1980 PLP 812 (CLC)

(3) (a) Before taking up the contentions of the learned counsel for the defendants, it will be appropriate that I should examine the contention of Syed Anwar Ali, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, that this Court cannot go into the question of the validity of the registration certificate in the present suits. In support of the above contention he hag relied upon the case of Silver Cotton Textile Mills Ltd. v. Bawany Violin Textile Mills Ltd. (P L D 1963 Kar. 79) and the case of S. Muhammad Din & Sons v. Sheikh Nabi Bux & Sons (P L D 1974 Lah. 58), whereas the learned counsel for the defendants have relied upon the cases of Karachi Textile Works v. Multan Handloom Factory (P L D 1955 Sind 351), Qadar Bakhsh v. Ghulam Muhammad (A I R 1934 Lah. 709), Messrs Khurshid Industrial Corporation & others v. M/s. Habib Metal Industries and others (1969 D L C 521), Manicka Thevar v. Mls. Sattar Plough Works Melur (A I R 1965 Mad. 327). The Pilot Pen Co. (India) Private Limited v. The Gujrat Industries Private Ltd. (A I R 1967 Mad. 215), Ram Shai v. Angnoo (A 1 R 1922 All. 496), Calico Printers ~4ssociation Ltd. v. Savani & Co. (A I R 1939 Bom. 103), .Smith v. Grigg Ltd. (41 R P C 149), Marshal & The Lace Web Spring Co. Ltd. v. The Crown Bedding Co. Ltd. (46 R P C 267) and Bourjois Ltd. British Home Stores Ltd and another (68 R P C 280). (b) 1n the above Karachi case of 1963, the facts were that the District Judge, Lahore issued a temporary injunction against the defendants restraining them from using on textile goods the design which was regis tered on the application of the plaintiffs under section 43 of the Act. However, the learned District Judge did not restrain the defendants from selling the goods lying in the stock, for which it was ordered that the defendants should maintain an account. The defendants filed an appeal against the above order. Raliance was place by the defendants in the aforesaid case on the case of Karachi Textile Works v. Multan Hand loom, referred to herein above. While dissenting from the aforesaid 1955 case, Qadeeruddin, J. (as his Lordship then was), was pleased to hold that the common law rule that defence of invalidity of registration can be raised without applying for cancellation or rectification is in applicable to suits filed in Pakistan. It was further held that the cancella tion of the registered design can only be claimed under section 51-A of the Act through a Petition in the High Court or before the Controller. It may be observed that the facts of the above case of 1963 Karachi are distinguishable from the facts of the instant cases inasmuch as that in the above Karachi case of 1963 the suit was filed in the District Court which had no jurisdiction under section 51-A of the Act to entertain a petition for the cancellation of the design, whereas in the instant case, the suits have been filed in the High Court which admittedly has the power under section 51-A to order the cancellation of the registered design. Qadeeruddin, J. was mindful of the above distinction and in that context his Lordship has observed as follows :- '(And answered it in the negative. I should note that in the case that it before me, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to either order rectification of the register or to order cancellation of registration, because under section 64 of our Act, the power of rectification is given to the Controller, and under sec tion 51-A, the power of cancellation is conferred on the High Court. The trial Court was thus not competent to give relief by either ordering rectification or cancellation. The English precedents, therefore, in which the defence of invalidity was allowed to be raised without applications for rectification or cancellation are inapplicable to suits which are filed in our country, excepting for and that too in a restricted sense only to these suits which may be filed on the original side of the High Court." The second distinguishing feature is that the defendants in the pre sent 2 suits have filed proper petitions under section 51-A of the Act for the cancellation of the design, namely the defendants in Suit No. 366/79 have filed J. Misc. 8/79 and J. Misc. 9/79 on 28th February 1979, a few months prior to the date of the filing of the suit by the Plaintiffs Mrs. Yasmin Saleem who is the proprietor of Shahi Enterprises and who, according to the defendants in Suit No. 367/79, have been manufactur ing the thermic jugs which has allegedly infringed the plaintiffs' registered designs has also filed a petition under section 5l-A of the Act on 10th May 1979 for the cancellation of the plaintiffs' designs and whereas the defendants in Suit No. 525/79 have also filed a Petition under section 51-A of the Act on 2nd August 1979 (J. M. 31/79). It may be observed that all the aforesaid J. Misc. Petitions were fixed along with the above suits for hearing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, and, therefore, it cannot be urged that the validity of the registration of the two designs in favour of the Plaintiffs is not in issue before this Court or that this Court has no jurisdiction under section 5i-A of the Act to order the cancellation of the registration. (c) The Lahore case relied upon, namely, P L D 1974 was also a case in which the original order was passed by the District Judge and