2004 PLP 867 (CLC)

In order to appreciate, whatever has been stated at the bar and in the pleadings, it would be necessary to refer to certain sections of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001. Section 148 of S.L.G.O. 2001, deals with the elections of members of the various Local Councils and the Nazims and Naib‑Nazims in such Council, The section reads as follows:‑‑ "Section

148. Franchise.‑‑‑ (1) Members of a Union Council including Union Nazim and Naib‑Nazim shall be elected through elections based on adult franchise and on the basis of separate electorate. (2) The Electoral College for the election of Zila Nazim and Naib Zila Nazim and reserved seats of women, peasants and workers, and minorities in the Zila Council shall be all the members of Union Councils in the District including Union Nazims and Naib Union Nazims. (3) The Electoral College for the election of a Taluka Nazim, Town Nazim, Taluka Naib‑Nazim, Town Naib‑Nazim and reserved seats of women, peasants and workers, and minorities in the Taluka Council and Town Council shall be all the members of the Union Councils in the Taluka or, as the case may be, Town including Union Nazims and Naib Union Nazims: Provided that for the election for reserved seats for women in Zila Council proportionately divided among Talukas or Towns shall be all members of the Union Councils in a Taluka, or, as the case may be, Town. Explanation. For the purpose of this section, all members of Union Councils notified as returned candidates in the elections held under this Ordinance shall be deemed to be members of the Electoral College." Section 156 of S.L.G.O. 2001, deals with the bye‑election for the vacant seats of the Local Councils and reads as under:‑‑ "

156. Election to vacant seats.‑‑‑ (1) If a seat of a member becomes vacant during the term of office of a Council, a new member shall be elected through bye‑election and the member elected in bye‑election shall hold office for the remaining portion of the term of the Council. (2) If any seat reserved for women remains vacant, the same shall be filled through bye‑elections and the elected women member shall hold office for the remaining portion of the term of the Council. (3) All bye‑elections shall be held once a year on a date or dates fixed by the Chief Election Commissioner. (3‑A) The period of one year referred to in subsection (3) shall be computed from the date of assumption of office of the Council: Provided that in the year in which General Elections are to be held the bye‑election may be held within eighteen months. (4) A vacancy of Union Nazim or Naib‑Nazim shall be filled through bye‑election (within as far as) practicable one hundred and twenty days of the occurrence of vacancy as provided in subsection (1) of section 148. (5) A vacancy of Zila Nazim, Naib Zila Nazim, Taluka Nazim or Town Nazim, Naib Taluka Nazim or Naib Town Nazim shall be filled through bye‑election (within, as far as practicable one hundred and twenty days) of one occurrence of vacancy as provided in subsection (2) and (3) of section 148. (6) When the office of a Zila Nazim, Taluka Nazim or Town Nazim falls vacant, the members of the concerned Council shall by a majority vote elect an officiating Nazim from amongst its members as provided in section 48 and 68, respectively, and the person so elected shall continue to retain his office as a member also: Provided that the officiating Nazim shall not be a candidate in the bye‑election held for election of the Nazim. (7) When the office of a Union Nazim, falls vacant, the members of the concerned Council shall by a majority vote elect an officiating Union Nazim from amongst its members and the person so elected shall continue to retain his office as a member also: Provided the officiating Nazim shall not be a candidate in the bye‑election held for election of the Union Nazim. " The counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following case law:‑‑ In the case of Irfan Akhtar Shah v. Election Tribunal District Shahpur PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 189 the Lahore High Court has held that: ‑‑ "The term `election' as employed in paragraph 1 of Part II. When the law requires that certain process have to be completed. The legal process of election. Until this is done the process remain incomplete. `Mere poll' does not mean `election' and could not be intended to be such by the author of the Order. " (c) Writ Certiorari Misconstruction and misinterpretation of relevant provisions of law Patent illegality certiorari issued election case ‑Constitution of Pakistan (1956). " In the case of (Chaudhri) Salah‑ud‑Din M.L.A. Member District Board, Gujranwala v. (1) Haji Ghulam Muhammad, Member District Board, Gujranwala (2) Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala and (3) Ch. Nabi Ahmad, Member District Board, Gujranwala (Ex‑Chairman District Board, Gujranwala), it has been held that:‑‑ "The question before the High Court would in the exercise of writ jurisdiction hold that the meeting was whether the result of election was materially announced by any circumstances known to the Election as cognizable is a matter within jurisdiction of an Commissioner and not within writ jurisdiction of the Court. " In the case of Lt.