P L D 1967 Karachi 576 (PLP)

(4) Whether the plaintiff has proved that he incurred the alleged loss on account of the delay in the delivery of the goods? If so, is the plaintiff entitled to the damages claimed by him? ,

5. The first three issues may be conveniently dealt with together. The vessel ss. Brooklyn Heights commenced its journey from the port of Norfolk in Virginia and it then came to the port of Baltimore, at which port the steel billets consisting of 415 pieces and weighing 111 tons were loaded at the bottom of hold No. 3 of the vessel. The vessel then travelled to the port of Philadelphia and then to Albany where a large cargo of wheat in bulk had to be loaded for transport to Bombay. Out of this quantity 1,305 tons were. loaded in hold No. 3 at the top of the cargo of billets. The remaining quantity of wheat was loaded in several other holds. The vessel then came for further loading to New York from where it proceeded on its onward journey and reached Karachi on 12th July 1957. According to the evidence of defendants' witness D. C. Blayke, the shipping manager of Messrs Shaw Wallace, defendant No. 2, the cargo of wheat was loaded and was being carried to India upon a special request made to New York in an emergency. At the Karachi port there were no facilities at that time for the discharge of wheat in bulk and so if the cargo of steel billets was to be landed the wheat on the top of it would have to be put into bags for being removed. Tire plaintiff was informed that this cargo of steel billets would riot for that reason be discharged at Karachi at that time and this would hive then to be traps‑shipped from an onward port. The plaintiff protested against this and wrote to the defendant No. 2 as per Exh, 19 that as his goods were being over‑carried to Bombay for traps‑shipment to Karachi this would take considerable time and the goods being essential commodities were urgently required as per allocation by the Controller of Iron and Steel and that therefore arrangement should be made for removing the cargo of wheat so that leis consignment may be landed at Karachi. This letter was written on 12th July and the defendant No. 2 replied on 15th of July Exh. 20, stating that the wheat cargo was in bulk and it would have to be discharged first and that the plaintiff's goods would have to be carried to Singapore and would be trans‑‑shipped back to Karachi. The ship accordingly left for. Bombay but it had to be redirected to the port of Nalaki where the wheat cargo was discharged and the ship proceeded to Singapore, from where the consignment of the plaintiff was re‑shipped per ss Troutpool which arrived at Karachi opt 2nd September 1957 and the consignment in question was then discharged and delivered to the plaintiff. There was, however, a shortage of 6 pieces, the liability for which was admitted by the defendants. Thus a delay of about 2 months took place by the fact that the consignment of the plaintiff was not discharged when the ship called at the port of Karachi. It was, however, contended by Mr. Fakhruddin, the learned counsel for the defendants, that the carrier was within its right in adopting the course which it did. Reliance was placed upon clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the bill of lading, from which the material portions relied upon by Mr. Fakhruddin may be reproduced:‑ (4) The scope of the voyage herein contracted for shall include usual or customary or advertised ports of call . . . . also ports in or out of the advertised, geographical, usual or ordinary route or order, even though in proceeding thereto the ship may sail beyond the port of discharge The ship may omit calling at any port . . . whether scheduled or not and may call at the same port more than once and before giving delivery of the within mentioned cargo at the port of discharge herein provided sad with the like liberties as aforesaid to leave and then return to and discharge the said cargo at such port, may . . remain in port, sail . . . . and all of the foregoing are included in the contract voyage. (5) In any situation, whatsoever and wheresoever occurring and whether existing or anticipated before the commencement of or during the voyage which is the judgment of the carrier or the Master is likely to give rise to risk of . . . delay or disadvantage to . . . . the ship or any part of her cargo, to make it imprudent . . . . for any reason to . . . discharge the goods . . . at the port of discharge, or to give rise to delay or difficulty in . . . discharging at . . . the port of discharge. .the ship may proceed . . to . . . .any port or place whatsoever as the Master or the. Carrier may consider safe or advisable under the circumstances, and to discharge the goods . . . at any such port or places ; or the carrier or the Master may retain the cargo on board . . . until such time as the Carrier or the Master thinks advisable and discharge‑ the goods at any place whatsoever as herein provided or the carrier or the Master may discharge and forward the goods to the port of discharge by any means . . . at the risk and expenses of the goods . . . Discharge or the taking of any action by the Carrier or Master pursuant to the terms of this paragraph 5 shall constitute complete delivery or performance as the case may be under this contract and the Carrier shall be freed from any further responsibility. (6) Whenever the Carrier or the Master may deem it advisable . . . . and although traps‑shipping or forwarding of the goods may not have contemplated or provided for herein . . . the Carrier or the Master may, at the port of discharge or at any place whatsoever, trans‑ship or forward the goods . . . by any vessel . . . at the risk and expenses of the goods and at any time whether before or after loading on the ship named herein, sad by any route whether within or outside the scope of the voyage or beyond the port of discharge or destination of the goods and without notice to the shipper or con?signee . . . ". The contention of Mr. Fakhruddin was that having regard to the terms of clause 4 which related to the scope of the contract of voyage there was no deviation by the carrier and the ship could call at the port of Karachi arid then proceed onward without giving delivery at that port on its first call. It could then return to that port and then discharge the cargo. That being so, it was urged that in so far as clause 6 of the contract permitted trans‑shipment the carrier acted within tile terms of the contract in trans‑shipping the goods from Singapore for being carried to Karachi. 1n any case it was urged that clause 5 was a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim because, if in the judgment of the carrier the discharge of the plaintiff's cargo which was beneath the wheat cargo was likely to cause delay or disadvantage to the ship or in the discharging of the wheat cargo, the ship was permitted under this clause to proceed to any port of place what?soever as the carrier considered advisable under the circumstances and to discharge the plaintiff's goods at another port to be forwarded from there to the port of Karachi.

