2026 P Cr (PLP)

Muhammad Ayub Khan Tareen, J.

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated June 15, 2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge Sariab Division Quetta in sessions (Murder) case No.35/2021, whereby the appellant (accused) Sanaullah son of Rehmatullah was convicted and sentenced in the following terms:

1. Under section 302(b) P.P.C as Tazir to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay compensation Rs.200,000/- as envisaged under section 544-A, Cr.P.C to the legal heirs of deceased Naqeebullah, in default thereof shall further suffer imprisonment for six months;

2. Under section 377 P.P.C to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.200,000/-, in default thereof to further suffer simple imprisonment for six months, however 50% of fine amount on its recovery is ordered to be paid to the legal heirs of deceased as envisaged under the provisions of section 17 of Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2020; 3. under section 364-A P.P.C to suffer rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years and to pay Rs.200,000/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for six months. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. Similarly, the petitioner (complainant) filed the Criminal Revision Petition No.28/2024, for enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellant (convict) by the trial court.

2. Facts of the case are that pursuant to report (Ex: P/1-A) of complainant Muhammad Qasim (PW-1), a criminal case, vide FIR No.123/2021 (Ex: P/14-A), dated 16th August 2021, under sections 302, 364-A, 377 and 34, P.P.C was registered at P.S. Shalkot, Quetta, wherein he alleged that on 25th July 2021 he was working in an orchard, his son Naqeebullah was also present with him; at about 3:00 p.m. he sent Naqeebullah to home and after completion of work in the evening when he returned home, his wife informed that Naqeebullah had not reached home; despite efforts he did not know the whereabouts of Naqeebullah. On 16th August 2021 he came to know that an unknown person abducted Naqeebullah, committed his murder and thrown his dead body in Killi Hassani Dasht graveyard. During investigation, appellant was arrested and on completion of investigation, challan of the case was submitted, trial commenced, the learned trial court framed the charge and read over the same to the appellant to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial.