an appeal was filed in the High Court. A perusal of the above Lahore case will show that it was more a case for infringement of a trade mark than of a design. It is true that the question of design was also involved but the main discussion is on the question of trade mark and the use of the name. There is no discussion on the question whether the validity of the registration of the designs can be agitated in a suit in defence in a Court which is also competent to entertain a petition under section 51-A of the Act. Aftab Hussain, J. followed the aforesaid Karachi case of ,1963. (d) Reverting to the case of Karachi Textile Works v. Multan Hand. loom Industry, it may be observed that Inamullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) after discussing the various Indian and English rulings was pleased to hold that in granting a temporary injunction against violation of a design, the same principles should be applied as are applicable in the case of violation of a' patent, e. g. that the patent is prima facie valid or it has been enjoyed for many years without dispute and that temporary injunction will not be granted if the registration is recent. In the above case it was also urged that the remedy available for the defendants was under section 51-A of the Act and that the plea of inva lidity was not available as a defence in the suit. While repelling the above contention, his Lordship was pleased to observe at page 354 as follows :

The contention of Mr. Farooqi is that Patents and Designs Act is a complete act. It has provided the machinery as to how the registration of a design can be challenged. This is provid ed under section 51-A of the Patents and Designs Act. Any person who wants to challenge the registration of a design can apply to the High Court or to the Controller on the grounds that have now been taken by the defendant to challenge the validity of the registration. The words `subject to provisions of this act' in section 47 of the Patents and Designs Act have to be given ordinary meaning and if that is so, the Plaintiff should be held to be the proprietor of the design that has been registered in his favour subject to the challenge that is provided in section 51-A of the Act. On the other hand, it would appear that this argument had been raised in several Indian cases and the view that has been taken by the Judges was that in a suit for infringement of designs, the defendant could take such plea as he has now taken. The authorities that have been cited before me and which I will presently mention, no doubt relate to the period when section 51-A was not introduced. Section 51-A was introduc ed by Patents and Designs Amendment Act, 1930 (VII of 1930). This consideration, in my opinion, has not much weight as section 64 was being used for the same object which is now provided in section 51-A of the Patents and Designs Act." In the case of Muhammad Abdul Karim v Muhammad Yaseen (1) Banent, J. observed that :- "Similar objections that have now been taken by the present defendant could be taken under section 64 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911." (e) In the case of Messrs Khurshid Industrial Corporation v. Messrs Habib Metal Industries, a suit was filed in the Court of District Judge for the infringement of design which was decreed after trial. Against the judgment of the District Judge an appeal was filed in the High Court and while disposing of the above appeal, it was observed by a Division Bench of the Dacca High Court that in a suit for damages and injunction against infringement of registered design defendant not raising counter claim for revocation of the plaintiffs' design, the District Judge in the circumstances had rightly assumed jurisdiction instead of forwarding the case to the High Court under section 29 (1) of the Patents and Designs Act. The above observation of the Dacca High Court indicates that the Court was of the view that a plea of the invalidity of the design could have been raised in a suit for the infringement of the design and that the defendant could file a counter claim for cancellation and upon making such a counter claim, the suit would have become liable to be transferred to the High Court under section 29 of the Act. (f) In the aforesaid cases of Indian High Courts; namely, 1922 Allah abad, 1934 Lahore, 1939 Bombay High Court and 1967 Madras, the defence about the validity of a design/patent was allowed to be raised in the suits. Similarly in the aforesaid English cases reported in 41, 46 and 68 R P C mentioned hereinabove, the defendants had 'raised the plea of the invalidity of the design/patent which was allowed. It is therefore, clear that in Indo-Pak as well as in England before the above judgment of 1963 Karachi, the consistent view of the various Courts was that the defendant could raise the plea about the validity of the design or patent in defence in a suit. The aforesaid old view prevailed even in the recent cases of the High Courts of Madras and Delhi i.e. A I R 1965 Mad. 327, A I R 1967 Mad 215, A I R 1976 Delhi 87 and A I R 1977 M O C (Delhi) 162. (4) (a) It was urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that section 54 of the Act was not considered in the aforesaid Karachi case of 1963, which expressly provides that the provisions of the Act with regard to certificate of the validity of patent and