P L D 1957 Dacca 242 (PLP)

RAHMAN, J.

This appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge 2nd Court, Dacca passed on the 29th of November 1954, to Title Suit No. 15 of 1954. The said suit was instituted by the respondent (the wife) for dissolution of her marriage and for recovery of her dower, both prompt and deferred. The case as made out to the plaint was that the plaintiff and the defendant had been married according to Muhammadan Law on the 24th of Feb ruary 1947, and had duly executed a kabinnamah, that the said marriage had also been duly registered under the Bengal Muhammadan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1876, that under the terms of the kabinnamah, the dower was fixed at Rs. 5,000, half of which was prompt and half deferred, and that there were also certain special conditions incorporated in the said kabinnamah, of which the only one relevant for our present purposes, is as follows: "If I do not pay the monthly maintenance allowance to Masuda Bibi, then the said Masuda Bibi after realizing the whole amount of dower money from me and after realizing the maintenance allowance as prescribed in condition No. 3 can be free from the marriage tie after the said time . . . . . . I give that power today to Bibi Masuda ; this will be treated as power of divorce given by me to her." The plaintiff then alleged that in. spite of these conditions the defendant had abused her, oppressed her and treated her with cruelty as a result of which she had been forced to leave her husband and to come and stay in her parents house; that after this the present defendant brought a suit, being Title Suit No. 34 of 1949, in the Court of the 6th Munsif, Dacca, for restitution of conjugal rights which was contested by the plaintiff on the grounds of cruelty, etc., and in particular upon the ground that neither the prompt nor the deferred dower had been paid to the plaintiff in spite of her demands ; that the said suit was at first decreed conditionally by the learned Munsif, and the defendant, who was the plaintiff in that suit, was called upon to deposit the sum of Rs. 2,500, being the prompt portion of the dower, within three months of the said decree and in default of such depose being made, the suit was to stand dismissed ; that although this order was made on the 15th of April 1951?, the present defendant did not deposit the said amount and that ultimately by an order made on the 31st of July 1950, the dismissal of the suit in accordance with the above decree was recorded. From this dismissal, an appeal was preferred by the present defendant. On appeal, the decree, of the learned Munsif was set aside and a decree was passed for restitution of conjugal rights, the father and mother of the present plaintiff who were defendants Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights were permanently restrained from obstructing the plaintiff in that suit in getting his wife back, and it was provided by the decree that it would not be executable unless the present defendant deposited in Court the sum of Rs. 2,500, being the prompt dower, and that upon such deposit being made, the wife would not be entitled to withdraw it unless she went back to her husband's house. The decree was made on the 6th of January 1951; but the present defendant again did not deposit the amount of the prompt dower with the result that on the 7th of January 19f4, the said decree for resti tution of conjugal right became unexcitable. The plaintiff in the present suit, therefore, claimed that as the decree for restitution of conjugal rights became un-executable on 7th January 1954, the marriage also stood dissolved as from that date. She further alleged that ever since the passing of the said decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the defendant had violated the terms of the kabinnamah by his neglect and failure to provide the plaintiff with maintenance for the last 5/6 years and in not paying the dower amount either prompt or deferred‑when demanded by her; and on these grounds she claimed that she was entitled to a decree for dissolution of her marriage with the defendant as also to a decree for the entire amount of the dower. The husband contested the suit and his defence mainly was that the allegations in the plaint as to cruelty, etc., were totally false; that he was always ready and willing to maintain his wife and live together as man and wife, but it was the plaintiff who was refusing, in spite of his requests to live with him; and that her parents were really at the back of all this because of a decree that he had obtained against his parents‑in‑law for the sum of Rs. 4,100 which he had sent to his father‑in‑law on the latter's represen tation that he would purchase a property for him either at Narayangani or at Dacca, but the parents‑in‑law had wrong fully misappropriates the said money and were refusing to repay the same. The defendant further maintained that the claim for prompt dower was also barred by limitation. At the trial, the plaintiff examined herself and her father in support of her case, and relied upon the kabinnamah and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights. As against this the only witness called on behalf of the defendant was the defendant himself, who also relied upon the judg ment and decree of the learned Munsif and of the appellate court in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights as also on the judgment and decree in the suit for the recovery of the money from his parents‑in‑law. Upon a consideration of the evidence on record the trial Court came to the view that the plaintiff's contention that the marriage stood dissolved into facto by reason of the non‑execution of the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights or by reason of the said decree becoming inoperative and un executable was not well‑founded. According to the trial Court the decree will subsist until the marriage is dissolved and the relationship of husband and wife will continue to exist unless the dissolution of the marriage takes place either by a decree of the Court or by the exercise of the power of the Talak‑i‑tafweez given to the plaintiff by the kabinnamah. No question of the exercise of the latter power arose in the present case as it was neither alleged in the plaint nor suggested in the evidence. As for the allegations with regard to habitual ill treatment and cruelty it appears that in view of the findings in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights, namely, that these had not been proved, the same were not pressed at the trial of the present suit and, therefore, n9 question now arises as to whether there has or has not been any such habitual ill‑treatment or cruelty as to entitle the plaintiff to the dissolution of her marriage on that ground. But with regard to the ground of neglect and failure to maintain her for more than two years, the trial Court took the view that by reason of the fact that the defendant had failed to deposit the amount of the prompt dower as directed by the decree in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights and had rendered by his own conduct that decree inoperative and un-executable, he could not insist upon his wife returning to and living with him, and as such, the defendant was bound to provide her with maintenance, which admittedly he had not done, as no amount of money had been paid to the plaintiff since the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, passed more than two years ago, either by way of maintenance or on any other account. In this view of the matter the learned trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the dissolution of the marriage. With regard, however, to the claim for the dower the trial Court took the view that the claim for the prompt dower being governed by Article 103 of the Limitation Act had become barred by limitation prior to the institution of the suit, as, according to the trial Court, the plea taken by way of defence in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights amounted to a sufficient demand and the faliure on the part of the defendant to comply with the order of the learned Munsif to deposit the amount of the prompt dower within three months of the date of his order constituted also a refusal, and since both these dates were more than three years before the institution of the suit, the claim for the prompt dower was barred by limitation. A decree was, however, made for the balance of Rs. 2,500 being the amount of the deferred dower. In this appeal, the defendant‑appellant assails only the decree for the dissolution of marriage but the plaintiff res pondent has also field a cross‑objection challenging the finding of the trial Court that claim for the prompt dower was barred by limitation. So far as the decree for the dissolution of the marriage is concerned, the appellant's contention is that the Court below has erred in taking the view that under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939) the wife had an absolute right to her maintenance, and that the non payment simpliciter of maintenance for a period of over two years was sufficient to found a claim for the dissolution of the marriage under the said Act. According to the learned Advocate for the appellant, the said Act does not enlarge the rights of the spouses under the Muhammadan Law, as it is merely a dilatory Act con solidating and clarifying the law relating to the rights of the female spouse with regard to divorce under the Muhammadan Law; and, in support of his argument, he has relied on the cases of Jajar Hussain v. Mst. Akbari Begum (I L R 26 Lah. 517), Mst. Shamim Fatnra v. Ahmadullah Khan (A I R 1947 All. 3) Ahmad Ali v. Sabha Khatun Bibi and others (P L R 1 Dacca 793 = P L D 1952 Dacca 385), Ainuddin harihar v. Salatannessa Bibi (P L R 2 Dacca 337 = P L D 1953 Dacca 216) and Mst. Aisah Bibi v. Sain (P L R 5 Lah. 491 = P L D 1952 Lah. 460). It appears that the earlier view taken by some High Courts, including the Lahore High Court, that the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. 1939, being a consolidating Act, was to be taken as a complete Code in itself and thus to be construed regardless of the previous state of the law and that, as such, the clear and unambiguous provisions thereof could not be curtailed or restricted by any reference to the previous state of the Muhammadan Law is no longer approved of by the majority of the High Courts including this High Court. It is unnecessary for us to refer to each one of these cases because all the previous cases other than the two decisions of this High Court have been considered in the case of Mst. Aiha Bibi v. Sain by His Lordship Muhammad Munir, Chief Justice and the entire law on the subject has been elaborately discussed. We very respectfully agree with the views expressed therein and the reasons given by His Lordship to which we have nothing to add. As observed by His Lordship, even apart from the provisions of the Muhammadan Law as they stood prior to the passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 under the language of the said Act itself, a neglect or failure on the part of the husband to provide maintenance has to be established before the wife can expect to succeed in a suit for dissolution of her marriage on this ground. A neglect or a failure to do some thing naturally connotes that there is a duty cast upon the person to do that thing which he has failed or neglected to do. This automatically leads us to the enquiry as to what that duty is. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, does not prescribe what that duty is, and, as such, the only source from which the extent and the nature of the said duty can be ascertained must necessarily be the Muhammadan Law on the subject, which being the personal law governing the relationship of Muslims in this country is the only law to which recourse can be had for this purpose from this point of view also, the above word of the statute by themselves attract the previous Muhammadan Law and it cannot, therefore, he said that the non‑payment simpliciter constitutes a failure or neglect within the meaning of the provisions of clause (ii) of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Having come to this view, we need only mention that the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has not placed before us any new decision which was not considered in the case of Mst. Aiha Bibi v. Sain by Chief Justice Munir, and .since we agree with the view expressed by His Lordship in that case, it is not necessary for us to re‑examine all the decisions referred to and discussed therein. In this view of the matter, it next become necessary for us to find out if there was in the peculiar facts of this case any duty cast upon the defendant to maintain the plaintiff. With regard to this, the learned Advocate for the appellant has merely contended that upon the admitted facts in the present case, namely, that since the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights the plaintiff has been living with her parents, and the fact that she has stated in her evidence that she is not willing to go back to her husband, a case had been made out which was sufficient to exonerate the husband from the liability of maintaining wife who was not prepared to carry out her chief marital obligation namely, to give the benefit of her society to the husband. In this view the learned Advocate contends that if the defendant's evidence is believed that he did want his wife to go back, but she did not do so, he had sufficiently discharged the onus of proving that the wife had been disobedient, and has thus disentitled herself to the maintenance. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Advocate for he overlooks the fact that the right to prompt dower given to a wife is a right which cannot be defeated by the husband even on the ground of his being denied the society of his wife. The wife is under the Muhammadan Law entitled to refuse herself to her husband until and unless the prompt dower is paid to her. This right she can exercise even when residing in the house of her husband. Indeed all authorities on Muhammadan Law are unanimous on the point that the right to mainten ance cannot be defeated if the wife has demanded her prompt dower and the husband has not paid it to her. We need only refer to a few of the authorities that have been placed before us by the learned Advocate for the respondent on this point. He has referred us to Hamilton's Hedaya Book IV, Volume I, where, at page 394, it is stated as follows: "If a woman refuses to surrender herself to her husband on account of her dower (that is on account of its not having been paid to her), her maintenance does not drop, but is incumbent upon the husband, although she be not yet within his custody, since her refusal is only in pursu ance of her right, and consequently the objection to the matrimonial custody originates with the husband." To the same effect is Ameer Ali's Muhammadan Law Volume II, page 406, where it is stated as follows "The husband is bound to maintain his wife even if she be residing in her father's house, provided he has not required her to come to his own house, and can co‑habit with her there. If he has called upon her to come and live with him, and she has refused without valid or justifiable reason, such as the non‑payment of prompt dower or illness, she is not entitled to maintenance while residing in her father's house." In Baillee's Digest of Muhammadan Law, Book VI, at page 441, the law with regard to the maintenance of wives is stated as follows: "It is incumbent on a husband to maintain his wife, whether she be Muslim or zimmee, poor or rich, enjoyed or un-enjoyed, young or old, if not too young for matri monial intercourse; and it makes no difference whether she be free or a mookatubah. When a wife is too young for matrimonial intercourse, she has no right to mainten ance from her husband, whether she be living in his house or with her father. When an adult woman, who has not yet removed to her husband's house asks for main tenance, she is entitled to it unless he has called upon her to remove; and the fatwa is in accordance with this view