2016 P Cr (PLP)

SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.

Qasim Ali son of Sultan Ahmad, caste Arain, resident of Manzoor Pura Plot, Tehsil Shakargarh, Distirct Narowal, appellant/Juvenile, along with Atif Bilal alias Bilal Khan son of Muhammad Boota (tried and convicted separately being major) was involved in case FIR No.189, dated 13.11.2008, offence under sections 365-A, 302, 201, 34, P.P.C., read with sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, registered at Police Station Noor Kot, District Narowal, and was tried by Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Gujranwala. The learned trial court in terms of judgment dated 27.07.2009 convicted the appellant under section 365-A, P.P.C., read with section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life being juvenile along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- and in case of failure in payment thereof, to undergo S.I. for one year. The appellant was also convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C., read with section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and sentenced to imprisonment for life with direction to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to the legal heirs of deceased and in case of default in payment thereof, to undergo SI for one year. Under section 201, P.P.C., the appellant was sentenced to undergo R.I. for seven years along with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in case of default in payment of fine, to further undergo S.I. for three months. All the sentences inflicted upon the appellant were directed to run concurrently and benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended in favour of the appellant. The appellant has challenged his conviction and sentence through filing Crl. Appeal No.1506 of 2009.

2. The prosecution story as alleged in the FIR (Exh.PA/1) lodged on the complaint (Exh.PA) of Afzal Khan son of Faqir Khan, caste Pathan, resident of Manzoor Pura Plot, Tehsil Shakargarh, District Narowal, complainant (PW-7) is that he is resident of Manzoor Pura and settled in Saudi Arabia in connection with livelihood and in the days of occurrence he had arrived his house on leave. On 05.11.2008 at 6:00 p.m. when the complainant was present in his house on Mobile Phone No.0342-6466546 a call was received by Mohsin Khan son of the complainant, who on receipt of call went towards road to see his friend, however, did not return. On 06.11.2008 at 6:10 a.m. the complainant received call from 0342-6466546 at his Mobile No.03076163785; wherein it was disclosed that Mohsin son of the complainant was with them. The complainant, at his own, traced out that number and came to know that from that number certain calls were also made on Mobile No.0343-6636651. On 06.11.2008 from 8:38 a.m. to 1:20 p.m. four calls were made to the complainant through mobile No.0342-6466546 wherein ransom amount was demanded on which the complainant promised to make the payment of Rs.1,00,000/- to the accused and they asked the complainant to reach Mouza Kanjroor and the complainant in the company of Haji Arshad Khan son of Muhammad Ismaeel Khan, resident of the same village and Saeed Ullah Khan son of Walayat Khan, caste Pathan, resident of Rasheedpur while riding on motorcycle reached Kanjroor near JAZZ Tower National Bank Kanjroor and the accused made a telephone call at 5:33 p.m. thereby stating to drop the ransom amount in the bushes besides road near Mobile Tower. The complainant placed the amount in the bushes and the complainant and other PWs while hiding themselves started watching the accused. At 7:15 p.m. two young boys while riding on motorcycle YAMAHA reached there and after taking the ransom amount from bushes rode on motorcycle bearing registration No.6089/STT and passed by the complainant and others to whom the complainant, Haji Muhammad Arshad Khan and Saeed Khan identified as (1) Bilal Khan son of Muhammad Boota, caste Pathan and (2) Qasim son of Sultan Ahmed, caste Arain, resident of Manzoor Pura Plot. The complainant and others tried to chase them, however, the accused disappeared. The complainant claimed that he had searched the accused, however, they could not be traced out and their mobile numbers were also off. The complainant alleged that Bilal Khan and Qasim had kidnapped his son and did not release him although they had received the ransom amount. As per contents of the complaint, due to fear that the accused may not murder his son, the complainant did not inform the police about the incident earlier.

