1994 PLP 811 (CLC)

We may now advert to the second ingredient, namely, from whose custody the original title deed and other documents came in evidence. It is true that in the present case the appellant has produced the original sale‑deed. The reason for production of the same by him is explainable. The statement of account of the amount paid by the respondent to the House Building Finance Corporation indicates that the respondent made the last payment of Rs.1,820 against receipt No.031453 dated 15‑4‑

72. The respondent by his letter dated 18‑4‑72 addressed to the General Manager, House Building Finance Corporation stated and requested as follows:‑‑-- "Dear Sir, I am the attorney of Mr. Sajjad Hussain of the above account. I have cleared the balance outstanding loan of Rs.1,820 by depositing cash into Bank vide receipt No.031453, dated 15‑4‑1972. A photostat of the power of attorney duly registered at Karachi by the Sub‑Registrar T‑Division IV is enclosed for your perusal and record. Please arrange to hand over all the relevant documents of the‑ above account to me. Thanking you. Yours faithfully. (Sd.) Illegible." It appears that after the above payment of Rs.1,820 by the respondent on 15‑4‑1972, the appellant also remitted '& sum of Rs.1,820 through a cheque dated 18‑4‑1972 which is reflected from the certificate dated 21‑3‑1978 issued by the Manager of the House Building Finance Corporation (Exh.D9). It also appears that the appellant through a public notice published in an Urdu newspaper on 5‑7‑1972 purported to cancel the power of attorney without serving any notice upon the respondent though as per para 16 of the above registered power of attorney, it was irrevocable. It is not understandable as to how the appellant paid aforesaid some of Rs.1,820 on 18‑4‑1972 when factually the above sum was already paid by the respondent on 15‑4‑1972. From Exh.D21 which is a letter dated 30‑5‑1972 from the House Building Finance Corporation it appears that there was over payment of the amount which was refunded to the extent of Rs.110.97 to the appellant while issuing clearance certificate. Be that as it may, since the appellant was the ostensible owner of the second house, he obtained the title deed from the House Building Finance Corporation and, therefore, the production of the title deed by the appellant is itself not sufficient to negate the other evidence which tends to prove that the appellant was Benamidar particularly keeping in view as many as 41 receipts for the payment of loan amount to the Housing Building Finance Corporation, 8 receipts for the payment of the property tax for the years 1968‑69 to 1976‑77, 8 receipts focthe payment of K.M.C taxes for the period of 1969‑70 to 1976‑77, and four receipts for payment of ground rent to the KDA for the period from 1968 to 1971, were produced by the respondent. . In case of Ismail Dada Adam Soomar v. Shorat Bano (PLD 1960 (W.P) Karachi 852) at pages 867 to 873 of the report it has been held as under: "The sale‑deed of this property Exh..17 is in favour of defendant and as it is the plaintiff who is impeaching this deed and asserting that this was a Benami transaction, the burden of proving this is upon him. One of the recognized tests though not the only one in such cases is to see the source of the consideration for such a purchase. While dealing with issue No.5 I came to the consideration that the defendant did not have any money of her own and it was conceded by Mr. Fakhurddin the defendant's Advocate, and rightly, so, that all the expenses for the purchase of this house, and for its reconstruction were met by the income of the bakery and confectionery business of Ismail D. Adam Soomar and Corporation. That being so, upon my finding on issue No.5 that the plaintiff was the sole proprietor of that business, it would follow that the consideration for the' sale as well as the money for construction proceeded from the plaintiff and not from the defendant. If, therefore, the consideration flowed from he plaintiff and the expenses of reconstruction was incurred by him the case of the defendant as set out in her pleadings that all this was done with her .money and for that reason she was the owner of this property must be negatived. The question which then remains to be considered is whether in taking the sale‑deed in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff had intended her to be the sole owner of the property. It has been laid down by a series of decisions of the P.C. and the principle of advancement which applies to such cases in England does not apply to this sub‑continent. It was held in AIR 1925 P.C. 181 as follows:‑

