P L D 1961 Dacca 278 (PLP)

CHOWDHURY, C. J.‑In this Writ Petition (Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960), the petitioner objected to the imposition and realisation of "Shipping and Landing charges for handling done at Commissioners' moorings" by the Trustees for the Port of Chittagong under section 57 (1) (c) of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914 under Gazette Notification dated 1‑4‑55 as amended by Gazette Notification dated 11‑3‑

60. The facts are as follows: The petitioner, a company incorporated in the United States of America, having its head office at Karachi, carrying on business at Chittagong and elsewhere " in East Pakistan, in importation, storage and distribution of oil and petroleum products by sea‑going vessels into East Pakistan, through the Port of Chittagong. For the purpose, the petitioner has taken lease of the land including the foreshore on which they with necessary permission constructed all necessary facilities including jetties, office premises, railway sidings, oil storage, tanks and other equipments essential for loading and unloading the oil and other petroleum products from Company's tankers to its own tanks ; and oil is loaded and unloaded with its own pump laid on its jetties with the aid of its own pipe lines. The respondents, the Trustees for the Port of Chittagong, have their own moorings (buoys tied to a chain which is attached to a fixture embedded in the river) in front of the petitioner's jetties which are used by the petitioner for securing its tankers for which it pays charges or tolls under notification, as amended from time to time, under section 57 of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914, hereafter referred to as the Act. Apart from the land rent and licence fees, the petitioner pays other charges, such as, Port dues, hire for moorings, pilotage, Harbour Master's fees, etc. The respondents by notification under section 57 (2) (b) of the Act dated 14‑3‑55 published in the Pakistan Gazette dated 1‑4‑55 levied some charges on the loading and unloading of petrol and petroleum products from the ships at Port Trustees' moorings as they levied on cargoes dealt with overside the railway jetties under paragraph 96 of the jetty schedule. The petitioner objected to the levy and the notification on various grounds. Some of them are : (1) that section 57 of the Act simply authorises of framing a scale of tolls, dues, rates and charges but does not authorise imposition or levy of those charges ; (2) that there is no existence of subsection (2) (b) of section 57 ; (3) that the notification has not been duly published as contemplated in subsection (3) of section 57 ; (4),that there is no provision for levying a charge for "loading and unloading from the ships at the Commissioners' moorings" or for shipping and ending charges for handling done "at Commissioners' moorings" when possession of land utilized for landing and shipping is not vested in the Trustees and it is only possible for cumulative user of docks, wharves, stages, quays, jetties, moorings and piers which belong to the Trustees when landing and shipping are done by or without the service of the servants of the Trustees under section 57 (1) (b) (i) and (v) and 57 (1) (c) of the Act. When the attention of the petitioner was drawn to the impugned notice on 16‑5‑57 the petitioner made a representation to the respondents that the levy of the said charges was unauthorised, and as a result no demand was made for levying the said additional charges and thereby the Company was induced to continue to sell the oil and petroleum products at control prices fixed by the Central Government without taking into consideration these additional charges of landing and shipping. On the said representation of the petitioner and representation of other Oil Companies, Central Government discussed the matter in a meeting "with all interested concerns" and at the instance of the respondents a new notification dated 11‑3‑60 in the shape of corrigendum was published in Pakistan Gazette dated 11‑3‑60 by which the original notification of 1955 was amended to read:‑ (1) "Shipping and landing charges for handling done at Commissioners' moorings" and (2) the reference to the non‑existing section 57 (2) (b) was deleted and "section 57 (1) (c) of the Chittagong Port Act 1914" was inserted in the impugned notification and thereby illegally given a retrospective effect. It is also contended that this subsequent notice is also illegal and ultra vires as the 1st notification for the same reasons and grounds. As the respondents are now pressing for payment and demanded payment of landing and shipping charges retrospectively and have refused to allow the goods to be cleared without payment, and as the petitioner has been compelled to pay the landing and shipping charges and the respondents illegally collected them which the Company is entitled to get refunded, they obtained this Rule nisi after failing to get justice from the respondents in spite of repeated prayers. The respondents in their affidavit‑in‑opposition denied all allegations of the petitioner in substance and asserted that the respondents are competent under the provisions of the Act to frame scale of toll, charges, etc. for using the moorings for landing and shipping of the goods