P D 1993 ',ahore 218 (PLP)

IRSHAD HASSAN KHAN, J.-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seeks to challenge the conviction and sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Summary Military Court No.48, Multan, on 8-4-1984 and Summary Military Court No. 41, Multan, on 12-4-1985. The prayer clause reads thus:-- "(a)? That the conviction and sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Summary Military Court may be declared to be without lawful authority. (b)??? That the respondents be directed to refrain from acting on the basis of ?????????? the purported conviction and sentences. (c)??? That the respondents be restrained from acquiring or taking separate ?????????? possession of the agricultural lands of the petitioners. (d)??? That the respondents be directed to refund the petitioners the sale ?????????? proceeds of their movable property, already auctioned. (e)??? That the respondents be refrained from collecting any fine from the ?????????? petitioners. That by way of interim relief during the pendency of this writ petition- (i)???? the petitioners be ordered to be enlarged on bail; (ii)??? The respondents be directed to refrain from separating the share of the petitioners' agricultural land from that of their co-sharers and taking possession thereof. (g)??? That any other relief to which the petitioners may be found entitled ?????????? may be awarded.

2. The facts in brief are that on 31-1-1984, Hakeem Muhammad Shafi, complainant, lodged F.I.R. No. 52/84 dated 31-3-1984 under sections 307/148/149/354/452/326 read with section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, and under Martial Law Regulation No.3, registered with Police Station Alpa, against the petitioners and others alleging that they having entered the house of one Muhammad Akbar, caused injuries to him with weapons like Kulharis and Dangs and also dragged dut Mst. Saeeda Bibi and Mst. Nasreen Bibi, the wives of two brothers of the complainant, and after removing their clothes, paraded them nak ' ed in the bazar. The record produced before us shows that the accused were challaned and convicted by the Summary Military Court No.78, Multan on 8-4-1984 and not by the Summary Military Court Nos.41 and 48, Multan as alleged in the writ petition. According to Memo. No. 289/L/A/ML/52/M, dated 10-4-1984 forwarded by the Headquarters Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Sector 111, Multan to the Headquarters Martial Law Administrator (Zone, A) Punjab, Lahore, a copy whereof w ' as also endorsed to the District Collector, Multan and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Multan. Mukbtar Hussain, Muhammad Shafi and Riaz writ petitioners were all awarded one year R.I., 15 lashes, a fine of Rs.2,00,000 and confiscation of all agricultural land in Pakistan and 25% of the fine realized was ordered to be equally shared by Mst. Saeeda and Mst. Nasreen. Saeed Ahmad and Abid petitioners were awarded three years' R.I. each, 15 lashes, a fine of Rs.2,00,000 and 25% of the fine realized was ordered to be equally shared by Mst. Saeeda and Mst.Nasreen

3. On receipt of orders dated 11-4-1984, attachment proceedings were initiated against the accused and an amount of Rs.8,480 was recovered from the following accused through auction of their household goods.

(1) Riaz Hussain son of Ghulam Hussain, petitioner No.5. (2) Abid Hussain son of Ghulam Hussain, petitioner NoA (3) Saeed Ahmad son of Peer Bakhsh, petitioner No.l. (4) Mukhtar Ahmad son of Peer Bakhsh, petitioner No.2. (5) Ejaz Ahmad son of Khan Muhammad. (6) Taj Muhammad son of Muhammad Bakhsh. (7) Shaukat Hussain son of Fida Hussain. (8) Allah Pitta son of Muhammad Hussain. (9) Mustafa son of Muhammad Hussain. (10) Zulfiqar son of Muhammad Hussain. (11) Bashir Ahmad son of Khan Muhammad. (12) Muhammad Shafi son of Peer Bakhsh. (13) Ejaz son of Muhammad Bakhsh. (14) Muhammad Iqbal son of Peer Bakhsh. (15) Aslam son of Nabi Bakhsh. (16) Ishaque, son of Ghulam Hussain. Likewise, agricultural land owned by Riaz Hussain, Abid Hussain, Muhammad Shafi, Saeed Ahmad and Mushtaq Ahmad were confiscated. The remaining accused had no immovable property at the time of conviction, as such recovery of fine from them could not be effected. Consequently, land measuring 844 Kanals, 13 Marlas owned by Saeed Ahmad etc., petitioners in joint Khatas, was mutated in favour of the Provincial Government. The crops standing over it were also taken into custody on 11-4-1984 vide relevant entries made in the mutations and Rapat Roznamcha Waqiati and Register Haqdaran Zamin for the year 1988-89. After confiscation of the property from the accused in favour of the Provincial Government, the share of the produce of the land accruing to the Government in accordance with the shares recorded in the joint khata is being collected through Superdar and the same is being deposited in the Government Treasury under Head "1230-31 "Administration of Justice". As per report of the Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Multan, a sum of Rs.4,57,297/14 has been realized from the accused persons and the land still stands in the name of Provincial Government but the same has not been sold/transferred to any person.

