P (PLP)

AGHA, J.‑This is an application under Order XXXIX, rule 2 and section 151, Civil Procedure Code, made by Pir Illahi Buksh, the plaintiff in Suit No. 247 of 1949. In the general elections held in December 1946, the applicant Pir Illahi Buksh was declared elected as a Member of the Sind Legislative Assembly from the Mohammadan Rural Dadu Central Constituency, and Kazi Muhammad Akbar was declared elected from the Muhammadan Rural Dadu South Constituency. Against the election of Kazi Muhammad Akbar, an election petition was filed by one of the rival candidates G. M. Syed. On 28th June, 1947 His Excellency the Governor of Sind appointed a Tribunal consisting of Mr. Justice Lobo as President and Messrs. B. P. Dalal and Muhammad Bakhsh Memon as Commissioners. At a later stage, Mr. Dalal was appointed President of the Tribunal. The report of this Tribunal was submitted to His Excellency the Governor of Sind on 2nd February, 1949. In this report the Tribunal held the applicant Pir Illahi Buksh guilty of corrupt practices: His Excellency the Governor of Sind then, on 4th February, 1949 issued orders that the applicant shall be disqualified for six years from voting or being a Member of the Sind Legislative Assembly. The applicant then filed the present suit for declara tion that the order of disqualification is void and of no legal effect, and for the issue of an injunction upon the Province of Sind restraining it from calling upon the Muhammadan Rural Dadu Central Constituency to elect a Member to the Sind Legislative Assembly. The main ground on which this suit has been filed is that, Mr. Dalal was not qualified to be (appointed as a Commissioner on the Tribunal: During the pendency of the suit, in 1949, an application was made under Order XXXIX rule 2 and section 151 Civil Procedure Code for a temporary injunction. It appears that the Sind Government had issued a notification on 29th October 1949 calling upon the Constitution to elect, a Member to fill up the vacancy caused by the dis qualification of the applicant Pit Illahi Buksh. This application, however, was rejected on 7th November, 1949 by my Learned Brother Vellani, J., who held that the applicant had not made out a prima facie case. On the question of balance of convenience, he held in favour of the applicant. It appears that the notification dated 29th October, 1949, calling upon the Con stituency to elect a Member was cancelled before 7th November, 1949, but the order of Vellani, J., does not make any reference to it, and seems to have been passed on the assumption that the election was going to be held. The Sind Government have again issued a notification dated 23rd August, 1950 calling upon the Constituency to elect a member, and it is on account of this notification that the present application far the issue of a temporary injunction has been filed against the Province of Sind. The Constituency is called upon to fill the vacancy before 1st October 1950. I have heard Mr. Suhrawardy for the applicant and Mr. Fatehchand for the defendant No. 1 the Province of Sind. I have also heard Mr. Sharifuddin, who very kindly argued the matter as amicus curiae on the question of applicability of section 46 of the Specific Relief Act. Defendant No. 2 is represented by Mr. Inamullah who had notice of this application, but the matter has not been argued by anybody on behalf of the defendant No. 2, apparently, because the question of the issue of a temporary injunction against defendant No. 1 did not affect the defendant No.2. Briefly Mr. Suhrawardy s argument is that Mr. Dalal was not qualified at the time of the submission of his report to be a member of the Election Tribunal, and therefore the report made by him was a nullity. The order of disqualification of the petitioner issued by the Governor of Sind based on this report has, therefore, no effect, and the petitioner continues to be a Member of the Sind Legislative Assembly. On the question of balance of convenience, be has relied on the remarks made by Vellani, J., wherein he has said that the balance of convenience lies on the side of the applicant. The reply of the other side is that Mr. Dalal was qualified to be a member of the Tribunal and that even if he was not, section 56 of the Specific Relief Act would be a bar to the issue of the injunction asked for. Mr. Suhrawardy's reply to this is that section 56 of the Specific Relief Act does not apply in cases where the act complained of is a wrongful act and that the present act of the Province of Sind calling upon the Constituency to elect a Member is a wrongful act, as the petitioner continues to be a member of the Sind Legislative Assembly and his seat has not fallen vacant. Mr. Suhrawardy has further argued that, even if I hold that this is not a wrongful act, and section 56 of the Specific Relief .Act will be applicable to the present case, his prayer for the issue of a temporary, injunction can be granted, because section 56 bf the Specific Relief Act applies only to cases of perpetual injunctions and not temporary injunctions which are governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. To this last argument of Mr. Suhrawardy, the reply of Mr. Fatehchand is that a temporary injunction cannot be issued in cases where the Court cannot issue a perpetual injunction. Coming to the question, whether Mr. Dalal was qualified to be appointed as a Commissioner on the Election Tribunal, Para. 4 of Part III of the Government of India (Provincial Elections) Corrupt Practices and Election Petitions Order, 1936, says that only those persons can be appointed as Commissioners "who are or have been or are eligible to be appointed as judges of a High Court". Section 220, clause (3) of the Government of India Act prescribes the qualifications for appointment as a judge of the High Court. Ire the written statement of the defendant No. 1, it appears that the defendant's case was that Mr. Dalal was qualified under section 220, clause (3) (b). . Vellani J., in his order on the first injunction application, has said: " It was common; ground between the parties that if Mr. Dalal's appointment could be justified at all, it was under the qualifications prescribed in the said clause (b), and the arguments therefore were confined to its provisions." This shows that, even at that time, the defendants were relying on this clause. Before me, however, Mr. Fatehchand has further contended that Mr. Dalal was qualified also under subsection (3) clause (c). I will, therefore, discuss both these clauses. Before doing so, it might be mentioned here that, as Vellani,. J. had rejected a similar application. I am prevented from revising his order. Mr. Suhrawardy, however, has argued that, after passing of that order; further material has come on the record, and therefore I was competent to hear this application and any orders that I may pass in this matter will not amount to revising the order of Vellani J. At the time the previous order was passed, the service book of Mr. Dalal was not available. In the written statement no mention was made what appointments had Mr. Dalal held and during which periods. The order of Vellani. J. proceeds on the assumption that, so long it is shown that Mr. Dalal acquired the requisite qualifications before making the report, th validity of his report could not be questioned. For the purposes of this, application I am also proceeding on that assumption, lest it might be said that I was revising the order of Vellani, J. on that point. Now, let us first take clause (b) of subsection (3) to section 220 of the Government of India Act. This says that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court unless he " is a Member of the Indian Civil Service of at least ten years standing, who has for at least three years served as, or exercised the powers of, a District Judge. The service book of Mr. Dalal shows that he ‑was appointed to the

