1981 PLP 307 (PLC)

Maqsood Ali and another v. Pakistan Railways. 21‑6‑1980. W. P. No. 6997‑

80. Zawar Hussain and 47 others v. Pakistan Railways 17‑9‑1980. W. P. No. 10357‑

80. Ejaz Ahmad Qureshi and 27 Others v. Pakistan Railways The said seven Writ Petitions are now before me for disposal.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners in all seven writ petitions have only addressed arguments with regard to one legal question, namely, whether a revision petition is competent before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 38 (3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, from the decision of a Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority under section 17 of the Wages Act, 1936. No other legal point has been canvassed before me nor has the case been argued on the merits at all by any of the learned counsel. In the circumstances, all these seven writ petitions will be disposed of by this judgment, as in all these petitions the same question of law is involved as has been canvassed before me.

4. The learned counsel for the Pakistan Railways, in support of his petitions, has submitted that a Labour Court, by virtue of section 35(5) (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, could exercise powers and functions other than those referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsec tion (5) of section 35 as may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, or any other law and to the extent that it exercised powers of an appellate authority under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the exercise of the said appellate powers was not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. In these circumstances learned counsel submitted that no revision lay to the Tribunal under section 38 (3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as the appellate proceedings were not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. In this respect, learned counsel, cited Lyal1Pur Cotton Mills, Faisalabad v. Iftikhar Hussain (1980 P L C 568‑d) and assistant Director of Labour and Inspector of Factories, Karachi v. M. Saleem, Director/Occupier, Messrs Sabina Cotton Mills Ltd. (1979 P L C 326). Learned counsel also submits that the order of the Labour Court as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, attained finality under section 17(2) of the said Act and that as no revision was provided under the Act, the same could not be imported by resorting to the assistance of section 38 (3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Learned counsel also contended that neither Mr. Fazle Mehmood nor Khan A. Hameed, Advocates, learned counsel appearing for the ex‑E. I. R. Guards in all. the seven writ petitions, had powers‑of‑attorneys from all the Guards whom they purported to .represent and that, therefore, the said counsel had no authority to represent all the said Guards who were respondents in the writ petitions filed by the Pakistan Railways or those who were petitioners in the three writ petitions filed on their behalf and that the institution of the three writ petitions in which all the said Guards were petitioners were legally not properly instituted as the counsel did not possess authority in that behalf.

5. Learned counsel for the ex‑E. I. R. Guards, in support of his petitions submitted that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, constituted the general law relating to all labour matters which were not otherwise specifically provided by special statutes and that the hierarchy of tribunals constituted thereunder dealt with a large range of matters which were not only provided by the said Ordinance but which under section 25‑A of the said Ordinance arose out of rights guaranteed or secured to employees by or under any law or any award or any settlement. As a Court of general jurisdiction over labour matters, other‑than those covered by special statutes, it was submitted that the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under :section 38 of the Ordinance had at all times sun mote jurisdiction to call for the record of any case or proceedings under the Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction had passed an order, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order and could pass such order, in relation thereto, as it thought fit. The learned counsel further submitted that when the Labour Court acted as an appellate authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, its procedural working was governed by the Ordinance and it could not, therefore, be said that its proceedings were not under the Ordinance: In this connection, learned counsel cited Kochadai Naidu and another v. Nagayasami Naidu and others (A I R 1961 Mad. 247) Learned counsel also contended that the word "case" appearing in sub section (3.a) of section 38 of the Ordinance also included an appeal and since the Labour Court could exercise appellate powers and functions under section 35(5) (d) of the Ordinance, the exercise of the appellate powers under the Payment' of Wages Act constituted a case being decided under the Ordinance within the meaning of section 38 (3‑a) of the Ordinance. In this connection, learned counsel cited Debidutt Dube v. Central India Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. (A I R 1945 Nag. 244). Learned counsel also next contended that the word "proceedings" in section 38(3‑a) of the Ordinance included proceed ings whether original, appellate or revisional, as held in Thakur Rudra Paratap Singh v. Thakur Miritun Paratap Singh (A I R 1957 All. 28). In the light of these cumulative submissions, it was urged that the exercise of powers by the Labour Court by virtue of section 35(5) (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, read with section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, constituted a case or proceedings decided under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, within the meaning of section 38(3‑a) of the said Ordinance and that, therefore, the Tribunal had revisional jurisdiction over the appellate order of the Labour Court. In this connection Divisional Manager, Rice Milling Corporation, Gujranwala v. Khushi Mohammad and 209 others (1978 P L C 289) and Muhammad Ilyas Khan v. The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways (1979 P L C 1) and Jannat Textile Mills v. Sind Appellate Tribunal (P L D 1979 Kar. 725) were cited.

6. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents in both sets. of petitions filed by the Pakistan Railways and the Railway Guards. Before deciding the important legal issue raised before me, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, confers certain rights and obligations on employers and employees with regard to creation and registration of Trade Unions; pre vention of unfair labour practices; joint consultation, conciliation mediation and arbitration between employers and workmen; constitution of Wage Com missions for fixing rates of wages and determination of terms and conditions for service etc., and also the machinery (such as, labour officers, Registrar of Trade Unions, the National Industrial and Relations Commission, Labour Courts, Labour Appellate Tribunals, Wage Commission etc.) for the enforce ment of the rights conferred by the said Ordinance and by other laws, as provided inter alia by section 25‑A of the said Ordinance. The Payment of Wages Act, 1936, however, does not confer any rights on the employees to the receipt of wages, provident fund or gratuity the three basic matters referred to in the Act, but provides the machinery inter alia for the orderly enforcement and recovery thereof. In respect of claims arising out of deduc tions from the wages or non‑payment of dues relating to provident fund or gratuity payable under any law, or delay in the payment of wages of persons employed or paid, the same can be referred to the Authority under section 15 thereof. An appeal against a direction made under subsection (3) or sub section (4) of section 15 of the Act lies to the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arises, under section 17 of the Act, subject to the conditions stated in clause (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of the said section. The procedure to be applied by the Authority when dealing with cases under section 15 of the Act is provided in section 18 thereof and Rules 1 to 11 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules. 1937, made by the Governor‑General‑in‑Council under subsection (1) of section 26 of the Act read with section 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 18 of the Act reads as follows: ‑ "Every authority appointed under subsection (1) of section 15 shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898)." Rules 1 to 11 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules; 1937, relate to form of application, authorization, permission to appear, presentation of documents, refusal to entertain application, appearance of parties, record of proceedings, signature on forms, etc. rule 11, which relates to the exercise of powers conferred on the Authority by section 18 of the Act, states as follows: ‑ "In exercising the powers of a civil Court conferred by section 18, the Authority shall be guided in respect of procedure by the relevant orders of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with such alteration as the Authority may find necessary, not affecting their substance, for adapting them to the matter before him, and save where they conflict with the express provisions of the Act or these rules." The procedure to be followed by the Court, acting as the Appellate Authority, when dealing with appeals under section 17 of the Act is provided in rule 12 of the Payment of Wages Procedure) Rules, 1937. ‑Rule 12 reads as follows: "An appeal shall be preferred in duplicate in the form of a memorandum, one copy of which shall bear the prescribed court‑fee, setting forth 4.141 concisely the grounds of objection to the direction and shall be accompanied by certified copy of that direction. (2) When an appeal is lodged a notice shall issue to the respondent in Form G. (3) The Court after hearing the parties and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, may confirm, vary or set aside the direction from which the appeal is preferred, and shall make an order accordingly." The Payment of Wages Act, 1936, therefore, partly itself and through its rules of 1937 provides the special procedure to be followed by the Authority and the Labour Court when exercising their powers and functions under sections 15 and 17 thereof. I Learned counsel for the Railway Guards has drawn attention to the Payment of Wages (Federal Railways) Rules, 1938, as being applicable to the case in instance. I am afraid this position cannot be accepted. The Payment of Wages (Federal Railways) Rules, 1938, were framed by the Governor‑General‑in‑Council under subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 26 read with section 24 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Under sub section (2) of section 26 of the Local Government could, subject to the control of the Governor‑General‑in‑Council, make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and under section 24 thereof, the powers of the Act conferred upon the Local Government could be exercised by the Governor‑General‑in‑Council in any case in which the exercise of such powers affected any person' employed by a railway administration. This was the position in 1938. But the Rules framed under subsection (2) or subsection (3) of section 26 of the Act cannot regulate the procedure to be followed by the Authorities and Court's referred to in sections 15 and 17 of the Act, for such Rules regulating procedure can only be framed under subsection (1) of section

26. The Payment of Wages Act, 1936, therefore, itself and through its Procedure Rules of 1937 provides the special procedure to be followed by the Authority and the Labour Court when exercising their powers under sections 15 and 17 of the Act. With this brief outline of the scheme of the Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969, and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. I would now turn to the legal point in issue. .

