P L D 1955 Lahore 215 (PLP)

ABDUL AZIZ KHAN, J.‑--This is a petition by one Lal Khan under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the nature. of writ of habeas corpus from detention under an order purporting to be made under section 3 (1) and (4) of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944. The detenu was arrested on the 23rd of July 1954 and detained for fifteen days from that date under section 3 (2) of the Pakistan Public Safety Act. An order for his detention under section 3 subsections (1) and (4) of the Detention and Prevention Ordinance was made by the Provincial Government on the 6th August, 1954. The ground on which the detenu asks for an order under section 491 is that the order has been made with an ulterior motive and is, therefore, mala fide. The learned Advocate‑General who opposed the applica tion on behalf of the Government relied on section 10 of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No. III of 1944) for the proposition that the High Court is precluded from calling in question the orders of detention made in pursuance of that Ordinance and is not competent to make any order under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 10 (1) of the Ordinance provides :‑ "No order made under this Ordinance, and no order having effect by virtue of section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance, shall be called in question in any Court, and no Court shall have power to make any order under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, : 1898 (V of 1898) in respect of any order made under or having effect under this Ordinance, or in respect of any person the subject of such an order." I drew the attention of the learned Advocate‑General and the learned counsel for the detenu to the provisions of section 223‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935, as inserted by the Government of India (Amendment) Act 195,4 which reads :‑ "Every High Court shall have power throughout terri tories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government within those territories writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them." This new provision in the Constitution Act has apparently given every High Court the power throughput its terri tories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government within their territories writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. I desired both the parties to address me on the point whether section 223‑A had not materially affected the existing provisions of all laws on the subject which purported to limit that power. The learned Advocate‑General contended that Ordi nance III of 1944 was a special law, which the "general law" (as he called it) contained in the new section 223A of the Government of India Act could not, in any way, alter or abrogate. In support of his contention he relied on the principle enunciated in the well‑known maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" and drew my attention to the following passage on page 183 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes" :‑ "It is but a particular application of the general pre sumption against an intention to alter the law beyond the immediate scope of the statute to say that a general Act is to be construed as not repealing a particular one, that is, one directed towards a special object or a special class of objects. A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special .one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, "where general words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible applica tion without extending them to objects specially dealt with by earlier legislation that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so This argument, with all respect to the learned Advocate -General, is devoid of all force. Section 223‑A is a part of the present Constitution of our State and the view that any provision of a special or general law of the land which runs contrary to the provision of the Constitution is that extent ultra vires needs no elaboration. Attention may be drawn to the following observation of Harris C. J., in Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal (A I R 1952 Cal. 152 (F. B.)) "When an Act gives powers which may and can offend against a provision or provisions of the Constitution such an Act is ultra vires though it could be administered so as not to offend against the Constitution." The inconsistency between section 10 of the Ordinance III of 1944 and section 223‑A of the Government of India Act is admittedly glaring. Whereas section 10 of the Ordinance provides that no Court (including a High Court) shall have power to make any order under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of any order made under or having effect under the Ordinance, section 223‑A of the Government of India Act clearly confers upon every High Court the power to issue to any person or authority writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus etc. In other words the former section denies all Courts, including a High Court, the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus in respect of matters falling under the Ordinance while the latter confers on High Courts unlimited power to issue what have been called the High prerogative writs in all matters where the exercise of that power is called for. The two are, therefore, unquestion ably inconsistent in so far as the powers of a High Court are concerned. I have no doubt in my mind that where, as in the present instance, the new law is wholly inconsistent with or repugnant to the existing law, the inconsistency or repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing law especially where the new law is a part of the Constitution Act. Crawford in his book entitled "Interpretation of Laws" (1940 Edition) summarizes the position thus on page 196 :‑ "Repeals of this type (Implied Repeals) are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no provision expressly repealing them Such repeals have been, divided into two general classes; those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force, and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefore . As has been suggested, a repeal takes place under these circumstances, even though the new act contains no repealing clause, and in face of the fact that there may be a constitutional provision prohibiting the repeal of any law simply by reference to its title or section number. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the last expression of the legislative will should prevail. Technically, there is perhaps a violation of the constitutional provision but from a practical stand point the circumvention can be easily justified." Maxwell in his standard work on the Interpretation of Statutes (1946 Edition, page 163) has expressed the same view in the following terms :‑ "An author must be supposed to be consistent with him self, and, therefore, if in one place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place unless it clearly appears that he has changed it. In this respect, the work of the Legis lature is treated in the same manner as that of any other author, and the language of every enactment ‑ must be con strued as far as possible in accordance with the terms of every other statute which it does not in express terms modify or repeal. The law, therefore, will not allow the re vocation or alteration of a statute by construction when the words may be capable of proper operation without it cannot be assumed that Parliament has given with one hand what it has taken away with another. But it is impossible to construe absolute contradictions. Consequently, if the pro visions of a later Act are so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, those of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together, the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the later." The principle laid down by Harries, C. J., in A I R 1952 Cal. 150, to which I have already referred, is, however, more per tinent inasmuch as here we are concerned in resolving an inconsistency between the special law (section 10 of the ordinance), the general law (section 491 L3) Cr. P. C.) on the one hand and a provision in the Constitution Ac (section 223‑A). The latter in my opinion must prevail. I am, therefore, of the opinion that since the enforcement of section 223‑A of the Government of India Act, section 10 of the Ordinance III of 1944, in so far as it purports to restrict the power of a High Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus is ultra vires and, therefore, invalid and inoperative. The mere fact that section 10 of the Ordinance was placed on the Statute Book before the enactment of section 223‑A of the Constitution Act does not save the former section. This would apply equally to section 491 (3), Cr. P. C., and any other similar provisions. The view that I have expressed above is supported by certain High Courts in India. Article 226 of the Constitution of India is identical with section 223‑A of the Government of India Act. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution Act of India provides :‑ "Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power through the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Article 226 was considered by the Madras High Court In the matter of Venkateswarlu (A I R 1951 Mad. 269). It would be advantageous to reproduce the following passage from para. 3 of the aforesaid report. "Though the original application was made under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure we are invited to dispose of it under the powers conferred on this Court under Article 226, Constitution of India, as the latter provision has superseded all provisions of the Cr. P. C., which gave power and authority to the High Court to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus." The learned judge, as is clear from his order, actually dealt with the matter under Article 226, and it must be taken that he upheld the petitioners' contention that section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was superseded by Article 226!of the Constitution. I would have been disposed to decide the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate‑General on the lines indicated above but for section 223 of the Government of India Act. Section 223 reads :-- "Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act to the provisions of any order made under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges there of in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the establishment of the Federation." Has the power under section 223‑A to be exercised subject to section 223 of the Constitution Act or independently of it that is to say is the power conferred under section 223‑A to be exercised under the restrictions similar to those placed on the exercise pf power under section 223, i.e. "subject inter alia to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature" by the Government of India Act ? In my opinion, by its enactment the Constituent Assembly intended to confer new, wide and unfettered powers on the High Courts. The under lined words in the section are significant :‑ "Every High Court shall have power throughout ter ritories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government within those territories writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them. The section specifies the following :‑ (a) The forum, (b) The territorial jurisdiction, (c) Person or authority against whom writs may be directed, (d) Purpose for which the powers may be invoked, i.e., "appropriate cases." The High Courts have been given wide discretion so far as the purpose is concerned, (e) Nature‑this has been done by enumerating the five writs. The mention of some of the writs by name, preceded as their enumeration is by the word "including" deserves consideration. This seems to have been done to emphasize widely general character and quality of the writs that may be issued While inserting section 223‑A the Constituent Assembly has omitted a reference to section

223. This indicates an in tention of conferring powers independently of section

