P L D 1961 Dacca 289 (PLP)

MURSHED, J.‑These three Writ Petitions are by three different Oil Companies engaged in the importation, storage and distribu tion of oil and petroleum products by sea‑going vessels into East Pakistan through the Port of Chittagong. They all raise common points for decision and are directed against the realisation of certain river dues by the Trustees of the Port of Chittagong. They were all heard together by us, on the application of the parties concerned, and this judgment will dis pose of all the three applications. It is averred that oil and other goods are landed at Chittagong Port from ocean‑going tankers and stored for a short period in special storage tanks and then shipped from Chittagong to various places for distribution inland. It is further alleged that all the vessels used for shipment of oil inland, are either "dumb crafts" or barges which are not mechanically propelled and which have no power of their own and, furthermore, that oil and. petrole um products are taken to various points of delivery for distribution in East Pakistan, including Khulna, Jhalakati and Chandpur. It is claimed that "dumb crafts" used for this purpose have not been classified as sea‑going vessels for, the purpose of paying port dues under The Ports Act of 1908, inasmuch as they have no independent means of propulsion. The petitioners have further claimed that the aforesaid types of vessels are not sea‑going vessels and consequently no river dues can be legally levied in respect of any goods shipped into such vessels. Again it has been alleged that within a period of six months after having been landed, the said oil is shipped into the interior of East Pakistan to various destinations. It appears that for a number of years, there have been some controversies between the said oil companies and the Trustees of the Port of Chittagong as to whether the said trustees can levy, charge and realise from the above‑named companies river dues for landing and shipment of oil and other commodities more 'than once in six months. There have been some other contro versies which we shall discuss hereafter. The said companies (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners take their stand on a notification issued in the year 1903 by the Government of Bengal, being Notification No. 118‑Marine, dated the 25th of September 1903, published in the Bengal Gazette and reproduced in the current edition of the Chittagong Port Manual. The said notification, which has been appended as Annexure ` A ' to the petitions before us, reads as follows "Notification No. 118‑Marine, dated the 25th September 1903.‑It is hereby notified for general information that, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 44 of the Chittagong Port Commissioners' Act, 1887, the Lieutenant- Governor has been pleased to exempt such goods from the payment of the river‑due leviable on goods shipped into a sea going vessel under section 33‑A of that Act, as amended by Act IV of 1903, as have paid the river‑due when landed at that Port from a sea‑going vessel, if the same goods are again shipped into a sea‑going vessel within a period of six months from the date of payment of the due on being landed. W. A. Inglis, Offg. Secretary to the Government Of Bengal." By an Act of 1887, known as the Chittagong Port Com missioners' Act, 1887, the Port Commissioners of the Chittagong Port were authorised to frame a scale of toils, dues, rates and charges for the landing and shipment of goods from and in sea‑going vessels and vessels not being sea‑going vessels, respectively, at the wharves, quays, stages, jetties and piers by such vessels, and for the storing and keeping of any goods stored in any premises belonging to the Commissioners, for the removal of goods, and for the use of any moorings. Section 44 of the aforesaid enactment makes the following provisions : "All acts and proceedings of the Commissioners shall be subject to the approval of the Local Government who may cancel, suspend or modify any acts or proceedings and may grant exemption from the payment of any tolls, charges, dues or rates leviable under this Act." The Act of 1887, was amended and modified by Act IV of 1903. At the moment we are not concerned with the amending Act, as it did not modify the powers conferred on the Local Govern ment mentioned above. The above notification of 1903, grants exemption for goods landed in Chittagong Port as have paid river dues at the time of their landing from being charged again on account of river dues if the same goods are shipped again within a period of six months from date of the first payment of river dues on the landing of the goods at the said Port. It is, however, admitted that such dues can be charged again on their shipment after a period of six months from the first payment at the time of landing therein. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that charging river dues twice or more often within a period of six months would be illegal according to the exemption validly granted by the said notification of 1903. It seems that this position was never challenged by the Port Authorities until, at least: 1955. In the year 1956 a notification dated the 14th of April 1956, was issued and it was published as an advertisement in Part VII of the Gazette of Pakistan, dated the 27th of April 1957, stating that the aforesaid Notification No. 118‑Marine, dated the 25th of September 1903, was abrogated by the operation of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914, which repealed the Act of 1887 as well as the amending Acts of 1903 and 1912. It may be mentioned here that the Act of 1887 as well as the amending Acts of 1903 and 1912, were repealed by the Act of 1914 which re‑enacted most of the provisions of the older Acts with the addition of some other new matters. At the present moment the relevant Act is the Chittagong Port Act, 1914, which has consolidated and amended the law relating to the Port of Chittagong and has repealed all provisions of enactments with regard to the said Port. The petitioners have challenged the said notification of the 14th April 1956, as being bad in law and have asked for a writ of mandamus directing /the respondents to cancel, alter and/or rescind the same. In the year 1955 respondents published a notification, dated the 31st of March 1955, in the Gazette of Pakistan, Part VII, on the 22nd of April 1955. This is marked as Annexure `B' to the petition and it reads as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (4) of section 58 of the Chittagong Port Act, 19:4, (Bengal Act V of 1914) as amended up‑to‑date and in partial modification of notification, dated the 19th March 1951, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Part III, dated the 6th April 1951, the Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong with the previous approval of the Central Government propose under subsection (3) of the said section 58, to levy, as a special case, river‑dues on the consignments transported by inland sea‑going vessels at Rs. 1‑2‑0 per half a ton or part thereof with effect from the Ist of May 1955. M. A. Bary, Chairman, Port Commissioners." The petitioners have also challenged the legality of this notification dated the 31st of March 1955, and have asked for its cancellation on the following grounds, namely, because (a) it does not comply with the mandatory provisions of section 58 (4) of the said Act, (b) under section 58 of the said Act there is no category provided for imposition of river dues on goods landed from or shipped into "inland and sea‑going vessels" and (c) it is ultra vires the powers of the respondents under section 58 of the said Act as modified by the notification dated the 25th of September 1903. The petitioners have also challenged the validity of another notification, dated the 10th of September 1955, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Part VII, dated the 30th of September 1955, which reads as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred under subsection (3) of section 58 of the Chittagong 'Port Act, 1914 (Bengal Act V of 1914), as modified up to December 1950, the Commissioners notification, dated 31st"March 1955, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Karachi, Friday, April 22, 1955, Part VII, under which river dues were revised on the consignments transported by inland sea‑going vessels, as a special case; from Rs. 2‑4‑0 per ton or part thereof to Rs. 1‑2‑0 per half a ton or part thereof with effect from Ist May 1955, is confirmed with retrospec tive, effect. M. A. Bary, Chairman, Port Commissioners, Chittagong." The petitioners have added that the aforesaid notification, dated the 10th of September 1955, is also bad because it purports to give retrospective effect to its provisions. By a letter, dated the 17th of May 1960, the respondents, Trustees of the Port of Chittagong, demanded of, the petitioners the payment of river dues which, according to the respondents, were long overdue. The said letter is marked as Annexure 'E' and it reads as follows : "The Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong No. CA‑XXI (39)/5079. "From M. A. Bary, B.Sc. B.E., M.I.E. Chairman of the Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong." "Dated, Chittagong the 17th May 1960. Subject ‑‑(I) Landing and Shipping Charges on petroleum products. (2) River dues on shipment of oil. "Dear Sirs, In continuation of this office letter No. C.A.‑XXI,(39)/958, dated 25th June 1958, I have to state that your views were examined in detail by the Commissioners and the Ministry. It was held that the mention of a wrong subsection did not invalidate the Commissioners' Notification dated 14th March 1955, as this could be regularised by a corrigendum indicating the correct subsection of section 57 of the Chittagong Port Act. It was further held that your point of reference to Article 106 of The Pakistan Constitution, in support of your stand point, was not maintainable so that it would not in any way effect (sic) the Commissioners' levy. "A corrigendum having since been gazetted on llth March 1960, as per notification in the Gazette of Pakistan, Karachi, Part VII (a copy of the Notification is enclosed herewith), and the Government of