P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

(a) N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act (XIV of 1950), S. S(c) Words "measuring more than one kanal"‑Whether qualify immediate words "vacant site" or the word "house" as well-Whether it is obligatory on resident (minor or major) of village to occupy house in order to claim protection of S. 5(c)‑[Farid Khan v. Khawaja Mir, etc. Civil Revision No. 144 of 19,,3 (unreported) overruled]. In a suit for pre‑emption under the North‑West Frontier Province Pre‑emption Act, 1950, the questions mooted for discussion before the Court were: (i) Whether the words "measuring more than one kanal" in section 5(c) of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act, 1950 qualify the immediate words "vacant site" or also the word "house"?; and (ii) Whether for claiming protection of clause (c) of section 5 of the Act it is obligatory on the resident of the village whether he be a minor, living with his parents, or a major to occupy the house?: Held, on careful reading of the provision of section 5(c), the words "measuring more than one kanal" qualify the immediate words "vacant site" and do not govern the word "house". The first and the most compelling reason is that according to the undisputed rule of grammar the qualifying words govern the word or the term of expression immediately preceding and not more remote. The first canon of construction of statute is that we must take the language as it stands and if it is clear to give effect to it. It is not the duty of the Court to put a construction which seems to the Court to be the best in the sense that it would work out with most justice or with the least inconvenience but to put a construction which seems to the Court to be the best in sense i.e., nearest to the language of the Legislature. We are bound to look at the language used in the Act, constructing it with reference to the object with respect to which the Legislature has used that language, but constructing it in its ordinary grammatical sense, unless there is something in the subject‑matter or the context to show that it is to be understood in some other sense, and doing all this we are to say that what is the intention of the Legislature expressed by that language. Judging the material language of section 5(c) in the light of aforesaid canon of interpretation, it is clear that the language is free from any ambiguity and as such the plain language and grammatical construction namely, that the qualifying words govern the nearer words and not the remote, must be given effect to and it, therefore, follows that the words "measuring more than one kanal" do not govern the ‑ word "house". The second substantial reason is that the punctuations, including comma are not part of the statute. In the interpretation of statutes punctuation, not being a part of the statute to be construed, is not the determining factor and if the provision as punctuated leads to an absurd result or conflicts with some other provision of the statute which is unambiguous and free from doubt, the punctuation must yield to an interpretation that is reasonable and makes it consistent with the other provisions of the Act. The argument that if the qualifying words "measuring more than one kanal" are not held to govern the word "house", it would lead to "absurdity" or defeating the object of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act is equally fallacious, for the short and good reason that, as already indicated, the question of absurdity or defeating the object of the statute would come into play only if the language of the text is ambiguous, i.e., where the language is of doubtful meaning or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to some repugnance with some other provisions of the statute itself. It follows from the above discussion, that the real test in considering, whether a resident was entitled to the exemption, as contemplated by section 5(c), was that the resident should not own any house at all, and not that the house or houses owned by him, should individually measure less than one kanal. The concluding words of clause (c) "for his own occupation" mean that the resident must have bond fide intention of constructing a house. It is not necessary that he should construct the house within a specified time, much less that he should occupy it at once. To illustrate my point, it would be impossible for a vendee to occupy a house immediately in case of purchase of equity of redemption of a house, where the period of mortgage has not expired. Farid Khan v. Khawaja Mir, etc. Civil Revision No. 144 of 1953 (unreported) overruled. Muhammad Hassan v. Zaffar All Khan and others P 16 D 1962 Pesh. 199 considered. Ram Nandan v. State A I R 1959 All. 101; Robert Henry Leadon v. Ethel May Leadon and another A I R 1926 Oudh 319; Muhammad Hasan v. Zaffar Ali Khan and others P L D 1962 Pesh. 199; Sardar v. Feroz Din R. S. A. No. 105 of 1962 (unreported); Durand v. Durand 14 W R 416; Gale v. Gale (1911) 47 P R 1911 I C 487; Durand v. Durand (1920) 44 Bom. 924 and Yhema Agnes Kershaw v. Archibald Cyril Kershaw A I R 1930 Lah. 916 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes‑Language of enactment should be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense. In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or, in the circumstances with reference to which they are used to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense. In construing wills, and indeed statutes, a and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. Eastern Counties and London and Blackwell Railway Companies v. Marriage 31 L J Ex. 73 and Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island A I R 1921 P C 240 ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes‑ Punctuation ‑ Not part of statute. Lawis Pugh Evans v. Asbutosh Sen and others A I R 1929 P C 69 and Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Lahore A I R 1944 Lah. 353 ref. (d) Interpretation of statutes‑Words of enactment clear- Meaning of words should be followed even if they lead to manifest absurdity. If the words of an Act are clear we must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed an absurdity. A Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of provision, except, so far as it may help them in interpreting what the Legislature has said. Reg. v. Judge of the City of London Court (1892) 1 Q B 273 and Cooke v. Charles Vogeer Co. (1901) A C 102 ref. (e) N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act (XIV of 1950), Ss. 5(c) & 19 Exemption envisaged by S. 5(c)‑Absolute and irrevocable and not controlled by provisions of S. 19‑Person with superior rights of pre‑emption and entitled to protection under S. 5(c), joining in bargain vendee with no right or having inferior right of pre emption‑Does not forfeit benefit of exemption under S. 5 on doctrine of "sinker" laid down in S. 19. (f ) Interpretation of statutes‑No word should be read into statute which is not there. FAIZULLAH KHAN, J.‑The admitted facts giving rise to this Regular Second Appeal may be shortly stated. Defendants 1 to 8 on the basil of registered sale‑deed dated 10th of April 1956, registered on 17th April 1956, sold to defendants 9 to 12 a house situated in village Palsai, measuring about one Kanal 13 Marlas, ostensibly for Rs. 2,

