P L D 1969 Dacca 764 (PLP)

MAKSUM‑UL-HAKIM, J.‑The points that arise for consideration in these two revision cases are identical and as such will be dealt with in this single judgment. The facts giving rise to these cases may be briefly stated as follows: ‑ On 29‑10‑1960 Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Dacca for the requisition .of a number of plots of land for the purpose of setting up of a ‑Jute Mill at Ghorashal. Accordingly, in L. A. Case No. 25 of 1960‑61 of the Dacca Collectorate, an area of 0.44 acre of land ‑of C. S. Plot No. 1924 and 0.54 acre of C. S. Plots Nos. 47 and 48 of Mouja Ghorashal, Police Station Kaligonj, District 'Dacca, along with various other plots were requisitioned on 45‑12‑1960 under section 3 of the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act (hereinafter called the Act) for the 'Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (now the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation) for setting up of a Jute Mill at Ghorashal. The possession of the property was taken on 19‑1‑61, and a public notice as to the intention to acquire the property was given under section 5 (1) of the Act on 13‑3‑

61. The property was finally acquired by Gazette "Notification, dated 30‑3‑64 under section 5(7) of the Act. This Notification was published at page 536 in part 1 of Dacca--Gazette on 9‑4‑

64. The Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, assessed compensation @ Rs. 3,500 per acre for Nal land and Rs. 4,001 for Bhiti land and further awarded 15 percent statutory compensation on account of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. No com pensation was, however, given for loss of crop during the period of 3 years when the property was under requisition prior to its acquisition. The opposite‑parties, the landowners, were not agreeable to accept this compensation and claimed that the matter be referred to arbitration. Consequently reference was ‑made by the Government of East Pakistan under section 7(b) .of the Act and the Arbitration Cases Nos. 122 of 1965 and 166 .of 1965 were started. In the arbitration cases, the opposite‑parties demanded compensation @a, Rs. 3,000 per acre, besides recurring crop com pensation for the period .during which the property was under requisition. Over and above this, they demanded higher statutory compensation @ 25 per cent. The petitioner, the Province of East Pakistan contested the claim in the said arbitration cases and contended that the assessment made by the, authorities was legal, valid and adequate. Civil Revision Case No. 1423 of 1966 is directed against the award made in Arbitration Case No. 122 of 1965 by the Additional Sub‑Judge, Dacca, who was appointed arbitrator in this case. For the requisition and acquisition of 0.44 acre of land of C. S. Plot No. 1924 of Mouja Ghorashal, the arbitrator made an award for a sum of Rs. 4,642 in all. He held that compensation should be assessed on the basis of average market value of land of similar description and advantage in the area concerned, during 24 months preceding the service of the notice under section 5 (1) of the Act. This market value he assessed @ Rs. 7,000 per acre for Nal land and Rs. 8,000 per acre for Bhiti land. The arbitrator further held that the opposite‑parties are also entitled to crop compensation @ Rs. 600 per acre per annum during the period of requisition of the land over and above that, the opposite‑parties were held to be entitled to, statutory compensation at the rate of 25 per cent. instead of 15 per cent. for the compulsory nature of the acquisition of the property. The Civil Revision Case No. 1424 of 1966 is directed against the award by the same arbitrator in the Arbitration Case No. 166 of 1965. He made an award for a sum of Rs. 5,697 in all for the requisition and acquisition of an area of 0.54 acre of land of C. S. Plots Nos. 47 and 48 of Mouja Ghorashal. Re assessed the compensation in this case exactly on the basis on which the compensation was assessed by him in the Arbitrationt Case No. 122 of 1965. In these revisional applications, the petitioner's contention: is that the awards made by the arbitrator are not sustainable in law. In Civil Revision Case No. 1423 of 1966, Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has appeared to argue the case of the petitioner. In Civil Revision Case No 1424 of 1966, Mr. K. A. Baker appeared for the petitioner and adopted the argument of Mr. Choudhury. The following points were urged on behalf of the petitioner to assail the awards of the arbitrator. Firstly, it was submitted that the arbitrator acted illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction in assessing compensation on the basis of the market value of the property of similar description and advantage during the 24 months preceding the date of service of the notice under section 5(1) of the Act. According to the learned Advocate, the basis of assessment, in view of section 7(e) as it stood at the time of issue of the notice under section 5 (1), should have been the average market value of the land on the date of the order of requisition. Secondly; assessment of compensation on the basis of average market value of the land on the date of requisition is supported by the? provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which being at similar statute in the same field is referable in interpreting the provisions of the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act. Thirdly, the grant of the yearly crop compensa tion during the period of requisition is not permissible under law. Fourthly, the granting of higher statutory compensation of 25 percent over and above the value of the land is without any legal basis. Lastly, the arbitrator failed to exercise juris diction in not considering the import of Exhs. 1(c), 1(d) and 1(f), that is to say, the kabala filed by the petitioner for establishing the market value of the property. With regard to the first point, Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury contends that the opposite‑parties are entitled to receive compensation