6. Mr. P. C. Ramchandani appearing for the plaintiff on the other hand contended that in the first place clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the bill of lading did not cover the failure to discharge the plaintiff's cargo at Karachi when the ship called at that port and in any case the carrier or the master having acted negligently the clauses could not be relied upon by them in the manner in which it was being sought. It was also urged that if the application of these clauses was to run contrary to the main purpose of the contract then these clauses must be rendered void. At one time, it was suggested that these clauses were repugnant to The Hague Rules which were incorporated in the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, which Act was made a part of this contract, but this point, however, was not seriously pressed.

7. The first case relied upon by Mr. Ramchandani is the case of W. T. Sargant & Sons v. East Asiatic Co. Ltd. (32 TLR119) which was decided by Bailhache, J. in the King's Bench Division. In this case the plaintiffs had bought under a C. I. F. contract for delivery in London 100 tons of block gambler from the defendants who were also the owners of the ship. They had also bought a quantity of pepper from a certain party who in turn had bought it from the defendants. The delivery of these goods at the London port was refused on grounds in which it is not necessary to go. The bill of lading contained a clause giving the ship the liberty to carry the goods beyond their port of destination and to trans‑ship and forward the same at the ship owners expense but at the merchant's risk. Referring to these clauses the learned Judge held that under this liberty shipowners were not entitled to carry the goods into their port of destination and to refuse to deliver them there on the ground that there was a likelihood of the steamer being considerably delayed if the goods were discharged and so to carry them to another port and forward them from there. The learned Judge took the view that the clause only made provision for the case in which the carrying steamer failed to put into the port of destination. The facts of this case as appear from the report were different from the facts of the present case. But what is more important is that the liberty clauses of the bill of lading in that case are not avail?able so that they could be compared with the clauses in the present case. The clauses in the present case give the carrier the choice of not discharging the goods at the port of call and enable them to call at the same port again for the purpose of discharging the cargo or trans‑shipping it from another port. The circumstances under which this may be done is left to the judgment of the carrier or the master.

8. The next case cited is that of Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v Buerger ((1927) A C 1). In this case 8 bales of cloth were shipped by the plaintiffs for carriage from London to Odessa in the defendants' steamer under a bail of lading which reserved to the defendants liberty for the steamer, before or after proceeding towards leer port of discharge, to proceed to any port or ports, although to a contrary direction, in any order, for any purpose and if inconvenient for the ship's purpose to deliver during the ship's stay at the port of destination to forward the bales by any other ship at the defendants' expenses at the plaintiff's risk. The contemplated voyage was to Constantinople and thence to Black Sea ports including Odessa. On the arrival of the ship at Con?stantinople it appeared that Odessa was likely to be captured by the Soviet Forces and it was agreed that 5 bales should be delivered at Batoum and 3 at Constantinople. The ship proceeded to Batoum and back by Novorossisk to Constantinople; the bales consigned to Batourn retraining on Board after the ship had left that port. The three which wire to have been brought back to Constantinople were landed at Novorossisk for no explained reason and were detained by the defendant company's agents for two months. Neither the five bales nor the three bales Here thereafter traced. It teas, in these circumstances, held that the over‑carriage of the 5 bales and the landing and detention of three at the port of Novorossisk constituted deviation from the contract of carriage, by abandonment of the voyage or by such unreasonable delay as amounted to deviation so as to deprive the defendants of the benefit of the exceptions in the bill of lading. It would be noticed that the true reason for not allowing the carrier the benefit of the exceptions in the bill of lading was that the over carriage of 5 bales and the detention of other three bad not been satisfactorily explained by the carrier.

