P L D 1969 Lahore 767 (PLP)

Dates of hearing: 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th January 1968. SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.‑--‑Muhammad Aslam was dec lared on the 10th of April 1967 to be a goonda under section 13 of the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance (XXXV of 1959), (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance) by the Tribunal,, and he was required under section 14 (1) (a) to furnish a bond in the sum of Rs. 1,0,),000 (one lac) with two sureties in the like amount to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. The Tribunal further directed under clause (d) of sub section (1) of section 14 that he shall not reside within the revenue district of Lahore for the like period of two years, and that he should remove himself from the said area within three days of the order. Ghulam Muhammad, a brother of Muhammad Aslam, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by means of a writ petition (No. 116 of 1967), to challenge the said order as one without lawful authority and consequently of no legal effect.

2. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance (XXXV of 1959), is altra vires the provisions of Article 5 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, inasmuch as it 3s repugnant to the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, the Pakistan Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, which were existing laws and the Governor could not make the Ordinance unless he had obtained the previous instructions of the President under Article 110 of the late Constitution.

3. The Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of West Pakistan in pursuance of the Presidential Proclamation of the seventh day of October 1958, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf. The Ordinance became operative from the 4th of June 1959. The Preamble of the Ordinance shows that it was considered expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the control of disorderly persons commonly known as goondas in the Province of West Pakistan. It is a consolidating statute, because it repealed in whole the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, and the Sind Control of Goondas Act, 1952. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956 was abrogated on the 7th of October 1958, in pursuance of the Proclamation of that day, and the President made the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, on the 10th of October 1958. Notwithstanding the abrogation of the Consti tution, all existing laws were kept in force by Article 4 of the said Order, till such time as were altered, repealed or amended by competent authority. In Article 2 it was provided inter alia that "Pakistan, shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution." Clause (1) of Article 5 said that the "powers of a Governor shall be those which he would have had the President directed him to assume" on behalf of the President all the functions of the Government of the Province under the provisions of Article 193 of the late Constitution and such powers of making Ordinances as he would have had and within such limitations had Article 106 and clauses (1) and (3) of Article 102 of the late Constitution been still in force." The Governor, under clause (1) of Article 102 of the late Constitution could "make and promulgate" an Ordinance, but the power of making such an Ordinance was "subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws." The Pro vincial Legislature had the power under clause (2) of Arti cle 106 "to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List", and under clause (3) of the said Article, the Provincial Legislature enjoyed" exclusive power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial List." The exercise of the power by the Provincial Legislature, however, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List was subject to the restrictions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article

110. It is provided in clause (1) thereof that "if any Provision of an Act of a Provincial Legislature is repugnant to any provision of an Act of Parliament, which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the Act of Parliament, whether passed before or after the Act of the Provincial Legislature, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the Act of the Provincial Legislature shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void." Clause (2) of the aforementioned Article provided that if "an Act of a Provincial Legislature with respect to any of the matters in the Concurrent List" contained "any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter" and such an Act was "reserved for the con sideration of the President", and had "received his assent; the Act of the Provincial Legislature shall prevail in the province concerned." The existing laws with respect to the matters contained in the Concurrent List were rendered immune from a further legislation by the Provincial Legislature and a law made by the Provincial Legislature with respect to any of the matters covered by an existing law could be a valid piece of legislation only if it had received the approval of the President. An "existing law" under Article 218 of the late Constitution meant "any Act, Ordinance, Order, bye‑law, rule regulation or notification which immediately before the Con stitution Day has the force of law in the whole or any part of Pakistan" On the plain reading of the constitutional provisions, a law made by the Provincial Legislature before the Constitution was an existing law and if such a law was with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Con current List, the law made after the coming into force of the. Constitution by the Provincial Legislature was void unless it had been assented to by the President. The Governor for the exercise of his legislative power was controlled by the provisions contained in Article 110 and, therefore, lie could not make an Ordinance with respect to a matter about which there existed a law already on any o: the subjects contained in the Concurrent List. Article 110, of course, had no appli cation if the law related to a matter contained in the Provin cial List.