the remedy in case of groundless threats of legal proceedings by a patentee shall apply in case of a registered design in like manner as they apply in the case of patent with the substitution of references to the copyright in design or references to a Patent and of references to the proprietor of a design or references to the patentee and of reference to the design for references to the invention. It was further urged that in view of the above section, the provision of section 29 of the Act would be attracted to in a case of infringement of design. It may be observed that section 29 gives the right to a defendant to make a counter claim for the revocation of the patent in a suit and in case such counter claim is made in a suit filed by a patentee in the District Court, the suit becomes liable to be transferred to the High Court for decision. Whereas Syea Anwar Ali has urged that section 54 of the Act only contemplates the application of sections 32 and 36 of the Act and that a Court can at the most certify that a question of validity of a design was involved in the suit but no adjudication can be made. It was also urged by him that section 26 of the Act (which relates to the filing of Petition for cancellation of a patent) expressly provides for filing a counter claim, whereas section 51-A which relates to the cancellation of a design does not contemplate the filing of any counter claim. In this regard, it will suffice to observe that in my view for the purpose of deciding the present applications, it is not necessary to examine in detail the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties on the above point. However, it may be observed that the effect of section 54 of the Act was not considered in 1.963 Karachi or in 1974 Lahore. (b) The Karachi case of 1963 and Lahore case of 1974 are distinguishable from the instant cases for the reasons mentioned by me hereinabove in para 3 (b) and (c). Further more, I am inclined to take, the view that while considering an application for granting as interlocutory injunction the Court is competent to take into consideration' the fact that the validity of the registered designs which are the subjecfp matter of the suit are in issue in a competent legal proceedings, it is also competent !o examine as to whether the validity has been challenged on grounds which prima facie require full investigation or the same arel frivolous. (5) (a) In the instant case, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs could not have obtained the registration of the alleged designs inter all, for the following reasons :

fi) That the alleged designs are not new/original. `"~` iii) That there has been prior publication of the designs before the f filing of the application by the defendants. In support of the first contention, the defendants in Suit No. 367/79 have produced the documents mentioned by me earlier, vie. the literature containing the photos of the thermic jugs of Messrs Thermos Industrial Company Ltd., Seoul, Korea and the bill of entry, freight arrival advice of P I A and the State Bank permission which indicate that the defendants in the said suit had imported in 1976, 4 items which inter alia included design No. J P-6000 Picnic jugs, J P-5000 Picnic jugs and J P 6500 Picnic Jugs. It was urged that the above samples had more or less the same faucet and the same process of manufacturing was employed namely, two pieces of the jug body in JP-6500, in respe;:t of which the Plaintiffs have claimed novelty. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that the similar type of thermic jugs in respect of which design rights are claimed by the Plaintiffs were brought from abroad by the Pakistanis while returning to Pakistan particularly by the pilgrims from Saudi Arabia for a number of years. (b) Mr. Iqbal Kazi, learned counsel for the defendants in suit No. 367/79 has referred to the cases of Simons v. Mathies cfc Co. Ltd. (''8 R P C 4 >6) and Gramophone Co. Od. v. Alagazine Holder Co. Ltd. (104 W 25) in support of his contention that in order to make a design new or original there should be some invention and imaginative work of the design holder, In the first case, the Court of Appeal held that the registration of a design cannot give any rights unless that design is new or original and that. the original means that there must be a mental conception expressed in a physical form which has not existed before but has originated in the constructive brain of its proprietor and that must not be in a trivial or infinitesimal degree but should be in some substantial degree. Whereas in the second case, the House of Lords of England held that in an action to restrain the infringement of a registered design, the Court is competent to enquire whether the design is in fact move 1 and original and if it is not so to give judgment in favour of the defendants and that in order to make a design new original there must be some invention in it and it should be really works of art and design which may be properly protected. Without expressing any opinion it will suffice to observe that the defendants' above pleas require full investigation and prima facie hate some force, and, therefore, it cannot be outright held that they are bogus pleas. (6) (a) Reverting to the second contention that there had been prior publication of the registered designs reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the defendants on the aforesaid documents inter alia referred to in para. (5) (a) hereinabove. Mr. J. H. Rahimtoola has also referred to the book named "Copyright in Industrial Designs" by .4. D. Edition, Clarks, 111 Edition, in which the author has described publication through documents and by user. It may be advantageous to reproduce extracts from pages 40 and 45 of the above book which read as follows:- ' Page