9. The third case is that of Yrazu and another v. The Astral Slipping Company (20 T L R 153) decided by Walton, J. in the King's Bench Division. In this case cattle were shipped on board under is live‑stock contract which excepted the usual perils arid also loss arising from force majeure or from any negligence of the master or engineers. The vessel sailed to take in coal for voyage from there to the port of destination but it was found that she did not have sufficient coal and so she halted at another port for taking in coal. By the time it reached the port of destination the vessel was detained in quarantine. Upon a construction of the exception clauses it was held that the steamer was not permitted to land at any other port except in the case of force majeure and the deficiency of coal being owing to miscalculation was not a case of force majeure the ship owner was liable for the deterioration of the cattle.

10. In the present case, I am of the view that clauses 4, 5 and. 6 would have normally, covered the defendants against liability. I do not think that these clauses by themselves defeat the main object of the contract, that is the carriage of the goods from the port of embarkation to that of landing, or the fundamental rules popularly known as The Hague Rules. These clauses however, must be construed to safeguard the carriers to meet special situations, which may be brought about by circumstances beyond their control. To provide for such situations was open to the parties by the contract of carriage so long it did not offend against the very purpose of the contract. That purpose being provided for in the main part of the contract the printed clauses including the exception clauses must be subordinated to the written part of the contract. They are however, not to be disregarded unless there is a conflict which cannot be resolved. I am, however, clear in my mind that in order that a carrier may be entitled to the protection of the exception clauses it must be shown that the situation upon the basis of which the exception was being sought, was not brought about by the negligence of the carrier or the master of the ship. It seems to me that if a situation of difficulty or emergency is brought about by some thing which the carrier or the master are themselves responsible for they then cannot be permitted to call in aid the exception clauses in defence of the action in that particular situation which was caused by their own wrongful act.

11. Let me now revert to the facts of the case so as to tee whether the carrier or the master have not deprived themselves of the benefit of the clauses 4, 5 and 6 by their own action of neg?ligence. In this case, it must have been known to the master at the commencement of the journey that a large quantity of heavy cargo, such as steel billets, was to be loaded at Baltimore with its destination at Karachi and that a very large quantity of wheat was to be loaded at a subsequent port at Albany. Evidence has been led of an expert, Captain Asad Ali, on behalf of the plaintiff who gave it as his opinion that the loading of the wheat cargo on the top of the steel billets in spite of the knowledge that the destination of the latter cargo, that is Karachi, would be reached earlier than the destination of the wheat cargo, was imprudent and incorrect. He conceded that when the steel billets were loaded in hold No. 3 that loading was correct having regard to the stability of the ship. He, however; maintained that this cargo could have been loaded in holds Nos. 1 and 4 without, in any manner, endangering the safety of the ship. But once the cargo of billets was loaded in hold No. 3 it would have been more convenient at the port, of Albany to remove that cargo and load it on the top of wheat cargo after, the same had been loaded than to bring the ship to Karachi and unload the wheat cargo here for the purpose of discharging the billet cargo. I am inclined to accept this opinion in the absence of the evidence of the master or any other officer of the ship to explain why the loading took place in‑a manner which would have defi?nitely involved the non‑delivery of the plaintiff's cargo at Karachi notwithstanding the fact that the ship would call at Karachi first and then at Bombay or any other Indian port when the wheat cargo was to be discharged. I have examined the evidence of Captain John Johnson and the shipping manager of the defendant No. 2 and after anxious consideration of that evidence have come to the view that the opinion given by them that the billets could not have been loaded in any other holds without endangering the stability of the ship, cannot be accepted. The opinion of these two witnesses is based upon a number of assumptions which I am not prepared to accept. A carrier owes a duty to the shipper to show that skill which is normally expected of a person in that skilled profession. Where a carrier performs a loading in a manner which was bound to cause considerable delay in the discharge of the cargo of the shipper and which might necessitate the return of the ship to the port to which the shipper's cargo was destined or which might involve the carrying away of the shipper's goods to a destination far and distant he cannot be said to have acted with that standard of care which is required of a carrier. In failing to perform his duty with the skill required of him the carrier must be held to have acted negligently. That being so, he cannot then fall back upon the exception clauses in extenuation of his action which action was necessitated due to the carrier's own negligence at an earlier stage. I am, therefore, of the opinion that clauses 4, 5 and 6 do not provide absolute immunity to the carrier in this case. I answer the first three issues accordingly.