223. The object of enacting the new section (223‑A) is to make the position of the High Courts in Pakistan similar to that of the King's Bench in England. The Constituent Assembly has placed no restriction on the nature or form or orders or direc tions or writs that might be issued. The power given to the High Court is, therefore, a large one, but it must be exercised in accordance with well‑established principles. The decision of English and American Courts, subject to all necessary exceptions, will serve as a useful guide. With the decisions of this Court and of the other High Courts in due course of time, a standard is bound to be reached by reference to which the exercise of these powers will be regulated. I have indicated my mind regarding the extent of power conferred on this Court by section 223‑A. I must, however, confess that the point is not free from difficulty. It has arisen for the first time after the enactment of section 223‑A. In the interest of justice and for future guidance, it is desirable that there should be an authoritative decision on the point by a larger Bench. I, there fore, submit these papers to my Lord the Chief Justice for such orders as are necessary. JUDGMENT OF FULL BENCH S. A. RAHMAN, C. J.‑--Lal Khan was arrested on the 23rd of July, 1954, under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by order of Mr. Zulqarnain Khan. S. P., C. I. D. He was, directed to be detained for fifteen days pending disposal of a reference made to the Provincial Government by that officer, as required by the Act. On the 6th of, August, 1954, the Punjab Government passed an order under subsections (1) and (4) of section 3 of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance III of 1944 (referred to as the Ordinance hereinafter), authoris ing the detention of the petitioner for six months. This order was served on him on the 7th of August, 1954. Lal Khan challenged his detention by a petition purporting to be presented under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure read with section 223‑A of the Constitution Act. The petition came up for hearing before my brother, Abdul Aziz Khan. On behalf of the Provincial Government, the learned Advocate‑General raised the contention that section 10 of the Ordinance would preclude the High Court from going into the question whether the detention was proper or not. My brother, Abdul Aziz Khan, was inclined to the view that the limitation placed on the power of the High Court to call in question an order of detention passed under the Ordinance or to issue an order under section 491, Cr. P. C., in respect of such a detention was inconsistent with the provisions of the newly enacted section 223‑A of the Constitution Act and had been pro tanto abrogated. In view, however, of the importance of the question involved, he referred it for decision to a larger Bench. The same question arose in Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 671 to 675, 666, 695, 708 and 747 of 1954 and the referring order covers these petitions as well. The question has, therefore, been argued before this Full Bench. Section 10 of the Ordinance, so far as material, is in I the following terms: "No order made under this Ordinance, and no order having effect by virtue of section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance, shall be called in question in any Court, and no Court shall have power to make any order under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in respect of any order made under or having effect under this Ordinance, or in respect of any person the subject of such an order." The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan enacted section 223‑A of the Constitution Act in July 1954. It reads :‑ "Every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including, in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them." The question that calls for determination is whether this new enactment had done away with limitations contained in the existing law in respect of the power of the High Court to issue the writs mentioned in this enactment. The learned Advocate‑General has drawn our attention to the distinction made between "powers" and "jurisdiction" by Kaul, C. J., of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Anant Bhaskar Lagu v. State (A I R 1950 M. B. 60 (F B)). The learned Chief justice appar ently took the view that section 226 of the Indian Constitu tion, which corresponds to section 223‑A of our Constitution Act, confers upon High Courts in India certain powers which they may use for giving relief in exercise of their existing jurisdiction and that it was not intended to confer on them, any new jurisdiction. Another member of the Full Bench, Shinde, J., agreed with this view, but Mehta, J., was not persuaded that the view was correct. In a sub sequent Full Bench decision of the same Court reported as Daya‑bhai v. R. T. Authority (AIR1951M.B.121) Kaul, C. J., adhered to this view, but the other four learned Judges of that Bench differed from him on the point. It is interesting to note that even Shinde, J., who was a member of the subsequent Full Bench, seems to have changed his opinion in this respect. The learned Chief Justice further observed that his view had not found favour with most of the other Indian High Courts. With all deference for his opinion, it seems to me that the view cannot be sustained. The conferment of power in my humble judgment would imply jurisdiction for the exercise of that power. This is a well‑recognised principle which is embodied in section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. A consideration of the terms of section 223‑A of the Constitution Act, would make it clear that it F was intended to confer a very much larger, jurisdiction on the High Courts than they enjoyed under the previous law. At the time of the enactment of this section, under existing Pakistan Laws, every High Court had power, subject to certain limitations, to issue a writ or order in the nature of habeas corpus under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure ; in respect of criminal matters, powers in the nature of certiorari also vested in High Courts under section 435 of the Code and a corresponding power in civil matters was given by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The power of mandamus was only exercisable by the High Court of East Bengal under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The new enactment, however, expressly confers power on all High Courts to issue writs, inter alia, in the nature of mandamus. It is, therefore, plain that an interpre tation