40. Documents in circulation. 1f the design has been contained in documents, such, for instance, as books or catalogues, which have been sold or circulated there would, in such a case, unquestionably, be publication. It is not, however, necessary that large number of the documents should be proved to have been actually sold or circulated. In Harris v. Rothwell, Lindley, L. J, said it is sufficient to show that the invention was so described in some book or document, published in this country, that some English people may fairly be supposed to have known of it." And in Otto v. Steel, Pearson, J. said;.- "The question is whether or not this book has been published in such a way as to become part of the public stock of knowledge in this country. It is not, to my mind, necessary for that purpose to show that it has been read by a great many people, or that any person in particular which it is said would have enabled Dr. Otto in this case to have made his engine. But, to my mind, it must have been published in such away that there may be a reasonable probability that any person, and amongst such persons, Dr. Otto, might have obtained that ...... knowledge from it." Page 45,(a) Cases' of disclosure to specific individuals: If prior to the date of application for registration of the design there has been disclosure, either of the design itself or of a previous, similar design, to any of the public who is not under an obligation there will be publication. Thus, in Dumberson v. Syer, which was a patent case, a machine made substantially according to the patent was shown to a person in Syer's shop. In Re Taylor's Patent a stove similar to the patented article was used in the hall of a private house and shown to visitors. In both cases there was held to be publication. But if the disclosure is of a confidential nature, as, for instance, where it is to a person who has an interest in the design, or if the persons who see the user are under an obligation as to secrecy, then there is no publication. Cases of this nature differ really in no way from similar cases of disclosure to individuals of prior documents, and all that was said under that head is, therefore, equally applicable to where the disclosure is of a prior user. (b) Cases of prior user in public There will be publication if articles to which the design is applied are manufactured and used in such a way that members of the public might see them. It is not necessary that the prior user should have been sold, although, if there is anything in the nature of profitable user by the owner of a design prior to registration, there will undoubtedly be publication. Prior user thus means not user by the public but user in public as opposed to user in private. The classic cases of Carpenter v, Smith and Stead v. lriderson give a good idea of what amounts to prior user," (b) Whereas Syed Anwar has relied upon the case of Blank v. Foot. man Pretty,'& Co. ((1.888) 39 Ch. D 676) in which the facts were that in an action for the infringement inventor of a design showed it and consulted his agent and the agent consulted another person and also showed it to 2 customers and asked them for orders. It was held by a Single Judge that there was a prior publication, On the basis of the above case it was urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that merely showing to another person will not constitute publication but there should be sale of the articles. In my view the above case does not lay down the proposition urged by the learned counsel-for the plaintiffs. (c) It was also urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs even before applying for the registration started advertising their products on television and also started sale of the port of the above contention reliance was placed upon a photostat copy of an alleged cash memo of Messrs Karachi Importing Agency dated 2nd May 1978 of the alleged agent of the plaintiffs to show that the plaintiffs were selling the articles in question prior to the date of the application (Annexures D to J. M. No. 8/1979). In this regard it will suffice to observe that the question whether there has been prior publication in order to disqualify the registration of the designs serious question to be tried by this Court, Applications pending in this Court. (d) It may be observed that it has been the consistent view of the 'Courts in England as well as in Indo-Pakistan (except that in the above case of 1963 Karachi and 1974 Lahore a contrary View was taken) that in an action for the infringement of design/patent are and interim injunction is not granted when the defendant bona fidely challenges the validity of design/patent in defence and the design/patent is a recent one. This was so held in the aforesaid Sind case of 1955, Indian Case of Madras High Court of 1965 and England cases reported in R P C referred to herein above in para 3(a). In 1965 of Madras the High