8. The only question for determination in the present writ petitions is whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal can revise the decision of the Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, within the ambit of the powers as granted to it under subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance reads as follows: ‑‑ "The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard." In the first instance, it must be noted that the tribunals appointed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance to deal with controversial matters relating to the enforcement of rights conferred by the Ordinance itself and not by other laws consist basically of two tiers, the Labour Court at the bottom acting as the Court of first instance under sections 10(1) and (2), 25‑A, 34, 35(5)(c) and 37(1) and the Labour Appellate Tribunal at the top exercising appellate powers under sections 10(a) and 37(3); or the Registrar of Trade Union exercising original powers under section 10(3) and the Labour Court at the top exercising appellate powers under section 11(6); or a Bench of the Commission, other than a Full Bench, ‑ exercising, powers of first instance under section 22‑A and the Full Bench of the Commission at the top exercising appellate powers under section 22‑D: 'Other such instances can also be cited. This, however, is in addition to the powers exercised by the Registrar, the Labour Court or the Commission as tribunals of first instance, where no appeal is provided. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, under section 38(3‑a) also has powers, on its own motion, to revise orders of the Labour Courts passed in cases or proceedings under the Ordinance. Under section 37(4) of the Ordinance, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Ordinance, all decisions of and all sentences passed by Labour Courts are final and cannot be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority. The word "except as otherwise expressly provided in this Ordinance" obviously refer to the appeal and revision as are provided by sections 37(3) and 38(3‑ql of the Ordinance. Under section 22‑E of the Ordinance, no Court can entertain any plea as to the jurisdiction of the Commission or as to the legality or propriety of anything done or purporting to be done by the Commission or any of its Benches, and no order, decision, judgment or sentence, of the Commission can be called in question in any manner whatsoever, in or before any ‑Court or other authority. This section provides finality to the orders of the Commission. It would, therefore, appear that where the Labour Court, the Registrar of the Trade Union or a Bench of the Commission, other than a Full Bench, has acted as a tribunal of first instance, the decision of the next higher forum acting as the Appellate Authority, where an appeal is available, is final and where the order of the tribunal of first instance is non‑appealable, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal has called for the record for scrutiny of the case or proceedings in its revisional jurisdiction, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in revision is‑ final. In short, there is only one appeal or revision; the latter being within the suo motu jurisdiction of the revisional Tribunal. There appears to be only one exception to this rule, namely, where the appellate decision of the Labour Court under section 11(6) of the Ordinance appears to be open to revision. The scheme as provided by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is somewhat similar. The decision of the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is appealable to the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, under sub section (I) of section 17 of the Act, subject to the conditions stated in clause (a), (b) or (c) of the said subsection Under subsection (2) of section 17, except as provided in subsection (1) thereof, the decision of the Authority under subsections (3) and (4) of section 15 is final. It would, therefore, appear that where the Authority has acted as a tribunal of first instance, after one appeal to the Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority, if available, no further right of revision to any higher tribunal or Court is available to the party. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature has not provided more than one appeal or revision, both under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, in respect of matters falling within their own respective jurisdictions. It is, therefore, in this background that subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance will have to be appraised.

9. In dealing with the legal issue involved, certain Words appearing in subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations, Ordinance, 1969, first require examination. The first question that arises is what is meant by the words "case or proceedings" as referred to in subsection (3‑a) of‑section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The word "case' as appearing in section 115, C. P. C. has been held by Justice Sen to Debidutt ' Dube's case (A I R 1945 Nag. 244), as covering an appeal decided by the District Court, under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. In arriving at this finding, Justice Sen held that the word "case" in section 115, C. P. C. had a wider and more comprehensive meaning than the word "suit" and was to be understood in its broadest and most ordinary sense as including any matter effecting the rights of parties whether in a, suit or other proceedings under any other Act. For the purpose of construing the meaning of the word "case" in subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance, the said word must be treated as including an appeal. It cannot be forgotten that in revisional jurisdiction, the Labour Appellate Tribunal exercises supervisory jurisdiction to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of an impugned order which is brought before it for scrutiny and appellate .orders cannot be immune from such a scrutiny. The word "proceedings", as opposed to the word "case", relates to the procedure or mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word "proceedings" includes every step taken towards the further progress of a case in a Court or before a tribunal for the purposes of securing the remedy. It commences with the first step takes to put the machinery of law into motion and continue upto the decision of the cause. In this connection Kochadani Naidu v. Nagayasami Naidu (A I R 1961 Mad. 247), Jan Muhammad v. Home Secretary (P L D 1968 Lah. 1455) and in the good of Messrs Lalian Singh (A I R 1943 Cal. 19), may be referred. The expression "case or proceedings" as appearing in subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance would, therefore, not only cover the main case or appeal, as substantive matters before the‑Labour Court for resolution, but also the‑procedure or mode adopted by it for its resolution. However, this does not end the matter, because under the said subsection the Labour Appellate Tribunal only has revisional jurisdic tion over a "case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order". The words "under this Ordinance" ‑ are important and, therefore, require determination. Under section 35(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a Labour Court has the following powers‑ (a) to adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under the Ordinance; (b) to enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the implementa tion or violation. of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government; (c) to try offences under the Ordinance, and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in that behalf; (d) to exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under the Ordinance or any other law.