‑Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan through The Secretary Department of Agriculture Government of West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98 it has been held that:‑‑ "An election dispute is a dispute raised by a voter or a defeated candidate in his individual capacity under the statute. It determines the private rights of two persons to the same office but a proceeding for an information in the nature of quo warranto is invoked in the public interest. The latter seeks to determine the title to the office and not the validity of 'the election. These are two distinct and independent remedies for enforcing independent rights, and the mere fact 'that the disqualification has been overlooked or what is worse, illegally condoned by the authorities who were responsible for properly scrutinizing a person's right to be enrolled as a voter or his right to be validly nominated for election would not prevent a person from challenging in the public interest his right to sit in the house even after his election if that disqualification is still continuing. Indeed a writ of quo warranto or a proceeding in the nature of an information for a quo warranto unless expressly barred by some statute, is available precisely for such a purpose. Thus, as stated in Halsbury's Law of England, Third Edn. Vol. II, p.148 "even in a case where an election petition is the only remedy when the election is objected to on the ground that the person whose election is questioned was disqualified at the time of elections yet the remedy by injunction in lieu of quo warranto is available where a person becomes disqualified after election or where there is a continuing disqualification in other words where the objection is a continuous holding of the office by the person disqualified. There is no reason why relief by way of quo warranto should not be available in a case where the remedy by way of an election petition is no longer possible or is not the appropriate remedy or the disqualification is a continuing one which debars a person not only from being elected to an office. It. was further held where constitutionality was challenged Courts were not debarred from enquiring into such questions." (f) Constitution of Pakistan (1962) Article 178(4)(a) Expression 'public interest" Government alone best Judge to determine." In the case of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge and Returning Officer, Sindh and 13 others PLD 1994 Kar. 1, it has been hold that: "(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Articles 199 and 225 Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 whether barred by Article 225 of the Constitution does not bar exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution till actual election takes place; otherwise, by penalty illegal orders passed by any Authority purporting to act under Election Laws, a person, otherwise entitled to take part in elections could be deprived of his rights and then required to wait till election was over and then file election petition for redress of his grievances against alleged illegal or mala fide order passed much earlier to the actual date of election. Once the election process has been started by the announcement of election schedule, High Court mindful of its duty in that respect could legitimately be expected to desist from interfering in the election process, unless it was entirely imperative to do so in the interest of justice, maintenance of purity of elections supremacy of law and to prevent arbitrariness." In the case of Kartar Singh Sadda Singh and another v. The State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union and others AIR (38) 1951 Pepsu 141 C.N. 55 it has been held that:‑‑ "(c) Pepsu Judicature Ordinance (sint.2005) S.60‑‑‑Power of H.C. to issue directions‑Const. Ind., Art.226. Power is given by S.60 to the H.C. to issue directions or orders in the nature of writs of habeas corpus, etc.; or any of them for the enforcement of rights as are given by any law for the time being in force. Therefore, as the right of the voters and the candidates for Municipal Elections is a right given by the Municipal Act, the H.C. has the power to grant proper relief to the petitioners. Petitioning the H.C. against an illegal order of the Deputy Commissioner, stopping the elections and polling sine die. This power is irrespective of the power given by Art.226 of the Constitution." In the case of Bibi Supply Co. Petitioner v. Union of India and others (1956) SC 479 (S) AIR V 43 C 83 (June) it has been held that:‑‑ "(a) Constitution of India, Art. 14‑‑‑Reasonable classification for purposes of legislation. It is now well‑established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well‑established that Art.14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure (1955) 1 SCR 1945, Reiterated. Per Bose, J.‑‑‑Despite the constant endeavour of Judges to deline the limits of the law contained in Art.