Pakistan, Department of In dustries, having regularly paid 'these charges on the coal handled at the Moorings, the failure of the oil companies in not paying the landing and shipping charges on petroleum products as also the River Dues on shipments of oil would constitute a violation of the provisions, of the Chittagong. Port Act. "In the circumstances I would call upon you to pray immediately the above charges of the Commissioners with effect from 1'stApril 1955, as it will not be possible for the Commissioners to tolerate such evasion of payment of their dues' any longer. I would request you, therefore, to submit your Bills of Entry and Shipping Bills covering the handlings at the moorings together with three copies of challans covering each of the landing and shipping as the case may be. "Yours faithfully, (Sd.) M. A.. Bary, Chairman. "Memo. No. CA‑XXI (39)/5080 dated 17‑5‑60." The petitioners have also asked for the cancellation, withdrawal or rescission of the said letter of demand. In pursuance of the aforesaid letter of demand, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 61 of 1960, namely Standard Vacuum Oil Co. have paid a sum of Rs, 3,512 under protest to the respondents on the 25th of June 1960 ; the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 62 of 1960, namely, Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of Pakistan Limited, have paid a sum of Rs. 1,13,553 and the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 63 of 1960, namely Burmah Oil Co. (Pakistan Trading) Limited, have paid a sum of Rs. 17,

000. It would be apparent that all the petitioners have paid the amount of money demanded of them, although under protest. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Notification No. 118‑Marine, dated the 25th of September 1903, granting exemption from river dues on re-shipment of goods within six months from the date for payment of such dues upon the landing of the said goods, is still in operation. It was argued that on a repeal and re‑enactment of the provisions of the statute, orders passed under the repealed statute continued to remain in force until specifically rescinded or modified in a valid manner. Relying on clause 24 of the General Clauses Act and section 112 of the Act of 1914, it was submitted before us that the said noti fication No. 118‑Marine, dated the 25th of September 1903, con tinued to remain in force inasmuch as it was not specifically cancelled by the Central Government which alone could legally rescind the said notification. It was further argued that it was not correct to say that with the repeal of the Act of 1887 by the Act of 1914 all orders passed under the repealed Act of 1887 were abrogated. It, was next contended that under section 58 of the Act of 1914 there could be no imposition of river dues on goods landed from of shipped into "inland sea‑going vessels" as the said section refers to "sea‑going vessels" and that there was no category of "inland 'sea‑going vessels". The point in this contention is, that inasmuch as the notification, dated the 10th of September 1955, published in the Gazette of Pakistan on the 30th of September 1955, purported to levy river dues as proposed in the notification dated the 31st or March 1955, on consignments transported by so‑called "inland" sea‑going vessels, the said notification is illegal and also bad, in so far as it purports to give retrospective effect to its provisions. It was further contended that part of the oil shipment, in respect of which the respondents are demanding payment of river dues under section 58 of the said Act, consists of "bunker oil", which is supplied by the petitioners to various types of ocean going vessels. According to the petitioners, "bunker oil" supplied in thin way is used by those vessels solely as fuel for the ship's engines and is, therefore, in the nature of stores and cannot be considered to be cargo, merchandise or goods within the meaning of section 58 read with section 4 (4) of the said Act. On the aforesaid allegations, each of the petitioners obtained a rule from this Court in the following terms : "Let a Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus or an appropriate writ should not be issued directing them to implement the Notification No. 118‑Marine, dated 25‑9‑1903; to cancel, with draw or rescind the Notification dated 109‑1955 published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Part VII on 30‑9‑19,55 and Notification dated 14‑4‑1956 published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Part VII on 27‑4-1956, respectively, and also directing the respondents to cancel and withdraw their letter dated 17‑5‑1960, as prayed for, or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. "Pending the hearing of this Rule, let the respondents be restrained by an injunction from giving effect to the Notification dated 10‑9‑55, and 14‑4‑56 or making any realisation pursuant to the said Notifications, in any manner whatsoever, as prayed for." The respondents have traversed the allegations of the petitioners and have contended, inter alia, in their affidavit‑in‑opposition as follows "