1. C. S. in 1938. The report was made in 1949, and therefore he was a member of the Indian Civil Service of at least ten years, standing before that date. That by itself, however, was not sufficient, and he needed the further qualification of having for at least three years served as, or exercised the powers of, a District Judge. The Government of India Act nowhere defines what is a District Judge. Section 254 of the Act mentions by whom the appoint ments of District judges are to be made. Clause (3) of this section reads :‑-- " In this and the next succeeding section the expression " District Judge " includes Additional District judge,‑ Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions judge, Additional Sessions Judge, and Assistant Sessions judge." Section 255 refers to appointments and promotions of the members of the Subordinate Civil Judicial Service. Clause , 3 of section 254 specifically says that, in sections 254 and 255 the expression "District Judge" will include "Additional District judge, etc." This is not a definition of a "District Judge" : it only says that for the purposes of these two sections certain other persons also, who are not District judges, shall be included in the expression " District Judge." This clause, therefore, has clearly no reference to the expression ` District judge as used in section 220 sub-section (3) clause (b). The word District judge is defined in the General Clauses Act (X of 1897). The definition there reads as under : " `District judge' shall mean the judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. Mr. Fatehchand has, on the basis of this definition of expression " District judge " argued that the Sind Courts Act 1926 (Bombay Act VII of 1926) has divided the Courts into District Courts and Subordinate Courts. Section 22 of this Act requires that the Provincial Government shall appoint a District judge to each such Court. Section 23 says that the Provincial Government may appoint joint Judges to any District Court and every such joint judge shall exercise the powers and, jurisdictions of the District Court concurrently with the District judge in such matters as may be referred to him by the District Judge. It further says that all regulations and acts applying to a District judge, shall be deemed to apply also to the joint judge. Section 24 says that the Provincial Government may appoint Assistant judge to any District Court and that an Assistant judge shall have jurisdiction to hear such original suits, applications, etc. not being of the nature of appeals, as the District judge may refer to him. Section 25 says that an Assistant judge may .be empowered to, hear such appeals from the decrees and orders of the Subordinate Courts as lie to the District Court and as may be referred to him by the District Judge. Section 26 says that the Provincial Government may confer upon any joint or Assistant judge any of the powers and jurisdiction of the District Court within any specified part of a Civil District. Section 27 says that the District judge shall have general control over all the Civil Courts within the District. Clause (2) of section 28.says that where a decree or order passed by as Assistant judge in his original jurisdiction is appealable, the appeal shall lie to the Chief Court or to the District Court, according as the amount or value of the subject‑matter exceeds or does not exceed, five thousand rupees. Mr. Fatehchand's main argument is that, as an Assistant judge is appointed to the District Court and as under clause (2) of section 24 he has the jurisdiction to hear all such matters as are transferred to him by the District Judge; the Assistant judge is a District judge or at least exercises the powers of the District Judge. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention. The various sections, referred to above, clearly show, that every District Court has to have a District judge and, in addition to that, may have joint judges or Assistant Judges. The powers of an Assistant judge are not the same as of a District‑ Judge. He has no power to hear an appeal unless that power is conferred on him under section

