1987 PLP 872 (CLC)

8. The plaintiffs in their second appeal have prayed for the grant of decree for the suit land in Khata No. 98/169. The defendants also preferred second appeal. They have prayed for the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit with regard to the land in Khata No. 29/51‑52.

9. Mr. Samiullah ,Jan, learned counsel for the defendants‑appellants argued that the plaintiffs' suit for pre‑emption is hit by the doctrine of partial pre‑emption for the reason that they have not included Khasra No. 863/1 in the plaint. The argument though attractive is without any foundation. The defendant‑vendees have, according to the sale‑deed, besides other Khasras Nos. purchased Khasra No. 863/1. The plaintiffs have sued for possession by pre‑emption of land total area of which is 36 Kanals 16 Marlas. The part of the land purchased out of the Khasra No. 863/1 measuring 6 Kanals 4 Marlas is included in the entire area of 30 Kanals 16 Marlas which is the subject‑matter of the suit. The plaintiff (or plaintiffs) had inadvertently described Khasra No. 863/1 as Khasra No. 863 in the plaint. The mere misdescription of this Khasra number will, therefore, not affect the suit so as to suffer from the defect of partial pre‑emption. It is settled law that the right of pre‑emption is in essence, one of substitution and not of re‑purchase. The pre‑emptor, therefore, is bound to take the place of vendee or vendees in the original contract. He must take over the whole bargain. The pre‑emptor must seek the pre‑emption of the whole of the subject‑matter of the sale and pay the entire price paid by the vendees as consideration See Malik Hussain and others v. Lal Ram Chand and others P L D 1970 SC 299; Samarqand and another v. Muhammad Yunas P L D 1972 Pesh. 115 and Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others v. Khushi Muhammad and another P L D 1973 SC

444. I am, therefore, of the view that the plaintiffs' suit does not suffer from the fatal defect of partial pre‑emption. The learned counsel for the defendants‑appellants next argued that the defendants‑appellants, on the basis of the exchange deed (copy EXh.P.W.l) have secured a right of pre‑emption at par with the plaintiffs that the transactions of the deed EXh.D.W.l/2 is in reality a separate transaction than the sale‑deed, copy EXh.D.W.l/1, and that the Courts below have erred in holding that the two transactions are in fact one and the same transactions of sale. To appreciate the contentions, the re‑appraisal of the pleadings of the parties, contents of the two documents, and the evidence of the parties and their witnesses would be highly beneficial. The plaintiff (or plaintiffs) has averred in the plaint that the transaction of the two deeds are in fact one transaction of sale of the suit area measuring 36 Kanals 16 Marlas, and that the deed purporting to be an exchange for 16 Marlas out of the suit land is a fictitious deed. In reply to this averment in the plaint the three vendees have pleaded in their joint written statement that even if, according to the plaintiff the two transactions are one transaction then in that case the sale consideration for the entire area of 36 Kanals. 16 Marlas has been paid not only in money but also by alienation of land, and, therefore, the transaction cannot be called a sale. The deed Exh. D.W.1/2 has been entered in the register at serial No. 107 and in the deed EXh.D.W.I/1 it has been entered at serial No.