"A purchase in India by a native of India of property in India in the name of his wife unexplained by other proved 'or admitted facts is to be regarded as a Benami transaction by which the beneficial interest is the property is in the husband although the ostensible title is in the wife. The rule of the law of England that such a purchase by a husband in England is to be assumed to be purchased for the advancement of the wife does not apply in India. That the English principle of advancement does not apply to India (also Pakistan) has never been doubted, and no distinction has been made between the cases of Hindus and Muslims on this question. See Mst. Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj. The doctrine of intended advancement in favour of the wife not being applicable in this country, there would be a resulting trust in favour of the husband who provided the purchase money in the absence of proof of contrary intention. The question whether a transfer in the name of the wife for which the consideration was paid by the husband is a Benami transaction or amounts to a gift is always one of intention, and the intention to be determined is of the time when the transaction took place. The question which must be squarely answered is: Did the husband intend to make an absolute gift of the property to the wife? In determining the true intention. Regard must naturally be had to the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent conduct in so far as it is relevant to the understanding of the initial intention. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant having set up the case that she had purchased this property with her own money it is not open to her to invoke at the stage of argument an alternative case which had never been pleaded nor even deposed to by her in her own evidence. There is no doubt that alternative case should have been pleaded and it is also true that the defendant's plea that she was the owner of the property by virtue of her purchase with her own money is not quite consistent with the alternative case advanced in the argument that the plaintiff had intended to make a gift of this property to the defendant. But the question remains whether the purchase was Benami and I am of the view that the alternative case must be examined because if the plaintiff had intend that the defendant should be owner of this property the case of Benami would fail. In the light of the above observation let me consider the relevant circumstances. In the first place it must be remembered that this house was purchased and reconstructed at a grand scale and furnished likewise by the plaintiff so that he could live in it and shift from the flat. It is true that when this dream house was built and furnished, it was in the contemplation of the plaintiff that the defendant would also live in it with him but that it is entirely a different proposition from saying that he had intended to give this property absolutely to her to his exclusion. In order that the giving may be complete and absolute, there is to be bona fide intention of the donor to divest himself in presentation of the property and to confirm it absolutely upon the donee. This does not mean that a husband may not continue to live in the property with the wife after giving it to her but in this case the property was purchased and built and furnished with the intention that the plaintiff would enjoy all its benefits. Mr. Fakhruddin has contended that not only the sale‑deed was in the name of the defendant but the property was recorded in her name with the City Deputy Collector and that she was a party to all the documents relating to the mortgage of this property for the purpose of raising money from Joth Singh or the Mercantile Cooperative Bank. I have dealt with this contention in connection with issue No.5 and I repeat that the sale‑deed being in the name of the defendant, the existence of these documents is not inconsistent with the case of the plaintiff that he was the true owner of the property and that the defendant was a mere Benamidar. These documents would naturally be of the kind of which they are because if this property was being offered as a security for the loans, defendant's name would naturally appear in all the subsequent documents. On the other hand there are many circumstances subsequent to the sale‑deed which do not support the case of gift in favour of the defendant. All the estimates, bills, vouchers, receipts in connection with the reconstruction of the house and the fittings and fixtures are in the name of the plaintiff alone. There are Exhs.57/1, 57/15 and 57/17 to 57/27. These amongst others consist of the tender by the Architects H.R. Thakhar & Co., receipts of the payment to them, bills of Hinudstan Sanitary and Drainage Works, indents from Eastern . titles, and Concrete Work etc. The contract for the furnishing of the house with M/s. Continental Furnishing Co. Exh. 18 is also in the name of the plaintiff only and all receipts of payment to them in respect of this work is in his favour alone. These are Exhs. 19/1 to 19/9. There are other receipts by Engineers and Contractor for other work done in connection with this property. These are Exhs.20/1 to 20/12. All this evidence is far more consistent with the ownership of the property by the plaintiff instead of the defendant's. Another circumstance which points to the Benami character of this transaction is provided by the fact that almost every other thing was also being purchased in the name