000. Defendants 9 and 10, namely, Majid Khan and Muhammad Yusaf, 'minor sons of Mujahid Khan, were to get 2/3rd share in the house while the remaining 1/3rd share was to be shared in equal shares by Tehmas Khan and his brother Waris Khan, respectively, defendants 11 and 12.

2. Mujahid Khan and Nasrullah Khan brought a suit for a declaration that they were owners in possession of the suit house. In the alternative, they sued for possession by pre‑emption of the house on payment of Rs. 1,000.

3. The vendees, among other pleas, raised the plea that the sale was not pre‑emptible in that they were entitled to the protection of section 5, clause (c) of the North‑West Frontier Province Pre‑emption Act. The following issues were settled in the suit‑‑ (1) Whether the suit as laid is not competent? (2) Whether the suit is within time? (3) Whether the, suit is properly valued for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit house as being mortgagees for over 60 years? (5) Whether plaintiffs have got a superior right of pre emption ? (6) Whether the sum of Rs. 2,000 has been fixed in good faith or paid? (7) Market value? (8) Whether the sum of Rs. 1,000 was refunded by the vendors to the vendees after registration? (9) Whether the vendees have purchased the suit property for their own residential purposes and if so, with what effect? (10) Whether the vendees have made improvements in the suit property, if so, to what compensation, if any, are they entitled therefore? (11) Whether Mujabid Khan had purchased the suit property in the name of defendants Nos. 9 and 10 benami and if so, with what effect? (12) Relief. "I am riot in agreement with the reasoning of the learned Senior Sub‑Judge for the good reason that Mujahid Khan, father of‑the minor‑vendees, admitted in his evidence that the minor defendants were living with him in his own house and that tenants were living in the suit house on their behalf on payment of khakshora to him. Now this showed beyond all doubts that the minor defendants who had purchased 2/3rd share in the suit house did not need it for their own occupation. They were living with their father and their share was occupied by the tenants. The learned counsel for the appellants (respondents) argued at great length maintaining that the minors had no‑ house of their own ‑and were living with their father and that as‑ such they could avail of the provisions of section

