2023 PLP 1536 (CLD)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ DOGAR, J.

Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is being decided.

2. Briefly the facts of the case are that respondent No.2, Muhammad Bilal Ahmad in his capacity as Legal Officer Telenor Microfinance Bank (formerly Tameer Microfinance Bank Limited) filed an application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. for seeking a direction for registration of criminal case against the petitioner, with the allegation of dishonestly issuing a cheque amounting to Rs.3,85,002/- pleading that the said cheque had been issued by the petitioner towards repayment of loan and was dishonoured on presentation. Respondent No.3/learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace vide order dated 23.06.2023 while allowing the application of respondent No.2 issued a direction to the Station House Officer concerned to record the statement of respondent-bank and to proceed with it in accordance with law.

3. Before alluding to the facet of the matter, following moot points must be taken into consideration while deciding the matter which is as follows:- a. Can a cheque be drawn on any other institution but for a bank? b. Is the offence contemplated by section 489-F, P.P.C. only applicable in respect of cheques issued by banks? c. Is Section 489-F, P.P.C. applicable in respect of other negotiable instruments? d. What is the pith and substance of section 489-F, P.P.C. or for that matter what is the dominant object of the said provision? e. Does section 489-F, P.P.C. qualify as a law that only relates to banking companies and financial institutions or whether it is a law promulgated to govern dealings between private individuals? f. Whether the offence contemplated by section 20(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is completely different than the offence envisaged by section 489-F, P.P.C.? g. Whether the have-nots have a carte blanche to issue cheques that are dishonoured on their presentation?

4. Undoubtedly, respondent/Telenor Microfinance Bank is a Microfinance bank operating in terms of section 2(i)(a) of Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 ("MIO, 2001") and is providing microfinance services in accordance with section 2(j) and section 6 of Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001. Such Institutions/banks have been established with the specific purpose i.e. ".....for providing organizational, financial and infrastructural support to poor persons....." as provided in the preamble of Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001.

5. It is the case of the petitioner that he obtained loan from respondent/Telenor Microfinance Bank, which is established with a purpose to provide Micro Credit, therefore, in case of dispute between Telenor Microfinance Bank and its customers, criminal proceedings could not be initiated and the only course available to the said bank is to file a complaint before the Banking Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on "Mureed Hussain v. Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace, Jampur" (2014 PCr.LJ 1146).

6. On the other hand, learned Law Officer as well as the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank have opposed this constitutional petition by arguing that per force of section 3 of the Microfinance Ordinance, 2001, the Banking Companies Ordinance and any other law for the time being in force relating to banking companies or financial institution shall not apply to microfinance institutions, as microfinance institutions cannot be deemed to be a banking company for the purpose of said ordinance, therefore, no other remedy under the Banking Laws was available and there was no bar for the respondent Bank to have recourse to the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, and the order impugned is perfectly in accordance with law. Guidance can be sought for in cases reported as "Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. FIA and others" (2017 SCMR 1218) and "Muhammad Asif Nawaz v. ASJ and others" (PLJ 2013 Lahore 606), "Muhammad Tuseef and 4 others v. The State Bank of Pakistan and others" (2018 CLD 1196) "Syed Itrat Hussain Rizvi v. Messrs Tameer Microfinance Bank Limited and others" (2018 CLD 116) and "Telenor Mirco Finance Bank Limited v. The State and others" (2020 CLD 359).

7. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as learned Law Officer have been heard. File has been perused.

8. In order to answer the questions noted above, it has been observed that the word "Cheque" has not been defined in P.P.C. and hence, resort has to be made to Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the following provisions of which define that what instrument would constitute a Cheque, which in turn, could form the subject of application of section 489-F of P.P.C.: 6. "Cheque". A "cheque" is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand. 3 (b) "banker" means a person transacting the business of accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of or deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand otherwise withdrawable by cheque, draft, order, or otherwise, and includes any Post Office Savings Bank.

