P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑

On the 27th of April 1959, an order which subsequently appeared in the Extraordinary issue of the Gazette of West Pakistan dated the 1st of May 1959, as Home Department Notification No. 5631‑59‑PB was served on the General Manager of the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore. The order was in the following terms :‑ "Whereas the Governor of West Pakistan is satisfied that the book entitled 'Mizan‑ul‑Haq' published by the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore, and printed at Pakistan Printing Works, Lahore contains matter which is calculated to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan and publication of which is punishable under section 295‑A' of the Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860). "Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased hereby to declare to be forfeited to the Government of Pakistan every copy wherever found of the aforesaid book or its Urdu translation. (Sd.) Abu Nasar, Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Home Department." On the 22nd of June 1959, the Punjab Religious Book Society, Anarkali, Lahore through Mr. V. S. K. Fazal, its General Manager, put in the present application under section 99‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view to having the above order set aside. Attached to this application was an affidavit of Mr. F. M. Najmud Din wherein it was said that the deponent had been in the service of the Punjab Religious Book Society since February 1920, that the book entitled 'Mizan‑ul‑Haq' was being sold by the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore when he joined service, that all through his service the book had been sold and that so far as he knew no one had objected to any portion of the book in question. The application came up before this Bench of three Judges for a preliminary hearing at which a notice was issued to the Provincial Government to show cause why the order should not be set aside. It was added in that order that it was expected that the Government will specify the passages objected to a week before the hearing of the applica tion by the Court. The reason for issuing the direction was that no indication had been given about the passages in the book which were considered by the Provincial Government to justify the impugned order. Another reason for the direction was that though the General Manager of the Punjab Religious Book Society had addressed a registered acknowledgment due letter to the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Home Department, Lahore, wherein it was said that the Society shall feel grateful if the Government could indicate the reasons which had led to the issue of the order leading to the book 'Mizan‑ul‑Haq' being forfeited to Government, no reply to that communication had been sent by the Government till the 12th of October 1959, on which date the application had come up for a preliminary hearing before this Court.

2. It was averred in the application, and has not been controverted on behalf of the Provincial Government, that the book 'Mizan‑ul‑Haq' is a translation of book written about a hundred years ago by a German Missionary, named Rev. C. G. Fander, and that it was first published in German and later translated into English, Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Urdu and that the Urdu translation was published for the first time in England in 1862. It was further asserted in the application, and has not been controverted on behalf of the Provincial Government, that the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore, had published the translation of the book of Rev. C. G. Fander, in 1891 and had been selling it to the public and that the fourth edition of the book in Urdu was published by the Society in 1946 and its fifth edition in 1953.

3. The theme of the book about which the impugned order of forfeiture was passed is a comparison between Islam and Christianity and as was but to be expected the object of the author, who was a Christian, was to show that Christianity was a true religion and Islam was not. The author did not deny that his object was to show the superiority of Christianity over Islam, but he has said at more places than one that he had no intention of injuring the feelings of Muslims whom at places he called his brethren. The question that has to be determined is whether or not the impugned order is valid for the reasons mentioned in it, namely, that the book 'Mizan‑ul‑Haq' is calculated to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan and its publication is punishable under section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. That part of section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which could be invoked for passing the impugned order is to the effect that if a book or a newspaper contains matter which is deliberately and maliciously intended to insult or attempt to insult the religious beliefs of any class of the citizens of Pakistan, it could be forfeited to the Government of Pakistan by an order passed by a Provincial Government under that section. It will have been noticed that the impugned order did not say that the writing was deliberately and maliciously intended to insult Islam or the religious beliefs of the Muslims of Pakistan and only said that it was calculated to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan. This difference between the words used in the impugned order and those used in section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was urged by the learned counsel for the applicant as a ground which by itself should be sufficient for the acceptance of the application. This contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is not altogether without substance, because it is expected that when the Provincial Government passes an order, which could have such weighty results as the forfeiture of a book under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure can have it would precisely describe how the book offends against the law of the land so that the order might not be set aside on the short ground that it does not satisfy the provisions of the law under A which it was passed. The impugned order did not say that it was passed because it was believed that the matter contained, in the book was deliberately and maliciously intended to insult' the religious beliefs of the Muslims of Pakistan, but it did say; that the book contained matter which was punishable under section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. It appears that the official who drafted the impugned order did not devote that care and attention to it which he should have done and without caring to read carefully the provisions either of section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure or of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code sent out the order because he believed that merely mentioning that the book was likely to outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan was enough to justify the order of forfeiture. That requisite attention and care had not been devoted to it by the official entrusted with the drafting of the impugned order, which I presume must have been drafted after the authority competent to take action under B section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure had arrived at the conclusion that the passing of the order was justified by, law, is clear from the fact that the order says that every copy of the book `Mizan‑ul‑Haq' and its Urdu translation was forfeited, from which it would appear that the book `Mizan ul‑Haq' was in a language other than Urdu while the fact is that the book `Mizan‑ul‑Haq' mentioned in the first paragraph of the impugned order is itself in Urdu and though it is not known what name the German author gave it originally the name of its English translation would appear to be `Balance of Truth'. I am of the view, however, that the above two shortcomings of the order, only the first one of which was pointed out and relied upon by Mr. R. A. Jeremy, the learned counsel for the applicant, do not suffice to justify the verdict in favour of the applicant because the mention of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code in the impugned order saves it from being held invalid on the ground that the book was not believed to be deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of Muslims and the implied wrong description of the book in paragraph 2 of the impugned order is not of such serious a character as to deprive the impugned order of validity.