4. By referring to the Legislative Powers Order, 1959,. (President's Order No. 2 of 1959), it was argued that all the matters enumerated in the Provincial List in the Fifth Schedule to the late Constitution should be deemed to have been included in the Concurrent List of that Schedule; that there was no Provincial List left after the abrogation of the Constitution and that the Governor, if he were to make a law repugnant to any law which existed on the subject, could do, so by obtaining Previous instructions of the President. It was contended that the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, was already existing on the subject, and that since sections 4, 8, 10, 13 and 21 of the 1959‑Ordinance were repugnant to sections 5, 9, 10, 13 and 19, respectively, of the Punjab Act, and the latter Ordinance had not received the assent of the President, it was unconstitutional. It was held by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Afzal v. Commissioner of Lahore Division (P L D 1963 SC 401) : Thus it would appear that under Article 5 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order a Governor could promulgate an Ordinance containing provisions repugnant to an existing law or an Act of Parliament in respect of a matter on the Concurrent List if the Ordinance had been made under the previous instructions of the President or had received the subsequent assent of the President. Now the Legislative Powers Order, 1959, being President's Order No. 2 of 1959, as amended by the President's Order No. 17 of 1959, completely abolished the Provincial List in the Fifth Schedule of the late Constitution and transferred all the subjects men tioned therein to the Concurrent List. After this amendment the Governor's Ordinance making power became restricted as indicated above, i.e., he could validly make Ordinances repugnant to an existing law or a Central enactment either under the previous instructions of the President or if the Ordi nance had actually received the subsequent assent of the President, after being reserved for his consideration. In the present case West Pakistan Ordinance XXI of 1962, neither appears on its face to have been made under the previous instructions of the President nor to have received his sub sequent assent after being reserved for his consideration nor have the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respon dents in these matters placed before us anything to show that either such instruction or such assent was ever received in respect of this Ordinance. It is difficult, therefore, to appre ciate how this Ordinance which, as indicated earlier, is not only repugnant to the provisions of several existing laws but also of an Ordinance made by, the President himself, can be said to have been competently or validly made even under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order." The Legislative Powers Order was made and promulgated on the 20th of March 1959, but Article 4 by which all the matters enumerated in the Provincial List were included in the Concurrent List, was added to it subsequently on the 23rd of September 1959, by the Legislative Powers (Amendment) Order, 1959. It is from that date that the Provincial List altogether came to an end. Under clause (t) of Article 3 of the Amending Order, nothing in the said Order was to "affect the validity of any Provincial Law or part thereof in force immediately before the day on which" the said Order came into force. The Ordinance came into force on the 4th of June 1959, i.e., before Article 4 was added to the Legislative Powers Order, 1959, on the 23rd of September 1959. 'The validity of the Ordinance cannot be questioned on this ground.