12. I shall now proceed to examine the fourth issue which is the most important one for the purpose of the plaintiff's case, because unless it is proved that it was because of the delay in the ‑delivery of the goods that he suffered some loss my finding that delay had been caused by the negligence of the carrier would be of no avail to the plaintiff. The further question would tie whether the plaintiff would, in such a case, be entitled to the kind of compensation claimed by him in this case. It is the case of the plaintiff that he had to buy steel bars in the market at a higher price to fulfil his con?tract with the Department of Supply and Development because of the delay caused in the delivery of the steel billets which he had imported. The plaintiff has produced four delivery orders, Exhs. 95/1 to 95/4, to show that M. S. bars were delivered to the Department which bars, according to him, he had purchased from one Muhammad Hussain & Co. These four delivery orders are dated 24‑8‑57, 12‑9‑57, 11‑9‑57, and 20‑9‑

57. It may be recalled that the vessel through which the goods had been trans‑shipped arrived at Karachi on 2nd September 1957. The questions which then arise are ; firstly, whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case the plaintiff could not have waited until after the billets in question had been received by him to enable him to deliver the bars under the said contract and, secondly, whether the plaintiff, in fact, delivered these bars to the Department of Supply and Development infulfil?ment of the contract in respect of which the licence for import had been granted to him on 25th March 1957. On these points the plaintiff's case is wholly unsatisfactory if not untrue. It may be noted that the tender for this contract was accepted on 20th September 1956 as per Exh.

8. Under the special instructions contained on 20th September 1956 as per Exh.

8. Under the special instructions contained in Exh. 9 it was provided that necessary import licence for the M. S. billets in this connection would be issued to the plaintiff. This licence, however, as we know, was not issued until the 25th of March 1957. Where was then the urgency as the plaintiff had sought to make out? He has himself admitted that extensions had been granted for the performance of the contract from time to time. These bars were required, according to him, by the Ministry of Defence for some construction purposes. The documents upon which he has relied to show urgency may now be examined. These are Exhs. 10, 12, 27 and 83 and have been specifically referred to by the plaintiff. Exh. 10 is dated 7th February 1957 in which the plaintiff is asked to give first preference to the supply against the indent quoted in that letter. But that indent is dated 21st March 1956 and bears a different number than Exh:

7. Exh. 7 is dated 28th August 19156 and bears No. 42618 whereas the number quoted in Exh. 10 is 3810. This letter, therefore, has no reference to the contract as contained in. Exhs. 7, 8 and

9. Moreover, this reminder is dated 7th February 1957, that is a month before the issue of the licence in respect of the contract in question. Second letter, Exh. 12 does relate to this contract and bears the same number. It is dated 24th April 1957, in which he is told that the period stipulated for deli?very expired on 31st March 1957, and that a definite date be intimated for delivery. This reminder had no signifi?cance because the licence itself had been issued on 23‑3‑

57. The next letter, Exh. 27, is dated 10th August 1957 and in this the plaintiff is asked to expedite the supply and intimate to the Department a guaranteed programme thereof. The last letter relied upon is Exh. 83 produced by a clerk of the office of the iron and Steel Controller. It was upon this letter that considerable emphasis was laid by the plaintiff. But it is plain that this document has nothing to do with the contract in question. It is in this letter that it is stated that if the plaintiff did not ship the M. S. Bars all his facilities of import licence, etc. will be withdrawn. But in this letter the Controller had asked the plaintiff to ship 110 tons of M. S. Bars to East Pakistan per ss Mustali and he was required to contract the Gulf Steamship Co. in this connection. Now what has this letter to do with the contract, Exhs. 8 and 9? . It is strange that the plaintiff has not filed copy of any single letter of his to the Department of ?Supply and Development for extension of time or in reply to the letters, Exhs. 12 and