which confines the scope of this section to the exercise of the power conferred, within the limits of the existing juris diction of the High Courts, in untenable. The position taken up by the learned Advocate‑General is that section 223‑A of the Constitution Act should not be held to have repealed section 10 of the Ordinance by impli cation as the Ordinance is a special law covering 4 restricted field. He evidently relies on the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. No doubt the general principle is that the Courts should ordinarily lean against an implied repeal. In such cases, however, the question for determination is really as to the intention of the Legislature. The rule that earlier and Special Legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, G altered or derogated from, merely by force of general words in a subsequent enactment, is not an inflexible one and can be departed from if there are indications of an intention to the contrary. O course, there is no express repealing clause contained in the new enactment. Section 223‑A moreover is couched in affirmative terms. The question, however, is whether it can stand with the existing limitations contained in the Pakistan Laws in respect of powers of High Courts. If it cannot, then the cardinal principle of interpretation would come into play that the latest expression of the Legislature, will and ought to prevail. I have already referred to the position of a writ in the nature of mandamus above. In 'pre‑partition India, the Supreme Courts, and after they were abolished, the High Courts, had originally the power to issue writs of mandamus. This power was taken away by section 50 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which lays down as follows :‑ "Neither the High Court nor any judge thereof shall hereafter issue any writ of mandamus." Instead, by sections 45 and 47 of that Act the High Courts of judicature at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were empowered to issue a peremptory order to do or forbear a specific act. It is significant that the other High Courts besides the three Presidency High Courts, were not invested with any such power. The position, however, has radically changed by the placing of section 223‑A on the statute book. In this particular instance of mandamus, consequently, it is clear that there is such a repugnancy between the provisions of section 50 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and section 223‑A of the Constitution Act as to allow no escape from the conclusion that section 50 of the former Act stands repealed. The position with regard to the limitations placed on the exercise of power in respect of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus cannot, in my opinion, be very much different. Section 1 of the Ordinance is clearly inconsistent with the new power conferred on the High Court by section 223‑A of the Constitution Act and it must, therefore, yield supremacy to the new constitutional provisions. The contention of the learned Advocate‑General that the High Court would still have the power to issue the writ in the nature of habeas corpus but that as soon as it was revealed that the order of detention had been passed under section 3 of the Ordinance the Court would have to stay its hands except in cases where the order of detention was mala fide, would be calculated to make the provisions of section 223‑A ineffective. The Provincial Government could then acquire immunity for their orders by simply proceeding under the Ordinance instead of under the Punjab Public Safety Act. It is indeed curious that ink spite of the enactment of the Security of Pakistan Act, this Ordinance of 1944 has still been allowed to remain on the statute book. I am fortified in this conclusion by certain observations made by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court In the matter of Venkateswarlu (A I R 1951 Mad. 269). The learned Judges, while considering the provisions of Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, which corresponds to our section 223‑A, remarked that it had superseded all provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which gave power and authority to the High Court to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution no doubt seems to be worded in somewhat wider language than section 223-A of our Constitution Act, inasmuch as it uses the expression "directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of" whereas the words "directions and orders" do not occur in section 223‑A, but the question of the effect of the con stitutional provision is not affected by these omissions. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Prahlad Krishna Kurxe (A I R 1951 Born. 25) has expressed the opinion that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, including as it does the power to issue the common law writ of habeas corpus, may be outside section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, and may be wider than the power conferred under that section. The position is not dissimilar under on Constitution. It is well‑settled that an Act which contains a provision offending against a constitutional provision would be ultra vires. This is a general principle to which no exception is taken by the learned Advocate‑General. The position in this respect, under our present interim Constitution is somewhat peculiar, inasmuch as there is no specific procedure laid down for the amendment of the Constitution and even the Dominion Legislature, as contrasted with the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, can frame any law repealing or amending, inter alia the Constitution Act, by virtue of section 6 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. But even so, it .is clear that any inconsistent provision existing in any law in force at the time of the enactment of section 223‑A of the Constitution Act must give way to it if it cannot stand with it. It is significant that section 223 of the Constitution Act, which preserves the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice of the High Court to the extent that they were available immediately before the establishment of the Federation, was subject, inter alia, to an Act of the appropriate Legislature. But