4. Mr. Aftab Husain, Advocate, who appeared for the Provincial Government had read out in Court those passages from the book which, he said, had been believed to justify the order and to fall within section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. Learned counsel for the parties addressed arguments on the question whether or not the passages relied upon by the Provincial Government fall within the four corners of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code and when the passages were read out it was made clear by the Bench that though they could not be said to be entirely innocuous, most of the passages did not appear to fall within section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. Relying on this expression of opinion the learned counsel for the applicant urged that as the majority of the passages did not offend against the law, the order of the Provincial Government merited vacation on the ground that it was, at least in relation to some parts of the book, unjustified. I am clear in my mind that this contention of the learned counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted. Section 99‑D of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that if after hearing the application presented to it by any pet son having any interest in any newspaper, book or other document in respect of which an order under section 99‑A has been passed, the Bench of three Judges of the High Court hearing the case comes to the conclusion that the forfeited writing did not contain any of the matters mentioned in section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order of forfeiture shall be set aside. The section does not say, and cannot be construed to mean, that if only some of the portions of a book etc. on which reliance has been placed for passing an order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are of the kind they were believed by the Provincial Government to be, the order has to be vacated. A plain reading of section 99‑D of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that if the law relied upon by the Provincial Government for passing an order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is c applicable even to some of those portions of the forfeited writing which were considered objectionable by the Provincial Government, an order passed under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not be set aside.

5. It was next contended by Mr. Jeremy, the learned counsel for the applicant, that as no order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been passed earlier in spite of the fact that the book in question had been in circulation for about a century it should be presumed that the book contained no objectionable matter. This argument is not as weighty as it may at first sight appear to be. There is first the fact that section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as sections 99‑B to 99‑G were inserted in 1922 by section 5 and Schedule III of the Press Laws Amendment Act (Act XIV of 1922) and obviously even if action had been considered necessary earlier than 1922 section 99‑A could not have been invoked. Then there is another circumstance which has some bearing. Before the coming into being of Pakistan in 1947 real power with regard to matters of this kind was in the hands of persons a vast majority of whom were non‑ Muslims and even if action was not taken by them deliberately, their inaction cannot be a conclusive circumstance. Mr. Jeremy also said that the fact that no objection had been taken to it for such a long time by any Muslim should be enough for a finding that the book in question was of an unexceptionable character. This contention would have had quite some force if there had been evidence either to the effect that the book had been read by a number of Muslims and they had declared the book to be open to no objection or to the effect that the contents of the book had been given so much publicity that it could be presumed that its contents were known to ever one and yet no Muslim had raised a protest against the book. There is no evidence on these points and consequently the fact that no Muslim raised any objection earlier cannot be of any avail to the applicant. The decision will depend on the question whether or not the book contains matter which offends against section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code, It need hardly be mentioned that while considering whether or not the book contains matter which is mentioned in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code the Court has to take all relevant material into consideration and just as it attaches no great weight to the fact that the predecessors of the Provincial Government which has passed the impugned order did not take action under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the fact that no protests had b,‑en raised by Muslims against the book, it will not attach much weight to the fact that an order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure has now been passed, because just as it is possible that its predecessors were not sensitive enough in the matter it is possible that on account of a not inexcusable desire to keep unsullied the name of Islam, which is the religion of a vast majority of the citizens of Pakistan, the present West Pakistan Government had been over‑sensitive.