5. I am not in agreement with this argument for the simple reason that in case we extend the benefit of section 5 of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act, 1950 to purchase made by minors living with their guardians not needing the property for their own use, we shall then be going against the intention of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature by enacting section 5 of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act, in my opinion, was to protect only purchases made by such unfortunate persons who neither owned a house or a vacant site measuring not more than two Kanals in the village where they resided and were in need of some residential house or site for their own use. Section 5 of the Pre‑emption Act, to my mind, cannot be used in favour of a minor purchaser living with his father. If we do so we shall not only be going against the clear intention of the Legislature but shall be rendering the law of Pre‑emption ineffective, as then with a view to defeat pre emption purchases will be made in favour of minors. At any rate the meaning of section 5 of the Pre-emption Act is clear providing protection to a purchase made by a resident of a village in which the agricultural land or village immovable property sold is situated, where neither he owns a house or a vacant site measuring more than one Kanal for constructing a house for his own occupation. Now in the present case the two minor defendants 9 and 10 did not need the 2/3rd share of the suit house purchased by them for their own occupation and as such the sale in their favour is not covered by section 5 of the Pre‑emption Act." The vendees feeling aggrieved have come up on appeal.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously argued that the learned District Judge had misconstrued the language of section 5(c) in reading into it a condition that the house the sale of which was exempted under clause (c) of section 5 should be occupied by the vendees. It was complained that there was nothing in the language of subsection 5(c) which made it incumbent on the vendees in order to invoke the benefit of the protection afforded by clause (c) that they should occupy the house. It was argued that the real object of the clause was to allow residents of the village in which the property, which is subject‑matter of the pre‑emption suit, is situate that they should have dwelling house of their own and that it was not necessary that they should at all occupy it much less immediately after the purchase. It was, next argued that the protection was given to the residents irrespective of the fact whether the resident was minor or major or a male or female and the only limitation imposed by the clause on the right of the resident was that he "neither owns a house nor a vacant site measuring more than one Kanal, for constructing a house for his own occupation".

6. Mian Yunas Shah, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents on the other hand, argued that a person owning a house irrespective of the fact whether its area was less than one Kanal could not claim the benefit of section 5(c) and that the Words "measuring more than one Kanal" qualified the immediate words "vacant site" and not the word "house". It was argued that the real object of section 5 was that a person residing in a village must have a house for his shelter and that it was never the intention of the Legislature to prescribe one Kanal as a standard area of the house. He argued that for a minor to claim the protection of section 5, the house must be intended for his occupation and in cases where the minor was living, as in the instant case, with his father who owns a house, the benefit of section 5 was not at all available.

7. Since the points raised in the appeal turn on the language of section 5 and clause (c) it will be convenient to read that provision, which is in the following terms:‑ "

5. No right of pre‑emption shall exist in respect of the sale of, or the foreclosure of, a right to redeem: (a)

. . (b)

. (c) agricultural land‑or village immovable property consisting of an area measuring not more than two Kanals purchased by a resident of the village in which such land is situated, where he neither owns a house nor a vacant site measuring more than one Kanal; for constructing a house for his own occupation."

8. The first question which calls for decision is whether the words measuring more than one Kanal" qualify the immediate wards "vacant site" or also the word "house". The 2nd question which falls for determination is whether for claiming the protection of clause (c) of section 5 is it obligatory on the resident of the village whether he be a minor or not to occupy the house which is the subject‑matter of the pre‑emption suit as has been held in the instant case. Both these questions are of considerable importance, in particular question No. 1. "The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to argue that the qualification "measuring more than one kanal" goes with the vacant site, and not with the house, and, therefore, he contended that if a person owned a house in a certain village, then he was not entitled to claim the exemption provided by the above section in respect of another house purchased by him in the same village, irrespective of the fact whether the area of the house which he already has in less or more than one Kanal. Grammatically if `measuring more than one Kanal' only qualified the vacant site and not the house, then there should have been a comma after the word `house', which is missing in the Act. The meaning of the section is thus absolutely clear, that if a person owns a house, but the area of that house is less than one Kanal, he is at liberty to purchase another house in that village, the area of which is less than two kanals." "An agricultural land or village immovable property consisting of an area measuring not more than two Kanals could be purchased by a resident of the village provided the vendee neither owned a house nor a vacant 'site measuring more than one Kanal. If the vendee owned a house or a vacant site measuring more than one Kanal, then the sale of agricultural land of village immovable property in his favour would be pre‑emptible."

10. In a Full Bench decision reported in Ram Nandan v. State (A I R 1959 All. 101), their Lordships had to consider the true interpretation of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The question which required determination was whether the words "in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions, etc." govern not the "existing law", but the law to be made in future. At page 104, M. C. Desai, J., delivering the judgment for the Full Bench, observed: "I am satisfied that this alteration in the language does not mean that the words `any existing law' are not to be governed by the words `in so far as such law imposes'. According to the construction of the sentence and the punctuation the Words `in so far as such law imposes' govern not only the immediately preceding words `prevent the State from making any law but also the earlier words `any existing law'." "This question came before a single Judge of the Bombay High Court: D. A. Borgonha v. W. C. Borgonha (1920) 44 Born.