25. The appeal from his decrees and orders lies to a District Court when the amount or the value of the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 5,

000. It may be said that, 'under the Sind Courts Act, a joint judge exercises the powers of a District judge because section 23 specifically says so. The position of an Assistant judge is, however, quite different. In no case is an Assistant Judge vested with the powers of transfer of cases which the District judge has. There is, however, a further point to be considered, and it is that in the case of Mr. Dalal the Sind Courts Act will not be applicable, because he has not served as an Assistant judge in Sind. His service book shows that he has served as an Assistant judge in the province of Bombay, and not Sind. The Act applicable to his case will be the Bombay Civil Courts Act (Act No. XIV of 1869). Section 5 of this Act says:‑

" There shall be in each district a District Court presided over by a judge to be called the District Judge." Section 9 says: " The District judge shall have general control over all the Civil Courts .. Section 122 says: " A Joint judge shall be invested with co‑extensive powers and a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge." Section 15 says: " An Assistant judge shall ordinarily hold his Court in the same place as the District judge, but he may hold his Court elsewhere within the district, whenever the District judge shall, with the, previous sanction of the High Court direct him to do so. Section 16 of this Act says that the District judge may refer to an Assistant judge original suits of which the subject matter does not amount to ten thousand rupees in amount or value. From this it will be seen that an Assistant judge cannot try original suits of which the subject-matter amounts to more than ten thousand rupees. This section then provides that the appeal against the decrees and orders of the Assistant judge will lie to the District Judge in cases where the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed five thousand rupees. These provisions leave no room for doubt whatsoever that an Assistant judge is neither a 'District Judge, nor can it be said that be exercises the powers of a District Judge. The service book of Mr. Dalai shows that, on 8th November, 1943, he was transferred to the Judiciary and posted as an Assistant judge under training hereafter, he continued to be an Assistant Judge till 1st October 1946, when he became the joint judge, Poona, and after that he was transferred to Sind and posted as District Judge Sukkur. It is, therefore, only from 1st October 1946, that Mr. Dalai can be said to have served as a District judge or exercised the powers of a District Judge. The, report, as said above, was made on 2nd February 1949, less than three years after this date. So he cannot be said to have the requisite qualifications under clause (b) to subsection (3) of section 220 of the Government of India, Act. It is, I believe, on account of this that' Mr. Fatehchand, at the time of arguments, wished to rely also on clause (c). This clause says that he should have for at least five years held a judicial office in Pakistan not inferior to that of a Subordinate judge, or judge of a Small Cause Court. Mr. Fatehchand's argument was that, from the time Mr. Dalai was transferred to the judiciary and posted as an Assistant judge, he held a judicial office not inferior to that of a Subordinate Judge. As said above, the. service book shows that he became an Assistant judge on 8th November 1943. He was, however, at that time, serving in the Province of Bombay and came to Sind only in 1947. Clause (c) definitely says that this service of five years must be in Pakistan. It is very clear what is meant by " Pakistan ". It undoubtedly means the territory which now comprises Pakistan. The original words were : " in .British India ", and these have been substituted by the words " in Pakistan'. It was argued before me that‑ the Legislature did not intend that this entire period of five years should be in Pakistan, but the intention was that it should be in‑what was before known as‑Brutish India. It is, however, a definite principle of interpretation' of Statutes that, when the words used are clear, the intention of the Legislature is not to be looked at. In clause (b) there is no such limitation as to where the service of a District judge should have been rendered ; while in clause (c) there is a definite mention that it should be in Pakistan. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the period of Mr. Dalal's service in the Province of Bombay as Assistant judge has to be excluded. He cannot therefore be said to be qualified even under this clause (c). Prima facie, therefore, Mr. Dalai was not qualified to be a Commissioner upto the day‑ of making the report: In view of this, it appears to me that the applicant has made out a prima facie case on that point. On the question of balance of convenience, Vellarii, J., in his order passed on the first application, has said.: " On the question of the balance of convenience I would say, since this is an appealable order, that in my view it would lie in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Advocate'‑ General stated in Court on 3rd November 1949 that an. injunction was really not necessary because if ever the plaintiff obtained from the Court the declaration prayed for, the Government would respect it. But on the next day be corrected himself, saying that in no case would the plaintiff ever get back his seat. As the matter stands, If the proposed election is held and another person comes to represent the constituency then the plaintiff, if be succeeds, is sure to be in a difficult position. He will be constrained to consider a fresh and complicated situation and to take appropriate action to prevent such person. from taking his seat in the Legislative Assembly, and. if he has already taken his seat, to have him ousted." . Nothing has been urged before me against these remarks, which apply with equal force even today, because, as said above, the Government has again issued a notification ordering an election to be held. In my opinion, therefore, this would be a fit case in which the temporary injunction prayed for may be ordered to issue, if the provisions of section 56 of the Specific Relief Act did not apply to it. The next question to be considered is whether the provisions of section 56 of the Specific Relief Act would be applicable to the present case. Mr. Fatehchand relies on clause (d). of this section which reads: " An injunction cannot be granted to interfere with the public duties of any department of the Central Government, the Crown Representative or any Provincial Government or with the sovereign acts of a Foreign Government." There can be no doubt whatever that it is a public duty of the Provincial Government to hold the election. On the face of it an injunction issued in connection with the holding of an election would be interfering with the public duties of a department or a branch of Government. The argument of Mr. Suhrawardy however is that this is wrongful act and therefore the provisions of this section will not apply. According to him, the report of the Election Tribunal being a nullity, the order of Governor based on it disqualifying the applicant is also a nullity, and the applicant continues to be a member of the Sind Legislative Assembly. The order of the Provincial Government therefore calling upon the constituency to fill the seat is a wrongful act on the part of the Government. The learned Commentator, Aggarwal, in big commentary, on the Specific Relief Act, 2nd Edition, 1946, at p. 773, quoting Collect on Specific Relief Act says: " In respect to interfering with the public duties of any department of Government, clause (d) does not mean that an officer of Government is not liable for or may not be restrained from‑a wrongful act in the shape of a tort, done under the plea of the command of Government, but where the act is, by express enactment; or otherwise, one that may legally be done by the department, it is not for any Court to criticise or control ` the exercise, the department of its discretion in performing its duties." In the present case the report of the Election Tribunal on which the order of the disqualification of the applicant is based has so far not been declared bad or void of legal consequences. The act of Government therefore in calling upon the constituency to fill up the vacancy cannot be said to be a wrongful act. Whether during the pendency of the case the Government should have called upon the constituency to fill up the vacancy or not, is not a matter to be considered by the Court. It appears to me, therefore, clear that under section 56 clause (d) no injunction can be issued against the Government restraining them from calling upon the constituency to fill up the seat. This however refers to injunction. Mr. Suhrawardy's argument is that in the case of a temporary injunction it is not the provisions of the Specific Relief Act which would be applicable, but the issue or otherwise of a temporary injunction is governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 53 of the Specific Relief Act says: "Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specific time, or until " the further order of the Court. They may be granted at any period of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The reply of the other side to this argument is that the general principle is that where a relief cannot be granted perma nently, no temporary injunction can issue. A number of authorities have been cited before me and I will now discuss those authorities: In the case of Kanshi Ram and another v. Sharaf Din and another, reported in 1923, Lah. p. 144, it had been held that section 56, which occurs in the chapter relating to perpetual injunctions, has no application to temporary injunctions which are, by the express words of section 53 left to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held further in that case that a Sub‑Judge could issue a temporary injunction staying the execution of a decree proceed ing in a Munsif's Court. The Civil Procedure Code is not exhaus tive and the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order the issue of an injunction in order to see that teal and substantive justice is done. The finding was that the application made in that case for the issue of a temporary injunction did not come either under Order 39 rule 1 or rule