of the defendant. Apart from the immovable property, the Nash Car was purchased in her name in 1949 and according to the admission of the plaintiff in the witness‑box in the cross‑examination he used to buy even the household utensils in the name of the defendant and the defendant's name used to be carved on them. Having held that the defendant was not a partner in the business and was not getting any share of profits, it follows that that it was the plaintiff who was paying for everything why should he then effect himself so completely with regard to wordly possession of which he seemed to be quite fond. It was argued by Mr.Fakharuddin that he was trying to prove for her, put if that was the intention of the husband, it was not necessary for him to disown everything. It was held in a Madras case reported in AIR 1925 Mad. 95 that the presumption in favour of Benami will be strengthened if almost all the property was purchased in the name of the wife and the man purchased really next to nothing in his own name. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in the case of Kerwick v. Kerwick. This case arose out 'of a suit by a husband against his wife for a declaration that certain properties were held by the wife as his Benamidar and that he was the true owner of them. The parties in this case were born in India of English parents and who had resided in India all their lives except for a visit of England occasionally. The appellant (husband) had bought land with money of his own or borrowed and had procured it to be conveyed to the respondent (wife) by two deeds, and had at his own expense erected thereon two dwelling houses, which was the subject matter of this suit. It was held in this case that a presumption of an intended advancement was applicable on the ground that the parties were born of British parents and yet on consideration of the circumstances of the case it was held that the said presumption had been rebutted. In the present case there is no presumption of an intended advancement and though the plaintiff was deeply attached to the defendant, it is not reasonably possible to hold that he was denuding himself of every fragment of property which he was acquiring including 12 annas share in the partnership and leaving himself with hardly anything except the liability (may be partial) of huge debts which had been incurred in the acquiring of these properties. Next comes the question of the motive for acquiring this property in the name of the defendant. Motive may be a weighty consideration in the circumstances of another case but as has been repeatedly pointed out by the P.C. and followed by Courts in India and practice of buying property in the name of the wife or children as Benamidar is so prevalent in this country that unless warranted by the facts of a particular case, the question of motive becomes of little importance. In the present case having regard to the circumstances to which I have referred earlier, the question of motive fades into insignificance. In all probability, it was sentimental. It was held by the Patna High Court in the case reported in AIR 1935 Patna page 231:‑

`Benami transactions are so common in India and are so frequently entered into without any apparent motive that where other circumstances clearly point to the Benami character of a particular transaction, the mere fact that there is no apparent motive for the property being purchased in another person's name may not be sufficient to outweigh the cumulative affect of the other circumstances.' With the observations I am in respectful agreement. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the sale‑deed of this property came from the possession of the defendant. Custody of the title deeds of a property is a factor to be taken into account in determining the Benami character of a transaction. But in this case where the husband and the wife were living together in the same house and the plaintiff left it during his own sickness it would be quite natural for the title deed to have remained at the house and in the custody of the wife who had even the keys of the safe. I do not therefore, think that the production of the title deed by the defendant establishes an intention on the part of the plaintiff to give this property absolutely to her. Mr. Fakharuddin strongly relied upon certain observations made by the P.C. in the case reported in AIR 1932 P.C. 13 and two Indian eases reported in AIR 1951 Orissa page 22 and AIR 1953 Mysore page 89 in both of which reference was made to the said observations of the P.C. In the Privy Council case which went to it in appeal from Oudh one Baqar Ali did in many instances purchase immovable property in the names of the various members of his family without any intention of benefiting of the particular nominee and the question arose about a particular property described as Sher Darwaza property which had been purchased by Baqir Ali in the name of his daughter Abid Jahan from his favourite wife Mst. Fikhr Jan whether it belonged to her. The sale‑deed of this property was on the occasion of the marriage of Abid Jan placed upon a tray and sent for the inspection of her father‑in‑law. This circumstance was found by the High Court to be conclusive proof of Baqar Ali's intention of giving this property to Abid Jan. With this finding the Privy Council agreed and it was observed:‑‑