only on the basis of the average market value of the land as it prevailed on the date of the requisition of the property. In support of this contention, he relies on the provision of section 7(e) as it stood at the time of the service of the notice under section 5(1) of the Act. According to him, as soon as a notice under section 5(1) is served, a right arises in favour of the petitioner to acquire the land on payment of compensation which being a vested right, no alteration of the law after such notice can disturb such a vested right. It is further contended that it is immaterial to see what was the legal position on the day when the notification vesting the property in the Government is issued under section 5(7) of the Act. What, however, is important, according to Mr. Choudhury, is to see what was the legal provision with regard to the assessment of compensation on the day of the notice under section 5(1) of the Act. For a better understanding of the point raised, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the section 7(e) which underwent changes from time to time. We have already stated that the property was requisitioned on 15‑12‑60 and a notice under section 5(1) was issued on 13‑3‑

61. Section 7 (e) as it stood then was as follows: ‑ "The arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to the provisions of section 23 and subsection (2) of section 35 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable. Provided that‑ (i) Subject to the provisions of clauses (ii) and (iii) of this proviso, the market value of any immovable property for the purposes of this section shall be the market value of the property at the date of the order of its requisition under section 3. (fi) the market value of any immovable property within a radius of 15 miles from the respective collectorate buildings of Dacca, Chittagong and Khulna shall be the market value of such property in 1953. (iii) when there has been any transfer of ownership of any such immovable property after 1953 but before the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960, came into force, the market value of such immovable property shall be the price paid by the owner plus 15 per centum thereof Provided further that in awarding compensation for the requisition of any immovable property to which the provisions of the East Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1953, or any other law for time being in force, for the control of house rent, apply, the arbitrator shall have regard to those pro visions, so that the compensation awarded may not exceed the amount of rent allowable in respect of such property by such Act or law." From a reading of the above quoted section 7 (e) as it stood on 13‑3‑61, it will appear that the market value for the purpose of making an award for compensation for acquisition was to be the market value of the property at the date of the order of its requisition under section

3. This section 7(e) was, however, radically amended subsequently by East Pakistan Ordinance No. 40 of 1961, dated 9‑11‑61 and East Pakistan Ordinance No. 13 of 1963, dated 15‑8‑

63. On 9‑4‑64 when the Gazette Notification under section 5(7) vesting the property in the Government was published in these cases, the said section stood as follows: ‑ "The arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to the provisions of sections 23 and 24 and subsection (2) of section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 so far as the same can be made applicable Provided that‑ (i) the market value of any immovable property for the purposes of this section shall be the average value of the properties of a similar description and with similar advantages in the‑vicinity, during the twenty‑four months preceding the date of the service of notice under subsection (la) of section 5. (ii) where the public purpose for which the immovable property is acquired under section 5, is the establishment of an industry by a person other than the Provincial or Central Government, the Arbitrator shall in addition to such market value of the immovable property award a sum of twenty‑five per centum on the market value, instead of fifteen per centum as provided in subsection (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. (iii) in awarding compensation for the requisition of any immovable property 'to which the provisions of the East Pakistan Premises Rent Premises Rent Control Ordinance, 1961, or any other law for time being in force, for the control of house rent, apply, the arbitrator shall have regard to those provisions, so that the compensations awarded may not exceed the amount of rent allowable in respect of such property under those provisions." Since 15‑8‑63, the date of promulgation of Ordinance No. 13 of 1963, the provision of section 7(e) of the Act has remained as quoted above. The opposite‑parties contend that the above quoted provision of section 7 (e) as it stood on 9‑4‑64 i.e. the date of vesting the property in the Government under section 5(7) will be applicable in determining the market value in the present case for assessment of compensation for the acquisition of the lands in question. The learned arbitrator accepted this contention and made the award accordingly. A question therefore arises as to which version of section 7(e) will apply in these cases. In other words, the question is whether market value of the lands concerned is to be determined having regard to the provision of section 7(e) as it stood on the date of the notice under section 5 (1) regarding the intention to acquire or on the basis of the provision of the section 7 (e) as it stood on the date of the Notification under section 5 (7) vesting the property in the Government. This question, in our opinion, should be resolved having) regard to the time when the right to receive compensation in accrues. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, the learned Advocate of the petitioner, contends that the right to receive compensation accrues as soon as a notice under section 5(1) of the Act is issued and such right being a vested right the subsequent alternation of the law, will not affect that right. Accordingly he submits that section 7(e) as it stood on 13‑3‑61, the date of notice under section 5 (1) will be applicable in this case in determining the market value of the lands for the purpose of assessment of the quantum of compensation. We are unable to accept this contention as correct, for, section 7 itself offers an answer as to when the right to receive compensation accrues The main part of section 7 which has always remained unchanged is as follows: ‑ "Whenever any immovable property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the ,principles, hereinafter set out ." The main part of section 7 is thereafter followed by clauses (a) to (g) of which 'clause (e) provides for determining the market value. From this it clearly appears that compensa tion for acquisition becomes payable only when the property is acquired and not at any earlier stage, but compensation for requisition becomes payable after the property is requisitioned. "This means that the right to receive compensation for the acquisition of a property accrues, when the acquisition is complete, whereas the right to receive compensation for requisi tion accrues with the order of requisition. This brings in the question as to when the acquisition of a property becomes complete. The subject of acquisition is dealt with in section 5 of the Act. From an examination of this section, it will appear that if the Government intends to requisition property, then, a notice under section 5(1) is to be issued. This notice under section 5 (1) is in the nature of a preliminary notice wherein it is stated that the Government intends to acquire the property. Subsection (2) of this section. lays down that such notice requires all persons to state their objections, if any, against the acquisition of such property as well as the particulars of their claim in regard to the property. The officer authorised is required to bear objections and make an inquiry in the matter and submit his recommendation relating to acquisition to the Provincial Government along with the record of the proceeding held by him. Subsection (6) of this section lays down that the Provincial Government thereafter will consider such report and make a decision as to whether the requisitioned property should be acquired or not. Subsection of this section lays down that if the Provincial Government decides to acquire the property, then, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette. On and from the date of the publication of such notification in the official Gazette the property to which the Notification relates vests absolutely in the Provincial Government. From this, it is clear that until a notification is published in the official Gazette under section 5(7) of the Act the property continues to be the property of its original owner and the Provincial Government does not acquire any title thereto until the publication of such notification. It is patent, therefore, That a notice under section 5(1) is in the nature of a declaration on behalf of the Government that the Government is contemplating the acquisition of a property under requisition and is desirous of instituting an inquiry and hear objections with regard to such proposal. From an analysis of these provisions, it is abundantly clear that a right to receive compensation does not accrue with the issue of a notice under section 5 (1). Until the property is finally acquired by the publication of a notification in the Gazette under section 5 (7) . of the Act, such a right cannot come into being. Crawford on the Construction of Statutes (1940 Edn.), at page 647 quoting an observation from Butler v. Palmer ((N Y) I Hill 324) states: "Rights which are complete and consummated, so that nothing remains to be done to fix the right of the citizen to~ enjoy them" are vested rights. On the same page, the learned author further observes "a vested right may be defined as some right or interest in property that has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy". (Quoting from Downs v. Blount) (170 Eed. 15). Prior to the publication of a Gazette Notification under section 5 (7) of the Act, the right of the owners of lands to receive compensation for acquisition, remained in an inchoate[ state and cannot, therefore, be called a vested right. Such is right accrues only when the property vests in the Government by virtue of a notification under section 5 (7) of the Act. Unti1F then, the right to receive compensation on the part of the owner of the property was in embryo and had no legal existence and as such could not be a subject‑matter of legal enforcement. Consequently no vested right can be said to be in existence, until and unless, the Gazette Notification in this regard is made. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury the learned Advocate for the petitioner cited the case of Nazir Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1963 Dacca 962) in support of his contention. We are of opinion that this citation does not answer the point raised in this case and as such is of no assistance to the learned Advocate. From the above discussion, it will appear that a vested right can be claimed only from the date of publication of the Gazette Notification under section 5(7) of the Act. The said notification in this case is dated 30‑3‑1964 and was published in the official Gazette on 9‑4‑1964. As such it is only on this date, i.e. on 9‑4‑1964 that a right accrued in favour of the owners of the lands to receive compensation for such acquisi tion. Consequently, section 7(e) relating to the determination of market value and assessment of compensation as it stood on 9‑4‑64, the date of vesting the property is the law which will be applicable in these cases. As section 7(e) as it stood on the said date provided that compensation is to be assessed on the basis of average market value of the land during twenty‑four months preceding the date of service of notice under sub section (1) of section 5, the opposite‑parties are entitled to receive compensation on that