10. That the statements made in paragraph 10 are denied. It is not correct to say that invariably and in all cases the oil is shipped within a period of six months after having been landed. "

14. That the statement made in paragraph 14 is incorrect misleading and misconceived inasmuch as the Notification dated 31‑3‑1955 is not an independent or isolated Notification nor is the same designed to impose any new levy at the rate of Rs. 1‑2‑0 per half a ton as sought to be made out by the petitioner. The correct position is that the river dues in question have all along been in force at different rates since 1887. The Noti fication No. 118‑Marine dated 25‑9‑1903 issued under the existing Acts did not abrogate or withdraw the river dues but only allowed exemption from the payment of a second levy in case the imported goods are re‑shipped within 6 months. But the said Notification became null and void by reason of Schedule 2 of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914 and a specific Notification dated 29th March 1921, was issued under the said Act imposing the river dues. A true copy of the said notice is annexed hereto and marked B'. "

19. That with reference to the statement made in para graph 19 the deponent states that the said statements are mis leading inasmuch as the notice dated 17‑5‑60 has nothing to do with the Notification dated 10‑9‑55 or with the Notification dated 14‑4‑56 and the reference to Notification dated 25‑9‑1903 is uncalled for. The Oil Companies, including the petitioner hav ing persistently failed to make payment of certain legal and legitimate dues to the Port Commissioners in spite of repeated demands, the respondents had to write a strong letter on 11‑3‑59 and on 17th of May 1960. The letter dated 17th of May 1960 was the latest demand made on the Oil Companies for payment of the river dues along with Chittagong Port Act. "

23. That with reference to the statement made in paragraphs Nos. 23 and 24, the deponent states, that even bunker oil which is reshipped after being brought to Chittagong Port is subject to levies of river‑dues within the meaning of section 58 of the Chittagong Port Act. In fact, it is being realised from all parties from time immemorial and no party has ever raised any objection. In this connection Notification dated 29th of March 1921 and marked as annexure B' maybe referred to. It is denied that the bunker oil is in the nature of stores and cannot be considered to be cargo, merchandise or goods within the meaning of section 58 read with section 4 (4) of the said Act. The aforesaid Notification marked `B' is a clear answer to the contention raised. The deponent submits that the bunker oil is certainly "goods" within the meaning of section 58 (1) of the Port Act ; irrespective of whether the oil is consumed by the petitioner or sold to other vessels. "

24. That with reference to the statements made in para graph 25, the deponent begs to state that the petitioner is bound under the law to make the payment they have made and as such there is absolutely no question of any force having been applied to them by the respondents and save and except the Oil Companies including the petitioner, no other party has ever raised any objection to the payment of the river dues in question. "

25. That the various points of legal objections raised in various sub‑paragraphs of paragraph 26 are misconceived and incorrect as shown against the respective sub‑paragraphs as hereunder :‑ "(a) It is immaterial as to whether the "dumb crafts" are sea‑going vessels or not, inasmuch as the fact remains that they are towed by sea‑going vessels of which they are a part. As a matter of fact these crafts had already been classified as sea going vessels by the Central Government vide annexure `A (1) and A (2)'. "(b) The objection raised in this sub‑paragraph is wholly misconceived inasmuch as under Notifications dated 31‑3‑55 and 10‑9‑55 the petitioner has only been allowed certain relief by way of reduction in the rate of river dues in respect of their vessels plying on inland waters. The petitioner has certainly the option to pay at higher rate if it so likes. "(d) The contentions raised in sub‑paragraph (d) are denied. The deponent states that the petitioner has misconceived the word `inland' which has been used to specify the vessels operating within East Pakistan and these types of vessels were specified riot for the purpose of imposition of any new levies but for the purpose oft allowing. a concession in the form of reduced .rate. It is denied that the imposition of river dues is completely without juris diction and unlawful. It may be mentioned in this connection that the river dues are not like customs duty or cess or sales tax, etc, It is a charge for the use of the harbour of the Port which is to be maintained by elaborate river training works at very high costs. This is a special feature of the Port of Chittagong being located on a river. So a sea‑going vessel carrying cargo is charged every time it uses the harbour of the Port, the basis of charges being the quantity of goods carried. "(e) The contention raised in