27. He has admitted that the Department was extending time for delivery from time to time but he has not produced a single letter of his to show teat he had asked for extension upon the ground that the billets for the contract in question and for which the special licence had been given to him on 25th March 1957, had not been delivered to him though he had imported the goods and that they were expected to be delivered shortly. He has not even said so in his evidence. I am of the opinion that if he had said so be would have found himself in serious difficulty. It may be recalled that the ship carrying these billets had reached Karachi in the first instance on 12th July 1957. Most of his alleged deliveries were made in September 1957. I have not the slightest doubt that if the plaintiff had asked for extension of time upon the ground that the goods had been carried away to Bombay and were expected back, the Department would not have extended time for the delivery in respect of this contract. The plaintiff has admitted that he had many similar other contracts with the Department and so even if he purchased M. S: Bars in open market, a fact of which I am extremely doubtful, he did not deliver theta in fulfilment of the contract in question. No body was examined from the Depart?ment of Supply and Development' to support the plaintiff that the deliveries were made according to the delivery orders, Exhs. 95/1 to 95/4, or that these deliveries were made in respect of the contract in question. That the plaintiff was not under pressure for the supply of the M. S. Bars in respect of this contract is further made clear by his own letters. In Exh. 19 which he wrote on 12th of July on being informed that the consignment was going to be overcarried to Bombay what he has said is this: "You are well aware that‑such process (of trans‑shipment) takes considerable time. As this is a very essential commodity urgently required as per allocation by the Controller of Iron and Steel, Government of Pakistan, you are, therefore, kindly requested to make arrangement . . . . . ". There is no mention that the Department of Supply and Deve?lopment is pressing for the fulfilment of the contract or that they were threatening to cancel it. The next document is Exh. 23 which was in reply to the defendants' letter, Exh. 20, in which it had been said that the cargo in question cannot be discharged on this voyage and that it had to be trans‑shipped. In this letter also what is stated is that the Iron and Steel Controller has allotted the production of the mill to various allottees. There was no reference to the contract in respect of which this special licence had been given to the plaintiff. The last letter which may be mentioned is Exh.

37. In this the plaintiff has sent his whole claim to the defendants and with regard to the item of the difference of price of the imported goods and the goods alleged to have been purchased in the open market it is stated that these bars weighing 110 tons had been purchased from the open market and delivered to the allottees. There is no mention of the contract in question which was with the Department of Supply and Development. The plaintiff in the witness box admitted that the defendant No. 2 had on several occasions asked him for the particulars of the claim which he had made against them but he did not give them these particulars because they had not admitted his claim. The story that he had bought M. S. bars in the open market for the fulfilment of the contract as constituted by Exhs. 7, 8 and 9, was disclosed for the first time in the plaint of this suit, when the plaintiff was cross‑examined upon this point with reference to the letters mentioned above, he gave most evasive replies. He was pointedly asked that considering that these billets had been imported against a special licence for the supply of bars upon a contract with the Director‑General, Supply and Development how could these have been allocated to allottees by the Controller of Iron and Steel, he admitted that it was true that when a licence is granted for a particular purpose then further allocation in respect of the goods of this licence by the Iron and Steel Controller is not necessary. He, how?ever, went on to make a startling statement which may be reproduced: "It is true that when a licence is granted for a particular purpose then further allocation in respect of those goods by the Iron and Steel Controller is not necessary. What happens is that though the goods are related to a particular contract the delivery is made to Government Departments as and when they require it. In that case goods imported upon a licence for one purpose are delivered for another purpose if an urgent demand is made and later on the adjustment is made on the import of fresh goods." Pressed further he had to admit that the Iron and Steel Controller had not made any allocation in respect of these goods. I need not pursue the rest of the cross‑examination on this point, because it is abundantly clear that the stand taken in the correspondence by the plaintiff that these goods were urgently needed 'that they had been allocated by the Controller of Iron and Steel, cannot be pressed in aid for proving the claim of damages in this suit which could succeed only if the plaintiff had established, firstly that the pressure upon him was in respect of the contracted goods and that he had tried to get extension upon the ground of the over-carriage of goods and had failed and that the alleged purchased in open market was with reference to the contract in question. None of these things have been proved.