3. The complainant presented his written complaint (Exh.PH) to Muhammad Younas, ASI (PW-1)/Duty Officer, on the basis of which formal FIR (PH/1) was chalked out without any addition or omission. Thereafter, the investigation was entrusted to Muhammad Faiz, S.I. (PW-9), who proceeded to the place of occurrence; where the complainant and other PWs were present. The Investigating Officer inspected the place of occurrence and prepared rough site plan (Exh.PL) attested by the PWs and the Investigating Officer recorded their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. On 13.11.2008 the Investigating Officer raided the house of Atif Bilal and arrested him. During the course of investigation the accused made disclosure that after abducting Mohsin Khan he along with his co-accused had committed his murder by strangulation. Thereafter, the accused led towards Christian graveyard and got recovered dead body of Mohsin Khan and the complainant identified the dead body of his son. The Investigating Officer prepared identification memo (Exh.PC). He also prepared rough site plan of the place of recovery (Exh.PM). The Investigating Officer prepared inquest report (Exh.PN), injury statement (Exh.PO), drafted application for postmortem examination (Exh.PP) and dispatched the dead body to mortuary for autopsy. Thereafter the Investigating Officer reached village Kanjroor. The complainant and other PWs pointed towards the place where the ransom amount was placed and the Investigating Officer prepared rough site plan of that place (Exh.PQ). Subsequently the accused pointed towards the place from where they had taken away the ransom amount and the Investigating Officer prepared identification memo (Exh.PI) attested by the PWs. The Investigating Officer also recorded their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. Subsequently the accused led the Investigating Officer towards Pull Basantar Nala near village Dhuni Deve and pointed out the place from where co-accused Atif Bilal alias Bilal Khan had thrown the SIM No.0344-6010876 and 0342-6466546. The Investigating Officer prepared its identification memo (Exh.PJ) and rough site plan (Exh.PR). After the postmortem examination last worth clothes of the deceased shirt (P-1), shalwar (P-2) and vest (P-3) along with electric wire (P-4) were produced before the Investigating Officer, which he took into possession vide recovery memo Exh.PF signed by Khurram Shehzad, Sagheer Ahmed and Javed Iqbal PWs and the Investigating Officer recorded their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. On 14.11.2008 the Investigating Officer obtained physical remand of the accused and on 15.11.2008 the complainant produced small carton of mobile phone with warranty card of mobile phone NOKIA-6070 (P-6), which the Investigating Officer took into possession vide recovery memo Exh.PG. Arfan Ali Patwari (PW-1) took rough notes of the place of occurrence on the instructions of the PWs and after preparing scaled site plan (Exh.PA and Exh.PA/1) produced before the Investigating Officer, which he made part of the file. On 18.11.2008 during the course of interrogation the accused after making disclosure led to the recovery of ransom amount of Rs.30,000/- (30 notes of Rs.1,000/-) (P-8/1-30) from west corner of his room from an iron box lying on iron petty. He also got recovered Mobile NOKIA 6070 without SIM(P-1) and mobile phone LGK 270 with SIM No.0343-6636451 (P-9), which the Investigating Officer took into possession vide recovery memo Exh.PK signed by the PWs. He also prepared rough site plan of the place of recovery and recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses under section 161, Cr.P.C. On reaching the police station the Investigating Officer handed over the case property to Moharrar Malkhana for safe custody and onward transmission to the quarter concerned. On 19.11.2008 the complainant along with other PWs joined into investigation and identified Rs.30,000/- and Mobile Phone NOKIA 6070 recovered from the appellant. The Investigating Officer prepared identification memo Exh.PD attested by the PWs and their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. were also recorded. During the course of investigation, having found the accused/appellant guilty, the Investigating Officer while placing his name in column No.3 of the report prepared under section 173, Cr.P.C., sent the same to the court of competent jurisdiction.