4. The writ petition was filed on 21-4-1986 and was admitted to regular hearing on 3-12-1988. By order dated 28-5-1990, notice was issued to the Attorney-General for Pakistan under Order Y-XVII-A, C.P.C. as the controversy raised herein involved interpretation of Article 270-A of the Constitution. The Provincial Government was represented by Mr. Farooq Bedar, Additional Advocate-General and Ch. Ijaz Ahmad, Deputy Attorney?General represented the Federation. He also appeared on behalf of the learned Attorney-General.

5. Kh. Habib Uflah, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the offences under which the petitioners were tried and convicted by the Summary Military Court, did not provide for the confiscation of property and fine amounting to Rs.2,00,000 each and therefore, the impugned conviction and sentences recorded by the Summary Military Court were coram non judice. He further argued that the Summary Military Court had no jurisdiction to award sentence for a period exceeding one year, whereas in this case, two of the petitioners were awarded sentences of rigorous imprisonment for three years each. He further submitted that the controversy raised therein is subject to scrutiny by this Court in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and that the present case is not hit by Article 270-A of the Constitution, inasmuch as the entire proceedings before the Summary Military Court being in excess of the jurisdiction, were coram non judice. In this behalf it was further argued that the principle of past and closed transaction is not attracted in this case as the impugned conviction and sentences were void ab mitio and in any case the property which has been confiscated is still available for restitution as the same has not yet been sold by the Provincial Government in favour of any body else. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar PLD 1989 SC 26.

6. Ch. Ijaz Ahmed, learned Deputy Attorney-General argued that the impugned order of the Summary Military Court has been competently passed and the conviction as well as imposition of fine and forfeiture of property of the petitioners do not suffer from any infirmity in law. He further argued that the impugned conviction and sentences of the petitioners are valid being, in conformity with the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 3 read with Martial Law Order 4, paras. 2 and 3, MLO-5, MLO-37, and MLO-54. He further subn1ted that apart from the Martial Law Regulation No.3, the petitioners were also convicted and sentenced under sections 307, 148, 149, 354, 452, 326 P.P.C. and section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, which do provide for imposition of unlimited fine and, therefore, the sentences awarded and fine imposed by the Summary Military Court, were justified. As regards the confiscation of immovable property, it was argued by the.Depu Attorney-General that the same was valid under clause (c) of para. 7 of MLO-4 read with clauses (f) and (g) of para. 1 of MLO-5.

7. Mr. Farooq Bedar, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, appearing on behalf of the Provincial Government reiterated the submissions made by the Deputy Attorney-General.