3. To substantiate accusation, the prosecution produced and examined the following witnesses: PW-1 Muhammad Qasim (complainant), who produced his application (Ex: P/1-A). PW-2 Raheem-ud-Din son of Sharaf-ud-Din (circumstantial witness); PW-3 Haji Abdul Kareem son of Haji Wazir Muhammad (circumstantial witness); PW-4 Sardar Sajjad Ahmed son of Mir Behram Khan, who along with inhabitants of the village apprehended the appellant when he was burring the deceased in graveyard; PW-5 Irshad Ahmed son of Behram Khan (eye-witness); PW-6 Ahmed Shah Naib Risaldar Levies who brought the dead body of deceased to Levies Station; PW-7 Dr. Aysha Faiz, who conducted post mortem of the dead body of deceased Naqeebullah and issued report (Ex: P/7-A). She also examined the appellant Sanaullah and issued MLC (Ex: P/7-B) and after examination of co-accused Ehsanullah, she issued MLC (Ex: P/7-C); PW-8 Muhammad Haroon Mengal, Judicial Magistrate, who conducted identification parade of appellant vide identification parade form (Ex: P/8-A) and issued certificate (Ex: P/8-B); PW-9 Gul Azam SI is witness of recovery memo. (Ex: P/9-A) of parcel No.2 (Article-P/2), plastic jar (Article-P/3) containing shalwar and shirt of deceased (Article-P/4 and P/5), two anal swabs (Article-P/6), one tube of deceased s anal swab (Article-P/7), one blood tube of deceased (Article-P/8) and parcel No.3 (Article-P/9), plastic jar (Article-P/10) containing shalwar of appellant Sanaullah (Article-P/11), blood tube of appellant (Article-P/12) and buckle swab stick of appellant; recovery memo. (Ex: P/9-B) of parcel (Article-P/13) containing blood sample tube of co-accused Ehsanullah (Article-P/14), Buckle swap stick of Ehsanullah (Article-P/15) and sample of seal (Article-P/16); PW-10 Liaquat Ali son of Rasool Bakhsh (circumstantial witness); PW-11 Noor Bakhsh ASI is witness of recovery memo. (Ex: P/11-A) of parcel (Article-P/17) containing Sindhi Ajrak (Article-P/18) and sample of seal (Article-P/19); site inspection memo. (Ex: P/11-B); disclosure memo. of appellant (Ex: P/11-C), recovery memo. (Ex: P/11-D) of parcel (Article-P/20) containing iron hammer (Article-P/21), sample of seal (Article-P/22), parcel (Article-P/23) containing slippers (Article-P/24) and sample of seal (Article-P/25), parcel (Article-P/26) containing plastic bottle (Article-P/27) and sample of seal (Article-P/28), pointation memo. of place of occurrence (Ex: P/11-E), pointation memo. of hotel (Ex: P/11-F), pointation memo. (Ex: P/11-G) of graveyard and spade (Article-P/29), recovery memo. (Ex: P/11-H) of parcel (Article-P/30) containing mobile phone of accused Ehsanullah (Article-P/31), disclosure memo. of accused Ehsanullah (Ex: P/11-J), pointation memo. of hut (Ex: P/11-K), pointation memo. of place of occurrence (Ex: P/11-L) and pointation memo. of room in graveyard (Ex: P/11-M) from where the accused picked-up the spade; PW-12 Bashir Ahmed SI (circumstantial witness) PW-13 Abdul Ghafoor SI produced FSL reports (Ex: P/13-A and P/13-B) through challan (Ex: P/13-C); PW-14 Noor Hassan IP is the investigation officer, who produced FIR (Ex: 14-A), site map (Ex: P/14-B), Merg report and receipts (Ex:P/14-C to P/14-F), list of legal heirs of deceased (Ex: P/14-G), copy of FIR No.212/2013 (Mark-P/1), photographs of deceased (Ex: P/14-H-1 to P/14-H-9), site map (Ex: P/14-I) of shoes and iron hammer, pointation map (Ex: P/14-J) of place occurrence, pointation map (Ex: P/14-K) of hotel, and incomplete challans (Ex: P/14-L to P/14-N). On closure of prosecution evidence, the learned trial court recorded the statements of appellant and co-accused under section 342, Cr.P.C, wherein they disputed the prosecution story and pleaded their innocence; however, they did not opt to record their statements on oath provided under section 340(2) Cr.P.C.

4. On completion of trial, the learned trial court (Sessions Judge Sariab Division, Quetta), vide impugned judgment dated June 15, 2024, found the appellant guilty, as such, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above, while acquitted the co-accused Ehsanullah by extending benefit of doubt in his favour. Hence, this appeal with the prayer to set aside the impugned judgment passed by the trial court and to acquit the appellant of the charge. The petitioner (complainant) has also filed criminal revision petition for enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellant.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the FIR was lodged with a delay of 22 days, implying that deliberation and consultation could not be ruled out. He stated that the prosecution's case is based on circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances is broken; therefore, the trial court was not justified in convicting the appellant on such weak evidence. He further argued that there are several contradictions in the prosecution's evidence regarding the timings of different events. Lastly, he requested the court to acquit the appellant of the charge and dismiss the revision petition filed to increase the appellant's sentence.

6. Conversely, the learned Additional Prosecutor General, duly assisted by counsel for the complainant, contended that the delay has been adequately explained and that the question of deliberation and consultation could not be raised, as the accused appellant is not named in the FIR. He argued that the complainant had no enmity with the appellant to accuse him and that the prosecution witnesses also had no enmity to depose falsely against him. He stated that circumstantial evidence has connected the appellant with the commission of the offence, and even in cases based on circumstantial evidence, a death sentence can be imposed. Lastly, he prayed for the dismissal of the appeal and the acceptance of the revision, which would convert the appellant's life imprisonment sentence to death.