5. After submission of challan, the accused was formally charge sheeted by the learned trial court in terms of order dated 06.04.2009 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution in order to advance its case produced as many as nine (9) prosecution witnesses. Muhammad Afzal (PW-7) is the complainant of the case, whereas, his testimony was supplemented by Saeed Ullah Khan (PW-8). On presentation of complaint Muhammad Younas, ASI (PW-6) had chalked out formal FIR and Arfan Ali Patwari (PW-1) had prepared scaled site plan. The investigation in this case was conducted by Muhammad Faiz, S.I. (PW-9). Dr. Muhammad Latif Afzal (PW-4) had conducted postmortem examination upon the dead body of deceased and observed as under:- "EXTERNAL APPEARANCE It was dead body of young boy aged about 15 years wearing shalwar qameez and bunian of white colour. Face was swollen. Eye-balls were proturdent and prominent. Tongue was proturdent and swollen and biting by teeth. Petchial haemorrhage were present on the face. Ligature mark was present on the around neck. On the lower part of the neck, the ligature was below the level of thyroid cartilage. EXTERNAL INJURIES:- The ligature mark was horizontal and encircled the neck completely. The skin underneath the neck ligature was damaged and abraded. The ligature mark was due to electric wire around the neck which was around the neck encircling the neck tightly."

6. The learned Public Prosecutor vide his statement recorded on 26.06.2009 after giving up Maqbool Ahmed, Haji Muhammad Arshad, Usman Khan and Yousaf Khan, closed the prosecution evidence.

7. The appellant was also examined under section 342, Cr.P.C; wherein he opted to produce defence evidence, however, he opted not to appear as his own witness in terms of section 340(2), Cr.P.C. in disproof of the allegations levelled against him in the prosecution evidence. While replying to a question, why this case against him and why the PWs deposed against him, the appellant made the following deposition:- "I have been falsely involved in this case. The actual facts of the case have not been brought on the file deliberately by the complainant to save the honour of his family. The actual culprit has also been saved by the complainant being his Bhanja. Naveed was the master mind of the occurrence and he is the responsible of the crime. An altercation took place between me and complainant two/three days prior to the occurrence. So, he has falsely roped me in this case. The PWs are inter se related and inimical towards me and my co-accused and they have deposed falsely against me." Subsequently on 08.07.2009 without adducing any evidence, the appellant closed his defence evidence.

8. After hearing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, the learned trial court, while evaluating the evidence available on the record, found the version of the prosecution correct beyond any shadow of doubt, resulting into conviction of the appellant in the above terms.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant, at the very outset, while referring to reported judgment in the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah alias Papa v.

1. The State.

2. Muhammad Naqi Shah (PLD 2003 Pesh. 138) raised objection that the appellant being minor his case falling under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, having no overriding effect, he could not have been tried by the court constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. On merits learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay of eight days, which does not appeal to reason especially when both the complainant and PW-8 reside in the same vicinity and it is the prosecution version that they had identified the appellant on 07.11.2008, hence this aspect creates question mark with regard to presence of the prosecution witnesses at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant and his co-accused allegedly took the ransom amount on 07.11.2008 at 7:15 p.m, however, no source of light stood mentioned, which facilitated the complainant and other PWs to identify them and in absence of test identification parade, this prosecution version remained unproved. Even facts of the case, learned counsel for the appellant agitated, do not satisfy the ingredients of section 365-A, P.P.C. It was further argued that as per prosecution own version the dead body was recovered on the joint confession/ pointation of the appellant and his co-convict, which is inadmissible in evidence. He went on arguing that the factum of calls made by the appellant to the complainant could not be substantiated through any data and even the mobile phone from where alleged calls were made, was not in the name of the appellant. Learned counsel next submitted that the recovery of mobile phone and currency notes being of generalized nature, does not advance the prosecution case against the appellant. Whole of the police karvai, it was urged on behalf of the appellant, was completed on 13.11.2008, which also creates suspicion about its authenticity. Learned counsel further argued that as a matter of fact Naveed Bhanja of the complainant wanted to marry his daughter and on fixation of date of her marriage, in order to raise pressure, he abducted son of the complainant, which fact was not brought on record by the complainant deliberately. Learned counsel next argued that at the most it is a case of circumstantial evidence, which is not substantiated by any other evidence. Learned counsel next argued that in such circumstances of the case, in absence of any cogent and confidence inspiring evidence, the sentence inflicted by the learned trial court is uncalled for and even otherwise the reasons advanced by the learned trial court are not cogent enough appealing to prudent mind.