108. By the deed EXh.D.W.l/1 the vendors purport to alienate 16 Marlas out of the suit Khasra numbers to the defendant ‑vendees. Mst. Mumtaz Begum alias Mumtaz Safdar, the executants of this deed alleged in it that she is authorised to transfer the area on the basis of the powers of attorney in her favour. She has not stated therein that she has been authorised to exchange the said area. Mst. Mumtaz Begum the executants of the deed EXh.D.W.l/1 has stated in the deed that she on the basis of the power of attorney in her favour is authorised to sell the area. The two deeds have been executed on 7‑2‑1967. Fateh Muhammad and Muhammad Anwar Khan are the attesting witnesses of both the deeds. The deed EXh.D.W.l/1 was presented for the registration at 1‑30 p.m. on 7‑2‑1967. The deed EXh.D.W.l/2 was presented for registration at 2 p.m. on the same day. Jumma Khan (D.W.3) one of the three vendees has deposed in cross‑examination that the sale transaction and the exchange negotiations took place on the same day in the same meeting and Mst. Mumtaz Begum had sent for him to Peshawar as she wanted to sell the land because being lessee of the land, he had the prior right to purchase the land. He further added that he could not say whether or not Mst. Mumtaz Begum had exchanged any land in the village (Ismailzai) except the one referred to above. D.W.1, Fateh Muhammad one of the attesting witnesses of both the deeds has testified that he had seen in Court 'the original sale‑deed, dated 7‑2‑1967, certified copy EXh.D.W.l/1 and the original sale‑deed, dated 7‑2‑1967 certified Exh . D . W .1 / 2 . P . W . 2 Muhammad Ibrar attorney of the plaintiffs has deposed in examination- in‑chief that the whole area of 16 Kanals 16 Marlas has been sold by the vendor by means of one transaction, but it has been divided in two transactions of exchange and sale fraudulently and fictitiously and that the exchange deed is a fictitious one. This witness has stated in cross‑examination that he did not know if the land given in exchange by the vendees to the vendor is their ownership or not, because he has not seen it. On the basis of the above discussion of the oral and circumstantial evidence, the two Courts below have held that the transaction in the deed (copy EXh.D.W.l/1) is not an exchange transaction but the same is a part of the sale transaction by deed EXh.D.W.l/1 and by both the deeds, the vendors have in fact and reality sold the entire suit area of 36 Kanals 16 Malras for the sale consideration mentioned in the sale‑deed EXh.D.W.l/1, The learned counsel for the defendants‑appellants argued that the alienation by deed EXh.D.W.l/1 is an exchange transaction because Muhammad lbrar, the attorney of the plaintiffs has called it exchange. The argument is fallacious. Reading the statement of Muhammad lbrar in cross‑examination in conjunction with his testimony in examination‑in‑chief, it is clear that the witness did not know that the land given in exchange by the vendees to the vendors is or is not their property and that the exchange is fraudulent and fictitious. Mr. D.M. Kamil, counsel for the plaintiffs vehemently argued that the two Courts below have held that the alienation by 'the two deeds is in fact one transaction and that this being a question of fact concurrently found by both the Courts cannot be gone into in second appeal. The argument appears to be well‑founded. In Ajmal Khan v. Alam Khan A l R 1917 Lah. 156 the first contention was that the transaction in connection with which the pre‑emption suit was brought is mortgage and not a sale. The question has been discussed at page 157 as follows:‑ "As regards, the first question, the matter is more difficult and I have been referred to several rulings which have been rather treated by counsel in arguments before me as conflicting, but which are really to my mind not conflicting at all. On behalf of the appellant, I am referred to a Privy Council ruling, Fateh Chand v. Kishan Kunwar (1912) 34 All. 579, Diwan Chand v. Sundar (1961) 34 68 PR (1961) , and Narain Singh v . Jaggat Singh (1912) 14 IC

331. Now if these rulings be carefully read, it will be seen in every one of them the proposition laid down is substantially this that, if the question decided by the lower appellate Court is a question to be decided on the construction of a deed, then the question is one of law, but that, if it is to be decided not on the construction of the deed but on the deed combined with surrounding circumstances, then it is a question of fact. To put the point in another way, if the question the Court has to answer is, is this document, taken on its own wording, a sale or a mortgage (or whatever may be the actual controversy in the case), then the question is one of law; if on the other hand the question to be answered by the Court is, this document on the face of it is a mortgage, but was the contract actually entered into between the parties something different from this, namely a sale, and if in order to decide this question the Court has to consider the terms of the mortgage and surrounding circumstances, then it is question of fact." In Nar Singh Narain v . Sant Ram and others A I R 1931 Oudh 424, the vendor executed two documents at one and the same time. The fist of these two documents purported to be a transfer of sale for a share of Patti. The second purported to be a fight (Shankalapnama) of some share. The two Courts below had held that the intention of the parties was to transfer the whole of the 6 pies 5/1 Krants to the defendants transferees for the amount specified in the sale‑deed and that the transaction had been disguised in the form of two deeds for the purpose of putting difficulties in the way of a suit for pre‑emption. The contention put forward was that the Shankalapnama was a separate and independent transaction having no concern with the sale‑deed and the Courts below were not competent to look beyond the terms of the documents. The question was discussed at page 425 as under:‑ "With regard to the first point, the appellant's learned counsel relies on the case of Parshatain Das v. Abdul Rahman A I R 1927 Oudh