7. We heard the learned counsel for the parties and have pursued the record with their valuable assistance. The brief history of the prosecution case is that the minor deceased went missing on July 25, 2021, and the FIR was registered on August 16, 2021, after the body was recovered. The complainant, Muhammad Qasim, states he reported the matter on the same day (July 25, 2021); however, the FIR was not registered because there was no photograph of the minor, Naqeebullah. During cross-examination, the complainant provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in registering the FIR, stating that he had initially approached the police station. Still, his FIR was only recorded after the body was recovered. It can be inferred that the illiterate complainant, unfamiliar with legal procedures, was unaware of the consequences of not registering the FIR. Considering other circumstantial and incriminating evidence, the delay in lodging the FIR appears plausible and justifiable. This principle was discussed in the case Ghulam Husain Soomro v. The State (P L D 2007 Supreme Court 71), and the relevant paragraph is reproduced here for reference:

6. We have anxiously attended to the submissions of the learned counsel and found from the record that the delay in lodging FIR has been adequately explained and accounted for. In any event, mere delay in lodging of the FIR is not always fatal to the prosecution case, though in some cases it might militate against the bona fides of the prosecution. In the cases involving kidnapping of young ones for extorting huge ransom, parents as well as the investigating police invariably endeavour their best to locate the victim rather than promptly lodging FIR for fear of death of victim, which may sometimes prove to be counter productive. We are, therefore, not inclined to draw any adverse inference against the prosecution on the ground of delay alone in lodging the FIR. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan took a similar view in a case titled Muhammad Nadeem alias Deemi v. The State (2011 SCMR 872), A relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below: 6. ..It is an established principle of law and practice that in criminal cases the delay, by itself, in lodging the FIR is not material. The factors to be considered by the Courts are firstly, that such delay stands reasonably explained and secondly, that the prosecution has not derived any undue advantage through the delay involved.

8. In the present case, the theory of last seen is pivotal in establishing the guilt of the accused, Sanaullah, in the murder of the minor Naqeebullah. The prosecution witnesses, PW-4 Sardar Sajjad Ahmed and PW-5 Irshad Ahmed, testified that they last saw the accused in the graveyard of their village at Dasht Area, where he was engaged in the suspicious and unnatural act of digging a grave to bury the deceased. The deceased s dead body lying was wrapped in a Sindhi Ajrak, and the circumstances surrounding the burial raised significant doubts about the accused's intentions. The proximity of time and place between the last sighting of the accused with the deceased and the subsequent discovery of the body by the accused, Sanaullah, creates a compelling inference that Sanaullah was involved in the crime for which he could not utter a plausible justification. The witnesses, being chance observers, provide corroborative evidence that strengthens the prosecution's case, as the last seen theory necessitates that the accused must offer a plausible explanation for his actions during that critical time. Further, the burden of proof may shift to the accused to provide a reasonable explanation for their presence and actions during the time they were seen with the dead body. Given the lack of any reasonable explanation from the accused regarding his presence at the graveyard with the deceased, coupled with the fact that the accused tried to escape, the evidence of last seen together serves as a crucial link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, supporting the conviction of Sanaullah for the murder of Naqeebullah. The theory, as mentioned above, is also discussed by the Honourable Supreme Court in myriad cases. Likewise, in Abdus Samad v. The State (PLD 1964 SC 167), the evidence against the accused was charged with the offence of raping and murdering a little girl, he was that she was last seen in his company, and he had also led to the recovery of her body from a remote place, which was exclusively within his knowledge. There was also an incriminating recovery from the spot where the deceased was found, which implicated the accused. On this evidence, the conviction was maintained, and the appeal was dismissed with the observation. The relevant extract is reproduced: the two circumstances mentioned above were, in my opinion, sufficient to establish the charges of kidnapping and murder against the accused, being sufficient to exclude all possibility of his being innocent of the death of the child. Additionally, in Munshi and another v. The State (PLD 1971 Lahore. 781), Division Bench of the Lahore High Court observed that this view has undergone some modification and, in that connection, remarked: Held: But it is not difficult to conceive of a case where the circumstance that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused, may raise reasonable presumption against the latter and he may, justifiably, be expected to give an explanation, e.g., where a person, who is seen visiting the used in a room, in the sole occupations of the latter, is found dead shortly thereafter, with signs of violence on his person. In such a case the onus of displacing the presumption of guilt shall shift on the accused and he shall be under an obligation to furnish a reasonable explanation as to how the deceased met his death. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan took a similar view in a case titled Qaisar Mehmood and another v. The State (2021 SCMR 662), and the relevant portion is reproduced herein below: 4. the Court may rely upon the evidence of last seen, without a demur, if found free from any taint, constituting a reliable link between the offender and the victim within the proximity of time and space.