though the lawyers of Bulkh have said that she is not entitled till actual removal. If, when called upon to remove to his house, she refuses to do so of right, that is, to obtain payment of her dower, she is entitled to maintenance; but if she refuses to do so without right, as when her dower is paid, or deferred, or has been given to her husband, she has no claim to main tenance." In this connection we might also refer to the case of Najiman Nissa Begum v. Serajuddin Ahmad Khan (A I R 1946 Pat. 467), where the facts were somewhat similar to those of the present case, Manohar Lal, J., after considering the evidence in that case, observed as follows: "In my opinion, upon the facts found, the wife is entitled to a decree for dissolution. The husband refused to pay the prompt dower. He took the defence when a suit had been instituted to recover it that there was no prompt dower payable by him . . . . . The High Court, however, decided in December 1937, that the lady was entitled to the payment of her dower debt. The dower debt is still unpaid . . . . It follows that before the institu tion of the suit the lady had not been paid any maintenance since the institution of this suit. Indeed the husband's attitude in this Court was that he was not bound to pay maintenance unless and until the lady comes and stays with him. In these circumstances, the facts come within the mischief of section 2, sub‑clause (ii) of Act VIII of 1939, and the lady is entitled to dissolution of her marriage." In the present case also, the prompt dower has not been paid, admittedly no maintenance has been paid for over two years and the husband's attitude is much the same as in the Patna case. It thus appears upon an examination of the authori‑i ties that if the wife has a lawful excuse or a legal right to refuse to live with her husband, as for example, on account of the non‑payment of the prompt dower, the husband will not be absolved of his liability to maintain the wife even though the wife be not residing with him. Having found that the husband, in the present case, was not absolved of his liability to maintain his wife, we have next to examine the evidence in this case in order to find out whether there is anything apart from the non payment of the prompt dower to show that the wife had any other legal excuse for refusing to live with her husband or anything from which it can be said that she had under Muhammadan Law disentitled herself from her right to be maintained by the husband. It is admitted by the defendant that he did not pay the prompt dower in terms either of the learned Munsif or of the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Apart from the fact that he simply states that he could not deposit because he had no money, there is not an iota of evidence to show what effort, if any at all, he made to deposit the said sum and to take back his wife nor indeed are we satisfied from the evidence that his conduct has been such as would lead to the inference that he was in any way anxious to take back his wife. He says that he sought to bring his wife back with the help of some close relations but none of these close relations have been called to give evidence in this case nor has anything been said to show that these close relations were not available for the purpose of giving evidence. In the circumstances, we cannot rely on the word of mouth alone of the defendant to establish his case that he bona fide desired the consortium of his wife but his wife wrongfully refused it to him. The fact, therefore, remains that the prompt dower is still unpaid and the defendant has not considered it worth while to make any effort whatsoever to deposit this prompt dower; and even though in order to bring about harmony between the husband and the wife this appeal was adjourned once, no offer has come from the husband that he was, even at this stage, prepared to deposit the prompt dower or any substantial portion thereof in Court. As against this, we have the direct and positive evidence of the wife to the effect that it is not a fact that the defendant went to her father's house with close relations to take her back. This statement does not appear to have been challenged in cross‑examination. If there was any truth in the state ments of the defendant that he did send some close relations to fetch his wife, it was not too much to expect that in cross‑examination at least the names of such close relations would have been suggested to the wife to test the correct ness of the statement made by her that no close relations were sent to fetch her. This, however, was not done and we are left with that statement of the wife un-contradicted. In this state of the evidence, we cannot say that the wife has on her part been guilty of any conduct which would disentitle her to the right of maintenance. She states, and very frankly states, that she refused to live with her husband until and unless her prompt dower was paid, and that seems to have been her attitude right from the time when the suit for the restitution of conjugal rights was filed. There was nothing wrong in this and she was perfectly within her rights in claiming to do so; and since admittedly the defendant did not pay or make any effort to deposit the stipulated prompt dower, there was no default on the part of the wife, and, as such the liability to maintain her remained and on the failure of discharging that liability