5. We may now deal with the question whether the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, was with respect to a matter in the Concurrent List and the impugned Ordinance is invalid by virtue of Article 110 of the late Constitution. According to the learned counsel, 1951 Act was with respect to a criminal matter and it was, therefore, covered by item No. 1 of the Concurrent List, viz : "Criminal law including the law of evidence and procedure". On the other hand, learned Assistant Advocate‑General argued that 1951 Act was covered by item No. 1 of the Provincial List, viz : "Public order" and that if it provided for punishment of certain offences and their procedure, the provisions to that effect were covered by item No. 91 of the Provincial List providing for "offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List." It is, therefore, to be determined whether the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, pertains to a subject which falls within the Provincial List or the Concurrent List, and if it falls in the Concurrent List whether it is in any way repugnant to the existing law on the subject. The competency of the Provincial Legislature to make) laws or of the Governor to promulgate Ordinance in respect of a matter in the Provincial List even if it was repugnant to existing laws was unquestionable. The consent of the President was not necessary to validate any Provincial law relating to Concurrent List. The question of such assent arose only where the Provincial law was inconsistent with an existing law in the Concurrent List. If there was no repugnancy, the assent of the President was not necessary to validate the Provincial law. In Chief Secretary to the Govern ment of East Pakistan v. Moslemuddin Sikdar (P L D 1957 SC 1) it eras held that "subsection (2) of Article 110 of the Constitution will show, an Act of the Provincial Legislature in the concurrent field is hit to the extent that the subject in question is already covered by legislation. It is not void merely by reason of being an enactment in the concurrent field. It is only void for lack of assent, to the extent of repugnancy." it is, therefore, necessary to examine as to what is the intent and purpose of the impugned Ordinance According to the preamble it is a law "to consolidate and amend the law relating to the control of disorderly persons commonly known as goondas in the Province of West Pakistan." Sections 2 to 5 deal with the constitution of the Tribunals and their jurisdiction. Sections 6 to 12 deal with the procedure which the Tribunal is to observe in hearing the cases against the persons who are complained against for being declared to be goondas. Section 13 furnishes the grounds on which a person is to be adjudged to be a goonda. Section 14 provides for special orders, and under this section the Tribunal may require a. person who is adjudged to be a goonda to furnish a bond of good behaviour or prohibit him to visit certain areas or places and may also direct him to report himself at such time and such place as may be specified in the order, so on and so forth. Section 15 deals with the publication of the declaration made against a person under section

14. Section 16 provides for the form of the bond and its enforcement in case he commits breach of it. Section 17 empowers the Tribunal to order that no action against the person proceed against is necessary. Sections 18 and 19 provide for appeal and revision to the Commissioner and the High Court, res pectively. Under section 20, a person who is declared to be a goonda under section 13, can be asked to furnish his photographs, finger‑prints, etc. For the contravention of any of the orders passed under the Ordinance, punishment is provided in section 21 and the offences are made cognizable and non‑bailable under section

22. The rest of the provisions only provide for bar on civil or criminal proceedings ; removal of name from the list of goondas, custody of records and transfer of cases etc. Under section 28 the Government has the power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Ordinance. The reference to the previsions of the Ordi nance leaves no doubt whatsoever that the intention of the Ordinance is to control the behaviour of disorderly persons.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the grounds mentioned in section 13 on the basis of which a person can be declared to be a goonda are offences punish able either under the Pakistan Penal Code or the Customs Laws etc., and, therefore, pertained to "criminal law" falling under item No. 1 of the Concurrent List. The acts mentioned in section 13 may indeed constitute offences either under the Pakistan a Penal Code or under some other law and, therefore, may be punishable accordingly, but these acts or any one of them do not render a person liable to a penal section under section

13. Notwithstanding section 13. it is competent under the relevant penal law to punish a person for any act or omission mentioned in the clauses. This section, moreover, does not take notice of the individual acts. It is only if a person is by habit indulging in disor derly activities that he is declared to be a goonda. The declaration of a person as a goonda under section 13 is no bar for taking a penal action against him for any of the acts mentioned in these clauses. If a person is tried for these acts under the Pakistan Penal Code or any other law, the decision in that case may furnish an evidence to the Tribunal for its satisfaction whether or not the allegations against the person for declaring him to be a goonda are correct. Section 13 applies to a different situation and a purpose, and in no way provides for taking penal action.

7. We are in no doubt that the Ordinance is covered by item No. 1 of the Provincial List, viz : "public order". Section 13 of the Ordinance provides that a person can be declared to be a goonda on the grounds, inter alia, that he is frequently drunk and disorderly in public, behaves riotously in public by entering into affrays, or otherwise howsoever causes fear or alarm to the public or any section or member thereof, by issuing threats verbally or in writing, or by making, publishing or circulating false statements, rumors or reports ; defies the law generally and endangers public peace, etc. The person indulging in these activities doubtless disturbs the public peace, and tranquility, and to maintain public order it is necessary to control such activities. The Ordinance is intended for that and only for that purpose. The order de claring a person to be a goonda is published along with the statement of the order. Thus an information is imparted to the public about the antecedents of such a person so that they should be in awareness of his activities. Such a person can also be asked to furnish security for good behaviour and breach of it renders him liable to the forfeiture of the amount and also to punishment. All these steps are preven tive in nature and are provided with a view to controlling disorderly behaviour of such persons.