basis and not on the basis of the average market value of the land in question on the date of its requisi tion. We, therefore, find no substance in the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner in this case on this point which accordingly fails. Mr. D. C. Bhattacharjee appearing for the opposite‑parties, however, argued that the arbitrator is required to apply the law relating to the computation of compensation as was in force at the time of his deciding the matter even though the law was otherwise when such right accrued. We are not, however called upon in this case to consider the point relating to the alteration of the law during the pendency of an action or subsequent to the creation of the right inasmuch as section 7(e) as amended by Ordinance No. 13 of 1963, dated 15‑8‑63, that is to say, the law relating to the assessment of compensation has remained unchanged from 15‑8‑68 till today. The second point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that assessment of compensation on the basis of the average market value of the land on the date of its requisition finds support from the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which being a similar statute in the same field is referable in inter preting the provisions of the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the property vests absolutely in the Government after the preparation of an award by the Collector (and taking possession of it) under section 16 of the Act, which follows a Gazette Notification under section 6 of that Act. Even then, the market value for assessment of compensation under the said Act has to be the market value at the time of the preliminary declaration with regard to the acquisition of property under section 4 of that Act. On the analogy of this scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, it has been contended by Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury that the same also should be applicable in determining the market value of the property for assessment of compensation under the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act. It is further pointed out that under the Acquisition Act also, there is a procedure for hearing objections as laid down in section 5(e) of that Act and the Government decides about the acquisition after considering the report of the Collector who hears such objections. Final decision with regard to such acquisition is notified by a Gazette notification under section 6 and the property vests when an award is made under section 16 of that act. 1n spite of this; it has been laid down in the said Act that the market value of the property as it stood on the date of notification under section 4 of that Act is the value which is receivable by the owner. To substantiate this point, the learned Advocate has relied on the decisions reported in A I R 1941 Rang. 225, A I R 192) P C 126 and A I R 1931 Sind

52. In our opinion, this contention of the learned Advocate is clearly unsustainable. Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as it stands now after the Amending Act of 1923 (Act XXXVIII of 1923) clearly stipulates that in determining the amount of compensation, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (10) should be the basis of the award. In view of such clear mandate of the law, the market value of the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act has to be invariably the market value on the date of the preliminary notice under section 4(1) of that Act. But even in the Land Acquisition Act, the position was otherwise before the Amending Act of 1923 (Act XXXVIII of 1923). Prior to this amendment, section 23(1) laid down that for assessing compensation, the market value of the land in question was to be the market value of such property on the date of the notification under section 6 of that Act. In the case of Manmatha Nath Mullick v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (28 C W N 461), Mookerjee, J. (with whom Rankin, J. agreed), while considering an award with regard to acquisi tion of a piece of land under this Act observed as follows: ‑ "This much is plain that in the case before us, what has to be ascertained is, as required by clause (1), subsection (1) of section 23, the market value of the land at the date of the publication relating thereto under section 6." The notification under section 6 in that case was published on 20th May 1919. From the above it will be clear that under the Land Acquisition Act, the assessment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land is to be done as stipulated under the provisions of that Act and the provision: relating thereto was not uniform throughout the life of that statute. It is true that both these two Acts deal with similar subject‑1 in some respect and the scheme contained in the Land Acquisition Act 1894 can be referred for a clear understanding of the scheme as contained in the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act as both of them are in the same field. This, however, cannot persuade us to deviate from the plain meaning of a particular section of the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition Act. Section 7(e) of the East Pakistan Emergency Requisition of Property Act as it stood in 1964 clearly lays down that the assessment of compensation for acquisition of property has to be on the basis of the market value of the property during the 24 months preceding the date of the service of notice under section 5 (la). Any contrary scheme in the provision of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applicable in supersession of the clear meaning of section 7(e) of the East Pakistan Emergency Requisition of Property Act. The large series of amendments of this section 7(e) and its ultimate adoption in its present form since 1963 strengthens our decision; its import and clearly indicates the anxiety of the Legislature in providing a citizen of a somewhat fair compensation and to liberalise the scheme. In support of our decision we should like to quote an observation in a decision of the House of Lords in