section 223‑A is untrammelled by any such limitation and D contains no words suggesting that the previously existing law would govern the power conferred by the new section. I am inclined to think that to the extent that the new provisions in the Constitution overlap existing remedies, those remedies and the new remedies may become cumulative, but where there is a conflict between section 223‑A and a provision in an existing law and the conflict cannot be reconciled, the doctrine of implied repeal will have to be necessarily invoked. I would, therefore, answer the point referred to the Full Bench by saying that the limiting provisions of section 10 of the Ordinance that existed at the time of the enactment of section 223‑A of the Constitution Act, in so far as they are repugnant to section 223‑A, stand abrogated and can no longer be given effect to. The cases covered by the order of reference should go back for disposal by the Single Judge, with this expression of opinion on the law point raised. KAYANI, J.‑I agree. The learned Advocate‑General mainly dwelt on two points : that the Ordinance of 1944 was special legislation which over‑rode the general law and that section 223 of the Government of India. Act made the powers of the High Court, including powers under section 223‑A, subject to the Acts of the appropriate legislature. As regards "special legislation", it is enacted to provide for a special set of circumstances and as an exception. When, however, the Ordinance was being enacted, there was present to the mind of the ‑. Governor‑General's advisers only section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and they suspended its operation in respect of orders made under the Ordinance. They did not suspend, and they could not suspend, such powers of the High Court as were then not in existence. It would have been preposterous for them to say that the Ordinance "hereby" over‑rode all powers that might thereafter be conferred upon the High Court by any legislature, including the sovereign legislature. The effect of general legislation following a special law should always be to over‑ride the latter unless it makes a provision to the contrary ; particularly in a case like this where the two provisions, placed side by side, make it sheer commonsense to regard the former as having been impliedly repealed. The provision in the Ordinance is to the effect that the High Court shall have no power to make an order under section 491 of the Code in the nature of habeas corpus, and section 223‑A enacts that the High Court shall have power to issue all sorts of writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus. It is very difficult to say that section 223‑A has shown any respect for the special disability imposed by the Ordinance ; more difficult to believe that a retrograde provision in that retrogressive form of law which is known as an Ordinance, enacted at a time when the somewhat unprogressive provisions of the Defence of India Act were intended to be preserved for an emergency left behind by conditions of war, was intended to remain whole in the face of a very unreserved power conferred upon the High Courts during the dawn of a new era and brought, not on the statute book alone, but, with a view to emphasizing its firm character, on the Constitution Act itself. In the face of these weighty considerations, I regard it a minor argument‑though an argument still‑that at the very best the Ordinance imposes a restriction on orders made under section 491 of the Code, and section 223‑A has no reference to the Code. I do not understand the wisdom of retraining the Ordinance in any form, since its provisions except those of section 10, have been transferred first to the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance and then to the Security of Pakistan Act, 1951, Section three both of the present, Ordinance and the Security Act is more or less identical, except that the provinces have no power under the Act, and this is only proper, as the provinces are not concerned with defence or external affairs. For the maintenance of public safety and order they have their own Public Safety Act, and it confused the imagination to follow the intention of the Government when it chooses a weapon sometimes from one armoury, sometimes from another. The Ordinance was devised to meet the special conditions of 1944, when the war was over and the Defence of India Act was expiring ; but even if section 10 was a particularly clever measure, it could be transferred to the Security of Pakistan Act and the Ordinance repealed. When it was provided in the Security of Pakistan Act that it shall operate for a period of three years, it was intended to tell the legislature and the people that a fresh stock of the situation will be taken at the end of that period. The majority of the legislature do not belong to the legal estate and it is not within their expectation that even if the Security Act is not renewed, there still remains on the statute book the Ordinance of 1944. It is not that the Government itself is not aware of the existence of the Ordinance, because in the very year of grace, 1952, when the Security Act was passed, the Ordinance was amended by the Restriction and Detention (Amendment) Act, No 24 of 1952. Our objection is not, and cannot be, to the propriety or otherwise of any law ; it is to the multiplicity of' law on the same subject, leading to confusion of thought and waste of time in reconciling conflicts. In our quest for the intention of the legislature in a situation rendered nebulous by an omission as in this case, we are likely to chase the shadow and miss the substance. Next, as to the effect of section

223. That section merely kept alive the existing powers and jurisdiction of the High Courts, making them subject to enhancement or diminution by an Act of the appropriate legislature. The appropriate legislature has now enhanced those powers by section 223‑A. In the language of section 223‑A there is nothing to show that the new powers were exercisable subject to existing legislation. As I have already pointed out, that language is susceptible of but one interpretation that powers were conferred in the fullness of intention. ABDUL AZIZ KHAN, J.‑I agree. A. H. Reference answered