8. It was next contended that section 22 makes offences under the Ordinance cognizable and non‑bailable whereas under the Code of Criminal Procedure the offences being punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years are non cognizable and bailable and, therefore, to this extent they are repugnant to the "criminal Law", which is in the Concurrent List. The Ordinance, in our opinion, falls under item No. 1 of the Provincial List and by virtue of item No. 1 of the Provincial List it was competent for the Provincial Legislature while making provision in respect of matters in its jurisdiction also to make penal provision for the enforcement and carrying into effect the purpose of that Act. Section 21 which provides for punishment does not stand by itself. It comes into opera tion only if other provisions for which the Act was made, namely, to control the disorderly behaviour of persons are violated by such persons. Sections 20 and 21 are, therefore, within the competence of the Provincial Legislature and it could enact these provisions and the Ordinance thus cannot be impugned on this ground. The Ordinance, moreover, is a special law. It is provided in subsection (2) of section I of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure that "in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force." Under subsection (2) of section 5 "all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enact ment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise deal ing with such offences." The provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure have thus to be read subject to the pro visions of the special law. The procedure provided in the impugned Ordinance, which is a special law, will over‑ride the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question of repugnancy does not arise.

9. As to the contention of the learned counsel that sections 4, 8, 10, 13 and 21 of the 1959 Ordinance were repugnant to sections 5, 9, 10, 13 and 19, respectively, of the Punjab Act of 1951, we only wish to say that even if they are repugnant, it will not affect the vires of the Ordinance. The purpose, the object and the scope of the Punjab Act is also to control the disorderly behaviour of certain persons, and the provisions of section 14 of that Act on the basis of which a person could be declared to be a goonda are almost g identical to those in section 13 of 1959 Ordinance. The Punjab Act, therefore, falls under item No. 1 of the Provincial List and though an existing law it was not included in the Concurrent List, and, therefore, the provisions of Article 110 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service for canvassing that the Ordinance is ultra vices. The order of the Tribunal declaring the petitioner to be a goonda under section 13 was not challenged on any other ground. The declaration made under section 13, therefore, is unexceptionable.

10. Under clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance, the said Muhammad Aslam was also directed not to reside within the revenue district of Lahore for two years, and that he should remove himself from the said area within three days of the order. It is provided in subsection (2) of section 14 that "no order under clause (d) or clause (e) of subsection (1) shall be made operative for a period exceeding three years and without hearing the goonda in respect thereof." The learned counsel assailed this part of the order on the ground, namely, that Muhammad Aslam was not heard within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 14 and that at any rate, the Tribunal could not extern him from the whole of the district. Admittedly, no notice was given to Muhammad Aslam after he was declared to be a goonda. It is indubitably char from the tenor of subsection (2) that an order under! the said provision can be made only after hearing the "Goonda" ` in respect thereof It is pertinent to note that before al person is declared to be a goonda under section 13, he is referred to in sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 as the "person complained against". Section 13 itself, under which he is declared to be a goonda, describes him before the order is passed as the "person complained against", and it is only after the Tribunal is satisfied that "the person complained against" is proved to be guilty of any of the acts mentioned therein that it declares such a person to be a "goonda". The "person complained against" therefore, becomes a "goonda" only after the declaration. The order under subsection (2) can be passed only after hearing the "goonda" which means that the hearing is to be afforded to the "goonda" and not to the "person complained against".