9. In the present case, the absence of an established motive does not undermine the prosecution's case against the accused, as established by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in various rulings. The court has consistently held that a lack of motive or the prosecution's inability to prove motive does not preclude the imposition of the normal penalty of death if the prosecution has otherwise successfully established its case against the accused. Furthermore, the Honourable Supreme Court Pakistan in Mst. Nazakat v. Hazrat Jamal and another (PLD 2007 SC 453) clarified that a motive "shrouded in mystery" does not serve as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the sentence. This principle has been reiterated in case Mukhtar Ahmad and others v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 563) where the Honourable Supreme Court has maintained that the absence of motive does not diminish the culpability of the accused if the evidence presented is otherwise compelling. Therefore, in light of these precedents, the prosecution's case remains robust despite the lack of a clearly defined motive, supporting the argument for a conviction based on the evidence at hand. The same is held in the case title Muhammad Saeed v. Haq Nawaz Khurram and 2 others (PLD 2008 SC 416) and the relevant portion is reproduced for ready reference:

9. Now reverting to the plea of the learned counsel regarding absence/disproving of motive. Suffice it to say that lack of motive or inability of prosecution to prove motive does not effect the imposition of normal penalty of death if the prosecution otherwise has been able to prove his case against the accused. Reference in this behalf can be made to Nawaz Ali and another (ibid.). The view of this Court in the judgment reported as Ashfaq Ahmad v. The State 2007 SCMR 641, Federal Government Ministry of Defence v. Sepoy Liaqat Ali 2004 SCMR 1676 and Syed Hamid Mukhtar Shah (ibid.) is that lenient view should not be taken merely on the ground that the motive had not, been proved by the prosecution. In another judgment reported as Mst. Nazakat v. Hazrat Jamal and another (PLD 2007 SC 453) the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that "motive shrouded in mystery" by itself is not a mitigating circumstance for awarding lesser sentence and this theory has been discarded. In the same context the cases of Mukhtar Ahmad and others v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 563) and Khurram Malik and others v. The State and others (PLD 2006 SC 354) can be referred. In view of the enormous case law on the subject, the contention of the learned counsel is ill-founded.