9. Obviously, sections 2(i)(a), 2(j) and 6 of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 sufficiently authorize a person to open and operate bank accounts, accept deposits in such bank accounts and make payments against instruments drawn on such bank accounts, it can be safely termed as a "banker" and cheques issued by the same, if dishonoured, can attract the provisions of section 489-F, P.P.C. However, that the purpose and aim of establishment of the respondent-bank is limited to support persons with meagre means of subsistence and no criminal proceedings against such Customers (for whose alleviation the respondent-bank was established) were intended by the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001. The question whether the impugned order against the petitioner is without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set-aside or it falls within domain of local police the similar proposition time and again came under consideration before this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court whereby in the leading case referred by learned counsel for the respondents "Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal investigation Agency and others" (2017 SCMR 1218) it was laid down that provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 shall have over-riding effect and forum competent to try such offences would be the Banking Court constituted under the provisions of above referred Ordinance. In order to evaluate this aspect, section 7(b) of F.I.O., 2001 is necessary to reproduce as:- "

7. Powers of Banking Courts.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, a Banking Court shall: (a)- - - (b) in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, try offences punishable under this Ordinance, and shall, for this purpose have the same powers as are vested in a Court of Sessions under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898). Provided that a Banking Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Ordinance except upon a complaint in writing made by a person authorized in this behalf by the financial institution in respect of which the offence was committed".

10. To answer the question about the constitution of offence under section 489-F, P.P.C. and said section provides as 'Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque.

11. From a literal reading of section 489-F of P.P.C. it appears that for an offence to be made out, it is essential that all three elements are simultaneously present and discernible from the respondent's application i.e. (i) issuance of cheque with a dishonest intention i.e. having knowledge that the recipient of the cheque is entitled to receive proceeds of the cheque and that the account upon which the said cheque is drawn is insufficiently funded, (ii) issued cheque must be for the purpose of repayment of a loan i.e. for shedding off a liability which has already accrued in favour of the recipient and against the drawer of the cheque and (iii) dishonouring of the cheque. The necessity of the presence of all three elements has been stressed upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Mian Allah Ditta v. The State and others" (2013 SCMR 51): "4...... Every transaction where a cheque is dishonored may not constitute an offence. The foundational elements to constitute an offence under this provision are issuance of a cheque with dishonest intent, the cheque should be towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation and lastly that the cheque in question is dishonoured."

12. The contention that the respondent-Telenor Microfinance Bank is not a Scheduled Bank and hence cheques issued by the respondent-Bank do not pass the test of section 489-F of P.P.C. supposes albeit wrongly that the cheques drawn on the respondent-bank are not "cheques" for the purpose of section 489-F of P.P.C. What is a cheque is defined in Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 through sections 3(b) and 6, reproduced above.

13. The services that the respondent-bank is allowed to render and functions that it is authorized to perform as provided in sections 2(i)(a), 2(j) and 6 of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001: "2(i)(a) "microfinance bank" means an institution licensed by State Bank under this Ordinance to establish and operate as microfinance bank; 2(j) "microfinance services" means the financial and other related services specified in section 6, the value of which does not exceed such amount as the State Bank may, from time to time, determine;

6. Functions and powers: (1) A microfinance institution shall, in accordance with prudential regulations and subject to the terms and conditions of the license issued by the State bank, render assistance to micro-enterprises and provide microfinance services in a sustainable manner to poor persons, preferably poor women, with a view to alleviating poverty. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the powers and functions of microfinance institutions shall be:- a) to provide financing facilities, with or without collateral security, in cash or in kind, for such terms and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, to poor persons for all types of economic activities including housing, but excluding business in foreign exchange transactions, except to receive remittances from abroad payable only in Pakistan Rupees to beneficiaries in Pakistan subject to rules and regulations and authorization issued by State Bank of Pakistan from time to time. b) to accept deposits. c) to accept pledges, mortgages, hypothecations or assignments to it of any kind of movable or immovable property for the purpose of securing loans and advances made by it; g) to provide storage and safe custody facilities; k) to provide services and facilities to customers to hedge various risks relating to microfinance activities; p) to pay, receive, collect and remit money and securities within the country; v) to undertake mobile banking to expedite transactions and reduce costs; x) to receive grants from the government and any other sources permitted by the State Bank; and y) to generally do and perform all such acts, deeds and things as may be necessary, incidental or conducive to the fulfillment of their functions and the attainment of their objectives;

14. Besides, section 4 of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 lays down that microfinance banks are established only after issuance of a license to operate as such by the State Bank of Pakistan ("SBP"). The said license is granted by SBP under sections 12 and 13 of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 and similarly can be cancelled by SBP under section 13A. Respondent-Bank is recognized by SBP as its member Financial Institution and its name reflects among the recognized microfinance banks. It also provides regular banking services like opening and operation of current and savings accounts, issuance of cheque books and debit cards to its members/customers for withdrawal of money from their accounts and hence is covered under the definition of "banker" as given in section 3(b) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

15. On the other hand, what is a scheduled bank is defined in sections 2(m) and 37 of the SBP Act, 1956: "2 (m) "scheduled k" means a bank for the time being included in the list of banks maintained under subsection (1) of section 37.