at the Trustees' moorings, realise the same at the rate and the copy of the notification was published in the notice board of their office and copses were sent to ail concerned including the petitioner and that what was notified in the Gazette of 1960 was not an amendment of the notification published in the Gazette of 1955 but correction of certain apparent mistakes in that notification and as such no question of retrospectively came in and the power exercised by the Trustees under section 57 are not ultra vires and it is valid and legal and the provision of that section has not become repugnant. Points raised by the learned Counsel in support of the rule are as follows: (1) Under the Act the Company's liability to pay tolls or taxes either under section 57 (1) (b) (v) or under section 57 (1) (c) is for using the Trustees' moorings which they are paying and not for landing or shipping goods at Trustees' moorings. (2) That every such scale of charges shall have to be published in the manner provided in subsection (3) of section 57 and as they have not been published in the manner they are illegal for non compliance with the mandatory provision of the Act. (3) That the Trustees in any view of the matter waived their right by not pressing their demand and by not realising the taxes on the representation of the petitioner and having fixed the control price of the petrol or petroleum goods without considering these charges. (4) That the amendment at any rate cannot have any retrospective effect to enable the Trustees to make charges for the period prior to the date of the Gazette publication of the amendment on 11‑3‑60. (5) That even if clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 57 of the Act applies, it applies only in case of cumulative use of the "said docks, wharves, quays, moorings, stages, jetties and piers by any such vessel" and it does not apply if only Trustees' moorings are used for loading and unloading ships at the moorings and‑ (6) That the framing of scales of tolls, charges, etc. is ultra wires of the Trustees under the Provincial Act. Since the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution of Pakistan because the Port of Chittagong has been declared major Port in 1928 and since then it has become the Central subject and as it contravenes section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry No. 22 in Schedule VII of List I, i.e., Federal List, section 57 has become repugnant after the Government of India Act, 1935 as well as the new Constitution of 1956 as the same provision continued. Section 57 (1) provides‑‑ The Commissioner shall frame: (a) Scale of tolls, dues, taxes, etc. annul or other to be paid by the owner of the vessels plying within the limit of the Port. (b) Scale of tolls, dues, rates and charges for various purposes including (V) for the use of any moorings. (c) A scale of tolls for the use of the said docks wharves, quays, moorings, stages, jetties and piers by any such vessels in case the Commissioners permit the goods to be landed or shipped by persons other than their own officers and servants. The underlinings are mine, "said docks, etc." refer to those mentioned in clause (b) i.e. belonging to the Commissioners and "such vessels" refer to vessels mentioned in clause, (b) i.e. sea going vessels and vessels not sea‑going. Section 57 (1) (b) (v) and section 57 (1) (c) both refer to tolls for use of the Trustees' (Commissioners) moorings (a mooring is a buoy fastened to chain embedded in the earth at the bottom of the river either by an anchorage or by concrete, generally used for tying the vessels). I asked the learned counsel the difference between the two and why the legislature provided for payment of charges twice for the use of the Trustees' moorings. ‑The learned counsel's answer was what he has stated in his point No.

5. According to him clause (c) of section 57 (1) applies only in case of cumulative use of Trustees' docks, wharves, quays, stages and piers mentioned in that clause and if any one of them is used independently of the others it would come under clause (b). One may not use or it may not be necessary to use all of them. What would happen? The learned counsel had no answer. On the other hand, Mr. Suhrawardy, the learned counsel for the respondents‑Trustees for the Port, argues that the two user of the moorings in the two clauses of the section refers to two distinct and separate user by two different persons‑one is by the owner of the vessels and the other by the owner of the goods who caused his goods landed or shipped at the moorings. This reading of the clause is quite consistent not only with the entire section but also with the remaining part of the clause (c) particularly with reference to the sentence "in case the Commissioners permit the goods to be landed or shipped by persons other than their own officers and servants". It is argued that "landing" in the notification has reference to land and there cannot be any landing on the surface of the buoys. We are unable to accept this contention. To explain what landing means, we cannot perhaps do better than quote what Bramwell, B., has stated is the case of Harrey v. Lyme Regis Corpn. ((1869) L R 4 Exch. 260 at 262, 263) referred to in Words and Phrases Judicially defined by Roland Burrows, K. C. Vol. 3 at p.