2. There is no reasoning in the, case to show on what ground the injunction was issued. In the case of the North Western Railway Administration v. The North Western Railway Union Lahore, A. I. R. 1933 Lah. p. 204, it was held that the issue of a temporary injunction is governed by the same principles as the grant of a permanent injunction at the trial of a case. Then comes the case of Syed Mazaffar Hussain v. The Administrator of the Lahore Municipality and another reported in A. I. R 1941 Lah.

453. In this case there was a suit against the Lahore Municipality and the Punjab Government was joined as a formal defendant. An injunction was issued against the Administrator only and it was further stated that an injunction cannot be given to interfere with the working of Government Department. The last Lahore case is the case of the Lahore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Province of Punjab, reported in 1943 Lab. p.

41. The question there was whether section 306 of the Defence of India Act was a bar to the grant of an injunction against the Government. The provisions of the Specific Relief Act or Order 39 rules 1 and 2 were neither referred to nor dis cussed. Coming to the Bombay cases, in the case of N. M. Panday and others v. Gordon and others (6 Boni. 266), the following observations appear at p. 279 " The Specific Relief Act purports to deal only with perpetual injunctions, leaving temporary injunctions to be regulated by Chapter XXXV of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 492 and 493 of that Code state the particular cases in. which a temporary injunction may be granted. In the latter section it is provided that an application may be made for a temporary injunction to restrain a breach of contract'. It is plain, however, that apart from the special circumstances which determine whether the Court should, in its discretion, grant an injunction before the hearing of the suit, the same general principles must equally apply to the granting of a temporary injunction as to a perpetual injunction,, and those principles must therefore be sought in the Specific Relief Act itself." In the case of Mulji Haridas v. Ibrahim Rahimtulla reported in A. I. R: 1932 Born. p. 166 which is a suit for declaration and injunction to restrain. the defendant from proceed ing with certain clauses in the bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly, there was a prayer for, the grant of a temporary injunction which was refused. While refusing the injunction, Beaumont, C. J. made the following observations: " Of course we are not concerned on this motion with making a declaration, but we can only grant an interlocutory, injunction if we are satisfied that in all‑probability the declaration, which is the foundation for the permanent injunction claimed, will be made when the suit comes to be tried, and I am quite satisfied that the declaration will not be made." The principle enunciated there was that if the Court was not satisfied that the relief asked for will be granted at the trial, no temporary injunction should be ordered to issue. Coming to the Allahabad cases, in the case of District Board of Farrukhabad and others v. Ikhlague Hussain, reports d in A. I. R. 1933 All. p. 86, it was held that the conditions applicable to such an injunction are not applied in temporary injunctions. In that case the suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiff was the Secretary of the Board and for an injunction restraining the Board from interfering with the exercise by him of the duties of a Secretary, and the provisions of section 56 (d) of the Specific Relief Act were not referred to: As a general proposition of law, it was stated that the principles governing the grant of a permanent injunction are not to be applied to temporary in. junctions. In a later case, of Raghubar Dayal. Misra and others v. Shanker Lal and others reported in A. I. R. 1934 All. p. 876, where the provisions of section 56 of the Specific Relief Act were referred to, it was held that section 56 Specific Relief Act, relates to permanent injunction, and. cannot be made directly to apply to a temporary, injunction which is governed by the provisions of Order. 39 Civil Procedure Code. It was further held there that if, however, the relief which the plaintiff seeks cannot be granted, no temporary injunction can be issued by the Court. In this case the case reported in 1932 Pat. 133 was referred to with approval. . It has been held in that case that the general principle applicable to temporary injunctions is that where a permanent injunction cannot be given, no prayer for a temporary injunction will be allowed. The case reported in A. I. R. 1933 Pat. 250,, Radha Madhab Jiu Thakur v. Rajendra Prasad Bose and others, was also cited. In that case the plaintiff obtained possession of the property under a decree and the defendant filed an application under Order 21 role