6. Here two other arguments of the learned counsel for the applicant may be dealt with. He urged that as the book in question had been published earlier and no objection had been raised from any quarter the applicant honestly believed that the book did not contain matter offending against the law and that it appeared that at places the translator of the original book had not chosen the right words. I will assume that the applicant in good faith believed that the book did not offend against the law of the land, but that circumstance, which will be material and possibly conclusive in favour of a person standing trial for an offence under section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code, will be entirely immaterial in the present case because an order under section 99‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code can be passed if a book or other document contains matter falling, amongst others, under section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code and it is not necessary that someone should be proved to be criminally liable for the publication. As regards the contention that perhaps the translator had not been very accurate, I in prepared to admit the possibility of the person who translated the book of Reverend Fander into Urdu having here or there used words which could not be deemed to be a faithful translation of the words used by the author but that would be entirely immaterial because the book forfeited is the `Mizan‑ul‑Haq' published by the applicant and the fact that the original book had suffered in translation cannot make the translation immune from action under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure if that section is applicable to its contents, just as the translation could not have been forfeited to Government if it did not contain any matter mentioned in the section though the book of which it purported to be a translation was full of matter which would attract the provisions of the section.

7. I will now take up the crucial question that requires determination, namely, whether or not the impugned order was justified by the provisions of law under which it purports to have been passed. Section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to nip in the bud the evil which would otherwise ensue if a writing, be it a book, a newspaper or any other document which contains matter, the publication of which is forbidden by law, is allowed to be circulated. In the present case the Provincial Government passed the impugned order on the ground that the book in question contained matter mentioned in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. This section which was introduced in 1927 by section 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927, (Act XXV of 1927), at the relevant time, reads as follows:‑-- "Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of out raging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of Pakistan, by words either spoken or written, or by visible representations insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both". By section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927, some additions were made in section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure so that a publication which contained matter mentioned in the newly‑inserted section 295‑A of the Penal Code could be forfeited to Government. Section 295‑A was considered necessary because a learned Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore in Raj Pal v. King‑Emperor (A I R 1927 Lah. 590) held that section 153‑A of the Penal Code, under which Raj Pal who had written a book `Rangila Rasul' was tried, was not meant to stop polemics against a deceased religious leader however scurrilous and in bad taste they might be. In another case, namely, Devi Sharan Sharma v. King‑Emperor (A I R 1927 Lah. 594), however, a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore held that scurrilous, vituperative, and foul attack on a religion or its founder would come within the purview of section 153‑A of the Penal Code. For the purpose of this case it is not necessary to determine whether or not the view of Dalip Singh, J. in Raj Pal v. King Emperor which was not accepted in some other cases was correct because the fate of the present application turns on whether or not the book under consideration contained matter mentioned in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. The reason why it is necessary to confine the discussion to section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code is that as the Provincial Government said in the impugned order that the book contained matter punishable under section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code, the only ground on which this Court can uphold the order of the Provincial Government is that the Provincial Government had taken a precise view of the law even to the section of the Penal Code that applied. This was laid down by the Federal Court of Pakistan in The Woking Muslim Mission and Literary Trust, Lahore v. The Crown (P L D 1956 F C 209).

8. The above mentioned decision of the Federal Court of Pakistan was given in an appeal against an order reported as The Woking Muslim Mission and Literary Trust, Lahore v. The Crown (P L R 1954 Lah. 721: P L D 1954 Lah. 724) which was passed by a Bench of three Judges of whom two were my Lord the Chief Justice and myself, and wherein it was held that the book "Jesus in Heaven on Earth" written by Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, an Advocate of this Court, had been rightly forfeited by the Provincial Government under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The book had been forfeited by the Provincial Government on the ground that its contents attracted section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code whereupon an application under section 99‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure was put in and during its hearing lengthy arguments were addressed with regard to the applicability of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code to the contents of the book. The Bench held that section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was clearly applicable to the contents of the book, and, therefore, the order of the Provincial Government could not be vacated. On appeal against that order it was held by the Federal Court that the High Court could uphold the order of the Government only if the provision of law which the Government said in the order was applicable was in fact applicable and that even if the High Court were of the view that some other provision of the law which could have justified the passing of an order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable, the High Court bad no option but to accept the application made under section 99‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Federal Court did not deal with the question whether the book "Jesus in Heaven on Earth" contained matter which would attract section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code, nor did it say that it had been wrongly held by the High Court that section 153‑A of that Code was attracted and contented itself with accepting the appeal and reversing the order of the High Court, and vacating the order of the Provincial Government. I might mention that it was not the intention of the Bench in that case to hold that the writing did not fall within the four corners of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code but a definite finding with regard to the applicability of that section was not given because it was believed that even if section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code applied to the case, the order of the Provincial Government could be maintained. Considering the writing in that case my Lord the Chief Justice and I were not convinced that some portions of the book Jesus in Heaven on Earth"‑which portions I am purposely refraining from reproducing‑did not attract the provisions of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code but as section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was clearly applicable and it was believed by the three members of that Bench that the order of the Provincial Government could be maintained even if any of the other provisions under which an order under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be passed was applicable, that application was dismissed on the ground that the contents of the book offended against section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code. I have the authority of my Lord the Chief Justice to say that if it had been considered necessary to give a finding with regard to the application of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code he would have had no hesitation in giving that finding in favour of the Provincial Government and I can say the same about myself.