10. The Labour Court, therefore, has twin jurisdiction (1) to decide try and adjudicate certain disputes, matters, offences etc, and to exercise and perform certain powers and functions, where the right to decide, try and adjudicate such disputes, matters, offences, etc., and the right to exercise and perform such powers and functions are referred to in or conferred upon it by the Ordinance and (2) to try certain offences or exercise and per form certain powers and functions which fall under other laws, where the .right to try such offences are conferred upon it by the Provincial Government by notifications issued in that behalf under such other laws and the right to exercise and perform such powers and functions are also conferred upon it by such other laws,. The latter jurisdiction is an additional jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court. 'Unless the said additional power is conferred on the Labour Court, it would not have jurisdiction to try offences or exercise powers or perform functions falling under other laws. It cannot be denied that in many respects the labour tribunals acting under the Industrial Relations Ordinance are tribunals of general jurisdic tion dealing with labour matters. Apart from special tribunals created by special acts to deal with specific labour matters (including various employer‑employee relationship), the main workload of labour disputes falls on the shoulders of the tribunals constituted under the Ordinance, in view of the recent amendment to clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 and the addition of section 25‑A to the Ordinance. Where the special acts confer on litigants certain rights or remedies, but the power to decide, try or adjudicate the case is conferred on the tribunals acting under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and no procedure is prescribed as to bow they will dispose D of the case, the labour tribunals acting as Courts of general jurisdiction under the Ordinance can apply their own procedure. Once they do so, the "proceedings" would get drawn into the Ordinance. The expression "case or proceedings under the Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its, jurisdiction has passed an order", as appearing in subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance, would, therefore, include‑ (i) all cases initiated before the Labour Court' as a Court of first instance where the right to the relief sought is conferred by the Ordinance and the power to decide, try or adjudicate the matter is conferred upon the Labour Court by the Ordinance; (ii) all appeals before the Labour Court as a Court of appeal where the right to the relief sought is conferred by the Ordinance and the power to decide the appeal is conferred upon the Labour Court by the Ordinance; (iii) all cases initiated before the Labour Court as a Court of first instance where the right to the relief sought is conferred upon the procedure adopted by the Labour Court is that as provided by the Ordinance‑. (Where the special procedure, as provided by the other law, is applicable, both the "case" and the "proceedings" would fall under the other law); (iv) all appeals filed before the Labour Court as a Court of appeal where the right to the relief sought is conferred by some other law, but the power to decide the appeal is conferred upon the Labour Court by the Ordinance; and (v) all appeals filed before the Labour Court as a Court of appeal where the right to the relief sought is conferred by some other law and the power to decide the appeal is conferred upon the Labour Court by the said other law. but the procedure adopted by the Labour Court' is that as provided by the Ordinance. (Where the special procedure, as provided 'by the other law, is applicable, both the "case" and the "proceedings" would fall under the other law).

11. The Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority under section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, clearly acts by virtue of the power conferred under section 17 of the Act and not under any power conferred by any provision of then Ordinance. In acting as the appellate authority, the Labour Court is not bound by the rules of procedure provided by the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but by that provided by the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appeal before the Labour Court constitutes a case or pro ceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to bring the case within the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The words "case or proceedings under this Ordinance" appearing in sub section (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance, are specially intended to cove x only those cases, the remedy whereof is provided by the Ordinance or where the remedy is not so provided, special law empowers the Labour Court to hear and adjudicate the dispute or decide the appeal and the Labour Court has to apply its own procedure. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius fully applies to the instant case. The words "under this Ordinance" have been specifically added to make sure that the finality which by otherwise is applicable to original or appellate decisions given by labour tribunals or Courts acting under other special acts dealing with labour matters, is not disturbed. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the Lyallpur Cotton Mill's case appears to be correct. The decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the Rice Milling Corporation's case and Muhammad Ilyas Khan's case do not appear to be good law.