13. In the course of the argument the plaintiff was recalled for further cross‑examination and at the end of which he was asked to produce, if he could, any allocation made by the Con?troller in respect of the goods of the licence in question and any further allocation which might have been made by him in respect of these goods after the arrival in September 1957. I had also pointly asked Mr. Ramchandani to, produce any letter or document showing that his client had asked for the extension of time from the Department of Supply and Development on the ground that the goods had been overcarried. Mr. Ram chandani has produced two letters one of 30th July 1957 and the other of 3rd September,1957. These I have marked A and B. Along with these he filed a statement over his signature which I have marked as C. These documents, if anything further give away the whole case of the plaintiff. In the letter of 30th July the plaintiff amongst other things is asked to furnish certain information and one of the informations sought is "the date or dates of receipt of billets against the licence". It is complained in this letter that dealers had in certain cases even refused to book orders. It is clear from the information sought in respect of the date of the receipt of the billets against the relevant licence that the liability of the plaintiff to deliver M: S. Bars depended upon the receipt of the billets. In this case, as we know, the billets had not been received by him. There would, therefore, be no obligation on him to deliver M. S. Bars by purchasing them from the open market. It may further be observed that when an importer received any essential goods upon a licence he had to make a declaration that he had received the goods and it was only upon such a declaration being made that the Controller would make the allocation. As the goods of the licence in question bad not been received there could, therefore, have been no allocation in respect of these goods. The second letter produced is that of 3rd September 1957, to various parties including the plaintiff. In this he was informed of the shipping space allocated to him for transport of goods to East Pakistan and be was asked to make use of it. I do not see bow in view of the specific case set up by the plaintiff this letter is of any relevance. Looking at the whole thing the conclusion to which I have been constrained to reach is that the plaintiff finding that the defendants had done wrong in not delivering the goods to him when the ship first visited Karachi, decided to build up a claim for damages. This claim, as I have found, is not based on true facts.

14. What I have said above really disposes of the plaintiff's claim for damages but I. might add that in any case the plaintiff's would not have been entitled to the damages that he has claimed upon the basis of difference of price for which he alleged to have purchased these goods for fulfilling a contract with the third party: Admittedly, at the time when the contract was made the special circumstances that these imports were being made under a special licence for the supply of bars to the Ministry of Defence within a certain time was not made known to the carrier mainly the defendant No.

1. Mr. Ramchandani referred to the plaintiff's letter, Exh. 19, but that letter has written when the ship had arrived in Karachi and was not likely to discharge the goods on that voyage. Notice of the special circumstances must be given at the time of entering into the contract and not afterwards. It is not a case in which the price of the good had fallen between the date on which the delivery should have been made and the date on which the delivery was actually made. That could have been the basis for damages considering that the special circumstances had not been disclosed to the carrier at the time when he understood to carry the plaintiffs goods It may be mentioned that even according to the plaintiff when he did receive the billets he sold them as a profit of 10 %. Therefore, even if he bad proved the damages he would have to account for the amount so received in profit. In view of my conclusion my finding on issue No, 4 is against the plaintiff.

15. I view of my findings the plaintiff's claim for damages for Rs. 39,792‑14‑9 must be rejected in toto. The allegation that the mill was closed for 11 days on account of delay in the delivery of 415 pieces of M. S. Billets is not based upon any evidence worth the name and in fact was not pressed before me by Mr. Ramchandani. That also, therefore, must be rejected. The claim on account of paying interest to the bank must also be rejected because as would appear from Exh. 86 the loan was granted by the Mercantile Bank on 9th October 1957, that is the date when the plaintiff took delivery on the arrival of the goods after trans‑shipment. The only claim of the plaintiff which must be decreed is for the sum of Rs. 958‑4‑0 being the cost of the six pieces which had been short delivered. 1n view of my findings in respect of the other claims no question of interest on those claims arises. Even in respect of the claim for Rs. 958‑4‑0 no interest or cost can be granted because this had been admittedly offered to the plaintiff before the filing of the suit and had not been accepted.

16. In the result I decree the plaintiff's claim in the sum of Rs. 958‑4‑0 only without costs and interest. The rest of the claim is dismissed with no order as to costs. K. B. A. ????????? Suit partly decreed.