11. Moreover, when an action is taken under section 13, it is not necessary that an order under section 14 requiring the "goonda" to furnish a bond or to restrict him in his movements must necessarily be made. It is in the discretion of the Tribunal after it has declared a person to be a goonda to pass further orders under section

14. Section 14 is depen dent on section 13 and no action under section 14 is per missible unless there is first a declaration that the person is a goonda. Under section 14 (1) the goonda may be required to furnish a bond, and since there is no requirement like subsection (2) of section 14 for hearing him before this order is made, it can be passed contemporaneously with an order declaring the person to be a goonda. An order under clauses (d) and (e) of subsection (1) of section 14 can be made only after a hearing is afforded to the goonda. The provision of a hearing to precede an order under clause (d) or clause (e) is purposeful and has been made to achieve the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Under clause (d), his movements are to be restricted to any place or he may be directed not to reside within certain area. In the hearing which is afforded to him under subsection (2) he may impress upon the Tribunal the advisability of not excluding him from a certain area or not restricting his movements to any parti cular place or area. In one case he may say that if he is excluded frog certain areas he will, be derived of his means of living and sustenance while in the other he may agitate that if he is restricted to a certain place, his life may be in danger from his enemies. The reasons which a goonda may advance at the time of hearing against the proposed orders under clause (d) or clause (e) can be more than one and it is with reference to that circumstances of each case that they can be properly appreciated by the Tribunal. The hearing contemplated in subsection (2) of section 14 means a real substantial hearing. The action of the Tribunal cannot be justified by the fact that the person has been heard prior to the passing of an order declaring him a goonda. The hearing provided in this subsection is in fact in the nature of giving notice to the goonda to show clause why the proposed action under clause (d) or clause (s) be not taken. The Tribunal is not under any obligation to pass the order consequent upon the declaration of a person as a goonda. It is in its discretion to pass the order. The order is to impinge the liberty of a person, and, therefore, it is necessary that dis= t cretion must be exercised judiciously. The object is achieved if the order is supported by reasons. To achieve the object; a statutory hearing has been made a condition precedent to the passing of the order. The Tribunal, if it wishes to pass any order, must afford a hearing to the petitioner after he is declared a goonda. The order of the Tribunal under clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 14 on this short ground stands vitiated.

