an Advocate in India. * * * * * * " It is a power deemed to exist because its existence is necessary to effectuate the relations between advocate and client to make possible the duties imposed upon the advocate by his acceptance of the cause of his client." Their Lordships have further held: ‑ "Two observations may be added. First, the implied authority of counsel is not an appandage of office, a dignity added by the Courts to the status of barrister or Advocate at‑law. It is implied in the interests of the client to give the fullest beneficial effect to his employment of the Advocate. Secondly, the implied authority can always be counter manded by the express directions of the client. No Advocate has actual authority to settle a case against the express instruc tions of his client."

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, read before me the following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council: ‑ "Where the legal representative in Court of a client derives his authority from an express written authority, such as a vakalatnama, different considerations may well arise, and in such cases their Lordships express no opinion as to the existence of any implied authority of the kind under dis cussion." On its basis, the learned counsel has contended that if an Advocate is briefed on behalf of a party, he is perfectly within his rights to compromise a suit, but if the Advocate derives his authority from an express written authority, then, in view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council, different considerations would arise. In support of this contention, he has relied upon Din Muhammad and another v. Farooq Mirza (P L D 1955 Sind 62), where a Division Bench of the Sind High Court relied upon the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to above and held that in case of vakalatnama the power of the Advocate depends on its terms, and he can enter into compromise only when the vakalatnama empowers him to do so.

13. With the utmost respect to the learned Judges of the Sind High Court, I am inclined to think that the aforesaid observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council do not refer to an Advocate. In view of Order III, rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, no pleader can act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power‑of‑attorney to make such appointment, and every such appointment has to be filed in Court. Under section 2 (15), Civil Procedure Code, "pleader" means any person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an Advocate, a vakil and an attorney of a High Court. It is, therefore, clear that even an Advocate cannot act for his client in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person. So far as mere pleading is concerned, no such writing is necessary, but a mere memorandum of appearance has to be put in Court. While discussing the powers of an Advocate, I believe that their Lordships of the Privy Council had not overlooked the fact that an Advocate cannot act on behalf of a person, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that so far as an Advocate is concerned, once he is authorised by his client to act on his behalf in Court, he is perfectly within his rights to compromise or settle the suit c without any express authority from his client for the purpose. The reference by their Lordships of the Privy Council to "the legal representative in Court of a client" obviously refers either to the recognized agent, as provided for in Order III, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, or to the "legal representative", as defined in section 2 (11), Civil Procedure Code. "Legal repre sentative" is defined as follows: ‑ "Legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued." In Ramzan and others v. Gopal Das and others (A I R 1936 Lah. 199), a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court followed the rule laid down by the Privy Council and held that an Advocate has an inherent right to agree to a valid and binding compromise on behalf of his client.

14. In the present case, the petitioner had authorised Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate, to appear, act and plead on his behalf as an Advocate, and there is nothing mentioned in the power‑of‑attorney to restrict his power to compromise or settle the suit on his behalf. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate, had the authority on behalf of the petitioner to act on his behalf, and as such he could compromise and settle the suit without any express authority from his client.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has maintained that to agree to a reference to arbitration does not fall within the power of the counsel "to act." I confess that I have not been able to appreciate this argument. In my opinion, when the power is given to an Advocate or pleader to act, he can certainly act in the same manner as his client can, and if a client can agree to a reference to arbitration, I see no reason why an Advocate or pleader acting on his behalf cannot do so.

16. The question which now remains to be considered is whether the Court after staying the proceedings should have allowed the parties to follow their own course to enforce the arbitration clause in the agreement, or should have itself proceeded to enforce the arbitration clause in the agree ment. The clause in the agreement on which reliance was placed by the petitioner for the stay of the proceedings in the suit is clause (6) in the agreement, which reads as follows: ‑ "That in case any dispute or difference arose out of this agreement, the same shall be referred to an impartial arbi trator to be appointed by mutual consent whose decision shall be binding on both the parties." If the respondents had not filed this suit then in that case the position would have been governed by section 20 of the Arbitration Act and any one of the parties could have applied to a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates that the agreement be filed in Court, and the Court would have then followed the procedure laid down in clauses (3), (4) and (5) of that section. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act merely provides that where any party to an arbitration agreement commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement, such party may apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending to stay the proceedings, and if the judicial authority is satisfied that there Is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement, then such authority may make an order staying the proceedings. It does not provide that the Court shall then proceed to enforce the arbitration clause in the agreement. It appears to me that the Intention of the legislature is that in a case of this nature the parties should be left to pursue their own course to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. The parties can refer their dispute to an arbitrator In terms of the agreement without the intervention of the Court, or any of them may apply under section 20 of the Arbitration Act to a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates that the agreement be filed in Court, and then the Court shall have to follow the procedure laid down in that section.