924. It was held that the word `together' does not govern the word `reside' in the section. In this case Durahd v. Durand (1870) 14 W R 416 was followed, which was a decision of three Judges in Calcutta and a previous two Judge's decision of the Bombay High Court, Xavier v. Xavier (1.892) P J 153, was not followed. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court Henrieta Alexandra Gale v. Frank Honduras Gale (1911) 47 P R 1911 and there two Judges held that the word `together' does not govern the word `reside'. Some doubts on the matter were expressed by Mr. Justice Rattigan. The preponderance of opinion appears, therefore, to be in favour of making the word `together' govern only the word `resident'. The general rule is that a qualifying word shall be deemed to qualify the word nearest to it." In the words of Ashworth, J., the preponderance of opinion favours the view that a qualifying word shall be deemed to qualify the word nearest to it. This view is in conflict with the view expressed by Sheikh Muhammad Shafi, J., in the revision petition referred to above and the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, and the view seems to have been expressed, though by way of obiter, by the Division Bench of this Court, in Muhammad Hasan v. Zafar Ali Khan and others. Whether on the true interpretation of clause 5(c) the words "measuring more than one kanal" qualify only the words "vacant site" or also the word "house"?

13. Though the second question is not so difficult as to defy solution by the Division Bench, but since the first question is referred to a larger Bench, the second question may also be conveniently dealt with by a larger Bench, especially when with profound respect we have doubts about the correctness of the view expressed by our brother sitting singly in R. S. A. No. 105 of 1962 Sardar v. Feroze Din, decided on 9th December 1963. In fairness to our learned brother, the point which his Lordship was called upon to decide pertained to the interpretation of the concluding words of clause (c) of section 5 "for constructing a house for his own occupation," and the subject‑matter of the sale unlike the present case was a land and not a house. The second question may be formulated as follows:‑ "Whether on the true interpretation of section 5(c), it is incumbent for the resident to qualify for the protection of section 5(c) that the resident (whether minor or major must occupy the house."

14. The case should be laid before the Senior Judge for constitution of the Full Bench. OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH The following two questions have been propounded for reference to the Full Bench:‑ "(1) Whether on‑ the true interpretation of clause 5(c) the words "measuring more than one kanal" qualify only the words "vacant site" or also the word "house". (2) Whether on the true interpretation of section 5(c), it is incumbent for the resident to qualify for the protection of section 5(c) that the resident (whether minor or major) must occupy the house?" This judgment should be read in continuation of my referring order dated 1‑7‑64.

2. Since the interpretation of section 5(c), it will be convenient here to read the material portion of section 5(c) shown off clauses (a) and (b):‑ "(c) agricultural land or village immovable property, consisting of an area measuring not more than two kanals purchased by a resident of the village in which such land is situated, where he neither owns a house nor a vacant site measuring more than one kanal for constructing a house for his own occupation," I propose to resolve question No. 1 first.

3. Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan Bangash, learned counsel for the appellants, vehemently argued that it was plain from the language of clause (c) that the Legislature intended to exempt the sale of agricultural land or immovable property referred to in the beginning of sub‑clause (c) in favour of a resident who neither owned a house measuring one Kanal, nor a vacant site measuring one kanal. To put it differently, if a resident had a house or houses, measuring individually less than one Kanal he could purchase agricultural land or immovable property to the extent referred to in the beginning of sub‑clause (c) and the sale was exempted from pre‑emption. The learned counsel tried to argue that the words "measuring more than one kanal" immediately following the words "vacant site" did not merely govern those words but also govern the words "house". The learned counsel founded his argument mainly on the decision of Sheikh Muhammad Shafi, J., in Civil Revision No. 14'4 of 1953 Farid Khan v. Khawaja Mir, etc., in which his Lordship while called upon to decide precisely the same question, was persuaded to assent to the suggestion that the words "measuring more than one kanal" also govern the word "house" and not merely the vacant site. The short reason which found favour with the learned Judge in reaching that conclusion may be better reproduced in his own words:‑ "Grammatically if `measuring more than one K anal' only qualified the vacant site and not the house, then there should have been a comma after the word `house', which is missing in the Act." It will be clearly manifest from the passage reproduced above that the narrow ground on which his Lordship interpreted section 5 (c) was the absence of the comma after the word "house".

4. Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan when confronted with the question that if the material language of section 5(c) were to be construed according to the well established rule of grammar, namely that the qualifying word would govern the immediate word and not the remote one, tried to wriggle out of the difficulty by saying that the grammatical meaning of the words would lead to (1) absurdity, (2) or defeat the object of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act. The learned counsel when encountered with the question to point out the absurdity or the particular object of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act, which would be defeated, contented himself by saying that it would be unreasonable ,to expect that the benefit of the exemption was denied to the resident who happened to own a house measuring as little as one Maria.