576. I am, unable to see how the decision in that case can assist the appellant. The respondent relies on the case of Muhammad Ishaq v. Tahirunnisa A I R 1928 Oudh 472 which has been referred to in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. In this case it is clearly laid down that while it is not forbidden to a person to circumvent the law of pre‑emption by taking a transfer which falls short of a sale, there is a marked distinction between a device and a disguise. A device is permitted but it does not mean that a disguise cannot be exposed. Where the parties have really entered into a sale transaction but have disguised it under the mask or cloak of a different transaction, the Court must look to the real nature of the transaction for the purpose of determining whether it could be subject to the right of pre‑emption or not. Naturally other e than the document evidence of the intention of the parties other than the document itself, the question as was observed, in the judgment in the case just referred to resolve itself into one of construction pure and simple. But if evidence is forthcoming to show the real nature of the transaction it cannot bae ignored. It is clear, therefore, that evidence as to the real nature of the transaction is admissible. In the present case there is not only the oral evidence of witnesses that the intention of the parties was to effect a sale of the whole of 6 pies 5/1/2 Krants but, there are also the very significant circumstances that the transferees under the sale‑deed and the Shankalapnama are real brothers, that they constitute a joint Hilidu I family, and that there was no motive for Mst. Banki Kuer to make a gift to Narsing Narain who was stranger to the family and of a different case. In these circumstances the fin ding =:s of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court are conclusive regarding the nature of the transaction being that of sale and cannot be questioned in second appeal." In Malik Muhammad Haya1‑t Khan v. Subedar Yar Muhammad Khan P L D !966 SC 612 it was field that the proper legal effect of a document or of a proved fact is s always a question of law, but when an inference is to be drawn $o two a question of fact then whether the inference is drawn from oral evidence or from documents it is always a question of fact. This dictum has been discussed in the case at pages 626 and 627, as under:‑‑ "In the case of Wali Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Bakhsh and others 57 I A a6 the a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council laid down some propositions for determining as to what are and what are not questions o1fi'f law. It may be worthwhile to set them out here: (1) The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law, but the question . whether a fact has been proved when evidence for and against teas been properly admitted is necessarily a pure question of fact‑ (2) Whether the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which were net instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundations of right, but were real historical materials, have to be construed for the purpose of deciding the question. Again in the case or Naf‑7ar Chandra Pal v. Shaukur and others 45 I A 183 the Privy Council observed:‑‑"Questions of law and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle. The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law, so also is the question of admissibility of evidence and the question of whether any evidence has& been offered on one side or the other; but the question whether lithe fact has been proved, when evidence for and against has been properly admitted, is necessarily a pure question of fact ." We see no reason to depart from this enunciation of law and applying the tests in the present case we find the question that fell for consideration was& as to what was the true intent of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the compromise. In order to ascertain this true intent the surrounding facts and circumstances could legitimately be looked into but that this did not, in our view, make it a question of fact, for , the question, nevertheless remained as to what was the legal effect of the said compromise decree." In S. Masih Hassan v. Allah Diya and others A I R 1947 Lah. 326 it was held: "A finding that the exchange was in fact a sale which was given the appearance of an exchange to defeat the right of pre‑emption is a finding of fact when it is not based exclusively upon the interpretation of the deed of transfer but is based also upon consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction e. g. the statements of parties and their acts at the time of and subsequent to the transaction and, therefore, cannot be disturbed in second appeal. The fact that conclusions drawn from facts and circumstances are not reasonable is not a sufficient ground for interfering with the finding." The learned counsel for the defendants‑appellants in reply relied on Ch. Ghulam Ahmad Khan v. Diwan