100. The plaintiff filed a declaratory suit with the prayer for perpetual injunction of the proceedings under Order 21 rule

100. It was held that section 56 clause (a) was not a bar as there was multiplicity of proceedings. The case has no direct reference to the point to be decided in the present case. Now coming to the Calcutta cases, the first case is the case of Amir Dulhin v. The Administrator General of Bengal, reported in 1895, 23, I. L. R. Cal. p.

351. In that case it was held that section 56 of the Specific Relief Act applies only to perpetual injunctions, temporary injunctions being left by section 53 to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure `and section 56 was not intended to be affected by injunctions applied for under section 492 of the; Civil Procedure Code. In a later case reported in 15 I. C. p. 614, Jital Singh v. Raja Kamaleswari Prosad, which was a case for a declaration and: in which there was no prayer for consequential relief, it was held that an order for a temporary injunction such as the plaintiff seeks, can under Order 39 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code be sought only in aid of the prospective order for a perpetual injunction. If the plaintiffs do not ask for a perpetual injunction if, therefore, in the event of their success, they cannot obtain a decree for perpetual injunction, it is clearly not competent to them to ask for a temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit. Then there is the case of Ram Sadan Biswas v. Mathura Mohan Hazra and others, reported in 1925 Cal. 233, where it was held that the Specific Relief Act does not govern temporary injunctions but Order 39 r. 1 governs them. The point decided there was that a Court could stay proceedings pending before itself. This case again has no bearing on the present case which falls under Order 39 r.

2. The last case cited is the case of Baldeodas v. Governor of United Provinces, reported in A.

1. R. 1945 Cal. 44 in which an injunction was refused on other grounds. The learned judge said " Mr. Banerji also relies upon section 56, Specific Relief Act, and contends that under that section no perpetual injunction can be granted to interfere with the public duties of any department of the Central Government the Crown representative or any Provincial Government, and if a perpetual injunction of this nature cannot be granted a temporary should not also be granted. As at present advised I am not prepared to hold that the powers of this Court to grant temporary injunction are limited to the cases where a perpetual injunction can be granted and I would not be prepared to refuse this application on this ground." No reasoning is given for these remarks. As said above in the present case an application has been made under Order 39 r. 2 which is confined to applications made in suits for injunctions. It is difficult to understand how, in a case where the main relief of perpetual injunction asked for cannot be granted, a temporary injunction case could be granted. The point also came up before me in the case of M. A. Khuhro v. The Federation of Pakistan, reported in the All Pakistan Legal Decisions made in 1950 Sind, p.

49. In that case however it was conceded by the plaintiff that under section 56 clause (d) of the Specific Relief Act an injunction cannot be granted to interfere with the public duties of any department or the Central Government or any Provincial Government, and therefore the point was not discussed. The consensus of authorities, which are directly on the point, appears to me on the side that when perpetual injunctions cannot be granted, Courts should not order the issue of a temporary injunction. I quite agree with the remarks made in the case reported in 6 Born. 266 " Apart from the special circumstances which determine whether the Court should, in its discretion, grant an injunction before the hearing of the suit, the same general principles must equally apply to the granting of a temporary injunction as to a perpetual injunction, and those principles must therefore be sought in the Specific Relief Act itself." As said above, to me it appears that section 56 clause (d) of the Specific Relief Act bars the issue of a perpetual injunction) in this case, and therefore no temporary injunction also can be issued. I therefore reject the application with costs. A. H. Application rejected.