`The purchase of this property was a very natural provision by Baqar Ali for the daughter of his favouyte wife and though there may no presumption of advancement in such cases in India, very little evidence of intention would be sufficient to turn the scale. The sending of the deed for the inspection of the lady's father‑in‑law was clearly a representation that the property was hers, and their Lordships agree with the learned Judges (of the Chief Court) in the conclusion to which they came'." The above observations of the Privy Council must be read in the context of the particular facts of that case and if I may say so with respect the circumstance to which the reference was made was weight enough to turn the scale. Not only that this property was bought in the name of the daughter from the favourite wife, but when that daughter came to be married, the title deed was presented for inspection of the prospective father‑in‑law; the clear inference being that a declaration was a being impliedly made and an undertaking was being given to the in‑laws, who were interested in that declaration, that the particular property belonged to the bride who would carry it with herself to her pew home. The facts of the present case are however widely different to the salient parts to which I have already referred. In the Orissa case where reference ways made to the above Privy Council's case, it was held relying upon two other Privy. Council cases viz. AIR 1945 Privy Council 175 that upon the facts of the case which was before the Orissa Court, the conclusion that there was any intention of beneficial advancement was not warranted. In the case of Shamby Nath v. Pushkar Nath, a husband had made deposits in a bank in the joint names of himself and his wife and on terms that it was payable to either as survivor it was held that this did not constitute a gift by the husband to his wife. It was further held that there would be a resulting trust in favour of the husband in the absence of proof of a contrary intention, there being in India no presumption of an intended advancement in favour of a wife. Reliance was placed 'on a previous Privy Council decision reported in AIR 1928 Privy Council page

172. In the Mysore case it was held that from the fact that the consideration for the sale proceeded from the husband, it did not necessarily follow that the transaction was Benami, since payment of the purchase money was not a conclusion but only a vital test to determine the nature of the transaction. The circumstances which weighed with their Lordships in coming to the conclusion that the transaction was not Benami are stated in the following words in the concluding part of the judgment. This is what they say:‑

`The question being mainly one of intention we are of opinion that, in this case, having regard to the situtation and relationship of the parties, absence of clear evidence to show that Muhammad Sherif paid out of his own funds the purchase money arid gift of a house by Muhammad Sherif to his third wife, the appellant was intended to be and is the owner of the property and not the Benamider.' It is plain that the facts of this case have hardly anything in common with the facts of the present case. In a Lahore case reported in AIR 1937 Lah. 589, upon a consideration of various authorities it was held as follows:‑-- `The main principle deducible from the cases cited by either side appears to us to he this that it is the intention of the husband that mainly counts in the determination of the question whether he intended to make an absolute gift in favour of his wife or whether the transaction was merely intended to be a Benami transaction, and that if a party avers that an absolute gift was intended, clear and cogent and preferably documentary evidence should be produced in support of that allegation.' Upon the consideration of the evidence, it was held that the intention on the part of the husband to make an absolute gift of the house purchased in the name of the wife was lacking. Lastly we come to the question of possession. It cannot be disputed and has not been disputed that the house was purchased and subsequently rebuilt and furnished so that the husband as well as the wife would live in it and, therefore, from the fact that the wife did live in it, it cannot be inferred that her possession was of a character which would support the inference that possession was given to her in consequence of the gift or because the husband had intended her to be the owner of the property. In fact if this large house including the guest house and outhouses was the exclusive property of the defendant, there does not seem to be any cogent reasons why a small house in P.I.B. Colony should have been purchased in 1950 to shift the defendant's relations from