37. Scheduled banks. (1) The Bank shall maintain at all its offices and branches an up-to-date list of banks declared by it to be scheduled banks under clause (a) of subsection (2). (2) The Bank shall, by notification, in the official Gazette- a) declare any bank to be scheduled bank which is carrying on the business of banking in Pakistan and which- (i) is a banking company as defined in section 227F of the Companies Act, 1913, or a co operative bank, or a corporation or a company incorporated by or established under any law in force in any place in or outside Pakistan; (ii) has a paid-up capital and reserves of an aggregate value of not less than five lakhs of rupees: Provided that in the case of a co-operative bank, an exception may be made by the Bank; (iii) satisfies the Bank that its affairs are not being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of its depositors;"

16. From a comparison of the provisions of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 and the SBP Act, 1956 it seems that both Scheduled Banks and microfinance banks provide services of acceptance of deposit by their customers and in turn obviously are bound to remit such deposits back to the depositor or any other person as per the direction of the depositor. The distinctive feature of a microfinance bank is that the value of its banking services is limited to the maximum limit defined by SBP [Section 2(j) of MIO, 2001 above] whereas no such limit is defined for the scheduled banks. The reason for such restriction for microfinance banks is apparent from the preamble of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 which states that such banks shall be established for specifically catering to the needs to citizens from lower social and financial strata of the society. For the said protection, the respondent-bank like all other microfinance banks is under an obligation to maintain depositors' protection fund under section 19.

19. Depositors protection fund

1. A microfinance institution shall, as required by the State Bank, establish and maintain depositors' protection fund or scheme for the purpose of providing security or guarantee to persons depositing money in such institution.

2. Five per cent of the annual after tax profits of a microfinance institution and profits earned on the investments of the fund shall be credited to the depositors' protection fund and such fund shall either be invested in Government securities or deposited with State Bank in a remunerative account.

3. The depositors' protection fund shall be used to make payment to the individual depositors with aggregate deposits of up to ten thousand rupees in case of liquidation of the microfinance institution."

17. The premium upon the deposit by the members/customers of the bank is an additional advantage provided to ensure the alleviation of citizens with low income and minimal financial resources. Such premium, however, does not hinder any other services provided under section 6 by the bank i.e. accepting and remitting deposits made by the members/customers.

18. Hence, both Scheduled Banks and microfinance Banks provide services of a banker in terms of section 3(j) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Microfinance banks, however, are modelled in a beneficial manner to provide, support for and uplift of, persons with less financial resources and hence, are bound to operate in a manner to ensure some advantage to such persons.

19. There is no legal provision in sight differentiating the status of cheques drawn on microfinance banks and scheduled banks and hence, distinction between two seems insignificant for the purpose of section 489-F. Respondent Bank does conduct regular banking business and Cheques issued by it are as much a Negotiable Instrument as those issued by any other Bank or Scheduled Bank and attract the provisions of section 489-F.

20. The basic and moot point of the subject matter is the effect of section 3(2) of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 and on a plain reading of the said section shows that it is intended to exclude the respondent-bank from the laws applicable to other Banking Companies and Financial Institutions and that a special law regulating the affairs of Microfinance Banks is devised in the form of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001. It is noteworthy, however, that only the application of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 is expressly excluded. The Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 was promulgated on 16.10.2001 i.e. after the enactment of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances Ordinance, 2001 on 30.08.2001, yet the exclusion of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 has not been expressly made. Section 3(2) also declares that a Microfinance Bank shall not be considered a Banking Company but not that it shall not be considered a Financial Institution for the purpose of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.

21. It is important to note here that the case reported as "Syed Itrat Hussain Rizvi v. Messers Tameer Micro Finance Bank Limited through Attorney and another" (2018 CLD 116) correctly exclude the application of the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 basing the decisions upon the interpretation of the words "any other law for the time being in force relating to .......... or financial institutions". But the said judgment does not consider whether provisions of section 489-F can also be taken as "law relating to financial institutions" following the same rationale applied in case of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001? The respondent-bank, is recognized by SBP as one of its regulated Financial Institutions. If the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 can be inferred to be impliedly excluded, should the same treatment be extended to section 489-F of P.P.C.? It needs more food for thoughts.