8. We have heard at length the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the available material. The controversy raised therein needs examination of the various provisions of Martial Law Regulations/Orders and the effect of Article 270-A of the Constitution. it would, therefore, be advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions which read thus:-- "Martial Law Regulation No.3 (5th July, 1217).--Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman shall be punished. Maximum punishment 10 years' rigorous imprisonment and/or whipping up to 30 stripes. Martial Law Order No.4. (5th July, 12M! I. Military Courts: Military Courts of criminal jurisdiction shall be of the I following classes:-- (a)??? Special Military Courts. (b)??? Summary Military Courts. 2.????? (l)--A Military Court shall have power and jurisdiction to try and punish any person for offences under any Martial Law Regulation, Martial Law Order, or under any of the under mentioned laws notwithstanding that an offence is triable exclusively by a Special Court or Tribunal or Special Judge or any other authority or body: (A) (2) 3.(1) (2) (3-A) (5-A) SummaEy Militga Courts.--A Martial Law Administrator may by general or special order empower any officer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan to hold a Summary Military Court in the Zone concerned for trial of offences under Martial Law Regulations or offences under any other law for the time being in force or for contravention of Martial Law Orders. (a) (b) (c)??? The Court may award any of the punishments or combination thereof as prescribed under Martial Law Order No.5 except that of death, amputation of hand, imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment exceeding one year or whipping exceeding 15 stripes. (d)??? The proceedings of Summary Military Court shall, without delay, be forwarded to the Martial Law Administrator of the Zone concerned for review- Provided that a Martial Law Administrator of a Zone, if he deems necessary for expeditious disposal of cases, may direct a Deputy Martial law Administrator, in his Zone to review and countersign the proceedings of Summary Military Courts." "Martial Law Order No,5. ??????? (5th July, 1977) (1)??? Punishments shall be awarded according to the following scales:-- (d)??? Rigorous imprisonment for not more than 14 years. (e)??? Whipping not more than 30 stripes in public or in. jail as directed by the Court: Provided that whipping shall not be inflicted on women of any age or men over 45 years or persons below the age of 18 years. ?(f)???? Fine.--The amount is unlimited unless otherwise specified in a Martial Law Regulation (and notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, fine awarded by a M ilitary Court shall be recovered as arrear of land revenue). (g)??? Forfeiture of movable and immovable property, either completely or in part: Providea that the sentence of forfeiture of movable property shall not apply to utensils and clothings and other items necessary for life. 2.?????? The following combination of the above punishments shall be ?????????? permissible:-- (c)??? rigorous imprisonment may be combined with whipping and/or ?????????? forfeiture of property, and with fine. Martial Law Order No.3 . (19th FebruaEy. 1978) 2,?????? In Martial Law Order No.4, paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be substituted as ?????????? follows namely:-- (1) A Military Court shall. have power and jurisdiction to try and punish any person for an offence under any of the Martial Law Regulations or Orders or under any other law for the time being in force. (2)??? A Military Court, may, for purpose of sub-paragraph (1), take ?????????? cognizance of an offence:-- (a)??? upon receiving A complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b)??? upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer or any ?????????? officer of Armed Forces. (c)??? upon -information received from any person other than a Police Officer or an Officer of an Armed Forces, or upon its own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. Martial Law Order No-54- (10th September 1978) Notwithstanding any provision contained in any law for the time being in force by virtue of which an offence is triable exclusively by a Special Court, Special Judge or any other type of Tribunal, such offence shall, in case in which the Chief Martial Law Administrator so directs, be triable by a Military Court. Martial Law Order No.54 shall be constituted and shall be deemed to have always been so reconstituted namely- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force by virtue of which an offence is triable exclusively by a Special Court, Special Judge or any other type of Trib ' unal, such offence shall, in case in which the Chief Martial Law Administrator or, as the case may be, a Martial Law Administrator so direct, be tried by a Military Court and if such case is pending in a Special Court, Tribunal or before a Special Judge be transferred in a Military Court under sub? paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of Martial Law Order No.4." 4 The revelvant excerpt from . Martial Law Instruction No.8 dated 17-7-1977 reads thus

"(I)? General.--This instruction deals with the arrest, investigation, conduct of trial by Summary Military Courts and disposal of mercy petitions, if any. (2) (3) (4) (5)??? Conduct of Trial by Summary Military Court. (a) (b)??? Jurisdictio --Respective district as specified in the convening order, and such other cases as may be brought before the Court, on the direction of MLA/DMIA/SMLA. I - (c) Powers (1) RI??????????????????????????????????? ................................ ...????????????? One year (2) Whipping ... Fifteen stripes (3)?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Fine??????? ...????????????? Rs.5,000.00."

9. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that paragraphs 2 and 3 of MLO No. 4 were substituted by MLO No. 37, promulgated on 19-2-1978 and MLO No.72 promulgated on 22-10-1979 which substituted MLO No.4 conferred jurisdiction on the Military Court to try and punish any person for offences under any Martial Law Order or under any other laws mentionea in clause (a) thereof notwithstanding that the offence is triable exclusively by a Special Court or Tribunal or Special Judge or any other Authority or Body. Thus visualizecFthe trial of the petitioner by the Summary Military Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity.

10. The next question is as to whether there is any substance in the submission of Khawaja Habib Ullah, Advocate that in the absence of any specific provisions for imposition of fine under MLR No.3, the imposition of fine of Rs.2,00,000 on each one of the petitioners is without jurisdiction. There is no cavil with the proposition that MLR No.3 does not provide for imposition of fine. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, over-looked the faci that the petitioners were tried and convicted not only under MLR No.3 but also under sections 148/149, 452,354, 307 and 326 of the P.P.C.-and section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. All the aforesaid sections of the Penal Code and the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance do provide for imposition of rme and, therefore, no exception can be taken to this exteni either. Reference may also be made to clause (c) to paragraph 7 of MLO No.4 read with clause (f) (1) of MLO No.5 which provides for the imposition of unlimited fine unless otherwise specified in a Martial Law Regulation and notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in forcd, fine awarded by a Military Court shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue. As pointed out above, although imposition of fine is not contemplated by MLR No.3 but the fine could have been validly imposed by the Summary Military Court wider various provisions of the Penal Code and Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance stated above and, therefore, no exception'can 1: When faced with this Khawaja Habibullah, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if it is assumed that imposition of fine was within the competence of the Summary Military Court, the impugned fines are wholly without jurisdiction, in that, conduct of trial by the Summary Military Court was governed by Instruction No.8 issued by Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'A' on 17-7-1977. It was submitted that according to clause (c) toL paragraph 5 of the Instruction the Summary Military Court is competent to impose sentence up to one year, whipping of 15 stripes and fine not exceeding Rs.5,

000. Here the punishments of imprisonment awarded to two out of the five petitioners were three years each and, therefore, their conviction was rendered coram. non judice. According to him, under same provisions a Summary Military Court had no jurisdiction to impose fine exceeding Rs.5,000 and, thereforg, imposition of fine of Rs.2,00,000 on each of the petitioners was also corarn non judice. It is true that Martial Law Instruction No.8, referred to above, does not empower the Summary Military Court to impose fine exceeding Rs.5,000 but this plea is of no avail to the petitioners in that, Instruction No.8 was issued on 17-7-1977 whereas vide CMIA Order No.40 dated 26-2-1978, clause (c) to paragraph 7 of MLO No..4 was substituted. The petitioners were admittedly tried by the Summary Military Court in 1984 and, therefore, the imposition of fine beyond Rs.5,000 cannot be questioned in view of the aforesaid provision read with clause (f) of Martial Law Order No.5(i).

11. As regards sentences of imprisonment for a period of three years to petitioners Nos.1 and 4, the argument on behalf of learned eounsel for the petitioners is not without merit. The restriction on the powers of the Summary Military Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year was reiterated on 26-2-1978 vide CMLA's Order No.40 of the said date. The phrase the Court may award any of the punishments or combination thereof as prescribed under Martial Law Order No.5 empowers the Summary Military Court to award punishment which is within its competence, that is to say, not exceeding one year. Be that as it may, the petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 have admittedly undergone the sentence of imprisonment and, therefore, no order is called for in that regard.