Court declined to grant ad interim injunction in an action for infringement of a patent on the ground that the patent was recent one and the validity of its grant was disputed. In 41 R P C 149 the Court of Appeal discharged an inter-1.locutory injunction granted by the trial Court on the ground that the registration of the design was recent and its validity was not established. Whereas in 46 R P C 267 of a patent, a learned single Judge declined to grant injunction upon the defendants undertaking to keep account of the validity of the patent was challenged, though the plaintiff was manu facturing the product for a number of years. Similarly .in 68 R P C 280 a learned single Judge of the Chancery Division declined to grant an interlocutory injunction inter alia on the ground that the design had been newly registered. Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada, Advocate for the defendant in Suit No. 368/79 has referred to the two recent decided cases of the Delhi High Court, namely, the case of Ram Narain Kher v. Messrs Amhassador Industries, New Delhi (A I R 1976 Delhi 87) and the case of Messrs Brighto Auto Industries v. Raj Chawla (A I R 1977 N O C 162 (Delhi)). In the former case a learned Single Judge declined to grant an interlocutory injunction in an action for infringement of patent, in which the defendant disputed the validity of the registration of the patent. In the latter case it was held by a learned Single Judge that a registration cannot be deemed effective unless the design or con. figuration sought to be protected is new or original and not a pre-existing common type. It may be mentioned that the photostat copies of the judgments of the aforesaid Delhi cases were furnished by Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada to the Court and as well as to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, (e) It may be pertinent to mention that there is a distinction between the registration of a trade mark and the registration of design or patent. In the former case the Trade Mark Act and the rules framed there undo contemplate the publication of a prior public notice, and hearing of objections to the application for registration etc. whereas under the Patents and Designs Act, the registration is granted secretly without any prior publication. In other words, the affected parties have no oppor tunity to contest the application and, therefore, if the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is to be accepted that a Court shoal grant an ad interim' injunction without even examining as to whether prima facie there are some serious issues about the validity of the design sought to be enforced pending adjudication in a competent Court, it will cause hardship to the affected parties. (f) It was also urged by Syed Anwar Ali that the ground that the registration is recent is no ground for refusing an ad interim injunction as has been held in the aforsaid Karachi case of 1963. It will surface to observe that if there are no serious questions in issue about the validity of a design/patent and if a registered design holder has a prima facie case, to that event merely the fact that the registration of a design/patent is recent may not be a ground to refuse granting of an interlocutory injunction. Syed Anwar Ali has also referred to the case of Grafton v. Watson (51 L T 141) and the case of Carroll and others v. Tomado Ltd. (1971 R P C 401). 1n the former case the Court of appeal upheld the order of granting of ad interim injunction in an action filed for the infringement of the designs. Whereas in the later case a Single Judge of the Chancery Division was pleased to hold that the principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunction in patent cases were no different from the principles governing the grant of such an injunction in any other case. It was further held that in patent action the onus of showing a prima facie case justifying the grant of injunction was heavy one and that it was comparatively easy for the defendant to establish a defence sufficient to prevent the grant of such an injunction. In the above case an interlocutory injunction was granted as the Court prima facie found that the defendants' case against validity seemed very determinate and, on. Three evidence as a whole it was likely that at trial the plaintiffs would be successful on that question. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has also referred to the case of Hayward gyros. Ltd. v. Peakall (26 It P C 42) and has urged that even when a defendant claims concurrent right to use the plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory injunction. In the above case an interlocutory injunction was granted though the defendant had set up concurrent right to use a trade mark. In my view the above case has no application as the cases of trade marks stand on different footings. Secondly in the said case it was held that the defendant was not using his label in respect of which concurrent user was claimed but was using the plaintiff's label. . (g) It was also urged by Sye Aft war Ali that the statement of the sale filed by the plaintiffs indicates that they had sold thermic jugs in question for over a crore of rupees during the period commencing from 24th June 1978 and expiring on 30th June 1979 and whereas the sale by the defendants in Suit No. 525/79 was