17. Learned counsel for the respondents has, however, urged that after staying the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitra tion Act, the Court itself could proceed to enforce the agree ment. In support of this contention he has relied on Municipal Committee, Fazilka v. Fazilka Electric Supply Co., Ltd. (A I R 1947 Lah. 309) where Cornelius J. (now the Chief Justice of Pakistan) dealt with the various provisions of the Arbitration Act and observed as follows: ‑ "The Scheme of the schedule as well as of the Act clearly provide for certain well defined contingencies. The parties may agree to refer a matter in dispute between them to an arbitrator, and the arbitration having been commenced and concluded, power is provided for the award to be filed and made a rule of Court under certain specified conditions. Again, parties who are litigating inter se may agree, while the suit is pending that a matter in dispute between them shall be referred to arbitration, and the Court is then required to make the reference. In each of these cases, an agreement to refer is a sine qua non; the actual reference is made in the first case by the parties jointly (with the provision that in certain conditions one party may act validly on behalf of the other, when the latter is in default) : and in the second case, by the Court. A third case is possible in which the parties have agreed that a specified dispute which may arise or has arisen between them, shall be referred to arbitration, and thereafter, one of the parties in violation of this agreement institutes a suit respecting the specified dispute. Such an agreement does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, but the law has empowered the Courts in a suitable case to stay the suit, so as to enable the party which Is willing to take the matter before an arbitrator, to make the reference. The last type of case is one where an arbitration agreement exists and this is sought to be enforced through the agency of the Court by one of the parties. This is the case dealt with in para. 17 of Sch. 2, Civil P. C., and section 20, Arbitration Act. In such a case, the Court when moved by one of the parties to the agreement is under a statutory duty to make an order of reference, in accordance with the agreement, unless sufficient cause be shown against it." Learned counsel for the respondent has laid stress on the last lines of the above‑quoted passage and has contended that, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court was under a statutory duty to make an order of reference. After giving due consideration to this aspect of the matter, I am Inclined to think that the learned Judge did not hold that after staying the proceedings the Court itself is required to make an order of reference. The words "when moved by one of the parties to the agreement" are very significant, and, in my opinion, they refer to the moving of the Court by one of the parties under section 20 of the Arbitration Act.

18. In the present case, however, none of the parties had moved the Court under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Here, I would like to point out that the learned Civil Judge while deciding the question of jurisdiction had in his order, dated the 13th of June 1960, remarked as follows:‑ " Banking on the arbitration clause of the agreement instead of putting the written statement the defendant filed an applica tion under section 34 of the Arbitration Act requesting for setting aside the proceedings in the suit and for referring the matter to an arbitrator." I have carefully gone through the application submitted by the defendant under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and I do not find in it any request for referring the matter to an arbitrator. It appears that the learned Civil Judge had wrongly assumed that the application was also for referring the matter to an arbitrator, and for that very reason he had probably asked the counsel for the parties to propose the name of the arbitrator as soon as he had decided the question of jurisdiction. This he could not have legally done.

19. Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that the agreement of the counsel for the parties for reference to arbitration may be deemed to be an application under section 21 of the Arbitration Act. Section 21 lays down that where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may at any time before judgment is pronounced apply in writing to the Court for an order of reference. Admittedly, no application in writing was presented by the counsel for the parties for an order of reference. In such a case, an application in writing is absolutely essential, and in the absence of such an application the Court cannot proceed to refer the matter to an arbitrator.

20. For the reasons stated above, I am clearly of the opinion that by referring the suit to an arbitrator the Court had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law. I accordingly accept this revision petition with costs, and quash the order dated 30‑6‑60, whereby Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan Lodhi was appointed arbitrator. I further direct that the Court should pass the necessary order on the application presented by the petitioner under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and thereafter proceed in accordance with the law. K. B. A. Petition accepted.