5. In fairness to Muhammad Afzal Khan, learned counsel for .the appellant, he reinforced his argument by drawing our attention to the opening words of section 5(c), namely, "agricultural land or village immovable property, consisting of an area measuring not more than two Kanals purchased by . . . . ." The learned counsel contended that if the qualifying words "consisting of an area measuring not more than two Kanals" were to govern the immediate words "village immovable property" and not the opening words "agricultural land" then in that case the sale of agricultural land of whatever area was altogether exempted. To put it differently, it was argued that if the grammatical construction was altered to the sale of "agricultural land" would be exempted and since it would tantamount to repealing the Pre‑emption Act in regard to the sale of agricultural land, the Draftsmen had used the qualifying words in the beginning of clause (c) as also in regard to the word "house" to be governed by the qualifying words.

6. Mian Yunas Shah learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that no rule of interpretation was more firmly established than the one that the words of the statute must be given their plain literal and grammatical meaning and that only where the words of the statute were ambiguous in the sense that it admitted of two meanings then the Courts could resort to seek the true interpretation of the words of the statute. (1) Durand v. Durand 14 W R 416. (2) Gale v. Gale (1911) 47 P R 1911. (3) Durand v. Durand (1920) 44 Bom. (4) Leadon v. Leadon A I R 1926 Oudh

319. Reference may also be made to Thema Agnes Kershaw v. Archibald Cyril Kershaw (A I R 1930 Lah. 916), in which the above‑mentioned four authorities were noted and approved. .

9. It will be convenient to note here that the first canon of construction, of statute is that we must take the language as' it stands and if it is clear to give effect to it. It is not the duty of the Court to put a construction which seems to the Court to be the best in the sense that it would work out with most justice or with the least inconvenience but to put a construction which seems to the Court to be the best in sense. i.e., nearest to the language of the Legislature. I may profitably borrow the following observations of Mr. Justice Blackburn in Eastern Countries and London and Blackwell Railway Companies v. Marriage (31 L J Ex. 73). "We are bound to look at the language used in the Act, constructing it with reference to the object with respect to which the Legislature has used that language, but constructing it in its ordinary grammatical sense, unless there is something in the subject‑matter or the context to show that it is to be understood in some other sense, and doing all this we are to say that what is the intention of the Legislature expressed by that language." "I dread very much the consequences, if once the Judicature begins to trespass on the province of the Legislature and to produce not what the enactment is, but what it ought to be. If we (torn) I do not know where we are to stop. I think it much better in construing an Act, to follow what has been called the golden rule and (sic) declare that to be the intention of the Legislature which appears to be expressed by the words used, understood in their ordinary sense, though with reference to the subject‑matter and context, unless that is manifestly absurd or unjust." "In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be some thing in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or, in the circumstances with reference to which they are used to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense. In Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H L C 61, Lord Wensleydale said: `I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical, and ordinary sense of the words may, be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." Judging the material language of section 5(c) in the light of the aforesaid canon of interpretation, I am clear in my mind that the language is free from any ambiguity and as such the plain language and grammatical construction namely, that the qualifying words govern the nearer words and not the remote, must be given effect to and it, therefore, follows that the words "measuring more than one kanal" do not govern the 'word "house".

10. The second substantial reason is that the punctuations, including comma are not part of the statutes. In this connection, I would extract the following observations of Lord Warrington, J., (at page 71) in Lawis Pugh Evans v. Asbutosh Sen and others (A I R 1929 P C 69). "The truth in that if the article is read without the comma inserted in the print, as a Court of law is bound to do, the meaning is reasonably clear." "In the interpretation of statutes punctuation, not being a part of the statute to be construed, is not the determining factor and if the provision as punctuated leads to an absurd result or conflicts with some other provision of the statute which is unambiguous and free from doubt, the punctuation must yield to an interpretation that is reasonable and makes it consistent with the other provisions of the Act." The two authorities cited above demolish the reason which prevailed with Sheikh Muhammad Shafi, J., in interpreting the material language of section 5(c) that the absence of the comma after the word "house" gives clear indication that the word "house" was also governed by the words "measuring more than one kanal".