22. Although section 489-F was inserted in P.P.C. on 25.02.2002 i.e. after the promulgation of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investment Agency and others" (2017 SCMR 1218) has interpreted the words "for the time being in force" to mean all the existing and future laws: "10...... The phrase 'for the time being in force' [in section 1(2) of the Code] has been interpreted by a five member Bench of this Court in the judgment reported as (1) Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, and (2) Arif Iftikhar v. (1) Muhammad Sarfraz Administrator, Progressive Papers Ltd. (2) The Government of Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 585) to mean that it will apply not only to those existing statutes enacted in the past, but also to those which may be enacted in the future. Thus the Code does not affect any special laws including the Ordinance, 2001. 11.......We are not convinced by the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Ordinance, 2001 could not override section 489- F of the P.P.C. as the former law was promulgated on 30.08.2001 whereas the latter was inserted into the P.P.C. by way of amendment on 25.02.2002, because as mentioned above, the phrase "for the time being in force" applies to future enactments as well, thus mere insertion of a provision in a general law after the special law comes into force would not make the general law override the special law. Hence, irrespective of the time of insertion of section 489-F in the statute books, the special and hence, prevalent character of MIO, 2001 shall remain intact. Moreso because section 5 of P.P.C. itself recognizes that the provisions of P.P.C. shall not affect any special law i.e. no provision of P.P.C. shall be interpreted or applied in a way which hinders giving full effect to any provision of a special law.

5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended to repeal, vary, suspend or affect any of the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the State or of any special or local law.

23. It is noticeable that section 3(1) of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 states that "the provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to, and, save as hereinafter provided, not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force". But section 3(2) itself provides for the exclusion of laws and caters to the words of save as hereinafter provided. Whereas, the first part of section 3(2) of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 clearly ousts the application of any other law relating to financial institutions to the respondent-bank. Now the question which requires adjudication is if the term "relating to .... financial institution" in section 3(2) above can be deciphered in a way to mean that section 489-F of P.P.C. is such law relating to a financial institution such as the respondent-bank? If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, the application of Section 489-F shall stand ousted.

24. It is also noteworthy that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not provide for the establishment, purpose of establishment, functions or operations of a Financial Institution/Bank but merely provides for the remedies available to such Financial Institutions which come within the ambit of it, whereas the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 provides for the complete mechanism of formation, operation and the aim and purpose of such formation and operation of Microfinance Banks. The provision safeguards the right of private persons to whom, by way of repayment of loans, cheques are issued by other private persons with a dishonest intent.

25. In the case of banking companies covered in terms of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, there were two competing options available till the time this Court and the Hon'ble apex Court decided that for such banking companies and financial institutions to commence penal proceedings with respect to dishonouring of a cheque it was only the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and not section 489-F, P.P.C. which was the applicable law. It is in this context that the presence of section 20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was held to oust the application of section 489-F, P.P.C. and in the particular context and contours of cases involving banking companies and financial institutions other than microfinance institutions such as the respondent-bank.

26. It is jurisprudentially trite that both these provisions of law envisage two different situations. While section 20 deals with a cheque issued for securing repayment of finance to a bank, section 489-F, P.P.C. relates to a cheque, albeit of a bank, but issued between private parties. There is no comparison to be made and there are no competing provisions of law available because, as it is, the microfinance institutions have been held to fall outside the ambit of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Since the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 has already been judicially held to be not applicable to microfinance institutions, there are no competing provisions and a microfinance institution only has the facility contained in section 489-F, P.P.C. to fall back on in case a cheque issued to it for repayment of a loan is dishonoured. The remedy afforded by penal law in the present matter is only one i.e. afforded by section 489-F, P.P.C.!

27. However, most importantly, and of the essence is the fact that the phraseology employed in section 3(2) of the Microfinance Ordinance, 2001 does not just say 'any other law' but 'any other law relating to financial institutions or banking companies.' While section 489-F, P.P.C. does relate to banking companies and financial institutions inasmuch as cheques issued by such institutions are a subject of such provision but not exclusively at that and not as the only subject or object and in fact the dominant object of section 489-F, P.P.C. is geared towards ensuring protection of private parties. The operation of penal law cannot be ousted completely and the respondent-bank cannot be deprived of a remedy on the criminal side because that would attract clamours of discrimination by persons similarly situated as the respondent-bank and shall also fall foul of Articles 4, 10-A and 25 of the Constitution inasmuch as all persons are entitled to equal protection of laws and there cannot be any discrimination, reverse or otherwise, on the basis of financial or social status of a person.