9. Now, it will be noticed that the intention contemplated by section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code is not just the ordinary intention that one finds mentioned with regard to almost all other offences made punishable by that Code but a deliberate and malicious intention to do the thing mentioned therein. It appears to me that in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code the Legislature hedged "intention" with "deliberately" and "maliciously" because it was providing punishment for insulting or attempting to insult the religion or religious beliefs of a person and it is well‑known that when followers of a religion try to show that their religion is the best in the world, words which will not be palatable to the followers of other religions are difficult to avoid and if it were not made necessary that the intention to do the things mentioned in the section should be deliberate and malicious the door would have been closed on all religious discussions. What the intention of a person was when he did a certain act is known only to his maker and himself. The law, however, presumes that a person intends the ordinary and natural consequences of his acts. If a person shoots at another and kills him, the law will presume, that it was intentional killing of a human being, and if the person who fired the fatal shot wants to show that he did not intend to take the life of the person he fired at, the burden of proving that is placed by the law on him. In religious discussions and controversies exactly the same principle is applicable and if a person says a thing against the religion of another, the law will presume that the intention was to hurt the religious feeling of that other. However, the laws of Pakistan, like those of every other civilised country, do not forbid religious discussions and preaching and I should think that if a law attempted to put a gag on these things it will be attempting to attain the impossible because it will be wanting to deny human beings the satisfaction they want to get from showing to as many people as they can that at least in matters which are not mundane they have made the best choice. If, therefore, a person engaged in a religious discussion is merely attempting to show that the religion he is advocating is the best in the world, he is not doing anything to which the law takes exception. It is obvious that while trying to show the superiority of one religion over others, the person engaged in the attempt will have to compare it with other religions and it is but natural that if what a person believes to be the best is stated by someone else as not possessing that character there will be annoyance caused. It is clear that in the attempt to show that a particular religion is better than the others, things may be said or written which will outrage the religious feelings of followers of other religions. When a person does that, the law will presume that he intended to insult religious beliefs of the followers of other religions. But even so the ingredients of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code will not have been satisfied because they can be satisfied only if it is established that the intention to insult the religious beliefs was deliberate and malicious. When the thing objected to on the ground that it outrages the religious feelings of others is extremely offensive and has no reliable source to justify its acceptance as correct, the Court will presume that it was done with the deliberate and malicious intention of insulting the religious beliefs of the followers of the religion to which or the founder of which the thing relates. The same presumption will be raised when the thing objected to indicates that the argument in favour of one religion has sunk to the level of abuse to another. But while pronouncing on the question whether or not the thing which insults the religious belief of some one was said or done with the deliberate and malicious intention of insulting that religion or the religious beliefs of the followers of that religion, the Court has to pu4 itself in the place of a neutral person, that is to say, a person who is neither connected with the religion of the person who is alleged to have outraged the religious feelings of someone nor with that of the person or persons whose a religious feelings are stated to have been outraged. The Court has further to consider the thing from the point of view of a person who is not hyper, sensitive but is a person of normal susceptibilities. It is with these principles in view that I will examine the question whether the book under consideration contains matter mentioned in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code.

10. The book under consideration deals with a highly controversial subject which the author examines in a manner which discloses his learning as well as research and it is not easy to assert that all the arguments employed by the author, with which one may not agree, can be brushed aside as frivolous by a person who is not a follower of Islam. Some of the arguments employed by the author would probably have attracted the provisions of section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code, had it not been for the fact that the author quoted from books written by Muslims, some of which books are believed by many Muslims to be authentic. Personally I am doubtful of the authenticity of some of the things mentioned in some of the books relied upon by the author as they appear to me to have been cleverly managed to have been introduced in books dealing with religious subjects with a view to dealing Islam a blow, but it is undeniable that the books do contain the things which the author of `Mizan‑ul‑Haq' wants to use against Islam. It is obvious that arguments employed by a Christian which are based on passages from books written by Muslims cannot be held to have been deliberately and maliciously intended to insult Islam or the religious beliefs of the Muslims, when they are based on books which many Muslims accept as authentic.