11. The argument that if the qualifying words "measuring more than one kanal" are not held to govern the word "house", it would lead to "absurdity" or defeating the object of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act is equally fallacious, for the short and good reason that as already indicated, the question of absurdity or defeating the object of the statute would come into play only if the language of the text is ambiguous, i.e., where the language is of doubtful meaning or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to some repugnance with some other provisions of the statute itself. In this connection I would again refer to the judgment of Lord Atkinson,' J., in A I R 1921 P C

240. At page 242 his Lordship borrowed the following observations of Lord Esher in Reg. v. Judge of the City of London Court ((1892) 1 Q B 273). "If the words of an Act are clear you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed an absurdity. In my opinion, the rule has always been this:‑‑ . If the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity and the other does not, the Court will conclude that the Legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity and will adopt the other interpretation." Continuing further, his Lordship quoted the following observation of Lord Halsbury in Cooke v. Charles Vogeer Co. ((1901) A C 102). "But a Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of provision, except, so far as it may help them in interpreting what the Legislature has said." The above observation in my view furnishes complete answer to the argument tried to be resided by Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan Bangash, learned counsel for the appellants, that it was unreasonable to attribute to the Legislature that they did not intend 'to give the benefit of exemption to a resident who happened to own a house measuring even one Marla. It is not within the province of the Court to say what the law ought to be and the question of reasonableness or inconvenience cannot be considered to depart from the plain meaning of the words unless they would defeat the very object of the Act. With regard to the question of defeating, the object of the N.‑W. F. P. Pre‑emption Act, I do not find anything in the provisions of the Pre‑emption Act, and none was pointed out at the Bar from which it could be inferred that the object of section 5(c) or for the matter of that of any provision in the Act, was that that the Legislature intended to exempt the sale in favour of a resident who did not own a house measuring less than one Kanal.

12. The only other point which remains to be considered is the argument that if the qualifying words "consisting of an area measuring not more than two Kanals purchased by a resident" were under the rule of grammar to govern only the immediate words "village immovable property" and not the opening words "agricultural land", it would defeat the very object of the Pre‑emption Act, in that the sale of "agricultural land" irrespective of the area would be exempted.

13. The short answer to the above argument is that since, admittedly, literal or grammatical interpretation of the opening words of clause (c) in regard to the "agricultural land" would lead to absurdity and also defeat the very object of the Pre‑emption Act, the literal or grammatical interpretation is to be ignored in such a situation according to the well recognized canon of construction with a view to avoiding absurdity or repugnancy with any other provision of the statute, or with a view to saving the defeat of the very object of the Pre‑emption Act, which makes all the sales of agricultural land or village immovable property subject to right of pre‑emption, unless specifically exempted under the provisions of the Pre‑emption Act.

14. There is nothing in the provisions of the Pre‑emption Act that the Legislature considered that a house measuring less than one Kanal was to be treated unhabitable or that a resident must have a house measuring at least one Kanal. By parity of reason, we have come to the conclusion and it is that if the interpretation contended for is accepted, it would mean that a resident of the village, who owned a house measuring less than one Kanal could be permitted to acquire any number of houses the individual area of which was less than one Kanal. I am clear in my mind that it was not the intention of the Legislature that a house, measuring less than one Kanal is considered unfit for human habitation. I make bold to say, subject to correction, that even the World Health Organization has not ventured to declare that a house in an area of less than one Kanal is not considered fit for human habitation.

15. It follows from the above discussion, that the real test in considering, whether a resident was entitled to the ex emption, as contemplated by section 5(c), was that the resident should not own any house at all, and not that the house or houses, owned by him, should individually measure less than one kanal.

16. This brings me to the second question which in my view does not present such difficulty in that the concluding words occurring in section 5(c) "for constructing a house for his own occupation "according to the rule of grammar govern the immediate words "vacant site" and not the more remote word "house". As already noticed, sub‑clause (c) is unhappily worded, but what was clearly intended, as indicated above, was to exempt from pre‑emption the sale of two Kanals of agricultural land or immovable property in favour of the resident of a village if (1) he had no house at all, or (2) he had no vacant site measuring one kanal for constructing a house. The concluding words of clause (c) "for his own occupation" means that the resident must have bona fide intention of constructing a house. It is not necessary that he should construct the house within a specified time, much less that he should occupy it at once. To illustrate my point, it would be impossible for a vendee to occupy a house immediately in case of purchase of equity of redemption of a house, where the period of mortgage has not expired. MUHAMMAD LAUD KHAN, J.‑I agree. BASHIR‑UD‑DIN AHMAD, J.‑So do I. .