the case of Fendock Investment Trust Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1945 (2) A E R 140). Lord Simonds in his speech observed as follows: ‑ "My Lords, I do not doubt that in construing the latest of a series of Acts dealing with a specific subject‑matter, particularly where all such Acts are to be read as one, great weight should be attached to any scheme which can be seen in clear outline and amendments in later Acts should if possible be construed consistently with that scheme. But this is a principle which can easily be pressed too far in the consideration of a body of legislation such as that now under review, in which, if any prevailing notice can be found, it is in the attempt, as each loophole for escape from taxation is discovered, to close it as firmly as possible. I can by no means find in it any such scheme or context as would justify me in giving to the language of the Finance Act, 1939 section 15 any meaning which it does not naturally bear." While discussing the procedure of interpreting a Statute by referring, to previous legislation, their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Aristide Ouellesse v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company (1925 A C 569) observed as follows:‑ "The words actually employed 'must stand for interpreta tion as they are found unaffected by any such presumption. In the present case their Lordships' reference to previous legislation was not required, there being no confusion or ambiguity to remove." From the above it will be apparent that even though the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are at times referable in understanding the implication, background and legislative history of the East Pakistan Emergency Requisition of Property Act, still in the circumstances where the provisions of this Act are applicable and if they are clear, then, the contrary provision contained in the Land Acquisition Act will have no impact at` all in construing the provisions of the East Pakistan (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act. The third point raised by the learned Advocates for the petitioners is that when a property is acquired, the owner is entitled to compensation for its acquisition and there is no provision granting any further compensation for its requisition prior to its acquisition. It has been contended that the awarding of crop compensation by the learned arbitrator is, therefore, clearly illegal. From a reading of section 7 of the Act which we have earlier quoted in this judgment, it will be apparent that the East Pakistan Emergency Requisition of Property Act, envisages payment of compensation for acquisition as well as requisition of property. If a property remains under requisition for a period of time prior to its acquisition, then, it cannot be I said that all that is available to the owner of this property for its acquisition is the compensation which is awardable for such acquisition only and that he is not entitled to receive any com pensation for the period of requisition. We have not come across any provision in this Act which deprives the owner of the right to receive compensation for the period of requisition, if he is debarred from enjoying its use for a period of time. Apart from this, we are of opinion that the 6th clause of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act which by section 7(e) of the Act has been made applicable with regard to the pre paration of an award clearly supports a payment of compensation for the period of its requisition prior to the acquisition of the property. In the case of Vallabdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra (A I R 1929 P C 163), the Government proceeded to erect a building on a piece of land without the necessary notification which was actually served on 4th November 1920, under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government took possession of the property in 1919 and the building was erected soon thereafter. Compensation in this case was given for the use and occupation of the land prior to the notice of acquisition under section 6 of this Act. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: ‑ "They considered, and their Lordships agree, that the justice of the case was met by holding that the appellant was entitled to compensation for the occupation of the lands by the officials before the notification of 4th November 1920, which, as before stated was awarded in the form of interest in the value of the land computed from 27th November 1919, the date when the Government took possession." From the above discussion it will appear that the contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners to the effect that no compensation should be awarded for the loss of crop during the period of requisition prior to its acquisition should not be granted, is wholly without substance. The fourth point urged for the petitioner is that the arbitrator did not consider the effect and import of Exhs. 1(c), 1(d) and 1(f), that is to say, the kabalas filed by the petitioner for establishing the market value of the property. The learned Arbitrator formulated issue No. 2 for considering what should be the fair amount of compensation for the land m question. In considering this, he observed that the documents filed in Arbitration Cases Nos. 130 and 171 of 1965 were relied upon by the petitioner. In those cases the learned Arbitrator discussed those documents as well as others filed by both the parties and arrived at a decision concerning the market value of land of Mouza Ghorashal and Ghagra during the relevant period. Obviously those two cases were also concerned with other plots which were acquired for the same project and were in the proximity of the plots which were the subject‑matter of con sideration in the present cases. The learned Arbitrator adopted the finding in those cases which was arrived at after taking into consideration the aforesaid kabalas of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the documents filed by the petitioners were not taken into consideration by the learned