12. The contention of the learned counsel that the order under sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 14 cannot be passed directing a person not to reside within the district, is also formidable. The learned Assistant Advocate -General canvassed before us that the areas mentioned in this clause can be more than one place in the same district and also since the plural can also,, under the General Clauses Act, PC interpreted to mean singular, a person declared to be , a goonda can be directed not to reside in the entire area of the district. The word "area" used in sub‑clause (i) and the word areas mentioned in sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) of sub section (1) of section 14, are relatable to the district where the person complained against resides and over which the Tribunal has the jurisdiction. The word "areas" in sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) cannot be understood to mean the whole district. It is clear from the provisions of the Ordinance itself that the Legislature did not intend nor did not provide for the exclusion of a goonda from the district. Subsection (1) of section 2 of the Ordinance says that in "every district there shall be a tribunal to deal with cases under this Ordi nance arising within the district." The Tribunal, under sub section (2) of this section, is to be presided over by the "District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class especially empowered by Government in this behalf." The Tribunal can take cognizance of a case under the Ordinance only if the person complained against resides within the local limits of its jurisdiction. It is so provided in section 5 of the Ordinance. Under subsection (i) of section 14 the Tri bunal may require the goonda to furnish a bond to be of good behaviour and may also direct that "he shall not reside within areas specified in the order." The breach of any order made against any person. Under clause (d) or clause (e) .of subsection (1) of section 14, or the further commission of any of the acts mentioned in section 13, or the commission of any offence which is punishable with imprisonment under any law for the time being in force and which in the opinion of the Tribunal involves or implies moral turpitude amounts to a breach of a bond for good behaviour‑ which may have, been furnished by him under this Ordinance. The: Tribunal in such a case acts ‑clause section 16 and may forfeit the bond. If sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) of subsection (1) of. section 14 is interpreted to mean the exclusion of a person from the whole of the district, he in that case has to reside outside the limits of his jurisdiction and in that case it will not be possible to press in service the provisions of section 16 against such a person. In the context, it is clear that the goonda muse remain in the district so that the Tribunal should be able to exercise control over him and see that he maintains a good behaviour for the period for which he has furnished the bond: The Ordinance, moreover, aims at controlling the disorderly behaviour of a person who habitually indulges in activities which disturb the public order and if a person is excluded from the whole district, and since there is no provision to restrict his movements in any other district or any other part of Pakistan, he will be within his rights to live in any area no matter howsoever remote it may be from the district where originally he resided. There is also no provision in, the Ordinance for controlling his activities in that area. It could not be the intention of the Legislature that a person should be externed from the district and let loose to indulge in nefarious activities in other parts of Pakistan and should cause public disorder there, without being noticed, watched or controlled. It is manifestly the intention of the Legislature to control the activities of such persons and to keep them under surveillance. The Government to achieve this object made the Rules in the exercise of the power under section 28: of the Ordinance and it is provided in rule 6 thereof that the "name of every goonda shall be entered in the Surveil lance Register of the police station of the area in which he resides and his history sheet shall he opened by the officer in charge of such police station. A copy of the history sheet shall be maintained by the officer in charge Criminal Investigating, Agency of the area, where such goonda resides, and where there is no Criminal Investigating Agency by the officer in charge of the District Intelligence Bureau or such other police officer, not below the rank of Sub‑Inspector, as the Superintendent of Police of the District may appoint in this behalf." It is evident from the tenor of this rule that the goonda must reside within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the district because if it were not, so how is it possible to place, as required by sub‑rule (3) of rule 6 of the Rules, the history sheet of every goonda before the Tribunal once every quarter. The administration of each district, moreover, is such that the police officers of such districts are responsible to their own District Magistrates and as such it is inconceivable that the police officers outside the district should open the history sheet of a person as required by sub‑rule (1) of rule 6 and that too when it is not certain that the goonda is to reside there for any definite period because the only restriction imposed upon him is not to live in his own district and his movements are not restri cted to anywhere else. On the same reasoning, it is‑ not possible for the Deputy Superintendent of police, etc., to record the remarks as required by sub‑rule (,2) of rule 6. sub‑rule (8) is significant, under which the "disappearance of every goonda" is to "be notified in the West Pakistan Police Gazette and the District Police Gazettes of the District which" the goonda "is likely to visit." This is possible only if the goonda is not excluded from the district. It is thus clear from the provisions of the Ordinance itself that the Tribunal by an order under sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 13 of the Ordinance cannot direct the exterenment of a goonda from the whole of the district. The order must relate to an area or areas within the district. 1n Macbeth and others v. Ashley and others ((1874) 30 L T R 310) it was held by the House of Lords that "the resolution was ultra vires, and an evasion of the statute, for the Act gave them a discretion to select a portion of the whole district, and it was contrary both to the spirit and letter to apply an exceptional rule to what was vitually the whole burgh." The facts were that Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 35, fixed the hours for opening and closing licensed houses in Scotland at eight in the morning and eleven at night ; and by section 2, gave power to the licensing magistrates, at their discretion, to vary those hours `in any particular locality within any country; district, or burgh requiring other hours for opening or closing. The Magistrates of Rs. defined by metes and bounds a certain part of their burgh, which in fact included all le licensed houses therein, and passed a resolution to the effect that the particular locality so defined required that the licensed houses in it should be closed at ten at night, and inserted that hour in the certificates which they granted.

13. In the view of the matter we take, We hold that the Ordinance is intra vires the power of the Governor; the order of the Tribunal declaring Muhammad Aslam to be a goonda under section 13 is unexceptionable as also the order under section 14 (1) (a) by which be was required to furnish a bond in the sum of rupees one lac with two sureties in the like amount to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. The order of the Tribunal passed under sub‑clause (iv) of clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 14, so far as it directs Muhammad Aslam to leave the limits of civil district of Lahore for a period of two years, having been made with out affording him a hearing and also being not in accord with the provisions of the Ordinance, is declared to be without lawful authority and consequently of no legal effect. There shall be no order as to costs. K. B. A. Petition partly accepted.