Sheikh Ghulam Qatabuddin and another P L D 1960 (W.P.) Lah. 461, wherein it has been ruled:‑‑ "The question whether on the facts found the two sale‑deeds constituted one transaction or more is a question of law, because it calls for the determination of the legal effect of the proved facts. The question whether the legal effect of the two sales was that they should be regarded as one transaction is a question that is capable of being agitated in second appeal." The learned Single Judge has discussed the point at page‑66 as undue "Exhibits D‑3 and D‑4 having been proved, the dates of their execution and the description of the property transferred by them having been brought on the record and the intention of the vendor to sell the entire plot having been established by direct evidence, it was a question of fact, according to counsel and not question of law whether the two sale‑deeds constituted one transaction or not. This contention of learned counsel appears to me to be clearly erroneous. The question whether on the facts found . the two sale‑deeds constituted one transaction or more is a question of law, because it calls for the determination of the legal effect of the proved facts. I drew the attention of counsel to the following observations made by the Privy Council in Wali Muhammad v. Muhammad Bakhsh I L R 11 Lah. (P.C.) 191, at p. 207. 'The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law, but the question whether a fact has been proved when evidence for and against has been properly admitted is necessarily pure question of fact.' To my mind, the question whether the legal effect of the two sales was that they should be regarded as one transaction is a question that is capable of being agitated in second appeal." The two Courts below, on the basis of the interpretation of the contents of the two deeds, Exh. D.W. 1/2, purporting to be an exchange deed and Exh. D.W. 1/1, a sale‑deed, and oral and circumstantial evidence, have come to a concurrent conclusion that the two transactions in reality are parts of one and the same transaction of sale for the suit land measuring 36 Kanals 16 Marlas. In view of the above authorities, it is a question of fact and therefore, cannot be disturbed in second appeal. In Madan Gopal and Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others P L D 1969 SC 617, it has been ruled:‑ "The legal position does not admit of any doubt that a concurrent finding of fact reached at by the lower Courts will not be disturbed by the High Court in a second appeal even if it disagrees with that finding on its own view of the evidence, although the concurrent finding of the lower Courts may appear to be grossly erroneous, unless, as laid down in subsection (c) of section 100, the error or defect discovered is of a substantial character pertaining to the procedure as provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon its merits. Interference would also be justified if the decision of the lower‑ Courts is found to be contrary to law or some usage having the force of law or has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law. If the finding of fact reached by the first appellate Court is at variance with that of the trial Court, the former will ordinarily prevail, although it would not possess the same value or sanctity as a concurrent finding. Such a finding by the lower appellate Court will be immune from interference in second appeal only if it is found to be substantiated by evidence on the record and is supported by logical reasoning duly taking note of the reasons adduced by the first Court which have been disfavoured in the contrary finding." Mr. Samiullah Jan, counsel for the defendants‑appellants reluctantly produced certified copies of Mutation No. 8057 entered on 8‑3‑1968, attested on 15‑8‑1969, on the basis of exchange deed, dated 7‑2‑1967 on behalf of Mst. Mumtaz Begum and others in favour of Juma Khan and others, Mutation No. 8056, entered on 8‑3‑1968, attested on 15‑8‑1969 on the basis of exchange deed, dated 7‑2‑1967 on behalf of Sherin and Rekhmeen in favour of Mst. Mumtaz Begum and others and Mutation No. 7861, entered on 1‑3‑1967 attested on 15‑8‑1969 on the basis of exchange deed, dated 7‑2‑1967 on behalf of Juma Khan in favour of Mst. Mumtaz Begum etc. The learned counsel argued that on the basis of these mutations the executants of the deed Exh. D.W. 1/2 purporting to be an exchange deed in fact intended to alienate by exchange the area of 16 Marlas mentioned in Exh. D.W. 1/2. Mr. D.M. Kamil, counsel for the plaintiff, did not object to the placing on file of these copies of mutation but vehemently opposed the admission of the copies of mutations as additional evidence in the appeal. In an appeal it is now well‑settled that additional evidence should not be admitted in order merely to enable one of the parties to litigation to fill in gaps in the evidence". See the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Communication and Works Department and another v. Gulzar Muhammad P L D 1969 SC