28. The dominant object of section 489-F, P.P.C. is not focused on repayment of finances or loans to a banking company or a financial institution rather the thrust of section 489-F, P.P.C. is aimed at securing interests of a private party including even the respondent-bank to whom cheques are issued dishonestly and, hence, it follows that it is not a law that in its pith and substance exclusively relates to financial institutions or banking companies so as to attract the ouster contemplated by section 3(2) of the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001.

29. Even otherwise, the Pakistan Penal Code seeks to provide a general penal code for the country and has effect throughout it. Section 2 states that every person shall be liable to punishment thereunder for every act or omission contrary to its provisions. And the MIO, 2001 is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. Similarly, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sets out the general law relating to procedure for inquiry, investigation and trial of criminal cases and other ancillary matters. Section 5 thereof provides that it shall apply to all offences under the P.P.C. but for offences under other laws its provisions shall be applied subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner and place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offence.

30. Section 3(2) of MIO, 2001, reveals that it is intended to exclude the respondent-bank from the laws applicable to other Banking Companies and Financial Institutions and a special law regulating the affairs of Microfinance Banks is devised in MIO, 2001. There is no other law relating to banking companies application of which is in issue here. The law requiring deliberation here is only section 489-F, P.P.C. Also section 3(2) does not state that the respondent-bank cannot conduct business of a bank i.e. (acceptance of deposits and remission of proceeds) since the same is allowed by Section 6 and as long as the cheque issued by the bank are valid cheques in terms of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the respondent-bank is allowed to and does the business of a banker under the said Act, 1881, dishonouring of the said cheque will attract the provisions of section 489-F, P.P.C.

31. In "Muhammad Mumtaz Akhtar v. Additional Sessions Judge and others" (2014 PCr.LJ 1 = 2014 CLD 45), it has been held as follows:- "8. ..... It is again clear that jurisdiction with the Banking Court established under the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 would lie only when the bank/company is covered by the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinances, 2001, whereas in the instant case NRSP Microfinance Bank being only a microfinance institution and not being included in the list of Scheduled Banks, cannot take immunity from applicability of general law i.e Criminal Procedure Code.........

9. In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that microfinance institutions cannot be termed as financial institutions within the contemplation of the Financial institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to say that its matters could only be tried by the Banking Court. Thus, Code of Criminal Procedure being fully applicable, the application filed under sections 22-A/22-B, Cr.P.C. on behalf of the microfinance institution was fully competent and the impugned orders passed by the learned Ex-officio Justice of Peace do not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal error... .... "

32. It has been sought to be highlighted in the discourse above that the aim or object of section 489-F, P.P.C. is not recovery of loans but rather penalizing anyone who commits the crime envisaged by the provision. The rationale behind Ordinance or for that matter the aims and objects of the Microfinance Ordinance is to help the poor and, therefore, even if a person who is poor and socially not well placed commits the crime envisaged in section 489-F, P.P.C. he should not be punished because the said Section is inapplicable tantamouts to give a carte blanche to the poor to commit such a crime. Such a Benthamite interpretation cannot possibly be countenanced in a written constitutional setup which discourages discrimination and provides for equal protection of laws to all without distinguishing persons on the basis of status. Empathizing with the have-nots is all very well and noble but cannot be allowed to overtake or relegate to the backburner the command of the Constitution. 33 It has already been held by this Court in the case of "Maj. (Retd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiyani v. The State" (PLD 2006 Lahore 752) that section 489-F, P.P.C. applies to a case of an individual dishonestly issuing a cheque in favour of another private party and which cheque is subsequently dishonoured. If the private party happens to be a financial institution then, of course, the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 through section 20(4) shall take over it.

34. In view of what has been discussed above, this court has no hesitation to hold that microfinance institutions cannot be termed as financial institution within the contemplation of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to say that its matter could only be tried by the Banking Court. Thus, Code of Criminal Procedure being fully applicable, the application filed under sections 22-A/22-B on behalf of the Microfinance Bank was fully competent and the impugned order passed by learned Ex-officio Justice of Peace do not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal error. This constitutional petition is accordingly dismissed. MH/S-49/L Petition dismissed.