10. Contrarily, learned Deputy Prosecutor General assisted by learned counsel for the complainant vehemently opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel for the complainant argued that in view of dictum of law laid down by this Court in the case of Muhammad Din v. Muhammad Jehangir and 4 others {PLD 2005 Lahore 909} argued that the accused charged under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, could only be tried by the court constituted under the Act and not by ordinary court notwithstanding the fact whether he is major or minor. On merits it was argued that the appellant was duly named in the crime report with specific role. Regarding delay in reporting the matter, learned counsel for the complainant emphasized that in view of fear to the life of son of the complainant at the hands of accused and the marriage ceremony of his real daughter, the complainant reported the matter with such a delay. It was further argued that the deceased was lastly seen in the company of the appellant and his co-convict. After his arrest, learned counsel for the complainant argued, the appellant got recovered the dead body and string used for strangulation. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General stated that the medical evidence adduced in the testimony of Dr. Muhammad Latif Afzal (PW-6) also substantiates the prosecution case with regard to time of occurrence. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General submitted that during the course of investigation the appellant also pointed out towards the place of receiving ransom amount. It was further argued that recovery of Mobile Phone of the deceased and ransom amount of Rs.30,000/- further establishes link of the appellant with the commission of offence. Learned counsel for the complainant urged that as the parties were previously known to each other, therefore, no question of misidentification arises. It was next argued that the defence plea advanced by the appellant could not be substantiated either during the course of investigation or during the course of trial. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General submitted that the appellant was found guilty during the course of investigation and such findings of the Investigating Officer were never challenged before any higher forum. Even otherwise the complainant had no reason to substitute the appellant in place of real culprits. It was lastly argued that the learned trial court while attending each and every aspect of the case; thereby advancing very cogent reasons has convicted the appellant, who deprived the complainant from his young lad, as such he deserve absolutely no leniency.

11. Arguments advanced from all corners have been heard. I have also gone through the record available on file with the able assistance of learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the complainant, as well as, learned Deputy Prosecutor General.

12. Firstly we dilate upon the objection raised by learned counsel for the appellant that as the appellant was minor he ought not to have been tried by a court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. No doubt the appellant was charged under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; however, it has been the consistent view of the superior courts of the country that under section 32 of the Act, its provisions have overriding effect over all other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. In the case of Muhammad Din v. Muhammad Jehangir and 4 others (PLD 2004 Lah. 779), it was held that:- "

Ss. 12, 19(1) & 21-G

Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), S. 4(3)

Offender below age of 18 years accused of committing terrorism

Trial of such offender

Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 has exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant offence while Juvenile Justice System Court constituted under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 has exclusive jurisdiction over the offender

Offence of terrorism can be tried only by Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 whereunder age of offender has no relevance

Child below age of eighteen years can legitimately be tried by Anti-Terrorism Court

Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would have over riding effect over all other laws...." Similar view was affirmed in the cases of Meraj Hussain and 3 others v. Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Northern Areas Gilgit and another (2007 PCr.LJ 1011). Moreover, in a recent judgment reported as Muhammad Rasool and another v. The State (PLD 2012 Balochistan 122), it was held that:- "

Under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, courts acquire jurisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them

Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, under its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000." From the above it can safely be held that the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Gujranwala, was justified in conducting trial of the appellant.