210. It runs as follows:‑ "What is landing? It is putting on the land. Where does the land begin? Where the sea ends. Where does the sea end? At high water mark; above place where the goods were deposited. We must say that the goods were landed in the sea. It would certainly be strange if the captain of a steamboat were to say that he had landed his passengers, if he made them get out in three feet of water. Yet I do not say that the goods might not be said to be landed, if they were put there with the means and right of taking them up on to the land. As a matter of good sense it might perhaps be, that though goods would not be landed in the usual sense of the word until they had got to the land, yet as soon as in any manner they had reached what might be considered as the end of their transit, that might be called a landing. Suppose, however, the goods were taken out of the lighter within the harbour where the water never left the ground, for the purpose of being taken to the land, would they be landed, though below the lowest low‑water mark? I say again, if they were so placed that they could be fetched thence by the owner into . . . . . the country, it might perhaps be landing within the spirit of the Act." In the present case the Company keep their tanker at the moorings fastened with it and unload their petrol and petroleum products machanically, i. e., by pump and pipe, from their tanker to their petrol tank on the shore on their own leasehold land. So also they load their tanker from the tank for carrying them for distribution to their different centres. So they contend that they have not used the dock, wharves, etc., belonging to the Trustees and as such there was no landing or shipping within the meaning of "landing and shipping" in the notification or within the meaning of "to be landed or shipped" in clause (c) of section 57 (1) of the Act. Landing has got its own meaning in commercial or business language as explained in the case of Harvey v. Lyme Regi Corporation as per Bramwell B, and quoted above. So, there is no force in the, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Further the tolls levied by the respondents is not for landing in the sense of using any land, wharves, jetties, etc. of the Trustees which come under clause (b) of section 57 (1) of the Act but, for use of the mooring under clause (c) for landing or shipping the goods by the owner of the goods who in the present case happen to be the same as the owner of the vessel. This disposes of the 1st and 5th point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Now coming to the 2nd point of the learned counsel; I may refer to that subsection which provides for publication of such charges, rates etc. Subsection (3) of section 57 provides that every such seal shall be published in the manner specified in that subsection, namely "shall be kept hung up in some conspicuous place at the several docks, wharves, quays, stages, jetties, piers, warehouse and sheds". This publication is after the publication in the Official Gazette after the approval of the Central Government and is intended for information of those who are or may be concerned with payment of such scale. It is not the condition precedent for imposition of the tolls or taxes or for the purpose of inviting any objection or suggestion before any such imposition. This publication has got no bearing either in creating a right or a liability. In the counter affidavit it is definitely stated that the scale was published by hanging in the notice board in the office of the respondents and copy of the same was sent to the individual Company concerned including the petitioner. It has not been denied. On the other hand it appears that on the receipt of the copy of the notification the petitioner made a representation. So it cannot be said that strict non‑compliance with the provision of subsection (3), the petitioner was in any way prejudiced. Further the provisions in subsection (3) is not mandatory. It is directory and its non‑compl iance is an irregularity and cannot render the scale invalid or void. If it did not affect the petitioner prejudicially it cannot take exception to it. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited some authority to show that non‑compliance with similar provision in other Act has been held to have gone to the root of the matter to invalidate the action taken under those Acts. From all these authorities it appears that under the law, publication in each of them was made condition precedent and mandatory. He referred to the observations of the Chief Justice Taft in U. S. Supreme Court Report 67 Law E. d. U. S. 260‑262, P. 130 (right hand column) in support of his contention. It runs as follows:‑ "The maxim that a legislature may not delegate legislative power, has some qualifications as in the creation of Municipa lities, and also in the creation of administrative boards to apply to the myriad details of rate schedules, the regulatory police power of the State. The latter qualification is made necessary in order that the legislative power may be effectively exercised. In creating such administrative agency, the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. It is wholesome