the right to dissolution of the marriage under the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, was attracted and so for as the decree for the dis solution of the marriage is concerned, we are in agreement with the trial Court that plaintiff is entitled to the decree for the dissolution of her marriage. As regards the plaintiff's claim for the prompt dower raised in the cross objection, the learned Advocate for the respondent has first of all contended that the trial Court was wrong in taking the view that Article 103 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act applied to this case. According to the learned Advocate, the Article of the Limitation Act which should have been applied in this case was Article 116, because the claim, according to him, arose out of a contract in writing registered, and, as such, the period of limitation should have been six years. In support of this view, the learned Advocate has relied on the case of Muhammad Mazaharal Ahad v. Muhammad Azimuddin Bhuian (27 C W N 210). In that case there was a registered dower deed and the question arose as to which particular Article of the Limitation Act applied to a suit for the recovery of the dower debt under the said deed. Mooker jee and Rankin, JJ., held that in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Ttricomdas v. Gopinath (44 1 A 65), since there was a registered dower deed, Article 116 of the Limitation Act should apply to the case. It is significant that in that case what was stated was that there was a registered dower deed and not that the marriage had been registered as in the present case under the Bengal Muhammadan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1876. Nevertheless, the learned Advocate contended that this was a case like the present one, and since in that case it was held that Article 116 of the Limitation Act applied, the trial Court should in the present case have also held that Article 116 applied. The learned Advocate has also relied upon the case of Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Company, Limited v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty (1 L R 42 Mad. 33), where it was held that 'registered' in Article 116 means 'registered' not only under the Indian Registration Act but also under special Acts such as the Indian Companies Act, etc. and from this the learned Advo cate, by drawing our attention to clause 45 of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, has urged that `registered' must in accordance with the definition given in the latter Act means `registered' under "the law for the time being in force for the registration of documents" and since the Muhammadan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1876, was such a law in force, the kabinnamah bearing the seal of the Muslim Mar riage Registrar was a contract in writing registered. We have to point out that the decision in the case of Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Company, Limited v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty, was overruled by a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of A. Venkata Gurunath Rama Seshayya v. Sri Tripurasundari Cotton Press, Bazwada (I L R 49 Mad. 468) where it was held that `registered', under Article 116 of the Limitation Act, does not include registration under the Companies Act. In a subsequent case of the Bombay High Court, Bai Lalita Ratanchand Khimchand v. Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (A I R 1940 Bom. 97), a Full Bench presided over by Beaumont, C. J., however, held that `registered' under Article 116 of the Limitation Act includes registration under the Companies Act; but the reason for this was, as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, the fact that: "The Indian Companies Act, though no doubt not primarily concerned with the registration of documents, is nevertheless the law in force relating to the registration of certain documents affecting Companies." Therefore, a claim for dividends was held to fall under Article 116 of the Limitation Act, where the whole contract arises under the Articles of the Company registered under the Companies Act. In this sense, the meaning given to the word registered in Article 116 of the Limitation Act is still confined to 'registered' under laws prevailing for the registration of documents'. The Companies Act, apart from making other provisions with regard to Companies, does provide, as for example, by section 171 or 109 thereof for the registration with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies of the Articles of Association of a Company or of mortgages or charges over the assets of a Company. To that extent, at any rate, it can be said that it does also provide for the registration of documents. In the case, however, of the Bengal Muhammadan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1876, we are unable to find out any provision therein for the registration of documents. It is, as stated in its preamble, a law for the registration of marriages and divorces and indeed the distinction between a law for the registration of marriages and a law for the registration of documents is brought out in the Act itself. Section 9‑A of the said Act reads as follows:‑ "The Muhammadan Registrar shall not register‑ (a) a marriage of a woman who has effected a divorce of the kind known as Talaq‑i‑tafweez‑ (i) except on the production of a document registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, or under any other law for the time being in force for the registration of documents, or of a certified copy of such document, or of a certified copy of the order of the District Judge or any Court of competent jurisdiction, showing that div5rce has been effected or of an attested copy of an entry of the divorce in the register of divorces of the kind known as Talaq‑i‑tafweez (Book IV) . . . . . ." The language of this section 9‑A clearly indicates that the makers of that legislation did not consider the said Act to be an Act providing for the registration of documents, for, otherwise the distinction between a certified copy of a document registered under a law for the registration of documents and an attested copy of an entry in a divorce register provided for by the Act, would not have been there. In these circum stances, we are unable to agree that registration of a marriage under the Muhammadan Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1876, is a registration within the meaning of Article 116,6 of the Limitation Act. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that Article 116 is not applicable in the present case. The next contention raised by the learned Advocate for the respondent is that even if Article 103 of the Limitation Act is the proper Article to apply in the present case, the conditions for the application of the said Article do not exist, saice, it is urged, the date from which the limitation begins to run under Article 103 of the Limitation Act is the date not only of the demand but both of the demand and the refusal of such demand. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate has relied on the case of Ranee Khajooroonissa v. Ranee Ryeesoonissa (2 I A 235), where their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, although not concerned directly with the question as to when and under what circumstances a refusal arises, did observe as follows:‑ "Prompt or exigible dower may be considered a debt always due and demandable, and certainly payable upon demand, and, therefore, upon a clear and unambiguous demand, and refusal, a cause of action would accrue and the statute would begin to run." In the present case, however, we have no doubt in our mind that the facts do establish both a demand and a refusal and the period of limitation that has been calculated by the trial Court from the date of such refusal is more than three years prior to the date of the institution of the suit. Upon the orals evidence adduced in this case, the trial Court was not prepared to believe the evidence of the plaintiff that she had last demanded her dower in Aswin or Jaistha, 1360 B. S., and we also do not se a any reason for disagreeing with this finding of the trial Court. This leaves us with the demand in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights which is, in our opinion, sufficiently clear and unambiguous, and since the defendant failed to deposit the amount within three months as provided for in the order of the learned Munsif in that suit, there was, in our opinion, also a refusal to pay. A refusal, in our opinion, can be either express or implied from conduct. In the present case, we ate satisfied from the conduct of the defendant, as disclosed upon the evidence, that there was on his part such a refusal and since the date on which the refusal became operative was the 15th July 1950, and the suit was not filed until the 3rd of February 1954, that claim was clearly barred by limitation. We have come to this conclusion without going into the question as to the weight that should be attached to the copy of the deposi tion of the plaintiff taken in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights, and marked as an exhibit in the present case, and without taking the said evidence into account. The objection taken by the learned Advocate, however, as to the method of proof of the said document was for the first time taken before us, for, it does not appear from the record that any objection was taken as to the method of proof of these documents at the time when they were proved and admitted as evidence in the trial Court. In these circum stances, since there is no dispute as to the relevancy of these documents, we do not think that it is open to the learned Advocate now to challenge the admissibility of the same on the ground of improper mode of proof in the Court below. There can be, therefore, no question now that the previous evidence exhibited in this case can be looked into. If any authority is needed for this proposition, reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Padman and others v. Hanwanta and others (19 C W N 929), where, in delivering the opinion of the Board, the Right Hon'ble Mr. Ameer Ali observed at page 932 as follows: "It was urged in the course of the argument that a regis tered copy of the Will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first Court against the copy obtained from the Registrar's Office being put in evidence. Had such objection been made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention." This disposes of all the points urged before us. The result, therefore, is that both the appeal and the cross objection are dismissed with costs, which latter will be, set off one against the other. AMIN AHMED, A. C. J.‑

I agree. K. B. A. Appeal and cross‑objection dismissed.