the house in question. Likewise the fact that the plaintiff left the house in anger or disguised upon a quarrel between himself and his wife does not lead to an inference that he has either' intended or acknowledged her to be the owner of this property. Exh.31 clearly shows how much agony could be caused to the plaintiff in consequence of a dispute between himself and the defendant. Therefore, such a conduct does not strengthen the defendant's case in any measure. The plaintiff had declared even in 1953 by the public notice that he was the sole owner of this property. If there had been a subsequent settlement upon the basis that the plaintiff had retracted from that position I would have expected in all probability a writing to that effect between the parties. No such evidence documentary or oral has been led in this case. For all these reasons I hold that the plaintiff is the real owner of the land and building which is the subject‑matter of issue No.l and the defendant was merely a Benamidar. I answered the issue accordingly." In case of Mrs. N. Johnstone, etc. v. Gopal Singh and others (AIR 1931 Lahore "' 4 19). wherein at page 423 it has been held as under:‑

"It must be remembered, however, in this connection that there is no presumption in India (as there is in England) that property acquired by a father in the name of a child is intended for' his advancement. See Gopee Krist Gosain v. Gunga Pershad. In the case of a joint family, where there is a nucleus of joint property the initial presumption as already stated is that the property acquired in the name of any member belongs to the joint family. In the present instance, it has been found that the partnership business was acquired for `Gopal Singh and Brothers' on the security of the family property. It has been authoritatively laid down in a number of rulings that the best criterion for determining whether a transaction is or is not `Benami' is the source of purchase money: Gopee Krist Gosain v.' Gunga Pershad. In this case the source was obviously the joint family property on the security of which the Flour Mill at Misri Shah was acquired for Gopal Singh and Brothers and hence it must be presumed that the Flour Mills belonged to be joint family." In case of Akram Moquim Ansari v. Mst. Asghari Begum and another (PLD 1971 Karachi 763), wherein at page 766 of the report it has been held as under: "The material issues in the case are issues Nos.3 and 4, which in fact raise the question whether the property in dispute belongs to defendant No.l in her own right or whether the said property was and is held by this defendant `Benami' for her deceased husband Moquim Din Ansari. The law as to `Benami' transaction is laid down by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Sura Lakshmiah Chetty and others v. Kothandarama Pillai, in which it has been held that if an Indian husband purchases property in India in the name of his wife then unless otherwise explained, the purchase is presumed to be a `Benami' transaction, by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband and the ostensible title in the wife. But the burden to prove that the transaction is `Benami' lies on the person asserting it to be so, though this burden is discharged upon the said person showing that the purchase money was provided by him or someone other than the person in whose name the transaction appears to be. See Mst. Saddiqua Begum v. Abdul Jabbar and others. As `Benami' transactions are quite common, even slight quantity of evidence may suffice to show that the person in whose name the property appears to be is not the real owner thereof. See Tirthamayi Dassi v. Atkulla and another. Even direct evidence is not necessary to discharge this burden of proof, particularly when the transaction is an old one. (See Benoy Karshna Sadhukhan and others v. Panchanan Sadkukhan and others and Kailash Pati Sahai v. Jagarnath Rai." In case of Zafarul Hassan Qureshi v. M/s. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. etc. (1991 CLC 1580) wherein at page 743 of the report it has been held as under:‑‑-- "On this issue the plaintiff's case is that the said house situate in Gulshin‑e‑Iqbal belonged to the plaintiff (Sic. should be deceased) who had acquired the same in the name of his wife Fazil‑un‑Nisa and thus it being Benami transaction Fazil-un‑Nisl was only ostensible owner whereas deceased was real owner of the house. I have no hesitation in accepting contention of the learned counsel as it is an admitted fact that Fazil‑un‑Nisa was the wife and the defendants have not brought any evidence on record to prove that the said property was acquired by the said Fazil‑un‑Nisa from her own resources. The presumption in such case would be that the property had been bought by her husband. Reliance may be placed on the cases of Khan Imtiaz Ahmed Khan v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1983 FSC 28) and Ismail Dada Adam Soomar v. Shorat Banoo (PLD 1960 Karachi 852). Under the circumstances I would answer this issue in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that the plaintiff would be entitled to 2/5th share of the remainder in the suit property after satisfying share of the defendant as per the will of the deceased." In case of Miss Qamar Ali v. Syed Nadir Ali and others (1993 CLC 605) wherein at page 607 of the report it has been held as under:‑‑