10. The entire case is based on circumstantial evidence. The principle established by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan indicates that even in the absence of direct evidence, a conviction can be secured if the chain of circumstantial evidence remains unbroken, directly linking the commission of the offence to the accused. In this context, the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3, while not eye-witnesses, are significant as they confirmed that on July 25, 2021, the deceased, Naqeebullah, went missing. They learned about the discovery of a dead body in the hospital mortuary through the police and subsequently identified the deceased. The evidence regarding the disappearance of Naqeebullah and the subsequent discovery of his body, as revealed by the star witnesses (PW-4 and PW-5), has been found to be reliable and trustworthy, with their natural presence at the scene further corroborating their accounts. Additionally, the statement of PW-7, Dr. Aysha Faiz, the Police Surgeon, along with the postmortem report of Naqeebullah (Ex.P/7-A) and the medical-legal certificates MLC) of the accused, Sanaullah, and co-accused (Ex.P/7-B and Ex.P/7-C), provide critical insights. The Police Surgeon opined that the deceased had been subjected to forcible carnal intercourse and subsequently murdered with a blunt weapon. Furthermore, she confirmed that Sanaullah could perform sexual intercourse and was medically potent. The testimonies of the remaining witnesses (PW-8 to PW-14) and the DNA result and its conclusion, which shows that Seminal material was found on item Nos. 1 and 4,1-4.11(anal swab of deceased Naqeebullah, stains sections taken from Shalwar Qameez of Naqeebullah) human blood was identified on item No. 10.2(stain sections taken from Shalwar of appellant Sanaullah. The DNA profile obtained from sperm fractions of item Nos. 1, 4.1, 4.5, 4.10, epithelial of item Nos. 1 and 4.5 matches the DNA of Sanaullah (item No. 9). The probability of finding an unrelated individual at random from the population as being the source of DNA obtained from sperm fraction of item Nos. 1, 4.1, 4.5, 4.10, epithelial fractions of item Nos. 1 and 4.5 is approximately one in 64 sextillion in Caucasians. The evidence presented collectively supports the prosecution's case, establishing a coherent chain of circumstantial evidence that remains intact. The established principle is discussed in the case titled Qaisar Mehmood and another v. The State (2021 SCMR 662), and the relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below: Prosecution has relied upon a chain of circumstances comprising of the complainant and witnesses identifying the victim departing in the company of accused and co-accused, heading towards a factory, and again while disposing of the corpse concealed in a gunny bag; and the confession of accused and co-accused shortly before their arrest and subsequent recoveries of incriminatory bloodstained articles from their residential room in the factory. Said uninterrupted continuing links, synchronized in a chain of circumstances, were tallied by findings, recorded in the autopsy report that unambiguously confirmed a carnal assault with the victim within the durations compatible with the incidence of events related by the witnesses. Witnesses had no apparent motive either to falsely implicate the accused and co-accused or swap them with someone else. In a similar nature of case titled as Hamid Mahmood and another v. the State and another (2013 SCMR 1314), same view was taken and the relevant paragraph is reproduced for ready reference:

23. Similarly, the nature of the evidence produced at the trial is relevant primarily for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and not sentenced to be awarded. No rule exists that the sentence of death cannot be awarded in the absence of direct ocular evidence, if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial and forensic evidence.

24. The overall features of the occurrence, the nature of offence and the events leading thereto, including the motives etc. are relevant to the extent permitted by law. In the case reported as Laxman Naik v. State of Orisa (AIR 1995 SC 1387) above principles have been reiterated in the following manner: "According to the standard of proof required to convict a person on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon in support of, the conviction must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. The circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn have not only to be fully established but also that all the circumstances so established should I be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should not be capable of being explained by any other hypothesis, except the guilt of the accused and when all the circumstances cumulatively taken together should lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime. A similar view is also held in the case, reported as Muhammad Latif v. The State (PLD 2008 SC 503), it was held by this Court, as follows:

11. As far the contention of the learned counsel that upon circumstantial evidence, one cannot be convicted and awarded the penalty of death, this plea is also misconceived because there is no bar or hindrance to pass the sentence upon a killer of three human beings when the chain of guilt is found not to be broken and irresistible conclusion of the guilt is surfacing from the evidence, which is connecting the accused with the commission of that offence without any doubt or suspicion. If the circumstantial evidence brought on the record is of such nature than the conclusion would be in the shape of conviction and no other conclusion shall be drawn by any stretch of imagination in such a case, for the guilt of the accused, penalty of death or life imprisonment shall be a normal event.