13. As per prosecution version contained in the complaint (Exh.PH) on the basis of which crime report (Exh.PH/1) was chalked out on 05.11.2008 at 6:00 p.m. when the complainant was present in his house, his son namely Mohsin after receiving call from 0342-6466546 went towards road in order to see his friend (caller), however, did not turn up. On next day i.e. 06.11.2008 the complainant received various telephone calls at his mobile thereby demanding ransom amount; whereby he came to know that his son had been abducted by some unknown accused persons for ransom. This Court is conscious of the fact that the matter was reported to the police with a delay of eight days of the occurrence, however, it has come in the evidence of the complainant that on 07.11.2008 marriage ceremony of daughter of the complainant was being solemnized, therefore, in order to conclude the marriage ceremony peacefully, usually in our village, such incidents are not highlighted/pin-pointed. Moreover, on demand of ransom amount, it is natural that in order to save the life of his son, the complainant didn't report the matter to the police. Subsequently when the ransom amount was paid to the accused and even then son of the complainant did not return to his home, this fact prompted the complainant to report the matter to the police on 13.11.2008. In this backdrop it can safely be held that the delay in this case is natural and the same is not fatal to the prosecution version, at all.

14. In order to prove its version the prosecution adduced evidence on four counts viz. (i) last seen, (ii) witnesses before whom the ransom amount was received, (iii) recovery of dead body and wire used for strangulation: and (iv) recovery of articles belonging to the deceased, as well as, ransom amount.

15. Muhammad Rafique (PW-2) is the witness of last seen, who along with Yousaf Khan, on 05.11.2008, had seen Mohsin Khan, deceased son of the complainant, in the company of appellant along with his co-accused. Nevertheless this witness had made statement before the police on 13.11.2008, however, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, as the complainant delayed the matter while reporting it to the police, such delay is natural and not fatal to the prosecution case. Much has been emphasized by learned counsel for the appellant that non-production of Yousaf Khan creates dents in the prosecution version, however, as Muhammad Rafique (PW-2) adduced the prosecution version on last seen, therefore, considering it sufficient, the prosecution rightly gave up Yousaf Khan. It is cordial principle of law that quantity is not essential rather quality is sin-qua-non for establishing guilt against and person facing charge. Respectful reliance in this regard is placed on the ratio decidendi of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Abid Ali and 2 others v. The State (2011 SCMR 208); wherein it was held as under:- "

As a rule of criminal jurisprudence, prosecution evidence is not tested on the basis of quantity but quality of evidence; it is not that who is giving evidence and making statement; what is relevant is what statement has been given; it is not the person but the statement of that person which is to be seen and adjudged." Similar view was affirmed in the case of Niaz-ud-Din and another v. The State and another (2011 SCMR 725). Moreover, in the Indian jurisprudence in the case of Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another (2012 SCMR 1869) the above view was given ascent.

16. The most important aspect of the prosecution version is coming from the mouth of Muhammad Afzal Khan complainant (PW-7), and Saeed Ullah Khan (PW-8). As per contents of the crime report Muhammad Afzal Khan complainant (PW-7) had received numerous calls from the accused; thereby demanding ransom amount and he along with PW-8, on the instructions of the accused, had gone to bushes near JAZZ Tower National Bank Kanjroor and placed the ransom amount there and subsequently had seen the appellant along with his other co-accused taking away the ransom amount. Nevertheless learned counsel for the appellant had emphasized that in those days without proper light, there was every likelihood of misidentification of the appellant and his other co-accused, however, admittedly both the parties were previously known to each other being residents of the same village as both the accused had passed near the complainant and other prosecution witnesses, therefore, having identifying them properly the complainant and other prosecution witnesses named them as accused persons. As far as contention of learned counsel for the appellant that in this scenario it was necessary to hold identification parade is concerned, it is the consistent view of the superior courts of the country identification parade is merely a corroborative piece of evidence and if statement of a witness qua identity of accused is proved through other attending circumstances and there is nothing in evidence to suggest that he is deposing falsely, absence of holding of identification parade would not be fatal to the prosecution version. Respectful reliance in this regard is placed on the ratio decidendi of august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Dr. Javaid Akhtar v. The State (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 249); wherein it was held as under:- "....Identification parade was not a legal requirement

If eye-witness could identify the accused before Trial Court that was enough for conviction

Identification parade was immaterial if identification of accused was proved by other convincing evidence..." Similar view was affirmed by the apex Court in the case of Ghazanfar Ali @ Pappy and another v. The State (2012 SCMR 215).