12. The next question which requires consideration is whether the order of forfeiture of properties of the petitioners was intra vires the powers of the Summary Military Court. There is no cavil with the proposition that there is no provision for forfeiture of property either in MLR No.3 or any of the provisions of the Penal Code and section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 under which the petitioners were tried and convicted. It may be pointed out that MLRs. Nos.14, 21, 30 and 31 specifically provide for confiscation of properties and, therefore, it can be safely inferred that the scales provided for awarding punishments in MLO No.5 cannot bp read as conferring jurisdiction on all Military Courts irrespective of the trial of offences under M.L.Rs. afore-referred. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners were tried by the Summary Military Court under any of the offences under Martial Law Orders/Martial Law Regulations or any other law providing a punishment of forfeiture of properties in any eventuality. Thus visualised we are fortified in our view that MLO No.5 does not create any offence but is content witfi only laying down the scales of punishments and therefore, combination of one with the other by the competent forums functioning under MLO No.4. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the impugned forfeiture of the petitioners' properties was within the confines of the jurisdiction of the Summary Military Court. When faced with this, the learned Deputy Attorney-General vehemently argued that 'the trial and conviction of the petitioners including the impugned forfeiture of their properties was a transaction past and closed and was fully protected under Article 270-A of the Constitution. The argument was that the action taken by the Summary Military Court between the relevant periods stands saved under Article 270-A of the Constitution. We are not impressed by the submissions of the learned Deputy Attorney-General.

13. The forfeiture of property by the Summary Military Court violated Articles 4, 23 and 24 of the Constitution which provided that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law and every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property in any part of Pakistan. subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest. Here the Summary Military Court which passed order for confiscation of the property of the petitioners had no jurisdiction to do so and therefore, the impugned confiscation of petitioners' properties is coram. non judice and cannot be sanctified under any discoverable principle. There is no force in the contention raised on behalf of the learned Deputy Attorney?General that with the sanctioning of mutation in favour of the Provincial Government, the property of the petitioners cannot be returned to them as that action is a past and closed transaction. As held above, the order relatable to the confiscation of the property of the petitioners wastorarn non judice anu therefore, it is incapable of conferring any rights on the respondent?Government on the basis of mutation sanctioned in their favour. According to the report received from the Deputy Commissioner/DiStTiCt Collector, Multan. during the course of hearing of this case, it has been revealed that beyond the entry of the mutation in favour of the Provincial Government and collection of? the share of produce by the Governdment through a Superdar and deposit On? the same in the bank, no other action has been taken in making the corpus disappear or change hands. The position is that the property of the petitioners forms part of a joint Khata and it still retains that status.

14. There is no force in the submission of the learned Deputy Attorney?General that the forfeiture of property of the petitioners can be treated "as an act done or purported to have been made in good faith" within the meaning of clauses (2), (4) and (5) of Article 270-A of the Constitution. A similar contention was raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Ghulani Mustafa Khar (supra) but repelled after re-affirming the observations made by Hamood-ur-Rehman, CJ in case of State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC.49) and Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan (PLD 1974 SC 151). The precedent cases also related to the acts taken during the Martial Law period between March 1969 and April, 1972 and ended with the enactment of the Interim Constitution in 1972. In the precedent cases, complete immunity was claimed for the actions and legislative measures taken during the Martial Law period even in respect of mala fide acts or acts without jurisdiction. The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. Hamoodur Rehman, CJ.?observed- "The conclusion to which have arrived is that the validity given by clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution'to acts done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers given by Martial Law Regulations and Orders since repealed or even in the purported exercise of those powers do not have the effect of validating acts done corarn non judice or without jurisdiction or mala fide. A contention was also raised before the Court that the expression "purported to be done" or "done in purported exercise of powers" aass occurring in the Article was intended to cover acts which were not strictly related to the laws under which they were done as well as those which were mala fide. This contention too did not find favour with the Court and Hamoodur Rehman, CJ. ruled: 'I am therefore of the opinion that the words "purported to be done or done in the purported exercise of powers" cannot cover acts which were not done by person empowered under the statute or legislative measure to so act or were clearly beyond the scope of the powers given by the statute or were done mala fide or by practising of fraud upon the statute for a colourable purpose'. It was further observed:-? "During the Martial Law when the fundamental rights stood .suspended, Article 4 furnished the only guarantee or assurance to the citizens that no action detrimenal to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person would be taken except in accordance with law. Acts, actions or proceedings which suffered from excess or lack of jurisdiction or were coram non j udice or mala fide (be it malice in fact or in law) could hardly be treated as those in accordance with law. They were thus bad even under the system which was validated by Parliament under Article 270-A on account of violation of the assurance given by Article