11. The trial court made the following observation as a mitigating circumstance in connection with the quantum of sentence in paragraph No. 34 of the impugned judgment, which is reproduced here for ease of reference:

34. However, there seems to be involvement of mitigating circumstances as it is still not ascertain as to what happened just before the occurrence at unknown time is shrouded in mistry and prosecution evidence is silent in this regard. Whereas, to the extent of considering mitigating circumstances, and in light of the established facts surrounding the case of the accused, Sanaullah, and the relevant legal precedents set forth by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is imperative to enhance the punishment from life imprisonment to the death penalty keeping in view the gruesome and shocking act of the accused. The trial court's decision to impose a lesser sentence based on vague reasons cannot be justified, as such considerations do not constitute valid mitigating circumstances. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently held that awarding a lesser punishment on flimsy grounds, such as those mentioned in the impugned judgment, effectively grants individuals a license to commit heinous acts without fear of appropriate repercussions. Furthermore, the accused has failed to provide credible evidence to substantiate and draw any inference in connection with the offense, which would warrant leniency. Therefore, by the Supreme Court's ruling that the normal penalty for murder should be death when the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it is just and necessary to impose the death penalty on Sanaullah to uphold the rule of law and deliver justice for the grievous crime committed against the innocent minor, Naqeebullah. Reliance is placed on in case law titled Muhammad Aslam Sajjan v. Liaqat Ali and others (1998 SCMR 1555), and the relevant portion of the paragraph is reproduced:

5. The next question which arises for our consideration is the quantum of sentence which is to be given to the convict. The trial Court awarded imprisonment for life to the appellant on the ground that there existed political differences between the appellant, Liaqat Ali and Muhammad Ashraf, deceased. Such-like consideration or ground cannot be a mitigating circumstance for awarding lesser punishment. If a lesser punishment is awarded in a case of capital punishment merely on the ground that there exist political difference between the parties, then shall amount to giving an open licence to all to kill innocent people on that flimsy and easily available ground. Basic principles or the foundations of the democratic institutions are based on tolerance. The views, of the political opponents are to be heard and understood with patience and forbearance. These are not to be silenced by killing the holders of such views by applying violent means. This, therefore, cannot be a valid ground for not giving the normal penalty of death in murder cases. Faced with this situation, learned' counsel attempted to argue that Liaqat Ali was minor at the time of occurrence and as such, he was entitled to be given lesser sentence. There was no evidence having been produced by him to show that Liaqat Ali was minor when he committed the offence. The heavy burden was on him to prove his minority during trial on the basis of credible evidence. His simple statement, without proof, was not enough to give him the relief asked for. In the circumstances, Criminal Appeal No.403 of 1994 is accepted. In the result, sentence of death is hereby awarded to Liaqat Ali to meet the ends of law and justice. He shall be hanged by neck till he is proclaimed to be dead. In consequence, the connected Criminal Appeal No. 123 of 1995 is dismissed. The similar view held in the case titled Hamid Mahmood and another v. The State and another (2013 SCMR 1314) and the relevant paragraph is reproduced for ready reference:

20. In the instant case, the accused were involved in a brutal murder of a young boy who had been kidnapped by them for ransom. The accused persons were well known to the abductee, hence; apparently the accused had no intention of ever releasing the abductee on the receipt of ransom to avoid the risk of identification and capture. A heinous crime has been committed, which is a factor to be taken into consideration for determination of the sentence to be awarded and in the cases of brutal premeditated murder of a young child, death sentence appears to be appropriate, as has been held by this Court in the case, reported as Talib Hussain v. The State (1995 SCMR 1538). In the said case on account of the murder of a young boy, the sentence of life imprisonment was enhanced to sentence of death.

12. Additionally, the theory of deterrence is a factor to be taken into consideration, while awarding the sentence specially, the sentence of death and in this behalf, reference can be made to the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, reported as Khurram Malik and others v. The State and others (PLD 2006 SC 354), wherein it was held that:

16. It is also to be noted that justice is not for one but is for all and while examining the case of convict, the court owe a duty to the legal heirs/relatives of the convict and also to the society that justice should also be done with them as well, thus the sentence should be such which should serve as deterrent for the like minded person as observed G in the case of Muhammad Saleem v. The State PLD 2002 SC 558 amd State v. Farhan Ali PLD 1995 SC

1. Similar view to the extent of deterrence held in case titled Hamid Mahmood and another v. The State and another (2013 SCMR 1314), and the relevant paragraph is reproduced for ready reference:

25. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the considerations pertaining to quantum of sentence, have been examined. The reasons for the award of the death penalty far out weight the considerations for the award of lesser sentence. The tender age of the minor, the brutal and heinous nature of the crime and pre-mediation persuades us to agree with the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court as well as the learned High Court. The deterrent aspect of the sentence cannot be lost sight of either as it was a crime of kidnapping for ransom of minor, followed by murder. In such an eventuality, the normal sentence of death should be awarded and the Court should neither hesitate nor search for laboured pretexts to award a lesser sentence, as has been held by this Court, in the case, reported as Muhammad Sharif (Supra). Furthermore, it is also held in the case titled Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) and the relevant portion of the paragraph is provided as under:

16. Lastly, it was urged that assuming that the court was inclined to act upon the testimony of the first witness and to record a conviction for murder as against the first appellant, the court should not impose the extreme penalty of law and in the state of the record as it is, the lesser punishment provided by law should be deemed to meet the ends of justice. We cannot accede to this line of argument. The first question which the court has to consider in a case like this, is whether the accused has been proved, to the satisfaction of the court, to have committed the crime. If the court is convinced about the truth of the prosecution story, conviction has to follow. The question of sentence has to be determined, not with reference to the volume or character of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the prosecution case, but with reference to the fact whether there are any extenuating circumstances which can be said to mitigate the enormity of the crime. If the court is satisfied that there are such mitigating circumstances, only then, it would be justified in imposing the lesser of the two sentences provided by law. In other words, the nature of the proof has nothing to with the character of the punishment. The nature of the proof can only bear upon the question of conviction - whether or not the accused has been proved to be guilty. If the court comes to the conclusion that the guilt has been brought home to the accused, and conviction follows, the process of proof is at an end. The question as to what punishment should be imposed is for the court to decide in all the circumstances of the case with particular reference to any extenuating circumstances. But the nature of proof, as we have indicated, has nothing to do with the question of punishment. In this case, there are no such extenuating circumstances which can be legitimately urged in support of the view that the lesser penalty under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, should meet the ends of justice. It was a cold-blooded murder. The accused came for the second time, determined to see that their victim did not possibly escape the assassins' hands.

13. In the case of accused Sanaullah, it is clear that the accused does not deserve any leniency as granted by the trial court, particularly considering the principles established in Emperor v. Nga Tha Hmwe and others (AIR 1935 Rang. 504). The facts surrounding this case demonstrate that the murder was both deliberate and premeditated, and shocking, leaving no room for mitigating circumstances that would warrant a lesser sentence. The leniency shown in this case, where it is not deserved, constitutes a serious dereliction of the court's duty to administer justice. Therefore, under the established legal principles, the court must impose the maximum penalty of death, reflecting the seriousness of the crime committed and the necessity for justice to be served without undue leniency. The same principle is also discussed in the case titled Emperor v. Nga Tha Hmwe and others (AIR 1935 Rang 504):

6. The murder was committed not in selfdefence, nor in retreat, but was it only before the house was even attacked in order to intimidate the house owner and the neighbouring villagers. section 396 I.P.C., was expressly enacted in order to punish with the utmost severity of the law crimes of this very description. The dacoits were more heavily armed than usual, and were undoubtedly a desperate set of men. They must have known from the outset that murder was likely to be committed if there was any opposition, and a fortiori if murder was committed unprovoked there is all the more reason not to refrain from inflicting the extreme penalty. It has been urged that this penalty should not be inflicted in the case of the appellant Tha Hmwe, who after it was committed, seems to have so far repented, or so far been afraid of the consequences, that he deterred the dacoits from setting fire to the house-owner, and asked them to move the children to the bed-room to guard them against stray shots, I consider however that that would be a pure matter of grace or clemency, and that this Court would not be justified in not inflicting the extreme sentence on him also. For these reasons this appeal will be dismissed, and in revision the sentences under S. 396, I.P.C., on the four appellants will be enhanced to ones directing that they be hanged by the neck until they are dead."