12. It only now remains for me to comment on a few important cases referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the Railway guards.

13. Kochadai Naidu's case was referred to suggest that as the Labour Court acted under the Ordinance, the proceedings before it were under the Ordinance. In the case, a Magistrate dealing with a case under section 144, Cr. P. C. (as reconstituted and amended in India) referred the same under subsection (1) thereof to the civil Court for adjudication of the question as to which party was in possession of the disputed property. After the file reached the civil Court, an application was made under section 24, C. P. C. for the transfer of the case from the said civil Court to another civil Court. The application was resisted on the ground that the matter before the civil Court was criminal in nature and not a proceeding in civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 24, C. P. C. The said contention was repelled and it was held that as section 146, Cr. P. C. did not refer to the manner in which the jurisdiction was to be exercised by the civil Court, the said Court acting as a Court of general jurisdiction in civil matters could apply its own procedure and, therefore, the proceedings before it were civil in nature to which section 24, C. P. C. was applicable. This ruling is distinguishable. In the instant case, the procedure to be followed by the Labour Court as the appellate authority is laid down by the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. The question of the procedure prescribed by the Industrial Relations .Ordinance being applied by the Labour Court as the appellate authority does not arise. The pro ceedings before the Labour Court as the appellate authority are, therefore, not under the Ordinance.

14. Messrs Jannat Textile Mill's case was also cited to urge that suo motu revision by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was available against the appellate decision of the Labour Court. This case rests on its own facts. In this case, three employees whose services were terminated after enquiry under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applied under section 25‑A of the Industrial Rela tions Ordinance, 1969, to the Junior Labour Court for their re‑instatement. The Junior Labour Court set aside their dismissals and ordered their reinstate ment. The Management preferred appeals before the Labour Court, which were accepted. In the meantime, the designations of the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court were changed to the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal respectively and the power of suo motu revision was provided to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Ordinance. The employees preferred revision petitions against the appellate decisions, which were dismissed by the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it was not the intention of the law maker to provide revisional jurisdiction against appellate orders, which were to be deemed final. The employees then moved constitutional petitions before the Sind High Court which came up before a Division Bench of that High Court, which held that the power of revision was valid and open and could be exercised even against an order of a Labour Court passed in appeal, but that the same was available only to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which could act on its own motion, and not to the party, as no right was conferred on the party to file any revision. This is a case under Standing Order 12 which itself states that an employee, aggrieved by a wrongful dismissal order passed by the employer, can "take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance". This provision places the remedy under Standing Order 12 directly within the field of section 25‑A of the Ordinance, which brings the proceedings clearly "under the Ordinance". In the instant cage, the remedy, the forum and the procedure applicable are all provided by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Messrs Jannat Textile Mills' case, therefore, proceeds on totally different facts and cannot be applied to the present case.

15. With regard to the objection raised by the learned counsel for the Pakistan Railways that the two counsel representing the 79 Railway Guards in three writ petitions filed by them do not have authority from all of them to file these petitions and that the institution of the said writ petitions qua‑such guards who have not authorised them is incompetent, does not appear to be correct. Photo copies of two powers of attorney in favour of Mr. Maqsood Ali are on the file. All Railway Guards appear to be properly represented. Some of the petitioners have signed the wakalatnama themselves, whereas the others have done so through Mr. Maqsood Ali, their Special Attorney. The three writ petitions, therefore, filed by the 79 Railway Guards are competent and validly instituted.

16. The upshot of the above discussion is that Writ Petitions Nos. 2316/78, 2317/78, 2393/78 and 2394/78 filed on behalf of the Pakistan Railways succeed, whereas Writ Petitions Nos. 4852/80, 6997/80 and 103j7/80 fail. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, respondent No. 1, is hereby directed to refrain from exercising the powers of revision under section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the three revision petitions filed by the Railway Guards before it. To this extent only, Writ Petitions Nos. 2316/78, 2317/78, 2393/78 and 2394/78 are hereby accepted with costs. Writ Petitions Nos. 4852/80, 6997/80 and 10357/80 are hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.