"From the above facts, it is obvious that the deceased Syed Nazir Ali had 3 wives of whom one Mst. Mushtri Begum mother of defendants Nos.l to 5 predeceased her husband. She died in the year 1979 while the deceased Syed Nazir Ali expired in 1981. This fact also stands. admitted that the properties involved in the 3 suits were purchased by the deceased Syed Nazir Ali in the name of his wives. However, with regard to the property in suit i.e. `Bombay Hotel' the plea taken by the present defendants Nos. 1 and 2 is that it was purchased by late Mst. Hashmi Begum from her own resources but they have not been able to point out any independent source of her income. All that is said in counter‑affidavit is that she had purchased the suit property from her own funds. This is a general allegation not supported with any other material to at least prima facie show late Mst. Hashmi Begum had any independent source of income from which she could have paid for the suit property. As against this the other admissions as discussed above show that it was the deceased Syed Nazir Ali who had purchased the various properties in the names of 3 wives. From this fact which shows that in case where wife does not have any independent source of income and that the property is purchased by the husband in the name of wife then even if the possession is enjoyed by the wife as an ostensible owner, she can be treated to hold the property as such ostensible owner as a trustee for the former. This inference finds support from the case of Khan Imtiaz Ahmad Khan v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1983 Federal Shariat Court 28), wherein their Lordships were pleased to hold:‑‑

`We pointed out to him that the custom Benami recorded only in the sense that the Courts give relief to the real owner and do not extend its benefit to the ostensible owner. When the case comes before the Courts and they are satisfied that in any particular case the transaction was. Benami and the property was purchased by the person supplying the consideration thereof the Courts have always given the decree in favour of the plaintiff who has supplied the money and held the ostensible owner, to be only a trustee of the former.' Also in the case in Ismail Dada Adam Soomar v. Shorat Banoo (PLD 1960 (W.P.) Karachi 852), a learned Single Judge of this Court has placed reliance on the case reported in' AIR 1925 PC 181 wherein it was held:‑-- `A purchase in India by a native of India of property in India in the name of his wife unexplained by other proved or admitted facts is to be regarded as a Benami transaction by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband although the ostensible title is in the wife. The rule of the law of England that such a purchase by a husband in England is to be assumed to be a purchase for the advancement of the wife does not apply in India.' In view of the above case‑law, it can safely be assumed that the suit property, as the other properties, was purchased by the deceased Syed Nazir Ali in the name of his wife and that she being only an ostensible owner held the same as a trustee on behalf of the real purchaser. Consequently on the demise of Syed Nazir Ali, his heirs would be entitled to share in the said property." In case of Ch. Habib Ullah v. Sheikhupura Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. (PLD 1987 SC 53), wherein at page 81 of the report it has been held as under:‑-- "The law on the subject is clear enough. In the case from N: W.F.P: that of Guran Ditta and another v. T. Ram Ditta (AIR 1928 PC 172) the law was summed up in the following words:‑

"The general principle of equity, applicable both in this country and in India, is that in the case of a voluntary conveyance of property by a grantor, without any declaration of trust, there is a resulting trust in favour of the grantor, unless it can be proved that an actual gift was intended. An exception has, however, been made in English Law, and a gift to a wife is presumed, where money belonging to the husband is deposited at a Bank in the name of a wife, or, where a deposit is made, in the joint names of both husband and wife. This exception has not been admitted in Indian law under the different conditions which attach to family life and where the social relationships are of an essentially different character. The principle to be applied has been stated in Kerwick v. Kerwick (AIR 1921 PC 56=48 Cal. 260=47 IA ? (PC). The general rule and principle of the Indian law as to the resulting trusts differs but little, if at all, from general rule of English law upon the same subject, but in their Lordships view it has been established by the decisions in the cases of Gopeekrist v. Gungapersad (1854) 6 MIA 53=4 WR 46‑2 Suther. 