sub‑paragraph (e) is incorrect inasmuch as the respondent never claimed that Notifications dated 31‑3‑55 and 10‑9‑55 were designed to confer authority on the respondents to charge river‑dues. The deponent submits that the authority to charge the river‑dues has been conferred on the respondents by section 58 of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914 and the Notifications dated 31‑3‑55 and 10‑9‑55 were actually issued under subsection (3) of section 58 of the Chittagong Port Act to reduce the rate imposed in respect of certain classes of sea‑going vessels, namely, vessels operating on inland water within the Province of East Pakistan. The deponent reiterates that Notification dated 25‑9‑1903 lapsed immediately after passing of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914. "(f) The contention raised in sub‑paragraph (f) is mis conceived inasmuch as the bunker oil certainly becomes subject to the payment of river dues if the same are "landed from or shipped into any sea‑going vessels lying or being within the limits of the Port." It appears that the impugned letter, dated the 17th of May 1960, was the latest demand made on the oil companies for payment of river dues along with some other charges levied under section 57 of the Chittagong Port Act, 1914. We have already set out the letter itself, which is marked as Annexure `E' to the respective petitions. The letter specifically mentions that the demand is made in respect of, (I) landing and shipping charges on petroleum pro ducts and (2) river dues on shipment of oil. The letter is concluded by a demand in the following term : " . . . . I would call upon you to pay immediately the above charges of the Commissioners with effect from the 1st April 1955, as it will not be possible for the Commissioners to tolerate such evasion of payment of their dues any longer. I would request you, therefore to submit your Bills of Entry and Shipping Bills covering the handlings at the Moorings together with three copies of challans covering each of the landing and shipping as the case maybe," The main grievance is, that river dues cannot be charged on shipment of goods as such at the Chittagong Port, if such dues have been paid on their landing within six months of such shipment, in consequence of the exemption granted under the Notification of 1903, which, according to the petitioners, is still in force, and, according to the respondents, is wiped out by the operation of the Act of 1914. In our opinion, the petitioners are not entitled to a mere opinion by us that the view taken by the Ministry of Law and published by the respondents, is bad in law, inasmuch as the petitioners could not show us in what particular manner they have suffered a specific injury or an immediate threat of an imminent injury because of the alleged mistaken view of the law taken by the respondents. The petitioners have not been able to point out any single specific instance where the respondents have attempted to realise or have, in fact, realised river dues from the petitioners twice in the course of six months. There is nothing to indicate in the impugned letter of demand, dated the 17th of May 1960, that the petitioners have been required to pay river dues twice within six months. The petitioners have also contented them selves by merely stating that each one of them has paid a certain amount of money in pursuance of the demand made by the respon dents. They have n9t shown whether the whole or any part thereof has been paid as double levy within six months. Indeed, they have not shown whether they have been asked to pay and have in fact, paid any amount as double dues. It is conceded that the respondents are entitled to charge river dues again after the expiry of six months from the date when such payments were made, but not before the lapse of six months, as indicated above. Nowhere in the petitions or affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners there is any mention of the date of the first payment of river dues on the landing of goods and the date of the shipment of such goods again. We repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the petitioners to point out one single instance where double levy of river dues within six months had been demanded and paid. We were even prepared to allow the petitioners to amend their petitions or to furnish fresh affidavits to show that, in violation of the aforesaid notification of 1903, any demand had‑ been made by the respon dents or paid by the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated in Court that the petitioners did not consider it necessary either to amend their petitions or to furnish any further affidavits in respect thereof. Without making out any case of a specific injury or imminent and immediate threat of such injury, `we have been invited to state the general law on the subject and to direct the respondents to act according to law and, more particularly, according to what has been described before us as "the spirit and intendment" of the Notification of 1903 and to cancel the notification wherein an opinion has been expressed to the effect