14. Additionally, the eye-witnesses, PW-4 and PW-5, are credible and natural witnesses whose presence at the crime scene is both plausible and justified. Their testimony is further supported by the fact that they apprehended the accused at the graveyard, where the deceased minor's body was found lying next to the grave being dug by Sanaullah. The statements of these eye-witnesses are consistent and free of significant contradictions, reinforcing the reliability of their accounts. Importantly, it is acknowledged that PW-4 and PW-5 are neither relatives of the complainant nor do they harbor any enmity or ill will towards the accused, particularly Sanaullah. This lack of bias enhances the credibility of their testimony. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has similarly recognized the reliability of eye-witness accounts in cases where witnesses have no motive to falsify, The Honourable Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt with clear and concrete evidence. The court observed that the eye-witnesses remained firm during cross-examination, and their accounts were corroborated by medical evidence and other supporting circumstantial factors. Therefore, the evidence in this case is credible and deserving of trust, consistent with the principles established by the Supreme Court regarding the evaluation of eye-witness testimony. In conclusion, the evidence presented above is both reliable and credible. The Supreme Court also expressed a similar view in the case titled Zahid Imran and others v. The State and others (PLD 2006 SC 109), and the relevant portion of the paragraph is reproduced here for reference:

14. Let we make it clear at the outset and as mentioned above that we agree with the conclusion of learned trial and first appellate Courts that the prosecution has proved the guilt to the hilt by producing cogent ant! concrete evidence but we have serious reservations qua the application of section 316, P.P.C., factum of sentence and applicability of sections 6 and 7 of the Act, 1997. As pointed earlier the prosecution has established its case beyond shadow of doubt. In this regard the statements of Ishtiaq Ahmad (P.W.11) and Khalid Hussain (P.W.12) can be referred. They were eye-witnesses and it transpired from an in-depth scrutiny of their statements that they have fully supported the prosecution case. They remained firm during the test of cross-examination and in spite of various searching questions, lengthy and an exhaustive cross-examination, nothing beneficial rendering any help to the case of appellants could be elicited. They had no rancour, enmity or ill-will against the appellants and hence the question of their false involvement D does not arise specially when three accused were apprehended at the spot. Their version also finds support from the medical evidence, motive, factum of recovery and absconsion. Being worthy of credence and confidence-inspiring, their evidence has rightly been appreciated and believed by the learned trial Court determination whereof has been upheld by the appellate Court under different sections of Penal Code. Ishtiaq Ahmad (P.W.11) and Khalid Hussain (P.W.12), by no stretch of imagination, can be declared as chance witnesses, as pressed time and against by Mr. Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of appellants, because they have rendered a plausible justification for their presence at the place of occurrence. Furthermore, it has also been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case titled Imran Ali v. The State (2018 SCMR 1372) and the relevant paragraph is produced herein below:

4. As regards the sentences passed by the trial court against the petitioner which sentences had subsequently been upheld and confirmed by the High Court we may observe that the crimes committed by the petitioner were absolutely horrendous and barbaric and the same had been committed with a minor and innocent girl aged about 7/8 years. The petitioner had not only deceitfully kidnapped her but had also brutalized her by committing sodomy and rape with her and had then ultimately killed her mercilessly. In his pleading guilty to the charge as well as in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. the petitioner had admitted committing similar offences with eight other minor victims and in that backdrop the petitioner did not deserve any sympathy in the matter of his sentences.

15. Given the above, the appeal filed by the appellant, Sanaullah, is without merit; therefore, it is dismissed. The revision petition filed by the complainant (father of the deceased) of enhancement of sentence is allowed. The conviction awarded by the learned trial court (Sessions Judge Sariab Division, Quetta), vide judgment dated June 15, 2024, is maintained, however, sentence awarded to the appellant (convict) Sanaullah is enhanced from life imprisonment to capital punishment of death. The appellant (convict) shall be hanged by the neck until he is dead. JK/83/Bal. Appeal dismissed.