Arbitrator in arriving at a decision about the average market value of the land in question for the period preceding 24 months from the service of notice under section 5 (1) of the act. The last point urged by the learned Advocates for the petitioners is that the opposite‑parties are not entitled to statutory compensation of 25 per cent. over the market value of the property. It is contended that the opposite‑parties are entitled to statutory compensation of 15 per cent. on the value of the land. The basis of the contention of the learned Advocates of the petitioners is the provisions of the East Pakistan (Emer gency) Requisition of Property Act as it stood at the time of the requisition of the property as well as service of notice under section 5(1) which according to the petition should be applicable. Section 7(e) (iii) as it stood at the time of the requisition of this property as also at the time of the service of the notice under section 5(1) of the Act provided only the payment of statutory compensation of 15 per cent. of the market value. As we have already held that with regard to the assessment of compensation for the acquisition of the property, the law as it stood on the day of notice of acquisi tion under section 5(7) of the Act will be applicable, we hold that this contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners cannot be sustained. Section 7(e) (iii) as it stood in April 1964, provided that if the property is acquired for the purpose of establishing an industry by a person other than the Provincial or the Central Government then, the Arbitrator shall award a sum of 25 percent on the market value of the land as a statutory compensation for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. As the property was taken for the establishment of an industry for the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, it is clear that the opposite‑parties are entitled to statutory compen sation at the rate of 25 per cent. It cannot be said that acquisi tion for the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation for the purpose of establishing a jute industry is either for the Central or the Provincial Government. In our opinion, therefore no illegality has been committed in awarding the additional compensation of 25 percent to he opposite‑parties in view of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. At the end Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has tried to argue that the notice that was issued in this case was issued under section 5 (1) of the Act and the Arbitrator in assessing the market value has assessed the average market value of the land during the 24 months prior to such notice but section 7(e) as it stood in 1964 speaks of a notice under section 5 (1) and con sequently the basis of calculation has been defective. It is true that at the time when the notice was issued there was no such section as section 5(la) and section 5 (i) was subsequently amended and a subsection known as subsection (la) of section 5 was incorporated by Ordinance XL of 1961 on 9‑11‑6

1. This amendment was made after the issue of the notice undo; section 5 (1) in this case "as section 5 (1) as it stood on 13‑3‑61 when the notice under this section was issued was as follows :‑ "(1) The District Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, acquire any requisitioned property and if he proposes to so acquire he shall cause a public notice to be given at convenient place on or near the property to be acquired stating that he intends to acquire the property." On 9‑4‑64 when the property vested in the petitioner the section 5(l) and 5(la) stood as follows :‑ "(1) The Provincial Government may, if it thinks fit, acquire any requisitioned property on the proposal of the Deputy Commissioner in the manner hereinafter provided in this section. (la) The Deputy Commissioner shall, if he considers that the acquisition of any requisitioned property is expedient for a public purpose or in public interest, cause a public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the requisitioned property, stating that the property is proposed to be ac quired." From a reading of the amendment, however, it will appear that there is no basis of such a grievance. The original section 5 (1) was amended and in reality split into sections 5(1; and 5(la). No substantial change in the context of the law was effected by this amendment and the change is only of a consequential and incidental nature. Originally the power of requisition was given under the statute to the Provincial Government but the Provincial Government was entitled to delegate such power to its officers and the delegation was made to all the District Magistrates (later redesignated as Deputy Commissioners). By subsequent amendments the Statute authorised the Deputy Commissioners themselves to issue re quisition notices: By this amendment of section 5 and incorporation of t(a) into this section it was stipulated that the acquisition proceeding also could be initiated by the Deputy Commissioner, though the final authority with regard to acquisition all along remained with the Provincial Government. (See sections 5 (1) and 5 (7) of the Act). Apart from that the import of giving preliminary notice of acquisition under section 5(1) was in effect retained in the amended sections that in sections 5(1) and 5(la). Under these circumstances we are of opinion that a notification under section 5(l) will in effect be a notification under section 5 (la) after its amendment in view of the application of section 25 of the East Bengal General j Clauses Act. From the above discussion it will appear that this point also is without any substance, which accordingly fails. These are all the points that were argued on behalf of the petitioner in these cases and we find that none of them is entitled to succeed. We find that the awards by the learned Arbitrator are legal and valid and he has not misdirected himself in making these awards. The result, therefore, is that the Rules are discharged with costs. M. R. KHAN, J.‑I agree. A. H. Rules discharged.