that the Act of 1914 has abrogated the notification of 1903 which is the Magna Carta of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners has asked us to protect them from a possible and probable injury likely to be caused to the petitioners in future, because of the opinion expressed in the impugned notification, which according to the petitioners, is bad in law. In support of such a course, which we have been asked to take, Mr. Fazlur Rahman relied on three decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the following cases, namely, the cases of The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) S. A. Haroon v. Collector of Customs, Karachi (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 177) Madhabji Dharasibhai v. Karachi Panjrapore Association (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 83). We fail to see how the aforesaid decisions support the above arguments, because all the aforesaid cases are based upon specific injury to the petitioners. There is no authority for the proposition that the petitioners are entitled to a mere opinion from Court or for directions on matters of law without making out a case of specific or imminent injury to them. Apart from the enforcement of a legal duty imposed upon the respondents, the foundation for the issue of writ of mandamus or orders, as prayed for by the petitioners, is the right of the petitioner, which is alleged to have been violated and which is sought to be enforced. In the total absence of such a foundation, the petition for the issue of a writ would be incompetent. Unless an aggrieved person makes out a specific case of an infringement of his legal right, he cannot maintain a writ petition with a view to obtain the reliefs asked for by the petitioners. There must be an actual infringement of right or an immediate threat of such infringement, to enable this Court to acquire jurisdiction to deal with the situation. The petitioners are not entitled to ask for a mere opinion of this Court on general proposition of law or for the issue of writs or orders to prevent a possible invasion of their rights in future. We do not, therefore, propose to give any opinion as to whether the Notification No. 118‑Marina of 1903 is still in force or whether the contrary opinion to the effect that it has been B abrogated by the operation of the Act of 1914, is bad in law. It is also apparent that the impugned notification dated the 14th of April 1956 and published in the Gazette of Pakistan dated the 27th of April 1957, is nothing but an expression of opinion on a point of law. By mere expression of such an opinion it cannot be deemed that the respondents have encroached upon the rights of anybody. With regard to the notifications dated the 31st of March 1955 and the 10th of September 1955, the petitioners have them selves stated as follows : "18. "That notwithstanding the publication of the said Notification dated 31‑3‑1955 and 10‑9‑1955, the respondents did not enforce realisation of river dues and the petitioner has come to know that the respondents actually passed a resolution on 30‑3‑1959 agreeing to the exemption of the double river dues levy for the outward and inward movements of the same consignment for all cargoes, to be effective on the sanction of the Central Government. "

19. That demand was illegally made by the respondents under their notice dated 17‑5‑1960 to collect the river dues, which they allege, became payable according to the Notification dated 14‑4‑1956 without any reference to the Notification dated 25‑9‑1903. The respondents, by their aforesaid notice, have stated that non‑payment of the river dues constitutes violation of the said Act and have demanded payment of the double river dues from 1‑4‑1955 and further intimated that the Commis sioners would not tolerate evasion of payment of their dues any longer." The reply to this is stated in paragraph 19 of the affidavit‑in- opposition which has been already set out above. As we have seen above, the letter of demand dated the 17th of May 1960, Annexure B' to the respective petitions, fully substantiates the averments made on behalf of the respondent in paragraph 19 of the affidavit in opposition as already quoted. We have no hesitation in accepting the statements, made on behalf of the respondents in the said paragraph 19 of the affidavit- in‑opposition. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to ask for any of the reliefs prayed for by them. There is per se no illegality in the letter of demand, dated the 17th of May 1960 and nothing has been shown to us as to how the money paid by the petitioners or any part thereof was an illegal exaction. The petitioners have merely raised in their petitions many matters of controversies between the petitioners and the respon dents. Whether the views of the petitioners or those of the respondents are correct or incorrect, the fact that stares us in the face, is, that the petitioners have not been able to point out any illegal demand or any payment in pursuance of such illegal demand. The letter of the 17th of May 1960, is by no manner or means, of itself illegal. The letter of demand does not mention any double levy of river dues within six months; it does not mention realisation of such dues in respect of "banker oil" it also does nut speak of "inland" sea going vessels. On the contrary, it has specifically mentioned that the demand is in respect of‑(1) landing and shipping charges on petroleum products and (2) river dues on shipment of oil. The respondents in their affidavits‑in‑opposition have further averred that the said letter of demand has nothing to do with the notifications sought to be impeached before us. The petitioners have made no attempt to show how and when an attempt was made to demand illegal exactions from the petitioners. Mr. Fazlur Rahman has asked us to state the correct law on the controversies between the parties and to direct the respondents to act according to law without showing any injury suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners cannot expect this Court to give a mere opinion in respect of the construction and legality of various statutes and notifications relating to the Port of Chittagong without making any specific case of an illegal exaction or attempted exaction by the respondents. Mr. Suhrawardy, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has argued that the petitioners are not entitled to ask this Court' for the issue of the writs prayed for inasmuch as they are guilty of undue delay and laches in making these applications. It will be seen that the aforesaid notifications have been made in the year 1955 or 1956, and it is obvious from the records, which we have been shown in respect of these applications, that there have been several demands by the respondents upon the petitioners for a number of years. The petitioners waited for a long period to come to this Court for the issue of writs and, as we have seen above, even now they have not made out a case of any specific injury to them. Mr. Fazlur Rahm an has contended that if the impugned notifications are illegal they constitute a continuous threat to the petitioners and, therefore, the petitioners can maintain their applications for the issue of writs even after a lapse of several years. The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact that it treats this aspect of the case purely from the point of view of the law of limitation. There is no law of limitation, as such, with regard to writ petitions. But, it is well‑settled the this Court will refuse to exercise its discretion to issue writs of mandamus or orders of alike nature, if the petitioners do not come to Court with due diligence and expedition. The petitioners are not entitled to a speedy and summary relief, if they are themselves guilty of undue delay and laches in seeking it. They would then be left to pursue other remedies in accordance, with law. The reason for this is obvious, namely, that those who wish to seek a speedy and summary relief, must show and anxiety to seek it with deligence and promptness." We, therefore, hold that these petitions should be rejected on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. There is another ground as to why these petitioners should be rejected. It is obvious that there have been a number of controversies between the petitioners and the respondents spread over a period of a few years. The petitioners have, in fact, tried to obtain a declaration of law which they could ask for, in a properly constituted declaratory suit. Moreover, the petitioners have already paid various sums of money to the respondents in pursuance of the letter of demand dated the 17th of May 1960. The petitioners cannot and have not asked for any refund of any part of the said sums of money as being illegal exaction. Accounts have to be taken to find out whether any part of the money paid by the petitioners c institutes an illegal exaction. It is, therefore, obvious that even if the petitioners would have succeeded before us, they could not have got complete relief from us. In an appropriate suit, if the petitioners would have succeeded, they would have got a complete redress of all the grievances which they could establish in the said suit. It is, therefore, patent that in these circumstances a suit would have been a more convenient and beneficial remedy which would have resolved all the disputes that exist between the parties, and that the issue of writs by this Court could not have given a complete relief to tire petitioners It is also a well‑settled principle that if there is an alternative remedy which is more convenient and beneficial and which will give a more complete relief to the petitioners a discretionery writ of mandamus will be refused and the petitioners would be left to pursue the alternative remedy in such circumstances: On this ground also the petitioners are not entitled to ask for the issue of discretionary writs like that of a writ of mandamus or orders of the like nature. For the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are rejected and the Rules are discharged with costs which we assess at ten gold mohurs in each of the three writ petitions. SIDDIKY, J.‑I agree. A. H. Rules discharged.