17. After arrest of the appellant he himself had led the police towards the place where dead body of Mohsin Khan son of the complainant was lying and got it recovered. Moreover, the wire used for strangulation was also recovered from the place of recovery of dead body. Both these facts corroborate the prosecution version advanced by the complainant and other prosecution witnesses straightway establishing link of the appellant with the commission of offence. As far as argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the confession was made by co-convict and not the appellant, therefore, the same cannot be used against him is concerned, Article 43 of the Qanun-e -Shahadat Order, 1984 deals with the issue, which reads as under:- "

43. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons is proved. (a) such confession shall be proof against the persons; making it; and (b) the Court may take into consideration such confession as circumstantial evidence against such other person." This question was dealt with at length by august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Raja Muhammad Irshad v. Muhammad Bashir Goraya and others (2006 SCMR 1292); wherein it was held as under:- "

Confessional statement of co-accused which prima facie had connected the accused with the commission of offence could not be termed as "extra judicial confession", and there would be no justification in any manner to discard such piece of evidence..." Further in its salutary judgment in the case of Ghulam Ahmed Chishti v. The State and another (2013 SCMR 385) the august Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:- "The statement of a person who was initially a co-accused alone may not be sufficient to convict someone but in terms of Article 43 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, it can be used as a circumstantial piece of evidence...." It is also worth mentioning that while appearing in the witness box Dr. Muhammad Latif Afzal (PW-4) had mentioned time between the death and postmortem examination as eight days, which fully coincides with the prosecution version coming from the mouth of complainant and other PWs. Fact also remains that during the course of investigation ransom amount of Rs.30,000/-, as well as, Mobile Phone NOKIA of the deceased were also recovered from the appellant during the course of investigation, which aspect further substantiates the prosecution case.

18. The main stance of the appellant has been that Naveed, Bhanja of the complainant had developed illicit relations with daughter of the complainant and as date of her marriage was fixed, therefore, in order to build pressure, he had managed abduction of Mohsin Khan. We having examined the plea of the appellant while keeping it in juxtaposition with the whole prosecution version and arrived at the conclusion that this stance of the appellant is hinging in air finding no support from any other circumstance. Even otherwise if this was the intention of Muhammad Naveed, Bhanja of the complainant, it was better option for him to cause any harm to daughter of the complainant with whom he wanted to marry instead of kidnapping Mohsin Khan. Even otherwise if for the sake of arguments this defence plea is taken to be true as it is, the same is not substantiated from any other material and even glimpse of the same is squarely missing.

19. It is worth mentioning that during the course of investigation the appellant was found guilty and nevertheless it is the defence version that the appellant had no concern with the occurrence, however, neither any effort was made for changing the investigation nor findings of the Investigating Officer were challenged before any higher forum. Moreover, the appellant was having sufficient time to prove his innocence both during the process of investigation and during the course of trial nobody came forward in support of his version.

20. We also find much weight in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the complainant was deprived from his young lad, who was done to death in a brutal way without any fault at his end, therefore, when no previous ill-will/enmity had been alleged against the complainant, there was no reason for him to have substituted the appellant in place of real culprits.

21. After having scrutinized the prosecution case on the touchstone of evidence available on record as well as arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that the prosecution through leading cogent and confidence inspiring evidence in the shape of complainant duly supplemented Saeed Ullah Khan (PW-7), who remained affirm qua involvement of the appellant in the instant case finding full corroboration from medical evidence, the factum of recovery of dead body and other articles belonging to the deceased son of the complainant and the fact that during the course of investigation he was found guilty we have been persuaded to hold that the prosecution proved its case against the appellant to the hilt. The reasons advanced by learned trial court are also very cogent and we find no infirmity in the judgment of the learned trial court impugned by the appellant compelling this Court to take contrary view, therefore, the appeal preferred by the appellant is DISMISSED IN TOTO. Resultantly, the judgment of the learned trial court dated 27.07.2009 is MAINTAINED. HBT/Q-3/L Appeal dismisse