60. Mr. Samiullah Jan, while relying on the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 25(3)(d) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115, called Land Reforms 82 regulation, 1972, argued that the defendants‑appellants being tenants f the suit land have the first right of pre‑emption in respect of the and comprised in their tenancy and as such the entire suit of the plaintiffs for possession by pre‑emption is liable to dismissal. The argument is not well‑founded. The two provisions of the Land Reforms regulation, 1972, gazette on 11th March, 1972, hereinafter called the 3egulation, are quoted below:‑‑ "3. 'Regulation to override other laws etc'. The provisions of this Regulation, and any rule or order made thereunder, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, or in any order or decree of a Court or tribunal or other authority, or in any rule or custom or usage, or in any contract, instrument deed or other document." "

25. Rights of tenants. (3) as from Kharif, 1972. (d) Subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, a tenant has the first right of pre‑emption in respect of the land comprised in his tenancy." In the sale‑deed, copy Exh. D.W. 1/1, it is mentioned that Juma Khan vendee No. 1, was the lessee of the land sold. In the joint written statement it is averred that before the sale and exchange Jumma Khan defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit land as lessee. In the Jamabandi of the year 1965‑66, copy of Exh. D.W.111 from Kharif 1961 for five years, in respect of Khasras Nos. 857, 858, 859 in the Khasra girdawari, copy Exh. D/2, Juma Khan alone has been shown in possession as lessee for Khasras Nos. 857, 858 and 859 in Kharif 1966. In Rabi 1967 Juma Khan, Sharin and Rekhmeen (defendants‑vendees) are shown in possession of these three Khasra numbers on account of Badal. It is thus proved that Juma Khan defendant‑vendee alone was the lessee of Khasra Nos. 857, 858 and 859, before the sale of the land on 7‑2‑1967 till Kharif 1966. The Girdawari of Kharif 1966 was done on 10‑11‑1966 and the Girdawari of Rabi 1967 was done on 23‑4‑1967. Thus, at the time of sale neither Juma Khan nor his two co‑vendees Sherin and Rekhmeen are shown in possession as lessees of the suit land. The claim of the three vendees‑appellants, that they were lessees of the suit land at the time of the sale in respect of the entire suit land is, therefore, baseless. Moreover, paragraph 25(3)(d) has come D into force from Kharif 1972. The Regulation has come into force from 11th March, 1972. Regulation No. 115 has no retrospective effect, therefore, neither Juma Khan nor his two co‑vendees Sherin and Rekhmeen could acquire the first right of pre‑emption in respect of the suit land at the time of the sale. The decree for pre‑emption passed in favour of the plaintiffs will, therefore, not be affected by Regulation. Further the decree for pre‑emption passed in favour of the plaintiffs subsisted till the date of the decree, dated 17‑7‑1968, and maintained in appeal on 23‑11‑1968. Sherin and Rekhmeen co_ vendees of Juma Khan were not lessees or tenants of the suit land at the time of the sale. Juma Khan vendee and lessee of a part of the land at the time of the sale would have lost his superior right of pre‑emption, if any, under the Regulation, by doctrine of sinker at the time of the institution of the present suit with respect to the part of the suit land under his tenancy. Mr. Samiullah Jan also raised the question of improvements. The learned trial Court while discussing issue No. 9 with regard to the improvements claimed by defendant‑vendees has held that they cannot claim any compensation. The question of compensation was raised in the memo.. of appeal but not urged during the address before the appellate Court. In Abid Hussain v. Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum and others P L D 1972 Kar. 54 (D.B.), it was held: "The memo. of an appeal is only the charter of an appellant within which he can operate during the hearing of his appeal. It does not mean that the Judge who hears the appeal has suo motu and automatically to take up every point that is mentioned in the memo. of appeal and decide it. On the contrary, the correct position of law is that whatever contention has not been urged during the address before a Judge should be deemed to have been abandoned." The question of improvements having not been urged at the time of address in appeal before the appellate Court shall, therefore, be deemed to have been abandoned and cannot be raised in second appeal. In conclusion, the defendants' second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

10. Mr. D.M. Kamil, learned counsel for the plaintiffs‑appellants argued that the area of land sold in Khata Nos. 29/51‑52 and 98/169, total measuring 26 Kanals 16 Marlas, in fact forms one compact block and parcel and as such the plaintiffs' right of pre‑emption being co‑sharers in Khata Nos. 29/51‑52 extends to each of the contiguous Khasra numbers in suit in Khata No. 981/169. The argument has force. The previous view held by the High Courts was that for the purpose of pre‑emption, each Khasra number though purchased in one transaction and contiguous to each other, is to be considered separately and the pre‑emptor, in order to succeed, must prove his right based on contiguity in respect of each and every Khasra number. These decisions were reviewed in the Full Bench case Muhammad Yusaf v. Sikandar P L D 1970 Pesh.

160. At pages 164 and 165, it has been discussed: "The High Court of Peshawar in an unreported judgment in Abdul Khaliq v. Ghulam Sarwar (Civil Revision No. 206 of 1954, decided on the 12th December, 1955) observed: 'The plaintiff in this case has his property touching Khasra No. 330, but he has no property which touches Khasra No.