about Rs. 30 lacs for a period of about 4 years. It was further urged that for the termic jugs of the similar nature the defendants' sale was about Rs. 5 lacs which was stated by the learned counsel for the defendants, Mr. Rahimtoola during the agruments. On the basis of the aforesaid sale figure it was urged that the plaintiffs have a very strong prints facie case. It may be observed here that the defendants in Suit No. 366/79 have not filed the sale figure as the above case was not fixed on the day when the direction in Suit No. 525/79 was given for filing of the sale figures. In my view, the amount of the same will not make a strong prima facie case for granting of an interlocutory injunction if the validity of the registration of the design is seribusly in issue in a competent legal pro ceedings. It is an admitted position that the defendants in Suits Nos. 366/ 79 and 525/79 and according to the plaintiffs, defendants in Suit No. 367/ 79 (whereas according to the said defendants in the said suit Messrs Shahi Enterprises) have been manufacturing thermic jugs for-a number of years. (7) It may be pertinent to mention that defendants in Suit No. 366/ 79 have obtained registration of the design of the faucet which, accor ding to the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, is identical with that of the plaintiffs. It was first urged by Syed Anwar Ali that the above registration is invalid as the same has been obtained by misrepresentation/ fraud but when the learned counsel's attention was drawn to the fact that according to him this Court cannot examine the question of the validity of the registration of the design, his submission was that the defendants in the aforesaid suit were entitled to use the same faucet as has been used by the plaintiffs but they were not entitled to copy the design of the body of termic jugs as there was no registration in favour of the defendants in respect thereof. The fact that the same Controller of Patents and Designs (Mr. Bhatti) issued a registration of the design certificate in respect of the faucet in question in favour of the defendants speaks for itself. (8) During the arguments it transpired that Messrs Shahi Enterprises are using a label with the mark Starvac Product on their thermic jugs and the said mark is also written on the hard board packing. The above name is of the defendants in Suit No The defendants in the aforesaid suit instead of taking the only plea that they are not manufactur ing/marketing by thermic jugs, have pleaded the case in identical terms which has been pleaded by Mrs. Yasmin Salim proprietor of Shahi Enterprises in J. M. No. 22/79 filed by her for cancellation of the plaintiffs' registration. Mr. Kazi, learned counsel for the aforesaid defendants has urged' that the plaintiffs' application (C. M. A. 1985/79) for impleading M/s. Shabi Enterprises is not competent as the plaintiffs will have distinct cause of action against the aforesaid firm. As pointed out hereinabove that the aforesaid firm is using the aforesaid defendants' name on their product and as the said defendants have pleaded the aforesaid firm's case, indicate that prima facie it appears that there is some link between the said firm and the defendants'. Without going into the question as to whether Shahi Enterprises is a subsidiary or sister concern of the defendants in the aforesaid suit, I am inclined to take the view that M/s. Shahi in any case is a proper party to above suit No. 367/79. 1 accordingly allow plaintiffs' application C. M. A. 1985/79 and order that the aforesaid firm be impleaded as defendant No.

2. The plaintiffs may file an amended plaint within two weeks. (9) In view of my above discussion I am of the view that the plaintiffs' interest will be sufficiently safeguarded if the defendants in Suits Nos. 366/79 and 525/79 are put to some terms. I accordingly order that the ad interim injunction shall stand discharged upon the defendants in the aforesaid two suits furnishing security of the suit amount, namely Rs. 50,000 in each of the above two suits to the satisfaction of the Nazir of this Court and upon furnishing statement of the present stocks of the disputed thermic jugs. The defendants shall also file regularly the statement of their monthly production and sale of the disputed items by 15th of the following month till the disposal of the Suits. The plaintiffs shall be furnished copies of the above statements by the defendants. As regards Suit No. 367/79 it may be observed that in view of the defendants' statement in their counter affidavit and by their learned counsel, Mr. Iqbal Kazi's at the Bar that the defendants are not manufacturing and are not marketing any Thermic Jugs and that they have no intention to so, I have not put them to any terms. The ad interim injunction against the defendants in the aforesaid suit is hereby discharged on the basis of the above undertaking. However, it will be open to the plaintiffs to file appropriate application in the above suit against M/s 5Wh: Enterprises, who have been impleaded as a party to the suit. The above three suits and J. Misc. Applications Nos. 8/79, 9/79, 22/79 and 31/79 shall be fixed for regular hearing within 6 months from the date of this order after completing preliminaries. The applications mentioned in para. 1 (a) stand disposed of in the above terms. S. Q Order accordingly.