13=1 Sar. 493 (PC) and Uzhar Ali v. Bebee Ultaf Fatima (1869)13 MIA 232=4 BLR 1=13 WR 1 (PC) that owing to the widespread and persistent practice which prevails amongst the natives of India, whether Mahomedan or Hindu, for owners of property to make grants and transfer of its Benami for no obvious reason or apparent purpose without the slightest intention of vesting in the donee any beneficial interest in the property granted or transferred as well as the usages which these natives have adopted and which have been protected by statute, no exception has ever been engrafted on the general law of India negativing the presumption of the resulting trust in favour of the person, providing the purchase‑money, such as has by the. Courts of Chancery in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction, been engrafted on the corresponding law in England in those cases, where a husband or father pays the money and the purchase is taken in the name of a wife or child. In such a case there is, under the general law in India, no presumption of an intended advancement as there is in England." In case of Mst. Muhammadi Begum v. S. Salahuddin Ahmad (PLD 1992 Karachi 86) wherein at pages 88, 89 and 90 of the report it has been held as under:‑‑-- "Admittedly the property in suit was purchased during the period when the parties were living together as husband and wife. In his deposition Exh. P/5 the respondent stated that the suit plots were purchased by him in 1973 through Punjab Estate Agency for consideration of Rs.2,500 per plot. He produced certificates Exhs.P/6 and P/7 about the commission paid. He produced copy Exh.P/8 of his National Identity Card. He produced copy Exh;P9 of Ration card and copy Exh. P10 of certificate issued by the Councillor. Respondent further stated that construction over the suit plots was raised by him, out of his own funds and from the amount of loan obtained from the House Building Finance Corporation in name of the applicant. He produced copy Exh.P11 of letter of acceptance and copy Exh.P.12 of questionnaire form to be filled by Guarantor. He produced receipts Exhs.P.13 to P.22 about Sui Gas which were in his name. He also produced bills Exhs.P.23 and P.24 of gas contractor and gas bills Exhs.P.26 to Exh.P.31. Respondent also produced the documents Exhs.P.32 to P34 to Electric Supply Corporation. He also produced receipts Exhs.P35 to P.40 and bills Exhs.P.41 to P.43 about water and conservancy charges. Earlier the applicant stated that he was getting salary of Rs.2,000 per month. He is serving in Shipyard since 1955 as stated by him in cross‑examination. In reply to Court questions the respondent stated that he had spent Rs.10,000 to Rs.15,000 during the period 1973 to 1980 on construction of the suit plots, besides spending Rs.9,000 on gas and electric installations. He also stated that he spent Rs.22,000 to 25,000 from amount of the loan on construction of the house. In respect of the sale agreement about the suit property the respondent states that it was in possession of the applicant. As against aforesaid evidence Mst. Muhammadi Begum Exh.49 deposed that the two plots in suit were purchased by her. That she sold one plot and raised construction over another plot after obtaining loan of Rs.45,000 in her nom;, from House Building Finance Corporation. She claimed to be paying back loan amount. The applicant admitted that the house in suit was constructed under supervision of the respondent who got water and electric connection installed in the house in his own name. The applicant claimed to have purchased the plots from her own saving. She did not state if she had any independent source of income besides the money she got from the respondent. Applicant admitted in her cross‑examination that when she married with the respondent, she was dependent on him and her daughter was not in service. She admitted that she had no purchase receipt of the construction material. She admitted that the respondent was her daughter for obtaining loan from said corporation. She admitted that she had not produced any receipt showing that she had paid loan amount to the said Corporation. She admitted that she had not produced any receipt showing that she had sold one of the plots for Rs.70,000 to Musarat Begum. Even sale agreement about such transaction was not produced. Applicant did not examine any other witness in support of her case. Case‑law on the point lays stress on source of consideration money and possession of the document of title. In the case of Jamila Khatoon v. Yasin and others (PLD 1959 Dacca 690) it was held that where the dispute arises between the Benamidar and the real owner about a transaction being Benami or not, the questions about source of consideration money and possession of the document of title are of great force. In the case of Ismail Dada Adam Soomar v. Shorat Banoo (PLD 1907 Karachi 852) it was held that custody of the title deeds of property is a factor to be taken into account for determining the Benami character of a transaction but where the husband living in the house with his wife, left it during his sickness, it