and necessary principle that such an agency must peruse the procedure and rules enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith, to give a validity' to its action. When, therefore, such an administrative agency is required, as a condition precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must rest upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is ineffective." As I have said above the publication provided in subsection (3) of the section is not a condition precedent to affect its validity, nor non‑compliance of the same, when the petitioner was notified of the scale of tolls and is not affected prejudicially in any way, has rendered it ineffective. The learned counsel referred to section 574 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition Vol. 31 page 467 which runs as follows :‑ "Delegated authority of the kind above referred to must be exercised in accordance with the powers creating it and in the spirit of the enabling statute. Statutes of a subordinate; legislature, and also rules, ordinances, orders, and bye‑laws, which have fulfilled and all the conditions precedent to their validity, have the force of statutes, and must be construed as such." It is not contended for a moment that the publication intended of such scale is a condition precedent either of the framing of the scale or approval of the Central Government, rather it is a publication of such scale after the approval of the Central Government for information of those who are concerned in payment of those scales and it is in addition to publication in the official Gazette. The learned counsel also referred to the observation of Bose, J. in the case of Babulal Rajoolal Jain v. Emperor, (A I R 1945 Nag. 218.). Those observations relating to the provisions of Defence of India Act and the Defence of India Rules framed thereunder, with reference to the facts of that case, which are distinguishable both from the facts of and the law applicable to the present case, are not applicable here. I think I may profitably quote here from Crawford's Inter pretation of Laws to understand whether the provision of sub section (3) of section 57 is mandatory or directory. At page 519 it is stated :‑ "Ordinarily the words `shall' and `must' are mandatory, and the word `may' is directory, although they are often used interchangeably in legislation. This use without regard to their literal meaning generally makes it necessary for the Courts to resort to construction in order to discover the real intention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the Court that the legislature intended to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, however, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, then words which ordinarily are mandatory in their nature will be construed as directory, or vice versa. In other words, if the language of the statute, considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended the words `shall' and `must' to be directory, they should be given that meaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances, the word `may' should be given a mandatory meaning, and "especially where the statute concerns the rights and interests of the public, or where third persons have a claim de jure that a power shall be exercised, or whenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to sustain the statute's constitutionality." See also Maxwell Interpretation of Statute 9th Ed. p.

372. So the second point raised in the case as to the non‑compliance with the provisions of subsection (3) of section 57 of Act rendered the scale of tolls, rates and charges invalid or void is also of no substance. Now coming to the 4th point which relates to the alleged amendment of the first notification dated the 14th of March 1955 published in Pakistan Gazette, dated the 1st of April 1955. (Annexure B, page 39 at page 40 of the petition), it (notification) started with the heading "Shipping charges at mooring outside the jurisdiction of Chittagong Port (Railway)": In the body of the Notification it is stated "in exercise of the powers conferred by section 57 (2) (b) " though there is no subsection (2) (b) in the D Act. What happened is this : In the Act original clauses (a) (b) and (c) were relettered as clauses (h), (c) and (d) by the Amendment Act (XX of 1936). To indicate the alteration it is marked as 2 for footnote. This figure 2 is unfortunately placed just by the side of clause (b) in subsection (1) of section 57 of the Act. Those who drafted the notification, by mistake thought it to be 2 (b) of section 57 of the Act and drafted the notification as such. It is an apparent mistake for the present clause (c) which was originally clause (b) and which by relettering has now come to be clause (c). Formerly Chittagong Port was under the dual management, partly under the Commissioners of the Port and partly under the Port Railway. Tolls and charges outside the jurisdiction elf Port Railway used to be collected by the Port authorities. Now after amalgamation of the two administrations and vesting the same on the Port Authorities correction in the heading from "Shipping charges at mooring outside the jurisdic tion of Chittagong Port (Railway)" to "Shipping and landing charges for handling done at Commissioners' Moorings" was necessitated. So also substitution of section "57 (1) (c)" was necessary in place of "section 57 (2) (6)" to remove the apparent mistake. These are corrections of apparent mistake and not an amendment. The scale of tolls, taxes and charges were imposed by the previous notification. As by these corrections, scale o tolls or charges have neither been charged nor imposed, no changed but only certain mistakes as to the clause of the section has been corrected and the heading, on account of change in the management of the Port, has been changed, no question of retros pective effect comes in as to the imposition of taxes. It is contended that it is as amendment. True, correction are amendments, but the two terms are not synonymous and are not co‑extensive. All corrections are amendments but all amend ments are not corrections‑ though some amendments affecting the imposition of tares or affecting the rights and liabilities of subjects cannot have retrospective effect unless expressly or by necessary implication it is made so ; but here in the present case that question does not arise as the imposition is by the first notification and not by the second notification which is a mere correction of the previous one without affecting either the imposition of tax or any right or liabilities of the subjects. In the Law of Lexicon it is stated that In Legislation "Amendment" means of modification or alteration to be made in a bill on its passage or in an enacted law ; modification or change in an existing Act or statute" and "correction" means "The act of ,noting and pointing out for removal or amendment, errors, defect, mistakes or faults of any kind." In Craies on Statute Law by Charlese Odger, 5th Edition at page 364 it is stated "Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, or, as Park, J., (after wards Baron Parke), said in R. v. Dursley (1832) 3 B & Ad. 465, 469 "to `explain' a former Statute", the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. Thus, in Attorney‑General v. Pougett (I 816) 2 Price 381, 392, it appeared that by 53 Geo.. 3, c. 33, a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s. 4d., but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s. 4d. per cwt. and to remedy this omission 53 Geo. 3, c. 105, was passed. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay duty of 9s. 4d. per cwt., but Thompson, C.‑. B., in giving judgment for the Attorney -General, said "the duty in this instance was imposed by the first .Act, but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight for which the sum expressed was to have been payable occas ioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act." So I cannot accept the contention that these corrections are really an amendment and as such have retrospective effect and: the petitioner is not liable to pay taxes for the period prior to the second notification published in the Gazette dated the 11th March 1960. As to the third point which relates to waiver, I think there is not much in it. There is admittedly no express waiver. Whether there is waiver by conduct, it is said that in fixing control price of the petrol and petroleum products these charges for handling in the mcorings were not taken into consideration in the cost of the company and they have sold their goods at the price then fixed and now cannot realise it from the consumers. Controlled price was fixed by the Central Government and not by the respondent and as such that cannot be a waiver by conduct of the respondent. It is said that the respondent did not demand it so long. Mr. Suhrawardy, the learned counsel, refers to the letter of the respondent written to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 41 of 1960, which, the petitioner in. Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960, made an annexure (Annexure E at page 53 of their Writ Petition), which clearly shows that the respondent is always pressing their demand. This letter was written on account of the objections of the Oil Companies including the petitioner to pay taxes for use of the mooring for landing or shipping their goods at the Trustees' moorings. Further, it appears that on their representation there was a sitting of the representatives of all the oil companies concerned including the petitioner and the Central Government officials where the matter was discussed threadbare. In the circumstances, can it be said that there was waiver on the part of the respond ent of their demand for such taxes. Now coming to the last point which relates to the repugnancy of the provisions of section 57 and of the power of the Port Authorities to frame scale of tolls, charges, etc., after the Government of India Act 1935, the provision of which has continued even after the new Constitution in 1956, I may simply point out that in 1928, the Port of Chittagong was declared to be a major Port and the statutory control of its administration was transferred from the local Government to the Governor -General‑in Council and Act XI of 1928 was passed reconstituting the body of Trustees to administer the Port. It is conceded that acts done and power exercised by the Trustees of the Port upto the time when the Government of India Act 1935, was passed, were infra vires. What is contended is that the power to frame scale of tolls, dues, rates, charges, etc., delegated to the Trustees under the Provincial Act, namely, under the Chittagong Port Act of 1914, (Beng. Act V of 1914), has become repugnant as it contravenes the provisions of section 100 of the Government of India Act 1935, read with Entry Rio. 22 of List I of Schedule VII, i.e., Federal List as the Port became a major Port. Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provides the Federal Legislature has and Provincial Legislature has not the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerat ed in List I in the seventh schedule of this Act (hereinafter called the `Federal Legislative List'). It is not the case of the petitioner that any of the previ sions of the Chittagong Port Act 1914, was enacted by any Provincial Legislature after the Government of India Act 1935 came into force or even after the Act XI of 1928, passed by the Indian Legislature. Whatever was enacted before in the Bengal Act V of 1914, the Central Government of India adopted it after necessary adaptation when the power conferred on the Local Government was transferred to the Governor‑General in Council by, the Act XI: of 1928, and since then it remains as central subject. This Act namely, the Chittagong Port Act 1914, as amended by the Central Act XI of 1928, remained in force even after the Government. of India Act, 1935 came into force by virtue of section 3 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937 read with the Schedule to the said Order. Section 292 which corresponds with section 224 of the Consti tution of Pakistan, preserves the continuance of all laws that were in force immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935. In the circumstances, I do not understand how the delegated power of the Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong to frame scale of tolls, dues, rates, charges etc., has become repugnant and how it contravenes the provisions of section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry No. 22 of List I of Schedule VII of that Act i.e., Federal List. I do not find any substance either in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company which is discharging its cargoes i.e., petrol and petroleum products from their own tanker mechanically to their tank on their lease‑hold shore land by means of pump and pipe without landing them on any land, wharves, jetty of the Trustees, it is labouring under a wrong impression that it is not liable to pay any charges for use of the moorings for landing or shipping their goods as the petitioner is not attributing the meaning or landing used in commercial or business language and perhaps also under the impression that it is paying for use of the mooring forgetting that what it pays it pays as owner of the vessels and not as owner of the goods using the mooring for landing or shipping their goods. In the circumstances and for the reasons given above, I think the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The rule nisi issued on Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960, is, therefore, discharged with costs, hearing fee being assessed at 10 gold mohurs. This Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960, came up for hearing together with two other Writ Petitions, being Writ Petition No. 40 of 1950, by the Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company and Writ Petition No. 41 of 1960, by the. Burmah Oil Company (Pakistan Trading) Ltd., as they are all against the same respondent, the Trustees for the Port of Chittagong, on the same facts and circumstances. But the Writ Petition No. 40 of 1960, at the instance of the Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distri bution Company which is a commission agent of the Burmah Oil Company, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 41, is not maintain able as the petitioner in that Writ Petition is not directly affected by the scale of fees, tolls, etc., under the impugned notification. An application for a Writ of the nature mentioned in the petition under Article 170 of the Constitution can only be made at the instance of a person who is himself an aggrieved party and if some one, who is not himself aggrieved by an action, makes such an application, it must be shown that he is competent under the law to make an application. The petitioner in this Rule has not been able to show that it is so competent. So the Rule issued on that Writ Petition No. 40 of 1960, is discharged with costs assessed at five gold mohurs. As the Rule issued on the Writ Petition No. 41 of 1960, at the instance of the Burmah Oil Company (Pakistan Trading) Ltd., is based almost on the same facts and ground as in Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960, it is covered by the findings in that Writ Petition No. 39 of 1960. So for the reasons stated therein, the rule issued on this Writ Petition No. 41 of 1960, is also discharged with costs, hearing fee being assessed at 10 gold mohurs. SATTAR, J.‑I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. A. H. Rule discharged.