11. Then there are some other passages in which some things mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and some other books of Muslims have been commented upon in a language which is not complimentary. I am clear in my mind that the laws of Pakistan do not forbid comments on acts of founders and leaders of religions provided the comments are not of such a character as to make an unbiased person believe that they could have no other object but to deride or are so caustic in their tone as to merit the appellation unjustified and unfair comments. Some of the comments in the book under consideration, though they may relate to occurrences which took place are so worded as to indicate that the author was wanting to show that the construction placed on those words and occurrences by Muslims were entirely unjustified. In these passages the author expresses his difference of opinion with the views accepted by almost all Muslims with such intensity as would defeat its own purpose if the reader were a reasoning and logical person, because intensity of criticism is generally born of some kind of bias. The passages now under consideration have a tone so different from the general tone of the book that if there were some slight evidence to the effect that the book had suffered in translation I would have felt inclined to accept it. These passages will outrage the religious feelings of the Muslims and though the author has said in his book at more places than one that he has no intention of hurting the feelings of Muslims, the law will presume that, the protestations of the author notwithstanding, there was intention to insult the religious beliefs of Muslims as the author would, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have intended the ordinary and natural consequences of his acts. If the intention contemplated in section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code were not qualified by the dual condition of being deliberate and malicious I would have had but little hesitation in finding that section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was properly relied upon by the Provincial Government for passing an order of forfeiture of the book under section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure but as in Courts justice is nothing more nor less than the administration of the law of the land, the matter does not end there and it remains to see whether the intention to insult the religious beliefs of Muslims was deliberate and malicious. The acts and sayings commented upon have not been twisted and as the comments do not appear to be very different in tone from comments which appeal to the mass of followers of religions other than Islam,, it is difficult to give a finding that the intention to insult the religious beliefs of Muslims was deliberate and malicious.

12. The fact that it has been found that section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code did not apply to the matter in the book under consideration is not and should not be taken to be a finding that even section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code did not apply. This Bench was not called upon to give a finding whether or not the order of the Provincial Government could be upheld on the ground that section 153‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was attracted by the writing and, therefore, no finding is being given on that point. It was, however, made clear to Mr. Jeremy that the book was not entirely inoffensive in tone. Mr. Jeremy, the learned counsel for the applicant, gave art assurance that passages of the book which the Bench had indicated had been considered offensive in tone would be deleted from the next edition of the book and that the fifth edition will not be circulated. I have no doubt that these assurances, Which were given on behalf of the Punjab Religious Book Society, Lahore, of which body the Bishop of Lahore is the chairman and which were clear even from the last paragraph of the application, will be honoured and no further occasion will arise for the book `Mizan‑ul‑Haq' being the subject of examination by a Court of law. I am purposely refraining from quoting the passages which were considered objectionable and which Mr. Jeremy undertook to see did not occur in the new edition of the book, because I do not want to be the indirect cause of annoying those Muslims who have not read the book but may read this judgment, but in order that there should be no mistake in the matter, I would ‑mention that the passages which were considered objectionable were on the following pages :‑ (1) Pages 103, 104. (2) Pages 129‑130. (3) Page 147. (4) Pages 273‑274. (5) Page 341. (6) Page 376. (7) Page 379. (8) Page 475.

13. In view of what I have said above, I would accept the application. The question to consider is whether the applicant should have costs of the application. Ordinarily the parties would have been left to bear their own costs, but in the present case the order that the Provincial Government must pay the costs of the applicant appears necessary for reasons which I will presently detail. The impugned order served on the manager of the applicant suffers from some defects which I have pointed out in the body of this judgment. Moreover, the passages objected to were not so out of place in the book as to leave no room for doubt that section 295‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code was applicable. In addition them, is the fact that though the law relating to section 99‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been exhaustively dealt with in the decision of this Court reported in The Woking Muslim Mission and Literary Trust., Lahore v. The Crown and the decision of the Federal Court In The Woking Muslim Mission and Literary Trust, Lahore v. The Crown the order appears to have been passed either without keeping those judgments in view or without caring to look at those judgments which were quite recent and copies of which must be or ought to have been, in that department of the West Pakistan Government which deals with such matters. I would, therefore, direct that the Provincial Government shall pay the applicant's costs of this application and would fix Rs. 300 as counsel fee. KAYANI, C. J.

I agree. KAIKAUS, J.‑

I agree. A.H. Order accordingly.