would be quite natural for the title deeds to have remained at the house in custody of the wife. In the case of Upendra Nath Nag Chaudhary and others v. Bhupendra Nath Nag Chaudhary and others (PLD 1914‑1947 Calcutta 128) emphasis was laid on two principal tests viz. source of the purchase money and possession of the property for determining nature of the transaction being Benami or not. In the case of Sura Lakshmias Chetty and others v. Kothandaran Pillai (AIR 1925 PC 181) it was held that a purchase in India by a native of India of the property in India in the came of his wife unexplained by other, proved or admitted facts, is to be regarded as a Benami transaction by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband although the 'ostensible title is in the wife. It was also held that the rule of law of England that such a purchase by husband is to be purchase for the advancement of wife does not apply in India. In the case of Mollaya Pudayachi and another v. Karishna Sawama Iyer and others (AIR 1925 Madras 95), the view taken was' that the presumption in favour of Benami will be strengthened if almost all the property was purchased in the name of wife and the man purchased really next to nothing in his own mean. In Mirza Ahmad Baig and others v. Modle Mill Nagpur Ltd. (AIR 1926 Nag 262), it was held that in view of the extraordinary prevalence of Benami transactions in India, even slight quantity of evidence may suffice to prove it. Viewed in the light of the case law discussed above we have the evidence that the respondent was employed in Karachi Shipyard on monthly salary of Rs.2,000 (Rupees two thousand only) while the applicant was not employed anywhere. There is no evidence if the applicant was having any source of income. Applicant did not claim so in her written statement or in her evidence. It is difficult to believe that the plots in suit were purchased from the money of applicant. Even if the applicant had savings as claimed by her in her deposition Exh.49, the same could be only from the amount she was receiving from the respondent. One of the daughters of applicant may be employed but no particulars about the same have been given. Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that daughter of the applicant was in service before purchase of the suit property. All this shows that the applicant did not have her own money, from which she could have purchased the suit property. Evidence of the respondent Exh.P.5 that the suit property was purchased from his funds looks sound and plausible. In this view of the matter I find that the Courts below have rightly rejected claim of the applicant to the sole property.". Keeping in view the law declared in the aforementioned judgments and the facts of the case in hand, it stands established on record that the plot in dispute was purchased in the name of the petitioner by the respondent and similarly the construction was also raised by him and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is the property in question. There is no cavil with the proposition as laid down in the cases of Mohib Ullah Khan v. Sadiq Khan (1986 SCMR 270) and Shah Gul and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others (1990 SCMR 110), that in cases where the concurrent findings of fact are based upon misreading of evidence or omission of taking into consideration material portions thereof this Court can interfere with the said concurrent findings of fact in exercise of revisional jurisdiction yet in the case in hand the judgments rendered by the I two Courts below appear to be well‑based on evidence on the record and there is no misreading or non‑reading of any material piece of evidence. The judgments are also in accord with the principles laid down in various judgments referred to above for determining the question as to whether a transaction in question is Benami. This case hence is fully covered by the law declared in the cases of Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan (PLD 1983 SC 53), Haji Muhammad Zaman v. Zafar Ali Khan (PLD 1986 SC 88) and Guldar Khan v. Isa Khan and others (1993 SCMR 2099) according to which judgments the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the two Court below are not liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Resultantly I hold that the findings of the two Courts below on all the issues are unexceptionable and are not liable to be interfered with in this civil revision. Last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding her claim of payment of amounts allegedly spent by her is also misconceived as she has miserably failed that she spent any amount either for purchase or for raising the construction in question which was raised from her own independent source of income. Even otherwise this plea was also not raised before any of the Courts below, hence, cannot be allowed to be raised as this stage. Hence no relief on the above account can be granted to her. Resultantly I see no force in this revision. The same is dismissed with costs throughout. AA./K‑110/L Revision dismissed.