351. Consequently, it cannot be said that by reason of the fact that this property touches one Khasra number out of the two Khasra numbers sold, he should automatically . be held as having property touching both the Khasra numbers sold. In Qalandar Khan v. Pir Muhammad Khan P L D 1956 Pesh. 1) it was observed this Court has consistently held the view that for the purpose of pre‑emption each Khasra No. is to be considered separately, even though a number of them have been purchased by means of one transaction and are contiguous to each other, and the pre‑emptor must prove his right based on contiguity in respect of each and every Khasra No. before he can succeed.' In arriving at the finding reliance was also placed on Phul Chand v. Sundar Das A I R 1946 Lah. 345 where it was held that if two adjoining houses were sold by one sale‑deed, the pre‑emptor whose house was contiguous only to one of the houses had no right of pre‑emption to the other house which, though adjoining the other house, was not contiguous to the house of the pre‑emptor, and it was further observed: "A vendee in a suit brought to enforce, on the ground of vicinage, a right of pre‑emption in respect of one of the properties purchased by him, can successfully resist the suit on the strength of his title to an adjoining property conveyed to him by means of the same sale deed". This view was affirmed in Ghulam Mohayuddin Khan v. Ghulam Qasim P L D 1957 Pesh. 36 where a Division Bench held: "Each Khasra No. being distinct, if a suit is brought on the ground of vicinage, for possession by pre‑emption of those Khasra Nos., the plaintiff must prove that he has property contiguous to each one of them, and if he fails to do that, his suit qua the Khasra number with which he has no contiguous property must fail." Same view was reintercated in Sultan Muhammad v. Muhammad Yusuf P L D 1959 Pesh. 120 where after observing that each Khasra number is to be treated as a separate property and the pre‑emptor must prove his superior right in respect of each one of them, it was remarked: 'The plaintiffs, therefore, have no superior right of pre‑emption with regard to Khasra Nos. 105 and 108" and that they "lost their title with regard to Khasra No. 106 as well, because on the date of the decree the vendee, having become full owner of Khasra No. 106, had equal right of pre‑emption with them, both, having their property contiguous to this Khasra No. 'Further in Zahuruddin Khan v. Shahalam Khan P L D 1959 Pesh. 148 by observing that the pre‑emtpor's land was no doubt contiguous to Khasra Nos. 3860/214 and 4396/213, but the other two fields, Khasra Nos. 3851/198 and 212, which the vendee has acquired, are also contiguous to those two fields and the vendee too has right of pre‑emption, equal with Zahuruddin Khan pre‑emptor, in respect of them" it was held that the pre‑emptor was on a footing of equality with the vendee and had no claim to preference over him." The Full Bench held the view that: "Holding of the land which comprises in it a number of fields bearing different Khasra numbers remains one property and not that it has as many properties as there are Khasra numbers. If a person sells, out of his holding, land comprised in more than one Khasra numbers and they are all contiguous to each other thereby forming a compact block, the sale is pre‑emptible for the reason that on account of the compactness the block will be a property in itself. Thus, in case where a part of holding is sold, the right to pre‑empt extends as far as the property sold is not separated by any intervening space or other position of the property. The sale of a parcel of land comprised in more than one Khasra number will not be sale of as many properties as there are field Nos. , but will be only of one property represented by that parcel of land. In order that a person may pre‑empt the sale of block of land comprised in different Khasra numbers it is not necessary that he should have his property contiguous to all the Khasras numbers and that if his property is contiguous to any part of the block or parcel of land though comprised in a number of Khasra numbers ha will have the right to pre‑empt the entire land comprised in the Khasras number In the present case, the suit area has been sold out of Khasra Vos. 29/51‑52 and 98/169. All the Khasras Nos. viz. 857, 858, 859 and silo of Khat8 No. 29/51‑52 and Khasra Nos. 853, 854‑, 856, 861 and 863 of Khata No. 98/169, as evident from Akas Shajra Kishtwar EXh.P.W.l/2, form one compact lock without any separation by any intervening space or portion of property in between each of Khasra numbers. The, plaintiffs‑ pre‑emhtors' right of pre‑emption on account of their being co‑sharers in Khata No. 29/51‑52 will, therefore, extend to each of the contiguous Khasras in suit in Khata No. 98/169. The defendants‑vendees live not been proved to own land contiguous to any of the Khasra members sold out of Khata No. 98/169. In this view of the case, I accept the plaintiff'‑pre‑emptors' appeal and grant them also a decree for possession by pre‑emption of an area of 11 Kanals 5 Marlas out of Khasras Nos. 853, 854, 856, 861 and 863/1 in Khata No. 98/169 on payment of Rs.7,996 to be paid within a month in the trial Court. Parties to bear their own costs.