14. I am unable to deduce any clear‑cut principle from the oft‑repeated formula of classification. Article 14 sets out an attitude of mind, a way of life, rather than a precise rule of law. It embodies a general awareness in the consciousness of the people at large of something that exists and which is very real but which cannot be pinned down to any precise analaysis of fact save to say in a given case that it falls this side of the line or that, and because of that decisions on the same point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of the country and another somewhere else; one decision today and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered and the structure of current social thinking is different. It is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of the times and Art.14 narrows down to a question of fact which must be determined by the highest Judges in the land as each case arises. One can conceive of classifications that conform to rules and yet which are bad; classifications made in the utmost good faith; classification that are scientific and rational, that will have direct and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and yet which are bad because despite all that the object itself cannot be allowed on the ground that if offends Art.

14. In such a case the object itself must be struck down and not the mere classification which, after all, is only a means of attaining the end desired." In the case of Haji Rehan‑ud‑Din v. Farooq A. Sheikh and others PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 719 the Lahore High Court has held that:‑‑ "Election set aside on writ petition‑‑‑Election ordered‑‑ Ineligible members allowed to vote after complying with (new) directions of High Court." The very concept of the Local Government, system envisages participation of the local populous in the Local Government and it is with the same spirit that the present system of Local Government has been evolved, as codified by the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001. Section 148 of S.L.G.O. 2001, provides for the election of the members of the Union Council including Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazims, based on adult franchise and through separate electorate. Whereas subsection (2) of said section; requires that the Zila Nazim and Naib Zila Nazim and the Council members for the reserved seats of women, peasant, workers and minorities in the Zila Council, be elected through a Electoral College, constituted of all the members of the Union Councils B in the District, including Union Nazims and Naib Union Nazims. Similarly in term of subsection (3) thereof the Electoral College for the elections of Taluka Nazim, Town Nazim, Taluka Naib‑Nazim, Town Naib‑Nazim and reserved seats of women, peasant, workers and minorities in the Taluka Council, and Town Councils are required to be elected through a Electoral College constituted of all the members of the Union Council in the Taluka or as the case may be, Town including, Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim. Section 156 of S.L.G.O., 2001, as it stands today, requires that in the event, a seat of a member in a Council falls vacant during the terms of that Council, the same shall be filled, through bye‑election. Subsection (3) of section 156 requires that such bye‑election shall be held once a year on a date or dates, fixed by the Chief Election Commissioner. Whereas in terms of subsection 3(a) of the said section, the period of one year has to be computed from the date of assumption of the office of the Council. It is, however, provided that C in the year in which general elections are to be held, bye‑elections may be held within 18 months. The plain reading of section 156 S.L.G.O., 2001 shows, that election to a vacant seat of a member of a Council is to be filled up through bye‑election, essentially within a period of one year. However, such period of one year may be extended to 18 months, in the event only, where general elections are to be held during the relevant year. Thus, the election for vacant seats of a Council can, at best be delayed for a period upto 18 months and that too upon a contingency, otherwise a vacant seat is to be filled up through bye‑election within a period of one year from the date it falls vacant. Although in terms of, subsections (4) and (5) of section 156, vacant seats of Union Nazim, Zilal Nazim, Taluka Nazim, Town Nazim and Naib Town Nazim of such Council are to be filled up through bye‑election within 120 days from the date any of these offices fall vacant however, the insertion of `the words "as far as practicable" in the above subsections, clearly shows that the adherence to such time frame, for bye‑elections of the post of Nazim and Naib‑Nazim, is not mandatory and same has to be implemented, so far it is practicable. Whereas in contrast to that, adherence to the time frame for the bye‑election for the seat of the members of the Local Councils, is mandatory. It is an admitted fact that, presently, as many as 104 seats are lying vacant in the various Councils in Khairpur District, since last about more than two years and the process of bye‑election for such seats has not even been initiated so far. The only explanation submitted by the respondents for such indolence is, that steps are being taken for the preparation of electoral rolls on separate electorate basis, for conducting elections for Union Councils and that upon finalization of the process. Bye‑elections for the seats of Union Council shall be held as soon as possible. The above does not justify delaying of election for the seats of the Union Council in violation of the mandate of section 156 of S.L.G.O. more so for the reason that S.L.G.O., 2001 provides for elections for the seats of the members of Local Council on the basis of separate electorate and not on the basis of joint electorate. Mr. Awan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has in support of his contention, relied upon the definition of "Electoral College" as mentioned in Black's Law Dictionary. Electoral College has been defined in the said dictionary, as the College or Body of the electors of a State chosen to elect the President and Vice‑President also, whole body of such electors composed of all the Electoral Colleges of several stages. Although the above definition is with reference to the U.S Constitution. However, such definition is universal. If a Electoral College is constituted of the members of a certain body, it is the whole body, that constitute such College. The Electoral College for elections of the Naib Zila Nazim, in terms of subsection (2) of section 148, S.L.G.O., is constituted of all the members of the various Union Councils in a District, including Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim. A shortfall off 104 members from the Electoral College, is substantial and in the event elections to the office of Naib Zila Nazim are held without filling such seats, through bye‑elections as required by law it would prevent such voters of the Constituency in the District who, at present, are unrepresented, owing to above vacancies, who shall be deprived of their right to choose a Naib Zila Nazim through their duly elected members, who in turn would have been entitled to vote for the office of Naib Zila Nazim and even to contest election for such office. Thus, holding of election without first filling up the 104 seats of the Electoral College, as required by law, would result in disenfranchisement of a large population/voters of the District Khairpur and would negate the very concept of local` governance. As regards the objections to the maintainability of the present petition, it may be noted that the petitioners, admittedly, are the registered voters from the District Khairpur and their fundamental right to elect their chosen representatives to an important office of their Local Government is being affected through the proposed elections. The petitioners are therefore, justly concerned with and have every right to challenge the same. The unreported judgments of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, relied upon by the respondents, is not applicable to the present case, as through the said judgment a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court has dismissed the petition for its having become infructuous. In view of the foregoing we hold that the impugned Notification for the election to the office of Naib Zila Nazim in the circumstances is illegal. We direct the respondents to withdraw the same and immediately commence the process of election in respect of the seats presently lying vacant in the various Councils of the District Khairpur and thereafter proceed to hold the elections for the office of Naib Zila Nazim, District Khairpur and only after the returned candidates in the bye‑election‑for the said Council have been duly notified. The petition stands disposed of in foregoing reasons. M.H./A‑28/K Order accordingly.