4. It is difficult to concede that by enacting clauses (2) and (5) the Parliament had intended to validate such acts, actions or proceedings or to put them beyond the reach of the Courts or to deprive the persons who had suffered thereunder of any remedy or relief whatsoever. There is a presumption that Legislature does not perpetuate inequity or injustice and there is no reason why such a presumption should not be invoked while interpreting clauses (2) and (5) of Article - 270-A. In Ziaur Rehman's case ibid, Hamoodur Rehman, CJ. observed: 'As a general rule it is unthinkable that any Legislature consisting of civilized persons would in normal circumstances seek to perpetuate a manifest injustice by validating acts done in excess of jurisdiction or in abuse of jurisdiction or clearly in bad faith and it is for this reason that the Courts out of respect for the Legislature start with the presumption that the Legislature has to be imputed a just intention unless the words of -ouster used are either so express or so unequivocal that it must come to the contrary conclusion. The Legislature, however, even in abnormal circumstances, does not use such express or clear words or words which would necessarily imply such an unfair or unjust intent but resorts to Legislative devices of incorporating within, 'deeming' clause of extending the validity to even acts 'purported' to be done in exercise of statutory powers and then to add a clause saying that no Court shaft call in question such acts ... ... ... ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Now that there is a commitment on our part to seek inspiration in all our affairs from Islamic values the presumption to which Hamoodur Rehman, CJ. referred in Ziaur Rehman's case becomes even stronger and unavoidable."

15. The nature and extent of validation covered under Article 270-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, came up for examination before the Supreme Court in the case of Ghulain Mustafa Khar (supra). It would be advantageous to quote the following passage from the report:? "

30. Taking into account the background in which Article 270-A was enacted, the language in which it* is phrased and the absurd results which would follow if it is construed widely it appears that its object? was merely to afford protection to the dispensation which came into existence as a result of Constitutional deviation; it is difficult to interpret it as conferring validity and immunity upon such acts, actions E and proceedings as were illegal or indefensible even under that dispensation. Thus, this Article does not take away the jurisdiction of the High Courts from reviewing acts, -actions or proceedings which suffered from defect of jurisdiction or were corain non judice or were mala fide. For this purpose it is unnecessary to draw a distinction between malice in fact and malice in law." Clearly the confiscation of property of the petitioners was ex facie without lawful authority and in violation of fundamental rights. The property is still intact and has not been sold away by the Provincial Government, and therefore, is capable of being restored to the petitioners. In the case of Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 563), it was held:? "Where certain rights which were violated were still capable of being in force ahd there was something still left to be done under the impugned legislation when the fundamental rights had been restored, then the Court would be bound to give effect to such fundamental rights and save a citizen from being denied the benefit of the same." In the precedent case, similar dictum laid down by Supreme Court in the cases of Abul A' la Maudoodi v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 673) and Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) was reiterated. In the case in hand, the forfeited property still remains intact and has not been sold away by the Provincial Government to any person. This Court is, therefore, bound to give effect to fundamental rights of the petitioners by restoring to them the forfeited property alongwith the benefit derived by the Provincial Government during the period the forfeited property was enjoyed by it.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the impugned ordei in so far as it relates to forfeiture of the properties of the petitioners is without H lawful authority and is coram non judice. Resultantly, the writ petition is accepted to the extent indicated above and it is directed that the Deputyl Commissioner/District Collector, Multan, shall restore the possession of the confiscated properties to the petitioners alongwith the benefits derived by the Government of Punjab from the date of confiscation to Rabi~ 1992 within sixty days. There shall be no order as to costs. M.B.A./S-249/1,